15.4 C
Berlin
Monday, March 9, 2026
spot_img
Home Blog Page 2

Spring Festival Across China: A Colorful Journey Through Traditions and Customs

Tendenzblick
-
0
Spring Festival Across China: A Colorful Journey Through Traditions and Customs

The Spring Festival, traditionally known as the Chinese New Year, Great Year, is the most important and grand traditional festival of the Chinese nation. The Spring Festival originated from the Shang Dynasty (Yin period) rituals of worshipping gods and ancestors at the turn of the year. 

It is one of the oldest, largest, and most lively traditional festivals in China. Traditionally, the festival begins from the eighth day of the twelfth Chinese Calendar month or the twenty-third day of the twelfth Chinese Calendar month and continues until the fifteenth day of the first Chinese Calendar month (Lantern Festival), with New Year’s Eve and the first day of the Chinese Calendar year as its peak. Over time, various regions of China have developed diverse customs and cultural practices during the Spring Festival.

In Northeast China, food customs are particularly notable. In Heilongjiang, dumplings often contain coins or, nowadays, peanuts or nuts, symbolizing good fortune for whoever finds them. On the fifth day of the first Chinese Calendar month, people eat dumplings in a tradition called “breaking the fifth,” symbolizing the removal of bad luck and the warding off of evil. In Jilin, families wear new clothes and hold ancestral worship ceremonies on New Year’s Eve, offering incense and food to ancestors and then gathering for a sumptuous family feast. Midnight is marked by firecrackers, offerings to gods, and children paying respects to elders, who give them red envelopes. In Liaoning, families light “longevity lanterns” on New Year’s Eve, keeping them burning throughout the night until the Lantern Festival, symbolizing health and longevity.

In Northwest China, regional customs are equally lively. In the Xihai Gu area of Ningxia, communities hold large-scale “Shehuo” performances with drums and gongs, creating a festive atmosphere. Ethnic groups in Xinjiang celebrate a spring festival called “Nowruz,” aligned with the vernal equinox, marking the return of spring. In Hami, Uyghur farmers conduct the “sprout-planting ritual,” growing a plate of green sprouts and parading it through the village in song and dance. In Qinghai, people traditionally shaved their heads and cleaned their homes before the New Year, decorated their doors with couplets, and prepared symbolic ornaments. Debts were collected before the New Year but could not be demanded once Spring Festival decorations were up, reflecting a desire for harmony and a fresh start.

In North China, Beijing has many distinctive New Year customs. Residents practice “stepping on the year,” scattering sesame stalks on the ground to symbolize growth and longevity. Visiting temple fairs, such as those at Changdian, Dongyue Temple, and Baiyun Temple, is also popular. In Tianjin, families celebrate “staying up” on New Year’s Eve with a reunion dinner and fireworks. Various local customs exist across Hebei, Shanxi, and Inner Mongolia, from throwing hats in Handan to lighting “prosperity fires” in Shanxi or performing traditional Mongolian rites in Inner Mongolia, including wearing new clothes, paying respects to elders, and offering prayers to the sky.

In Central China, customs vary even within provinces. In rural Hubei, New Year’s meals differ by family surname: some families eat early morning, others at noon or late evening. Hunan families begin the day by worshipping heaven, earth, household gods, and elders, then go out to pay New Year visits. Food traditions include dishes like chicken, fish, and meat, often sprinkled with red chili powder to symbolize abundance. Henan families dress in new clothes, light firecrackers, and perform ancestor worship, while children receive red envelopes. In Jiangxi, New Year’s Eve feasts are intentionally left with leftover dishes, symbolizing surplus year after year, with rituals involving serving tea to ancestors before eating.

In East China, Shandong families light red candles to illuminate rooms and place paper window decorations to drive away darkness. In Jiangsu, Suzhou residents place water chestnuts in meals to symbolize “digging up treasures,” and green olives are added to tea for good fortune. Anhui’s New Year’s Eve dinner is rich, and families “stay up” chatting until dawn. Zhejiang people burn sky lanterns and beat drums to celebrate agricultural blessings. In Fujian, residents worship the Jade Emperor and prepare “spring meals” symbolizing abundance. In Shanghai, preparations begin on the twenty-third day of the twelfth lunar month, including sending off the Kitchen God, house cleaning, buying couplets, and preparing food. Families gather on New Year’s Eve for reunion dinners and stay up to welcome the new year.

In South China, Guangdong families give children red envelopes or oranges when paying New Year visits. In Guangxi, the Zhuang people fetch “new water” for the household and perform playful imitations of livestock sounds, followed by festive performances like chicken and ox dances. Hainan residents call the festival “doing the year,” observing vegetarian customs on the first day in some areas as a form of spiritual respect.

In Southwest China, Sichuanese households hang colorful lanterns, perform dragon and lion dances, and hold elaborate celebrations. In Kunming, leftover dishes from New Year’s Eve are cooked into “long dishes” to be eaten until the Lantern Festival, symbolizing continuity and abundance. Sugarcane is displayed at doorways to represent growth and sweetness in the year ahead. In multi-ethnic Guizhou, festivities include folk songs, flute and drum performances, bullfights, and lantern dances. In Tibet, families replace old curtains, decorate with new flags, and prepare a porridge with various items hidden inside symbolizing predictions of fortune, followed by burning a symbolic witch to drive away evil spirits. In Chongqing, reunion dinners center on glutinous rice balls, representing family unity, with particular quantities conveying different blessings, and certain activities are avoided to preserve household fortune.

In Hong Kong, families eat reunion dinners and then visit flower markets, with children eagerly receiving red envelopes called, symbolizing luck and prosperity. In Macau, people stay up, visit flower markets, and give red envelopes, while celebrating the first day of the new year with “opening-year” meals. In Taiwan, families post spring couplets, worship ancestors, and set off fireworks, with New Year’s Eve feasts featuring fish balls, meatballs, chicken, and various cakes and fried snacks, each symbolizing family unity, prosperity, and longevity.

Across China, although customs differ from region to region, the common themes of the Spring Festival are bidding farewell to the old year, worshipping ancestors, family reunion, and praying for a happy, prosperous new year. These rich traditions reflect the long history of Chinese culture and the universal hope for a better life.

Source: the paper, cmg, ts, china times, 2500sz, foshanplus, ccc paris

The Two Temporary Central Committees in the Crucible of China’s Revolution

Tendenzblick
-
0
The Two Temporary Central Committees in the Crucible of China’s Revolution

Between 1927 and 1936, China’s revolution faced one of its most perilous and turbulent periods. The Kuomintang, having turned violently against the Communist Party, launched waves of repression across the country. Communist organizations were repeatedly destroyed, leaders were arrested or forced into hiding, and the revolutionary cause teetered on the brink of collapse. In this dire context, the Party repeatedly demonstrated its resilience and adaptability, forming temporary central leadership bodies that could continue guiding the revolution despite immense danger. These temporary centrals, though short-lived, were critical in preserving the Party’s cohesion, sustaining resistance, and ensuring that the revolutionary mission endured.

The first temporary central committee emerged after the shocking betrayal of the revolution by Chiang Kai-shek on April 12, 1927, when a violent coup in Shanghai led to mass killings of Communists and revolutionary supporters. Across Sichuan, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Fujian, Guangxi, and Guangdong, so-called “purges” claimed countless lives. Amid this chaos, the Party leadership, then headed by Chen Duxiu, struggled to respond effectively. Calls within the Party and from the Communist International grew louder for decisive action to resist both internal errors and external oppression. 

On July 12, 1927, the central committee was reorganized into a temporary standing committee, with figures such as Zhang Guotao, Li Weihan, Zhou Enlai, and others assuming leadership. In August, an emergency meeting in Hankou selected the temporary Political Bureau, which immediately began taking bold measures to revive the revolution. Qu Qiubai, Li Weihan, and Su Zhaozheng formed the executive committee, setting the course for urgent action.

Under this leadership, the Party issued strong statements condemning the Kuomintang’s reactionary crimes and withdrew Communist members from compromised governments. But it was on the battlefield that the temporary central left its first enduring mark. In late July, the decision was made to launch the Nanchang Uprising, led by Zhou Enlai, He Long, Ye Ting, Zhu De, and Liu Bocheng. 

