The year 2023 has been significant for India in terms of domestic and great power diplomacy. India hosted two online summits for the Global South, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and the Group of Twenty (G20). Prime Minister Narendra Modi participated in the G7 summit and the QUAD summit in Japan, and the BRICS summit in South Africa. He also attended the G7 summit in June and engaged in major diplomatic activities with China. 

Additionally, Modi paid an official visit to the United States in June and then visited France in July as the chief guest for France’s National Day. Two of the most notable events were Modi’s visit to the US and the G20 summit, which garnered global attention. During this period, India and Prime Minister Modi were in the limelight, receiving a special welcome in the Western world, and India’s pro-U.S.-Western stance was evident in these key diplomatic events.

Alliance Against China 

Between June 21-24, 2023, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi undertook his sixth visit to the United States since assuming office in 2014, marking his first state visit. This visit was met with considerable ceremonial pomp, underscoring the significance of the bilateral relationship. 

During this visit, the U.S. and India formalized a series of cooperation agreements across various sectors, including economics, science and technology, defense, and humanities. The agreements encompassed diverse areas such as semiconductors, critical minerals, advanced technologies, space collaboration, and defense manufacturing and sales. This visit signified a substantial advancement in the U.S.-India relations, marking a formalization of their strategic alignment against China. 

Despite the broad emphasis on the comprehensive nature of the U.S.-India partnership, the current cooperation predominantly focuses on two main areas. Firstly, in the defense sector, the U.S. has provided India with advanced military technologies not offered to its formal allies, including the joint production of F414 engines by General Electric and Indian firms and the sale of 31 MQ-9B drones to India. Secondly, in response to U.S. restrictions on China’s semiconductor, quantum computing, and artificial intelligence sectors, the U.S. and India have concentrated on promoting the “Initiative for Critical and Emerging Technologies” (iCET), such as semiconductors, biotechnology, advanced materials, and rare-earth processing technologies. 

The partnership seeks to deepen innovation ecosystem connectivity, establish a semiconductor supply chain and innovation partnership, and support India’s ambition to become a major player in emerging technologies, potentially supplanting China in global supply chains.

The primary objective of the U.S.-India rapprochement is to counterbalance China. For the U.S., which views China as its principal strategic competitor and aims to contain it through the “Indo-Pacific” strategy, India is envisioned as a crucial pillar. 

Indian policymakers and their strategic circles have reached a consensus on aiming to establish a “multipolar Asia, multipolar world” international order. They believe that China is the biggest variable affecting the current global balance and could potentially become the dominant force in Asia. Consequently, India views China as a significant threat to its own rise as a great power and seeks to implement a strategic management approach to counteract China’s development. 

India plans to leverage the U.S. “Indo-Pacific” strategy to restrain China while simultaneously securing funding and advanced technology from the U.S., Japan, and Europe. This approach aims to bolster India’s position in the global industrial and supply chains, thereby facilitating its economic rise and emergence as a great power.

Challenges in the Alliance　　

While both countries agree on the need to contain and counter China, this shared objective is not their ultimate aim. 

First, there are differences in strategic objectives. The U.S. “Indo-Pacific Strategy” aims to maintain its position as the world’s dominant superpower, while India’s “Indo-Pacific Vision” seeks to establish itself as a major global power and promote a “multipolar Asia, multipolar world.” 

Second, the focus of their strategies differs. The U.S. strategy centers on the Asia-Pacific region, which includes encouraging India’s military involvement there. In contrast, India’s strategy emphasizes the Indian Ocean region.

Additionally, the two countries have divergent views on the primary forces and methods to contain China. The U.S. hopes that India will take a leading role in confronting China, possibly even engaging in direct border conflicts. Conversely, India seeks to involve the U.S. more actively, hoping to see the U.S. take the lead in containing China and facilitate the transfer of the global industrial supply chain. The U.S. prefers using military means and alliances, whereas India is reluctant to engage in direct military conflict or to develop the QUAD into a formal military alliance. India also resists signing bilateral treaties with the U.S. that might compromise its “strategic autonomy” or impose treaty obligations.

