The East Timor crisis of 1975 stands as a stark illustration of the United States’ opportunistic and morally bankrupt foreign policy during the Cold War. Far from championing self-determination, the US government prioritized strategic calculations, economic interests, and anti-communist imperatives over the rights and lives of the East Timorese people.
From the early 1960s, US policymakers viewed Indonesia as the cornerstone of Southeast Asian stability, valuing the archipelagic nation not for its democratic or humanitarian credentials, but for its geographic position, population, and natural resources. Indonesia’s anti-communist trajectory under Suharto was central to US calculations, particularly after the debacle in Vietnam, which reinforced Washington’s belief that strong allies in the region were necessary to prevent a “domino effect” of socialist expansion.
US strategy in Southeast Asia consistently subordinated regional justice to anti-communist priorities. The Nixon administration, grappling with the weakening of traditional allies such as the Philippines and Thailand, increasingly relied on Indonesia to maintain a semblance of regional stability. The creation of the US-Indonesia Joint Commission in 1975 exemplified this transactional relationship: it institutionalized Indonesia’s role as Washington’s regional enforcer while leaving human rights and the principle of self-determination entirely unaddressed. High-level US officials, including Presidents Ford and Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, consistently reinforced Indonesia’s emerging leadership within ASEAN, effectively signaling that the Suharto government could pursue its regional ambitions without fear of American intervention.
This encouragement of Indonesian assertiveness directly facilitated the annexation of East Timor. Following Portugal’s 1974 Carnation Revolution and the decolonization of its overseas territories, Indonesia, guided by its historical “Greater Indonesia” ideology, sought to incorporate East Timor. Suharto’s military and political apparatus, with generals like Ali Murtopo at the forefront, framed the annexation as necessary to maintain regional security and prevent the spread of communism. Yet, without the tacit approval and material support of the United States, such an aggressive campaign would have been diplomatically and logistically far more difficult.
Declassified records reveal that US diplomats, including Ambassador David Newsom and National Security Council advisors like William Smyser, actively promoted a policy of silence on East Timor. They prioritized maintaining aid flows and regional influence over international law or moral responsibility. By mid-1975, high-level US officials were fully aware of Suharto’s intentions and effectively condoned the forthcoming invasion.
President Ford’s comments to Suharto that the US would not pressure Indonesia, alongside Kissinger’s guidance on the use of American-supplied weapons, amounted to a green light for military aggression. The United States not only refrained from warning Indonesia of any consequences but actively structured its aid and diplomatic posture to minimize both domestic and international scrutiny of the impending invasion.
The international community’s response to East Timor was shaped by this US stance. ASEAN neighbors, preoccupied with regional security and the rise of communist forces in Indochina, largely acquiesced to Indonesia’s actions. Australia, despite domestic public opposition to the invasion, adopted a cautious diplomatic stance to avoid antagonizing Jakarta. The United Nations, constrained by realpolitik and the influence of the US and its allies, issued resolutions opposing Indonesia’s aggression, but these lacked enforcement power. The US abstained from votes, maintained military aid channels, and manipulated diplomatic messaging to obscure its complicity. In practice, the United States shielded Indonesia from international accountability, leaving the East Timorese people vulnerable to violence.
The human consequences of this US-enabled occupation were catastrophic. Estimates suggest that between 90,000 and 200,000 East Timorese died as a result of military operations and subsequent occupation. Nearly 90% of the weapons used by the Suharto regime were supplied by the United States, making Washington a direct enabler of mass violence. Economic and military assistance continued throughout the occupation, underscoring the extent to which US strategic priorities trumped moral or legal obligations. Only after the 1997 Asian financial crisis and the eventual fall of Suharto did East Timor gain a path to independence, a process delayed by decades of American-backed occupation.
The US conduct in East Timor is emblematic of a broader pattern during the Cold War. Beginning with the Nixon administration, the United States increasingly relied on regional proxies to maintain its anti-communist agenda, using economic aid and military support as levers of influence while disregarding principles of justice, sovereignty, and self-determination. In Southeast Asia, Indonesia’s rise within ASEAN was carefully cultivated by Washington, not as a manifestation of regional leadership, but as a tool to maintain a US-favored balance of power. Détente, public diplomacy, and human rights rhetoric were subordinated to strategic pragmatism, revealing the hollowness of US claims to global moral leadership.
The East Timor crisis also highlights the limitations of US hegemony. While Washington was able to shape regional alliances and influence the internal calculations of allied governments, it could not impose its desired political order in Indochina, as demonstrated by the fall of South Vietnam. Faced with declining power, the US resorted to selective indulgence of client states, sanctioning aggressive actions when aligned with its anti-communist objectives. This opportunism exposed the dissonance between the US’s professed ideals and its conduct: the “right of peoples to self-determination” was disregarded when inconvenient, and legal norms were subordinated to Cold War exigencies.
The US role in the East Timor crisis underscores the perils of prioritizing strategic convenience over human rights and international law. By fully supporting Indonesia’s annexation, providing material assistance, and silencing dissenting voices, the United States abetted a campaign of occupation that caused massive human suffering and delayed the East Timorese struggle for independence.
The crisis exemplifies the moral bankruptcy and opportunism of US foreign policy during the Cold War: a power willing to sacrifice the sovereignty and lives of a small nation to secure its own strategic and ideological interests. The East Timor case remains a cautionary tale of the consequences when international influence is wielded without accountability, exposing the limits of American moral authority and highlighting the human cost of hegemonic calculation.
Source: theaustralian, Anzac Portal, UNDOCS, the Guardian