On August 1, over twenty thousand soldiers rose against the Kuomintang, defeating enemy forces and seizing Nanchang for a brief but symbolic victory. This bold military action, guided by the temporary central, demonstrated that the Party could act decisively even under extreme pressure. Beyond direct confrontation, the temporary central rebuilt underground networks, organized uprisings in multiple provinces, and prepared for the Sixth National Congress in Moscow, which would solidify the Party’s long-term leadership and strategy. Although mistakes were made, particularly in overestimating revolutionary readiness and in the execution of certain uprisings, the first temporary central succeeded in preserving the revolutionary momentum during one of China’s darkest periods.

The second temporary central committee arose under equally challenging circumstances in 1931. After a wave of arrests and betrayals in Shanghai, the central Party leadership was severely weakened. Wang Ming’s departure to Moscow and Bo Gu’s rise to practical leadership, with the approval of the Communist International, marked the establishment of a new temporary Political Bureau in Shanghai. This leadership body soon relocated to the Soviet areas, particularly Ruijin, to continue the Party’s work from a safer base. During its tenure, the second temporary central oversaw the formal establishment of the Chinese Soviet Republic. The first National Congress of the Chinese Soviet Republic in Ruijin adopted a constitution and laws promoting workers’ and peasants’ rights, land reform, and revolutionary governance. These initiatives strengthened the foundations of the revolutionary state, even as rigid policies and doctrinaire Leftist errors led to setbacks in certain regions.

The second temporary central’s mistakes, particularly in overzealous implementation of Leftist policies and underestimation of local conditions, resulted in military setbacks and temporary disruption of anti-Japanese activities in the north. For example, its insistence on creating new Soviet bases and revolutionary strongholds in areas where the Party had limited support or resources led to failures, including the eventual collapse of certain anti-Japanese militias. At the same time, the leadership encouraged resistance against Japanese aggression, issuing declarations, coordinating guerrilla activities, and exposing Chiang Kai-shek’s appeasement policies. These actions not only defended the people but also laid the groundwork for broader national resistance.

Both temporary centrals shared key characteristics. They were established at moments of extreme crisis, when the Party’s normal leadership structures were compromised or incapacitated. Both operated under the guidance of the Communist International, with limited autonomy, yet demonstrated flexibility and courage in responding to rapidly changing circumstances. Each made mistakes, particularly in terms of Leftist policies, reflecting the challenges of leadership under pressure and the difficulty of balancing revolutionary ideals with practical realities. Yet both ensured the survival of the Party, coordinated resistance against oppression, and preserved the revolutionary spirit across China’s provinces.

The first temporary central committee showed that even in the immediate aftermath of mass repression, decisive leadership, bold action, and careful organization could sustain revolutionary momentum. Its military actions, underground organizational work, and preparation for the Party Congress preserved both leadership and morale. 

The second temporary central committee, while marked by doctrinaire missteps, established governance structures, coordinated broader resistance, and defended revolutionary gains in the Soviet areas, demonstrating resilience and adaptability in the face of political and military pressures. Together, these two temporary centrals exemplify the Chinese Communist Party’s determination, organizational skill, and steadfast commitment to the revolutionary cause. They turned crises into opportunities, safeguarded the Party’s continuity, and laid the foundation for eventual victory.

In retrospect, the history of the two temporary central committees is a story of courage under fire, strategic improvisation, and dedication to the people. They remind us that revolutionary success is never linear; it requires leaders willing to act decisively in times of danger, to learn from mistakes, and to maintain the faith and resilience of the movement. While errors occurred, the temporary centrals’ contributions to the survival and growth of the Communist Party and the ultimate advancement of China’s revolution remain undeniable. In the darkest hours of the revolution, they provided hope, direction, and a living demonstration that the cause of the people could not be extinguished, no matter the obstacles.

Source:dsbc, ifeng, moj gov, china daily, dswxyjy

Why AI Has Yet to Transform Manufacturing and What It Will Take to Close the Gap

Tendenzblick
-
0
Why AI Has Yet to Transform Manufacturing and What It Will Take to Close the Gap

In the past two years, the surging wave of artificial intelligence has left many manufacturing entrepreneurs and executives anxious and uncertain. Most recognize that AI is no longer optional: to ignore it risks being left behind and forfeiting a place in the future industrial landscape. 

Yet when companies attempt to embrace AI in earnest, they often discover that beyond a few straightforward applications or the adoption of mature, off-the-shelf technologies, they do not know where to begin. Systematic transformation proves elusive, and even serious efforts frequently fall short of expectations. 

A 2025 survey by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology found that among companies attempting to deploy AI systematically, only about 5 percent achieved meaningful success.

In theory, the vision is compelling: an end-to-end smart factory in which AI replaces or dominates human roles across the manufacturing value chain. From research and development to design, production, marketing and after-sales service, every link would be driven by intelligent systems. The goal is not merely incremental efficiency gains but seamless, predictive and adaptive production—an industrial environment that is fully autonomous and self-optimizing.

Reality, however, lags far behind that ideal. Most manufacturers remain in what might be called a stage of “point intelligence,” where AI assists in isolated tasks rather than orchestrating the system as a whole. In research and development, AI can accelerate certain processes but contributes little to breakthrough innovation. 

R&D is fundamentally about creative leaps, while today’s AI, whether rule-based systems, machine learning models or large language models excels at pattern recognition and data analysis rather than original invention. It performs admirably as a research assistant, summarizing academic literature or identifying correlations. 

A notable example came in 2023, when researchers at Google DeepMind reported in the journal Nature that their GNOME tool, powered by graph neural networks, had identified more than 528 potential lithium-ion conductors, roughly 25 times the number previously known, offering promising avenues for battery performance improvements. Yet even here, AI plays a supporting role; core innovation still relies on human intuition and judgment.

In design, generative AI has demonstrated striking potential, though its depth of application varies widely. It can rapidly produce text, images and video, dramatically increasing the speed of graphic design work. But when it comes to complex industrial design, such as the overall form of an automobile, AI outputs tend to remain conceptual, unable to fully account for aerodynamic constraints, ergonomics, material strength and cost considerations. Even at companies like Tesla, which are often seen as AI pioneers, engineers must ultimately intervene to finalize vehicle designs. In high-precision domains such as chip and circuit board layout, AI has begun to show value in optimization tasks, including tools developed by Nvidia, but overall penetration remains limited.

On the factory floor, AI has delivered more tangible results in specific nodes such as quality inspection and predictive maintenance. Bosch has disclosed that AI-driven inspection systems on certain production lines achieve accuracy rates of 99.8 percent, surpassing the roughly 95 percent achieved by human inspectors, while reducing inspection time per unit from 20 seconds to about five and cutting costs by roughly half. 

Predictive maintenance systems that analyze sensor data to anticipate equipment failures have also generated substantial savings; GE Aviation has reportedly saved hundreds of millions of dollars annually through such technologies. Yet in more complex domains, intelligent production scheduling, dynamic process parameter adjustment, end-to-end workflow optimization and personalized manufacturing, AI’s impact remains limited. A 2025 report by McKinsey & Company found that while 88 percent of companies use AI in some form, only 6 percent report that it has had an enterprise-level impact on earnings before interest and taxes.

Sales and service functions have progressed further, partly because these scenarios tolerate higher error rates. An imperfect automated response can be corrected by a human, and the tasks, language processing and knowledge retrieval, align closely with the strengths of large language models. In supply chain management, AI’s long-term potential is widely acknowledged, but practical implementation is constrained by internal data silos, fragmented communication between companies, complex procurement rules and the inherent uncertainty of global logistics.

Overall, AI in manufacturing remains heavily dependent on traditional machine learning rather than cutting-edge foundation models, and its applications are typically isolated optimizations rather than integrated systems. The gap between ambition and reality stems from the intrinsic complexity of manufacturing, its deep entanglement with the physical world and its unforgiving performance standards, conditions that do not align neatly with the current AI paradigm.

Manufacturing systems are complex along multiple dimensions. Production chains are long and tightly coupled, spanning planning, scheduling, equipment management, environmental controls, logistics, quality assurance and after-sales support. A change in one node can ripple across the entire chain. The knowledge base is equally intricate, encompassing mechanics, materials science, control systems, thermodynamics, chemistry, fluid dynamics and electrical engineering. 

