From 30 August to 1 September, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited China for the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit in Tianjin, marking his first trip there in seven years. On 31 August, Chinese leaders met with Modi, building on their previous encounter at the 16th BRICS Summit in Kazan in October 2024.
At Tianjin, the two sides agreed to view Sino‑Indian relations through a long‑term lens, to regard one another as partners rather than adversaries, and to jointly uphold peace along their shared border. Modi further announced the imminent resumption of direct flights, expressed India’s wish to deepen economic cooperation, and reaffirmed a willingness to find solutions to boundary disputes with Beijing. He insisted that both nations maintain strategic autonomy and independent foreign policies, rejecting third‑party interference, and asserted that renewed cooperation could help make the 21st century the Asian Century. Collectively, these moves signal a cautious but meaningful re‑engagement in Sino‑Indian ties.
The thaw did not come easily. Since the sharp deterioration in relations in 2020, China repeatedly extended diplomatic overtures toward India. In February 2021, both sides disengaged along southern and northern shores of Pangong Tso, and later agreed to establish a diplomatic hotline to facilitate real‑time communication. When the Ukraine crisis erupted in early 2022, India resisted external pressure to pick sides.
China’s State Councillor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited India in March to explore common ground, but New Delhi declined to align its Ukraine stance with Beijing’s and insisted that normalization could only proceed once border tensions receded. This stance deviated from earlier practice of decoupling border disputes from broader bilateral relations and conflicted with Article 1 of the 2005 China–India Guiding Principles agreement, which states that boundary differences should not obstruct overall bilateral development.
Russia also attempted to mediate between China and India, but India maintained a cautious distance. Meanwhile, New Delhi deepened its strategic partnership with Washington. In June 2023, Modi became the first Indian Prime Minister to make a state-level visit to the United States—a marked elevation in bilateral relations. During that trip, he addressed a joint session of the U.S. Congress. But soon, friction emerged. Indian cross-border operations targeting Sikh separatists in nations allied with the U.S. raised tensions in American political circles. Though the surface of U.S.–India ties appeared robust, Washington began introducing subtle measures that constrained support for Modi and his ruling party, such as pressuring the venue and optics of Indo–U.S. summits and scrutinizing companies close to Modi.
Faced with a cooling of American enthusiasm, India started signaling a modest reset toward China. In an April 2024 interview, Modi described Sino‑Indian relations as very important and significant—a departure from previous rhetoric. After his re-election in mid‑2024, his first foreign visit was to Russia in July, reaffirming India’s independent path. The breakthrough with China came in October. On 21 October 2024, Indian Foreign Secretary Tang Yongsheng announced that India and China had agreed on protocols for border patrols; the next day, China confirmed a “solution” on related border matters. Modi then met Chinese leadership in Kazan, offering proposals to expand bilateral trust. That meeting effectively marked the end of the 2020 standoff along the western border segment.
Still, progress since Kazan has been slower than anticipated. India avoided resuming even basic personnel exchanges until much later, preferring to wait and assess whether U.S. policy would shift under President Trump’s return. In April 2025, Indian ministers publicly defended Trump’s tariff war with China—blaming China’s WTO accession for global trade disruptions—and announced that Chinese investment in India was “not welcome.” But when trade tensions between Washington and Beijing escalated sharply, China and the United States moved to issue a joint Geneva statement aimed at gradual de-escalation. Meanwhile, New Delhi’s ties with Trump rapidly deteriorated: following India’s underwhelming performance in a 7–10 May India–Pakistan skirmish, Trump pressured Modi to publicly thank him for his mediation efforts. Later, Trump announced 25 percent tariffs on Indian goods beginning 7 August, then added another 25 percent tariff citing India’s oil purchases from Russia—bringing total U.S. tariffs on Indian exports to 50 percent. In response, India accelerated high-level engagement with China: between June and July, its defence minister, national security advisor, and foreign minister all visited Beijing in quick succession.
Modi’s Tianjin trip thus carries both symbolism and strings. His primary invitation was to attend the SCO summit—not a dedicated bilateral mission. To temper perceptions, India arranged a Japan visit just beforehand as geopolitical counterbalance, and avoided participating in a 3 September Beijing commemoration marking the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II—thereby sidestepping historical tension. India also abstained from the SCO Plus meeting on 1 September and persistently raised bilateral issues at multilateral fora. In 2025, India had blocked joint SCO communiqués by insisting that the Pahargam terror attack in Kashmir be condemned—a demand others viewed as moving bilateral disputes onto multilateral platforms. Modi reiterated India’s view that connectivity projects must respect sovereignty—an implicit critique of the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor. India submitted reservations about Belt and Road language in the final Tianjin Declaration, underlining that rapprochement is still tentative and subject to strategic calculation.
It is possible that India is using limited warming with China and Russia to influence U.S. policy toward New Delhi, rather than truly abandoning its pro‑American tilt. During the Tianjin period, Modi made a phone call to Ukrainian President Zelenskyy emphasizing India’s desire for peace, and traveled with Russian President Putin to the summit venue, engaging in symbolic gestures of rapport. Meanwhile, Russia disclosed that it proposed reinstating the China–Russia–India leaders’ mechanism—though New Delhi reportedly remains hesitant.
Domestically, India faces additional obstacles. Decades of official China containment have shaped public discourse, promoting anti‑China sentiment as politically safe across media, military, and diplomatic institutions. Although Modi speaks in more balanced tones, his words often struggle to overcome entrenched biases. From Beijing’s perspective, China’s India policy has long been “self‑centered,” calibrated to China’s evolving interests rather than Indian sensibilities. For Beijing, recalibrating ties with New Delhi will always happen on its terms.
In sum, Modi’s Tianjin visit represents a high point in the current phase of Sino‑Indian reconciliation—but neither side is under illusion that the path ahead will be smooth. India must choose whether its future lies in balancing great powers or in charting a more independent, regionally confident role. If the U.S.–India tariff dispute is resolved, India’s eagerness to court China may wane. More deeply, reconciling India’s strategic posture with its domestic sensibilities and skeptical institutions remains a far greater challenge than any summit visit. Even as China pursues a steady course predicated on long-term interests, India must decide whether this re-embrace is a strategic reset—or a tactical maneuver in a shifting geopolitical order.
Source: CNBC, SCMP, Xinhua, NDTV