Indians feel that the U.S. should invest significantly to earn their trust, as they believe the U.S. owes India a debt. India’s national character is often seen as calculating and ambitious, which means it will continue to present challenging demands to the U.S. Additionally, India’s strong economic nationalism and protectionist policies may hinder smooth cooperation. Indian national monopolies may restrict foreign access to the Indian market, and U.S. and Western multinational enterprises might face barriers similar to those encountered by Chinese companies. Consequently, economic and technological cooperation between the U.S. and India may encounter significant obstacles.

The historical context of U.S.-India relations and the Indian national psyche suggest that cooperation will face challenges. Despite claims from some Indian strategists that historical distrust is waning, underlying tensions remain. The U.S. is wary of India exploiting the strategic competition between the U.S. and China to rise to prominence, and while the U.S. has been generous in selling advanced weaponry and technology to India, this is a gradual process. 

Contradictions in the U.S.-India Strategic Objectives

Since 2017, India has actively sought to form an anti-China alliance with Western countries. Following the institutionalization of the US-Japan-India-Australia Quadrilateral Security Dialogue and the establishment of AUKUS, Indian strategic elites believe that the opportunity for China’s unchallenged rise is closing, if not already closed. 

This belief is driven by China’s geographically constrained position, which limits its movements both on land and at sea, and the growing resistance from the West and other nations. Although China’s power and influence are expected to continue expanding, particularly in regions close to India, the prospect of Chinese hegemony in Asia seems increasingly unlikely.

With the U.S. clearly positioning China as its greatest strategic competitor, Indian strategists view the current period as an opportune moment to counter China strategically. Consequently, India’s foreign strategic focus has shifted from leading the formation of an anti-China alliance with the U.S., Japan, and Australia to countering China’s influence in the Indian Ocean region and establishing a leadership role within the “Global South.” This shift aims to assert India’s identity as a major global player and to rival the U.S. However, India has found it challenging to compete with China in the “Global South” on its own strength. 

To address this challenge, India has sought assistance from the U.S. and Western countries to help establish its leadership position in the “Global South.” While the U.S. and its allies aim to use India to divide the developing world and marginalize China’s influence, they have been reluctant to provide substantial material support that would enable India to become a true leader in the “Global South.” 

The U.S. has consistently employed control tactics to ensure that its allies remain firmly aligned with its interests. A significant factor contributing to the advancement of U.S.-India relations since 2003 was the U.S.’s pressure on and intimidation of the Modi government. This pressure manifested in several ways: 

The U.S. issued a human rights report listing India’s “major human rights problems” and abuses. Additionally, the BBC produced a documentary titled “India: 

The Modi Problem”. At the behest of the United States, Sikhs in the U.S., Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom intensified their support for the Khalistan Movement. 

The U.S. short-selling organization Hindenburg Research targeted Indian plutocrat Adani, who is Modi’s close ally. By shorting Adani, the U.S. demonstrated its ability to influence India’s economic and political stability.

The U.S. also supported Rahul Gandhi and other opposition figures.

These controlling actions provoked resistance from India. The diplomatic dispute between India and the West over the assassination of Sikh leaders abroad reflects the broader struggle between U.S. control and Indian counter-control. India exploited its strategic value to the U.S. in containing China, using a series of incidents involving Sikh leaders in Canada and the U.S. as a pressure tactic. This resistance only temporarily subsided after the U.S. issued a clear warning.

Fundamental value differences between the U.S. and India, as well as conflicting interests between the U.S. and Indian monopoly consortiums, persist. While the U.S. aims to tie India closely to its China-containment strategy, it also seeks to control India’s development. This dynamic will continue to pressure the Modi government through sensitive issues.

Source: IISS, the Economic Times, lotusarise