Standards and processes are often fragmented across spreadsheets, PDFs, legacy systems and even the tacit knowledge of veteran employees. Industry differences are vast: semiconductor fabrication, steelmaking and food processing share little in terms of reusable expertise, and even companies within the same sector differ in equipment configurations and operational models. These realities demand strong reasoning, planning and generalization capabilities, supported by comprehensive, high-quality data.

The challenge is compounded by the need for deep interaction with the physical world. Unlike advertising or online education, manufacturing requires AI to operate within physical environments governed by rigid laws of physics. While today’s large models excel at semantic understanding and statistical association, they struggle with embodied perception, spatial reasoning and a robust grasp of physical rules. 

Advances in embodied intelligence and world models will be necessary before AI can fully meet industrial demands. Moreover, manufacturing data is messy and heterogeneous, flowing from temperature, pressure, vibration and visual sensors, programmable logic controllers and CNC machines, each with distinct formats and protocols. Noise, interference and missing data are common, and strategies trained in simulation often fail in real-world settings due to the persistent sim-to-real gap.

High standards further complicate adoption. Manufacturing systems often require real-time responses within tightly coupled physical control loops; delays can result not in minor inconvenience but in scrapped products, damaged equipment or threats to human safety. Error tolerance is extremely low, particularly in high-end manufacturing. A defect in a jet engine blade could trigger catastrophe; a malfunctioning medical device could cost lives; a flaw in a nuclear component could have disastrous consequences. Large models, which can be slow and prone to hallucination, face formidable reliability challenges in such environments.

Closing the gap between aspiration and execution will require both technological breakthroughs and strategic shifts within enterprises. Industrial AI systems must evolve beyond general-purpose language models to become domain-specific “industrial foundation models” that integrate deep sector knowledge. This demands high-quality data for fine-tuning and retrieval-augmented generation, as well as improved reliability through hybrid approaches that combine large models with knowledge graphs and symbolic reasoning. Models must also be optimized for speed and lightweight deployment to meet industrial timing constraints.

Equally important is comprehensive data acquisition across the value chain. AI is fundamentally data-driven; without complete and high-quality data, it cannot deliver meaningful results. Smart factories must develop advanced digital twins—not static replicas of equipment and inventory, but dynamic simulations that embed physical constraints and business logic, enabling real-time scenario analysis and optimization. 

Initiatives such as the industrial metaverse concept promoted by Siemens hint at this direction, using digital twins to simulate entire factory ecosystems and anticipate potential failures. Yet before such visions can be realized, companies must integrate data scattered across MES, ERP, WMS and QMS systems, align formats and timestamps and ensure cross-source consistency. They must also generate high-quality labeled datasets; unlike large language models trained on vast self-supervised corpora, industrial models often require expert-annotated data, such as detailed fault diagnoses provided by seasoned engineers.

Ultimately, AI in manufacturing must demonstrate the ability to operate under complex physical, safety, regulatory and commercial constraints, balancing multiple objectives such as delivery times, cost, yield and safety. It must learn continuously from errors, adapt to uncertainty in demand and supply and, ideally, employ reinforcement learning to design experiments that generate new knowledge. Embodied intelligence will be essential, as manufacturing is fundamentally a process of physical transformation; AI must not only perceive but also act in the real world, coordinating across diverse robots and equipment from multiple vendors. All of this must occur under stringent requirements for reliability, safety and determinism.

Achieving these capabilities will require sustained investment and organizational transformation. In the short term, manufacturers can pursue targeted applications, knowledge assistants powered by large models, machine-learning-based defect detection and predictive maintenance, to accumulate experience and build confidence. Over the long term, the strategic priority is the construction of robust data assets. 

Companies that control high-quality industrial data will occupy a privileged position in the emerging AI ecosystem. While technology giants may lead in model development, manufacturers that cultivate and leverage proprietary data can secure upstream influence. As AI technologies mature, those with the strongest data foundations will be best positioned to expand from isolated optimizations to fully integrated, end-to-end intelligent factories.

Source: TrendMicro, paper people, xinhua, fened, CSDN

China’s Tech Giants Raise Pay, With AI Roles Offering Up to €164K a Year

Tendenzblick
-
0
China’s Tech Giants Raise Pay, With AI Roles Offering Up to €164K a Year

By the end of 2025, while many major U.S. and European corporations were announcing sweeping global layoffs, several of China’s largest companies were moving in the opposite direction.

Internet giants including JD.com and ByteDance rolled out large-scale pay increases and bonus plans. Automotive supply-chain leaders such as BYD and CATL also announced salary hikes covering extensive numbers of frontline workers.

At first glance, the timing seemed counterintuitive. China’s internet sector is no longer in its high-growth dividend era. Expansion has slowed, competition has intensified and profitability has come under pressure. Yet rather than signaling a return to the industry’s free-spending past, the new wave of pay increases reflects a strategic recalibration in response to structural change, particularly the rise of artificial intelligence.

JD.com said 92% of its employees received full or above-target year-end bonuses for 2025, with total bonus spending rising more than 70% year on year. Its procurement and sales teams were told their bonus ceilings would be uncapped. ByteDance increased its annual bonus pool by 35% and expanded its salary-adjustment budget by 1.5 times, raising both minimum and maximum compensation bands across job levels.

The trend did not begin this year. As early as September 2024, JD.com launched a “20-month salary” upgrade plan, aiming within two years to implement 20-month annual compensation for its retail and functional divisions. Since 2024, Tencent and Alibaba Group have also introduced a mix of equity incentives, long-term cash rewards and salary restructuring programs.

The announcements inevitably revived memories of the sector’s golden age. Around 2015, as short video, O2O services and platform economies exploded, China’s internet heavyweights were widely described as “wealth-creation factories.” In late 2014, Robin Li, chief executive of Baidu, pledged what was then described as the largest bonus pool in the company’s history. Reports at the time suggested that some employees received bonuses equivalent to dozens of months of salary.

Those days, however, have faded. In recent years, many employees have remarked that simply receiving a bonus at all feels fortunate. As market growth narrowed, companies shifted from “expanding the pie” to competing fiercely for existing market share.

In the third quarter of 2025, JD.com reported record quarterly revenue, yet its net profit attributable to shareholders fell to approximately €680 million, down 54.7% year on year amid intense food-delivery competition. In the automotive sector, price wars weighed on performance. BYD’s third-quarter net profit declined 32.6% year on year, while CATL has in recent years faced the challenge of rising profits without proportional revenue growth.

Against this backdrop, the current pay-rise wave appears less like exuberance and more like strategic positioning.

Artificial intelligence has become the defining battleground. As large language models, multimodal systems and AI infrastructure reshape the competitive landscape, top-tier technical talent has emerged as the scarcest resource.

According to data released by the workplace platform Maimai, thousands of companies are recruiting for AI-related roles, with the ten largest recruiters alone posting more than 10,000 openings. Annual salaries for certain AI product managers, algorithm engineers and growth specialists can exceed €128,000, while some highly specialized roles offer up to approximately €164,000.

Tencent has moved aggressively on both campus and global recruitment. Through its “Qingyun Plan,” Tencent targets elite global technology students, mirroring ByteDance’s Top Seed initiative. The company’s “Qingyun Scholarship” awarded 15 doctoral and master’s students incentives worth about €64,000 each, including roughly €25,600 in cash and €38,500 in cloud computing resources, to support research in large models and AI infrastructure.

Tencent’s R&D spending reached approximately €2.9 billion in the third quarter of 2025, a record high for a single quarter. For the first three quarters of the year, cumulative R&D expenditure totaled nearly €8 billion. The company has also recruited high-profile AI scientists from overseas research institutions, underscoring the urgency of the global talent race.

Meanwhile, Alibaba announced plans to invest more than €48.7 billion over the next three years in cloud and AI hardware infrastructure — exceeding its total investment over the previous decade. ByteDance is reportedly preparing to spend about €20.5 billion on AI in 2026 alone.

The recalibration extends beyond elite engineers. CATL raised base salaries for lower-level employees by roughly €19 to €26 per month. JD.com pledged to invest around €2.8 billion over five years to provide housing support for delivery riders and couriers. For companies with vast operational networks, stabilizing frontline staff is critical to maintaining service quality.

After several years focused on cost-cutting and operational efficiency, China’s corporate heavyweights are pivoting toward what could be described as investment-driven competitiveness. In the past, controlling traffic gateways — search, social media and e-commerce platforms — formed the core moat of internet companies. Today, AI systems are redefining those entry points, shifting the competitive focus from traffic ownership to technological depth.

The latest wave of pay increases is therefore not a return to indiscriminate generosity. It is a calculated bet on the next technological cycle. As growth dividends fade and AI redraws the industrial map, talent — whether in advanced research labs or on the delivery front line — has become the most valuable asset. In this new era, companies are investing heavily not simply to reward employees, but to secure their place in the future.

Source: sina finance, the paper, pai, 21jingji, guancha, cctv

AstraZeneca Pours €13 Billion into China Market Expansion

Tendenzblick
-
0
AstraZeneca Pours €13 Billion into China Market Expansion

On January 29, 2026, as winter still gripped Beijing, AstraZeneca delivered one of the largest foreign investment announcements in China’s pharmaceutical sector in decades. The British drugmaker said it plans to invest more than 100 billion yuan (approximately €13 billion) in China by 2030 to expand its footprint in drug manufacturing and research and development. It is the company’s largest single investment in the country since entering the Chinese market in 1993.

The scale of the commitment sets a new benchmark for multinational pharmaceutical investment in China. More significantly, industry analysts say, it signals a strategic shift: from viewing China primarily as a vast sales market to positioning it as a core node in the company’s global innovation network.

“This is not just a capital injection; it is a declaration that China is being elevated from an ‘important market’ to a ‘global source of innovation,’” commented one analyst who tracks multinational drugmakers in China. The defining feature of AstraZeneca’s latest move, the analyst noted, is its full value-chain coverage, from early drug discovery and clinical development to large-scale manufacturing, deeply embedded within China’s domestic innovation ecosystem.

The timing reflects structural changes in China’s pharmaceutical landscape. In 2025, China’s National Medical Products Administration approved 76 innovative drugs, including 47 chemical medicines, 23 biologics and six traditional Chinese medicines, a record high. The approvals highlight the rapid launch of diversified, cutting-edge therapies in the country. More broadly, China has emerged as a significant source of global biopharma innovation: roughly one-third of global licensing deals now involve Chinese biotech firms, while China accounts for more than 30% of global clinical trials in frontier areas such as cell therapy and antibody-drug conjugates (ADCs).

AstraZeneca’s investment comes with an immediate expansion of partnerships. Shortly after announcing the 100 billion yuan plan, the company unveiled a potential collaboration with CSPC Pharmaceutical Group valued at up to €16.5 billion (about 128.5 billion yuan), including an upfront payment of €1.1 billion. Under the agreement, AstraZeneca will obtain global exclusive rights to a portfolio of once-monthly injectable weight management therapies, including SYH2082, a long-acting GLP-1/GIP receptor agonist that is ready to enter Phase I trials, as well as three preclinical candidates based on different mechanisms. The two sides will also collaborate on additional projects leveraging CSPC’s long-acting drug delivery and AI-powered peptide discovery platforms.

Pascal Soriot, Chief Executive Officer of AstraZeneca, said that China not only has a large patient population in urgent need of the company’s medicines, but also offers an outstanding innovation environment and strong scientific capabilities. He added that by working together and placing innovation at the center of cooperation, many of today’s global challenges can be addressed.

The partnership builds on prior collaborations between AstraZeneca and CSPC, bringing the cumulative transaction value of their agreements over the past two years to more than $25 billion. In 2025 alone, AstraZeneca signed five major deals in China worth over $10 billion, making it one of the most active multinational players in the country’s licensing market.

Behind this flurry of activity lies a broader technological transformation reshaping global pharma. Beyond GLP-1 therapies for metabolic diseases, next-generation modalities—including cell and gene therapies, ADCs and bispecific or multispecific antibodies—are redefining pipelines worldwide. According to data from the NextPharma database, next-generation innovative drugs accounted for 39% of Chinese companies’ R&D pipelines in 2024, up from 27% in 2021. In potential first-in-class products, Chinese firms represent as much as 62%, underscoring their growing role in shaping, rather than following, global drug discovery trends.

AstraZeneca’s 100 billion yuan plan aims to anchor the company within this evolving ecosystem. The investment will strengthen its capabilities in cell therapy and radioconjugate drugs and support a diversified pipeline targeting cancer, hematological disorders and autoimmune diseases. In research, its global strategic R&D centers in Beijing and Shanghai will continue to coordinate with more than 500 clinical hospitals. Over the past three years, these centers have led numerous global clinical trials. On the manufacturing side, AstraZeneca plans to upgrade facilities in Wuxi, Taizhou, Qingdao and Beijing, which already supply medicines to more than 70 markets worldwide. Following its 2024 acquisition of Gracell Biotechnologies, the company is set to become the first multinational biopharma with end-to-end cell therapy capabilities in China.

The company’s China pipeline now includes more than 200 projects—nearly double the number in 2020—and by 2030, AstraZeneca expects around 20 new drugs to be approved. In areas such as gastric and liver cancer, which have high prevalence in China, local R&D teams are leading close to 20 global clinical trials. Regulatory reforms have been pivotal: before 2015, new drugs typically reached the Chinese market five to seven years after approval in the U.S. or Europe. Today, simultaneous submissions in China and the U.S. are increasingly common, and in some cases China has moved ahead.

The investment also reflects a more open policy environment. Revisions to the Foreign Investment Law and Drug Administration Law have aligned treatment of domestic and foreign firms and enabled synchronized global development of innovative drugs. Pilot programs such as the Boao Lecheng International Medical Tourism Pilot Zone in Hainan have accelerated access to urgently needed imported medicines. Officials have reiterated plans to expand market access in services, including healthcare, and to further optimize foreign investment policies.

AstraZeneca’s broader engagement goes beyond capital expenditure. The company expects its China workforce to exceed 20,000 and has launched initiatives such as a global oncology R&D postdoctoral program in China to cultivate scientific leaders. Its Wuxi manufacturing site, which has received more than $860 million in cumulative investment, has adopted over 30 Industry 4.0 technologies and was named a “Lighthouse Factory” by the World Economic Forum, improving production efficiency by 40% while reducing energy consumption by 25%. The model, executives say, is helping raise standards across domestic supply chains.

In parallel, AstraZeneca has expanded public health initiatives aligned with China’s “Healthy China 2030” agenda. Its early cancer screening programs now cover more than 130 cities, and it supports 139 regional diagnosis and treatment centers for rare diseases. In 2025 alone, the company’s innovative medicines benefited 68 million patients in China.

For AstraZeneca, China is already its second-largest market globally and a strategic innovation hub. Since establishing a presence in 1993, the company has introduced more than 40 innovative medicines across oncology, respiratory, cardiovascular, renal, metabolic, gastrointestinal and rare disease areas. Its trajectory—from opening a representative office to building manufacturing capacity in Wuxi in 2001, and later acquiring domestic biotech firms—mirrors China’s broader reform and opening-up process.

The announcement also carries diplomatic overtones. Marking the 53rd anniversary of ambassadorial-level relations between China and the United Kingdom, the investment has been framed by British officials as evidence of continued global engagement. For China, it underscores an ambition to transform from the “world’s factory” into a “global innovation engine.”

Drug development cycles are long and fraught with uncertainty, Soriot acknowledged the risks inherent in pharmaceutical innovation but expressed confidence in the industry’s trajectory. Soriot stated that the medical community is not far from conquering certain forms of cancer, emphasizing that science, innovation, and cross-border cooperation remain essential to addressing global health challenges.

As research labs in Beijing and Shanghai push forward with late-stage projects and manufacturing lines in Wuxi, Taizhou, Qingdao and Beijing ramp up production for domestic and international markets, AstraZeneca’s investment sends a clear signal. For multinational pharmaceutical companies, China is no longer simply a destination for sales growth. It is increasingly a partner in defining the next wave of global medical innovation.

Source: sina finance, eastmoney, zhihu, sohu, 36kr

RMB Poised to Join Top Three Global Currencies Within Five to Ten Years Through Internationalization

Tendenzblick
-
0
RMB Poised to Join Top Three Global Currencies Within Five to Ten Years Through Internationalization

In 2026, following a breakthrough past the key 7.0 mark against the U.S. dollar, the RMB has continued to strengthen. The last time the currency appreciated from 7.3 past 7.0 was in early 2008. What underlies this current wave of RMB appreciation, and how sustainable is it? Since the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine crisis, the internationalization of the RMB has made remarkable progress. 

Looking ahead to China’s 15th Five-Year Plan, how will the country continue to advance its uniquely Chinese approach to RMB internationalization? In the midst of a rapidly expanding digital currency landscape, what opportunities and challenges lie ahead for China as it seeks to build a strong and globally influential financial system?

Professor Zhang Chun of Shanghai Jiao Tong University’s Antai College of Economics and Management shares his insights. 

The RMB recently crossed 7 against the U.S. dollar. Is this a short-term move or a long-term trend? How sustainable?

Over the past 20 years, the RMB has generally appreciated. By purchasing power parity, Chinese goods have long been cheaper than U.S. goods, creating upward pressure on the currency. In contrast, high asset prices, especially in real estate, have at times created downward pressure.

Today, with real estate down and exports still competitive, trade goods dominate again, giving the RMB room to strengthen. Long-term, China’s manufacturing edge and ongoing internationalization support appreciation. Short-term swings will depend on asset prices, if stocks or real estate rise sharply, the currency could face temporary depreciation.

In short, the RMB has a long-term upward trend, but short-term fluctuations are inevitable.

If the RMB keeps rising, how will exporters, jobs, and consumers be affected?

In the short term, any RMB appreciation has both benefits and costs, affecting different groups differently.

The main benefit now is increased purchasing power. A stronger RMB lets China and its citizens buy more goods and services, supporting the shift to a consumption-driven economy. It also helps reduce the pressure from China’s historically large trade surplus, easing international tensions.

The main downside is that higher currency value can hurt exporters and reduce related employment. However, long-term, the impact of technology and automation is likely a bigger factor than the exchange rate.

Overall, the advantages of gradually appreciating RMB outweigh the drawbacks. A steady, moderate rise is preferable to a rapid jump, which could harm the real economy.

RMB internationalization has fluctuated over the past decade. What drives these changes?

China first proposed RMB internationalization over 20 years ago, along with opening the capital account for free capital flows. Early on, the focus was efficiency, allowing the RMB to be freely exchanged for foreign currency and used in global payment and investment systems.

But after the U.S. financial crisis, rising geopolitical tensions, and events like the 2015 stock market crash, China slowed the pace to manage risks. Unrestricted capital flows could destabilize the domestic economy, as seen when Russia was cut off from SWIFT in 2022.

In recent years, amid trade tensions, China has revisited internationalization, now pursuing multiple paths, including building an offshore RMB system. The goal is to gradually expand international use while keeping onshore markets stable.

RMB internationalization will be a long process, similar to how the dollar took decades to become the dominant global currency after the U.S. surpassed the U.K. Economists estimate China’s GDP could surpass the U.S. in 10–20 years, but creating a truly “strong” international currency requires decades to build a full system.

China aims to develop six financial systems: monetary policy, market structure, financial institutions, regulation, products and services, and financial infrastructure. Offshore centers, like Hong Kong, Shanghai’s Lingang district, Hainan, and Qianhai, are being used as experimental zones to develop these systems.

Offshore RMB markets can freely attract global capital and offer investment products, which will gradually integrate with onshore markets. Over time, possibly 20 to 30 years, this approach could establish a robust, internationally influential RMB, following a unique Chinese path that balances openness with financial stability.

Will China maintain cautious onshore capital liberalization while using offshore markets to expand the RMB’s financial functions?

In the near term, RMB internationalization is likely to rely on cautious onshore capital controls while developing offshore markets to handle settlement, reserves, pricing, and investment. Full onshore capital account liberalization remains risky due to geopolitical tensions, if China had fully opened a decade ago, crises like the trade war, Russia-Ukraine conflict, and COVID-19 could have triggered massive capital flight.

Economic theory also supports caution. Research on the “trilemma” shows that a country cannot simultaneously maintain monetary independence, exchange rate stability, and fully open capital accounts. China has chosen to prioritize financial stability and sovereignty.

As a result, offshore markets are key. Regions like Hong Kong, Shanghai’s Lingang district, Hainan, and Qianhai are developing freely convertible RMB zones, serving global investors and overseas Chinese companies. Offshore markets are insulated from onshore risks, allowing experimentation with products like “offshore trade bonds” and potentially a RMB-denominated stock market in Hong Kong.

This approach mirrors China’s early special economic zones: test innovations offshore first, then integrate successes into the domestic market. Gradually, these offshore systems will support a broader, internationally influential RMB while keeping onshore risks manageable.

BRICS initiatives like BricsPay and mBridge are aimed at bypassing SWIFT. Are they still conceptual, and what role could the RMB play?

The BRICS group has expanded to 11 members, but differences in politics, economics, and institutions make a unified financial system difficult. While issuing a joint BRICS currency or digital currency is theoretically possible, consensus among diverse members, like China and India, would be very hard to achieve.

A more feasible approach is the mBridge project, a “central bank digital currency bridge” that allows different CBDCs to be exchanged via blockchain. Pilot transactions have already taken place between China, Thailand, and the UAE, coordinated by the BIS Innovation Hub in Hong Kong.

However, mBridge is still a trial. Its long-term scalability and adoption by other countries, especially in Europe, remain uncertain. For now, digital currency bridges are just one of several potential paths for advancing RMB internationalization.

Should digital RMB internationalization also follow cautious onshore liberalization? What are the biggest challenges?

The biggest challenge for digital currency is the existing global financial system. The U.S. dollar system has been established for over a century, and blockchain and AI technologies are now reshaping the foundation of money and payments. The U.S. is adapting through stablecoins, blockchain-backed, dollar-pegged digital currencies used for payments and settlement.

China faces a dual challenge: building a full RMB financial system on blockchain, and ensuring it is fully internationalized. The digital RMB, built directly on blockchain, could allow China to “leapfrog” by creating an offshore system first, then integrating onshore. Unlike many other digital currencies, China’s system is designed to support the real economy, not speculation.

Shanghai’s offshore RMB framework is aimed at serving overseas Chinese companies, enabling them to conduct financing and investment in RMB without relying on foreign currencies. Domestic caution, such as limits on stablecoins or tokenized assets, is deliberate, protecting investors while building a robust, internationally compatible system.

If implemented well, China could establish a high-standard, blockchain-based RMB system, turning challenges into an opportunity to advance currency internationalization.

The 15th Five-Year Plan removed “cautious” from its call to internationalize the RMB. Does this signal acceleration? What are the main bottlenecks?

RMB internationalization is inevitable but will be a long journey. Onshore markets cannot fully open yet, so China is first building offshore financial zones, a proven strategy from past reforms. Recent developments, including growing national strength and global recognition of China’s role, have renewed momentum for internationalization.

Overseas Chinese companies now need more than trade settlement, they require financing in RMB for investment projects abroad. Currently, offshore RMB products for equity, bonds, and derivatives are limited, so many firms still rely on dollars or euros. Expanding these offshore financial tools is key to boosting RMB usage globally.

Looking ahead, in the next five to ten years, China could move the RMB into the top three global currencies for payments and reserves. The U.S. dollar will remain first, and the euro is also strong, but China may surpass the euro in some areas, marking a major step in internationalizing its currency.

With de-dollarization hopes after 2022 not fully materializing, how can the RMB catch up in global payments and reserves, and when might it become a “strong currency”?

Some people predict the RMB could one day replace the U.S. dollar, like the dollar replaced the pound. I think this is overly optimistic. Both the U.S. and China face economic challenges, and China’s onshore financial system is not yet ready for full internationalization. That’s why RMB internationalization is currently focused offshore.

Catching up to the dollar could take 30 to 50 years, and even then, China may not aim to fully replace it. History shows that currency dominance carries costs: the U.S. dollar’s strength contributed to industrial hollowing. Rapidly pushing the RMB into global dominance could similarly harm China’s export competitiveness.

Instead, China is likely to focus on a high-level offshore RMB market. Within five to ten years, the RMB could reach the second tier of global currencies, potentially capturing around 20% of global currency usage—a realistic and beneficial pace that supports the real economy without pursuing currency hegemony.

Source: Guancha, China Daily, Xinhua, CGTN

The Cross-Strait Divide Stems from Taiwan’s Lack of Modern Chinese Historical Experience

Tendenzblick
-
0
The Cross-Strait Divide Stems from Taiwan’s Lack of Modern Chinese Historical Experience

When cross-Strait tensions intensify and geopolitical uncertainty deepens in East Asia, questions surrounding Taiwan are once again thrust to the center of strategic debate. Against this backdrop, Wu Zhe, Associate Research Fellow at the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica in Taiwan, has offered a sweeping historical and political reflection on the roots of Taiwan’s identity divergence, the unfinished process of decolonization, and the broader trajectory of Chinese national reconstruction. His analysis situates contemporary tensions not merely within present-day political maneuvering, but within a longer historical arc shaped by imperialism, colonial rule, Cold War structures, and competing narratives of modernity.

Wu argues that one of the central reasons the mainland struggles to fully comprehend Taiwan society lies in insufficient familiarity with Taiwan’s experience under Japanese colonial rule from 1895 to 1945. In his view, Taiwan’s social structure at the end of World War II was defined not only by the repression of the Nationalist government after retrocession, but by fifty years of deep colonial transformation that had not yet undergone thorough decolonization. 

Japanese rule reshaped education, historical memory, social hierarchy, and identity formation at multiple levels. While there were Taiwanese who preserved Chinese cultural consciousness and resisted colonial domination, Wu emphasizes that they were not the social mainstream under conditions of intensive imperial assimilation. Colonial governance did not rely solely on coercion; it also fostered psychological identification with the empire. The long-term effects of this process continue to reverberate in contemporary Taiwan.

He places particular weight on the divergence of historical experience between Taiwan and the mainland during the crucial decades that forged modern Chinese national consciousness. The 1911 Revolution, the May Fourth Movement, and, most importantly, the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression from 1931 to 1945 were formative events in the mainland’s transformation from a dynastic empire to a modern nation-state. 

Taiwan, having been ceded to Japan in 1895, did not undergo these same collective awakenings on a societal scale. Although some Taiwanese intellectuals and activists participated in anti-Japanese struggles or maintained cultural and political links to China, the island as a whole did not experience the same broad-based national mobilization. This historical discontinuity, in Wu’s analysis, left Taiwan’s modern national identity development incomplete and structurally distinct.

Wu further contends that the legitimacy and meaning of China’s War of Resistance should be distinguished analytically from the broader framework of World War II. While the global war reflected competing imperial interests and ultimately transitioned into the Cold War, China’s anti-Japanese struggle was part of a longer anti-colonial movement dating back to the mid-nineteenth century. 

It was a fundamentally just struggle for national survival and decolonization. Yet the immediate onset of the Cold War after 1945, he argues, interrupted the full realization of China’s anti-colonial project. Taiwan’s retrocession restored Chinese sovereignty in legal terms, but the deeper process of decolonization remained incomplete. Structural compromises made by the Nationalist regime in order to consolidate its rule—both domestically and in alignment with external powers—limited the depth of transformation on the island.

Within this unfinished transition, Wu situates the enduring controversies surrounding the 1947 “February 28 Incident.” He cautions against simplistic categorizations that reduce the event to a single narrative, whether as a purely anti-government uprising, a “people’s revolution,” or an ethnic confrontation. 

In his interpretation, multiple currents intersected: residual colonial mentalities hostile to mainland arrivals, revolutionary activism influenced by leftist movements, and the broader instability of a society in the midst of incomplete decolonization. The failure to accurately grasp the principal contradiction of that historical moment, he suggests, contributed to long-term narrative fragmentation. In contemporary Taiwan politics, competing interpretations of 1947 have been instrumentalized to serve divergent ideological projects, particularly the “de-Sinicization” narrative advanced by pro-independence forces.

Central to Wu’s broader thesis is the argument that colonial influence in Taiwan was not limited to political administration but extended deeply into epistemology and historiography. Japanese colonial education systematically restructured historical understanding by fragmenting the continuity of Chinese civilization and undermining the traditional concept of “Great Unity” that historically underpinned Chinese statecraft. 

By portraying successive dynasties as unrelated regimes rather than as expressions of a continuous civilizational polity, colonial historiography weakened the intellectual foundation of shared national identity. Wu maintains that contemporary “Taiwan independence” textbooks inherit this framework, emphasizing discontinuity, marginalizing the centrality of the Chinese heartland, and reframing China’s historical territorial evolution as imperial expansion rather than organic state formation.

He also identifies a broader shared predicament across both sides of the Strait: the internalization of Western-centric modernization paradigms transmitted through Japan. In this view, Japan functioned as an intermediary disseminator of Western models of political and economic development, embedding the assumption that legitimacy derives from conformity to Euro-American standards. 

This intellectual inheritance shaped not only colonial Taiwan but also segments of mainland intellectual discourse during the late Qing and Republican periods. The result, according to Wu, has been a persistent normative anxiety—a tendency to measure China against externally defined benchmarks and to doubt the civilizational legitimacy of indigenous development paths. He suggests that even today, remnants of this mindset linger, complicating the consolidation of full cultural confidence.

Wu extends his analysis to other frontier regions such as Xinjiang, Tibet, and Inner Mongolia, arguing that historical episodes of separatism or external intervention in these areas demonstrate a consistent pattern: when local interests are aligned from the grassroots level with the broader interests of the Chinese nation, separatist currents lose structural support. In his view, durable national integration requires not merely administrative control but the organic convergence of people’s material and cultural interests with the larger national project. Applying this logic to Taiwan, he argues that decolonization and the reconciliation of underlying social interests must proceed simultaneously. Emotional integration cannot be achieved through rhetoric alone; it requires structural alignment of interests and a sober reckoning with colonial legacies.

Wu rejects bloodline determinism as an explanation for identity divergence. The overwhelming majority of Taiwan residents, he notes, descend from migrants from Fujian and Guangdong. The persistence of pro-independence sentiment cannot be attributed to ethnic difference but must instead be understood through the lens of colonial conditioning and political mobilization. Colonialism operates not only by transplanting populations but by reshaping consciousness. To assume that shared ancestry automatically guarantees political identification is, in his assessment, a misunderstanding of both nationalism and colonial dynamics.

At the same time, Wu identifies grounds for cautious optimism. Traditional cultural values—such as family responsibility and communitarian ethics—remain deeply embedded in Taiwanese society. Cross-Strait exchanges since 1987 have generated nearly four decades of new shared experience, particularly through economic integration within the broader Chinese market. Taiwan’s economic growth in recent decades, he observes, has been inseparable from the rise of the mainland economy. These interdependencies constitute a new historical layer that cannot be easily severed. While political forces may seek to instrumentalize social welfare or identity narratives for electoral gain, the structural reality of intertwined interests endures beneath the surface.

For Wu, the Taiwan question is fundamentally a question of completing an unfinished historical process that began in the nineteenth century: resisting imperial encroachment, restoring civilizational confidence, and consolidating a modern Chinese nation-state grounded in its own values rather than externally imposed paradigms. Decolonization, in this understanding, is not merely the removal of foreign rule but the recovery of historical continuity and intellectual autonomy. Only by confronting the colonial layers embedded in historical memory and educational systems, he contends, can genuine national reconciliation and long-term stability be achieved.

In this broader civilizational perspective, Taiwan is not an isolated anomaly but a critical chapter in the ongoing project of Chinese national rejuvenation. The resolution of cross-Strait differences, in Wu’s framework, ultimately depends on the reintegration of historical narrative, cultural confidence, and material interests into a coherent national whole.

Source: Guancha, xinhua, cgtn, kan china

Chinese Researchers Identify Promising Treatment Pathway and Drug Candidate for Nipah Virus Outbreak in India

Tendenzblick
-
0
Chinese Researchers Identify Promising Treatment Pathway and Drug Candidate for Nipah Virus Outbreak in India

An outbreak of Nipah virus in India’s eastern state of West Bengal has once again pushed one of the world’s deadliest emerging pathogens into the spotlight. Several confirmed cases have been reported, more than 100 people are under quarantine, and neighboring countries including Thailand and Nepal have tightened health screening measures for travelers arriving from India. Though the scale of the outbreak remains limited, the ripple effects have been immediate, underscoring how quickly regional health threats can acquire international significance.

According to the World Health Organization, Nipah virus is a zoonotic pathogen that can be transmitted to humans from infected animals, most commonly fruit bats or pigs, or through food contaminated with their saliva, urine or excreta. In rare cases, human-to-human transmission can also occur. The clinical picture is alarming: infection can lead to acute respiratory illness and fatal encephalitis. There is currently no licensed vaccine and no specific antiviral therapy approved for Nipah virus infection. Mortality rates vary between 40% and 75%, depending on local surveillance capacity and clinical care, and the incubation period can stretch up to 45 days, complicating containment efforts.

Against this sobering backdrop, new research from China has drawn attention. Scientists from the Wuhan Institute of Virology, working with partners including the Shanghai Institute of Materia Medica and biotechnology firm Vigonvita, reported in the journal Emerging Microbes & Infections that the oral nucleoside drug VV116 demonstrates significant antiviral activity against Nipah virus in preclinical studies. VV116, a broad-spectrum antiviral candidate co-developed by Vigonvita and Junshi Biosciences, is designed to target viral RNA-dependent RNA polymerase (RdRp), a key enzyme required for viral replication.

Laboratory experiments showed that both VV116 and its active metabolite inhibited replication of different Nipah strains, including the Malaysia (NiV-M) and Bangladesh (NiV-B) variants. In a lethal-dose hamster model, oral administration of 400 mg/kg improved survival to 66.7% and significantly reduced viral loads in target organs such as the lungs, spleen and brain. Researchers described the findings as the first evidence supporting VV116’s therapeutic potential against Nipah virus, suggesting it could one day serve not only as a treatment but also as a prophylactic option for high-risk groups such as healthcare and laboratory workers.

Still, caution tempers optimism. Industry experts note that the current data remain preclinical; extensive clinical trials would be required before any real-world use. That path is costly, time-consuming and fraught with uncertainty, particularly for a sporadic but high-fatality virus like Nipah. The pathogen first emerged in 1998 in Malaysia, where 265 cases of acute encephalitis were recorded between 1998 and 1999, resulting in 105 deaths and heavy economic losses. Since then, periodic outbreaks in South and Southeast Asia have kept global health authorities on alert.

VV116 itself has had a complex commercial trajectory. Originally developed for COVID-19, it received approval in China and in Uzbekistan as Mindvy® for treatment of SARS-CoV-2 infection. In 2023, milestone payments and royalties from a cooperation agreement with Junshi Pharma drove Vigonvita’s annual revenue above 200 million RMB, with VV116 accounting for the overwhelming majority. Yet as COVID-19 receded and antiviral demand cooled, sales momentum waned. The drug secured broader approval in China in early 2025, but its market outlook appeared diminished compared with the pandemic peak.

Seeking to revive its commercial and clinical prospects, the company has pivoted toward other RNA viruses. A Phase II clinical trial of VV116 for respiratory syncytial virus (RSV) infection was completed in China in September 2025, and in December the firm granted Simcere Pharmaceutical exclusive rights in Greater China to develop, manufacture and commercialize VV116 for RSV and human metapneumovirus (HMPV). Company disclosures have also highlighted inhibitory activity against Zika virus and Nipah virus, positioning VV116 as a potential multi-indication antiviral platform rather than a single-disease product.

Parallel to therapeutic research, diagnostic preparedness has intensified. China’s newly revised Frontier Health and Quarantine Law, implemented in 2025, includes Nipah virus in its list of notifiable pathogens subject to inspection. Although no human or animal infections have been reported domestically, authorities have advised vigilance without panic, urging the public to follow official guidance and avoid unnecessary travel to affected areas such as West Bengal.

Rapid and accurate laboratory diagnosis remains central to outbreak control. In recent days, several Chinese in vitro diagnostics companies have announced Nipah-related testing capabilities. Liferiver emphasized early nucleic acid detection to compensate for the virus’s non-specific early symptoms. Hybribio reported development of a fluorescence PCR-based test kit suitable for port quarantine and disease surveillance. Daan Gene has similarly launched a Nipah nucleic acid test. Meanwhile, Wondfo Biotech introduced multiple product formats, including molecular point-of-care testing compatible with its proprietary platforms, and Autobio Diagnostics offers automated extraction and real-time PCR systems designed to deliver streamlined “sample in, result out” workflows.

Together, these developments reflect a broader shift in China’s life sciences sector. Once largely focused on the domestic market, Chinese pharmaceutical and diagnostics firms are increasingly positioning themselves as contributors to global health security. By investing in broad-spectrum antivirals, scalable PCR platforms and rapid-response manufacturing capacity, they are building toolkits that can be mobilized not only for national needs but also for international outbreaks. In an era when pathogens cross borders with ease, such capacity has global implications.

Nipah virus remains a formidable threat, highly lethal, zoonotic, and capable of silent spread during its long incubation period. Whether VV116 or other candidates will ultimately prove effective in humans is an open question. Yet the convergence of drug repurposing, translational research and diagnostic innovation offers a glimpse of how the next generation of outbreak response may look: faster, more coordinated and more international. In that effort, the expanding role of Chinese companies, both in therapeutics and in diagnostics, illustrates how scientific collaboration and industrial readiness can become shared assets in the worldwide fight for public health.

Source: yicai, yahoo, the paper, hkej, sina, hua shang news

Chinese Companies Harness AI to Improve Lives: Ant Group Enables 300,000 Doctors to Serve 91 Million People Online

Tendenzblick
-
0
Chinese Companies Harness AI to Improve Lives: Ant Group Enables 300,000 Doctors to Serve 91 Million People Online

On January 24, 2026, at the GBA Healthcare Association Annual Conference (GBAHA), Hao Df Online unveiled its “2025 Annual Good Doctor Rankings,” recognizing 737 doctors nationwide for their professional expertise and quality service. The release of the list carries added significance, coinciding with the one-year anniversary of Ant Health’s acquisition of the platform.

Founded in 2006 by Beijing Xinyi Qiangguo Technology, Hao Df Online is a pioneering internet healthcare platform in China. Its services include online consultations, remote outpatient visits, post-treatment management, family doctor subscription services, and disease knowledge dissemination. Accessible via its app, website, WeChat official account, and mini-programs, the platform also features the country’s first patient experience sharing system, allowing users to rate doctors and share their medical experiences.

In April 2016, Hao Df established the Yinchuan Smart Internet Hospital in Ningxia, initiating remote expert consultations and family doctor services to support hierarchical medical system development. In October 2022, founder Wang Hang represented the platform in showcasing “Internet Healthcare” achievements for the national “Eastern Data, Western Computing” initiative. In January 2025, Ant Group completed its acquisition of Hao Df Online, announcing plans to jointly develop AI medical assistant services. Hao Df Online subsequently became part of Ant Group’s Alipay Digital Healthcare division. By December 2025, the platform had over 280,000 registered doctors and had served more than 91 million patients. By January 2026, after integration with Alipay and Ant Yikang apps, the registered doctor base had expanded to 300,000.

Zhang Junjie, Vice President of Ant Group and Head of Healthcare Business, revealed at the conference that the integration has accelerated synergies: doctors now reach more patients nationwide, and users can easily access consultations through both Alipay and Ant Yikang apps.

Hao Df Online is also upgrading its doctor workstations with new AI-powered tools such as DeepSearch, creating personalized “AI assistants” to help doctors reduce workload, enhance efficiency, and improve the patient experience. The platform plans to explore innovative practice models with doctors, further amplifying professional expertise.

The expansion of service access points has been particularly transformative. Ant Group has heavily invested in healthcare AI models in recent years, launching the Ant Yikang app in 2025 to serve as an AI health assistant for all users. With over 30 million monthly active users and 10 million daily consultations, the app now links seamlessly with Hao Df Online, allowing users to be matched with qualified doctors across the country. For physicians, this means their influence extends far beyond their local hospitals, reaching patients nationwide.

Doctors have welcomed the change. One physician, active on Hao Df Online for ten years, noted that the platform removes geographic limitations, allowing them to serve patients from neighboring provinces to the entire country. AI handles repetitive tasks such as medical history collection, freeing up more time for direct patient care.

In addition, Hao Df Online’s health education content now integrates fully with Alipay, enabling doctors to conduct live broadcasts and share videos that reach millions of users. In the past year alone, doctors produced over 15,000 live sessions and more than 100,000 articles and videos. This represents a shift from treating illnesses to promoting preventive health, highlighting the growing importance of health education in medical value.

AI adoption is also increasing among doctors. More than 1,000 physicians, led by six academicians, have launched their own AI “avatars” on the Ant Yikang app, answering over 27 million user health queries to date. Digital technology is fundamentally reshaping healthcare delivery and efficiency.

Academician Zhong Nanshan, speaking at the conference, emphasized that smart healthcare is meant not to replace doctors, but to enable them to focus on patient-centered care, addressing the persistent issues of expensive and difficult access to medical services in China.

AI assistants aim to tackle efficiency challenges directly. Liu Junwei, general manager of Ant Group’s Medical and Health Business Unit and head of AI Health Manager, outlined upgrades coming to the Hao Df doctor workstation in 2026. Enhancements include deepening “human-machine collaboration,” allowing doctors to create AI avatars for answering routine queries and providing health education. Each doctor will also have a personal AI assistant to collect medical histories, assist during consultations by providing real-time diagnostic suggestions, and generate post-visit summaries and personalized follow-up plans. Additionally, the new DeepSearch feature will support literature review and clinical research, creating a Chinese version of Open Evidence freely available to physicians.

At the conference, Hao Df Online released its 2025 Annual Good Doctor Rankings, marking the 13th consecutive year of the list. The rankings, which assess service volume, depth, responsiveness, patient satisfaction, and offline reputation, recognized 737 top doctors from a pool of over 300,000. This year, 668 were named “Annual Good Doctors,” 15 as “Young Good Doctors,” 48 as “Long-term Online Doctors,” and 30 received the newly introduced “Health Education Doctor” award.

Founder Wang Hang highlighted that 2026 marks both the second year of Hao Df’s integration into the Ant ecosystem and the 20th anniversary of its founding. He said the combination of Ant Group’s platform resources and AI capabilities has unlocked new professional value, helping Hao Df confidently enter the AI era. The platform plans to continue innovating practice models, expanding the professional impact of doctors, and delivering health services to more people.

The evolution of internet healthcare in China is shifting from monetizing traffic to realizing professional value. AI tools now enable doctors to extend their service reach, improve clinical efficiency, and accelerate research support, effectively amplifying the impact of medical expertise nationwide.

Source: guancha, sina, jinguxun, ant group, eeo

Collective Genius Behind China’s EV Boom: BYD Employs 120,000 Engineers Focused on R&D

Tendenzblick
-
0
Collective Genius Behind China’s EV Boom: BYD Employs 120,000 Engineers Focused on R&D

“BYD is like a simple, hardworking kid—honest, diligent, and focused on learning,” Wang Chuanfu, chairman and founder of BYD, told investors in December 2025 during the company’s shareholder meeting, once again framing his company through the lens of a practical engineer. 

Over the past decade, BYD’s new energy vehicle sales have soared from 58,000 units to 4.6 million in 2025, a growth fueled not by conventional corporate structures or ready-made supply chains, but by a vertically integrated system of self-generated, highly internalized capabilities.

At the heart of this rise is BYD’s engineering workforce. By 2025, the company employed 120,000 R&D engineers, more than most traditional automakers combined, forming what Wang calls a “technical moat.” New graduates are recruited in large numbers and trained under a rigorous mentorship system, transforming students into engineers capable of tackling complex projects. “Managing this scale of employees requires the precision of managing a single individual,” says Ye Zi, general manager of BYD Human Resources.

Wang’s hands-on involvement shapes the company’s culture and technical decisions. Sun Huajun, CTO of BYD’s battery division, recalls Wang in the early years meticulously dismantling faulty batteries with engineers, searching for millimeter-level sealing flaws. Even today, Wang gives in-depth lessons to senior executives on principles ranging from anodic oxidation to grid capacitors, ensuring that technical understanding permeates every level of leadership. Weekly meetings between Wang and division heads review progress, and major strategic choices, like the company’s commitment to lithium iron phosphate batteries or the innovation of the blade battery, emerge from these intensive discussions, blending technical democracy with authoritative decision-making.

This engineer-driven ethos has powered BYD’s meteoric success. From its origins as a battery manufacturer to its leadership in electric vehicles, BYD has redefined cost and efficiency with proprietary technologies like blade batteries and DM-i hybrid systems, building an industrial empire spanning batteries, semiconductors, and energy storage, all rooted in internal technical mastery. Yet by 2025, the rapid electrification was giving way to the slower, more strategic battle over intelligent technologies, where success would hinge not just on battery efficiency or casting methods, but on software, algorithms, data ecosystems, and speed of iteration.

Wang’s philosophy is deeply embedded in the company’s talent development. Early recruits in the 2000s, often high-ranking graduates from China’s top universities, joined BYD because there were few alternatives. 

BYD’s “Tomorrow Star” graduate training program, established at the company’s founding in 1998, combines rigorous corporate culture lessons, immersive production-line training, and one-on-one mentorship. Graduates are quickly placed on real projects, often leading initiatives within their first two years. “BYD dares to let fresh graduates take responsibility,” Ye Zi notes. “Some of them become project leaders within a year or two.” This mentorship-project hybrid system ensures the transmission of both knowledge and company values, creating a continuous pipeline of capable engineers.

The company’s internal operating principles, codified in the internal handbook BYD Basic Guidelines, emphasize that decision-makers cannot succeed by sitting in offices alone; they must engage on the front lines, in labs, production floors, and even sales outlets. Wang exemplifies this approach, personally interacting with engineers to finalize technical strategies, while the 120,000-strong R&D workforce translates vision into reality. The blade battery, for example, emerged from Wang’s insistence on achieving 600 km of range with lithium iron phosphate cells, eventually realized by engineering innovations in production tooling and cell arrangement.

Over time, BYD has cultivated a leadership culture distinct from new electric vehicle startups, favoring internal promotion over poaching talent. More than half of the current general managers reporting directly to Wang are alumni of BYD’s own graduate programs. The company has consistently produced top leaders, including heads of research institutes and brand divisions, all forged under Wang’s mentorship. Management scholars like Jim Collins have long noted that visionary companies succeed when leaders are internally developed, a principle BYD has exemplified.

BYD’s explosive growth over the past decade has reshaped its presence in the talent market. The company now recruits thousands of new graduates annually, many from elite universities, most of whom enter R&D roles. Parallel promotion tracks allow technical experts to reach executive-level pay and status without leaving their craft, ensuring talent retention and career clarity. With a structured nine-tier ranking system spanning multiple sub-levels, engineers can navigate a clear, merit-based career path.

As BYD scaled, its culture of mentorship began to evolve. In 2017, the company introduced a culture of internal competition, later formalized in 2022 as “competing, learning, racing, collaborating, and victory-driven,” emphasizing meritocracy and adaptability. Internal debate is encouraged, but always aimed at outperforming competitors externally. Incentives extend beyond salary, with profit-sharing and equity programs fostering long-term alignment. The system now forms a self-reinforcing loop of selection, development, evaluation, and reward, ensuring that engineers remain aligned with company strategy.

Yet as the industry enters the intelligent mobility era, BYD faces new tensions. Vertical integration, once a source of cost advantage, brings management burdens and potential innovation inertia. Wang has elevated intelligent technologies to a core strategic focus, aggressively recruiting software, algorithms, and human-machine interface talent. By mid-2025, the intelligent driving team exceeded 5,000, including over 1,000 core algorithm engineers. The cultural challenge is integrating highly specialized, digitally native talent into BYD’s disciplined, production-centric engineering culture.

Early signs of synergy are emerging. AI platforms in battery research, for example, enable rapid formulation testing, complementing BYD’s traditional trial-and-error, first-principles approach. Yet the challenge remains: in a large, efficiency-driven organization where internal performance is rigorously assessed, how much room exists for uncertainty and experimentation? In the intelligent era, engineers must not only optimize technology but also understand and create user value.

BYD’s culture of simplicity, “focus on the work, not the person”, remains its guiding principle. It allows the company to command nearly a million employees and a vast industrial chain with the efficiency of a single operator. 

Source: BYD, xueqiu, 21jingji, qykc, 36kr, CSDN, xinhua, world journal

123...279Page 2 of 279

Die Redaktion dieser Plattform hat sich das Ziel gesetzt, eine große Vielfalt an Meinungen zu präsentieren, um den Leserinnen und Lesern die Möglichkeit zu geben, sich selbst sich selbst zu informieren und eine eigene Meinung zu bilden. Sowohl positive als auch kritische Nachrichten, Berichte oder Kommentare sind willkommen und werden wertgeschätzt. Alle Beiträge bemühen sich weiterhin, um einen respektvollen und höflichen Umgangston. (Medienprojekt von VANA)

Kontaktieren Sie uns: info@tendenzblick.net

© Copyright - TB - Aktuelle Nachrichten online