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The car of the future is a robot on four wheels: How XPENG Is Driving China’s Next Technological Revolution

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The car of the future is a robot on four wheels: How XPENG Is Driving China’s Next Technological Revolution

As the competition in the global automotive industry intensifies in 2025, intelligent driving has become the defining battleground. After years of progress in electrification, with the three-electric systems—battery, motor, and control—now mature and standardized, the focus has shifted from electric power to artificial intelligence. 

The history of technological revolutions has always followed a pattern of breakthroughs. In the 2000s, Microsoft and Intel built the digital foundations of the Internet era. In the 2010s, Apple redefined human interaction through the mobile internet. By the 2020s, OpenAI opened the frontier of digital cognition. Now, as AI begins to merge with physical space, the next great transformation is unfolding. Around the world, leading tech companies are racing to bridge the gap between the digital and the physical. Apple is developing desktop robots capable of autonomous navigation, Amazon has introduced its Astro home robot, and Google’s DeepMind continues to invest in large-scale robot control models. Across this global shift, the consensus is clear: the era of “Physical AI” has arrived. Among the first to embrace this vision in China is XPENG.

From its founding days, XPENG made AI its core research direction. Even when in-vehicle computing power was limited to a fraction of today’s levels, Chairman and CEO of XPENG, He Xiaopeng firmly believed that intelligent driving would be the ultimate expression of artificial intelligence. Guided by that conviction, XPENG became one of China’s earliest carmakers to build its own AI architecture, advancing almost in parallel with Tesla in its adoption of end-to-end autonomous driving technology. This early investment laid the groundwork for XPENG’s steady rise from a start-up to a leader in intelligent mobility.

By 2024, XPENG’s R&D team achieved a pivotal breakthrough in large-model training. The company’s VLA model, originally designed for visual perception and action, began to autonomously understand physical laws. This represented a fundamental leap—from perceiving and imitating the world to comprehending it. The next-generation VLA model, unveiled at XPENG’s 2025 Technology Day, integrates AI cognition with real-world physics. This fusion marks the dawn of XPENG’s Physical AI, an evolution that connects vehicles, robots, and aerial mobility under a unified intelligence framework.

At the event, XPENG showcased a range of technologies powered by this new model, including the upgraded Xiao Lu NGP driving system, the humanoid robot IRON, and mass-production-ready Robotaxi platforms. These breakthroughs highlight both XPENG’s technological strength and the rapid progress of China’s AI ecosystem. The theme of the event—“Emergence”—carried dual significance: the moment when quantitative accumulation transforms into qualitative change, and the simultaneous eruption of multiple technologies converging around one unified model. The wave of spatial intelligence, long anticipated by industry observers, is finally taking shape.

XPENG’s long-term vision is to become not just an automaker but a global embodied-intelligence company. This philosophy resonates with Tesla’s own trajectory, which has shifted focus from cars to humanoid robots and integrated software-hardware ecosystems. Yet XPENG’s approach reflects distinctly Chinese characteristics: building a comprehensive system that unites intelligent software, industrial hardware, and large-scale manufacturing—a combination few companies in the world can match.

Behind this ambition is a deep technological foundation. XPENG has invested billions of yuan in computing infrastructure, creating Nebula, China’s first 10,000-card automotive intelligent-computing cluster, and a 30,000-GPU cloud platform built with Alibaba Cloud. This cluster trains XPENG’s 72-billion-parameter foundation model for autonomous driving, allowing full iterations every five days. By comparison, while conventional automotive AI systems rely on tens of millions of parameters, XPENG’s second-generation VLA processes hundreds of millions and absorbs up to 270,000 hours of video data every week—equivalent to 30 years of human driving experience in just seven days.

Such immense data and computing capabilities enable XPENG to deploy Physical AI across its entire ecosystem. Automobiles remain the company’s core business, but they now serve as data-collecting intelligent nodes within a larger network that includes flying cars, robots, and Robotaxis. XPENG has established four strategic business lines: automobiles, Robotaxis, robotics, and flying cars—each reinforcing the others through shared algorithms, chips, and model architecture. This synergy allows the company to achieve economies of scale, reducing development costs while accelerating iteration speed.

In the automotive field, XPENG’s second-generation VLA intelligent-driving system will enter trial use by the end of 2025 and begin large-scale rollout in early 2026. The company’s Robotaxi division is preparing to launch three purpose-built models with five-, six-, and seven-seat configurations, all equipped with XPENG’s high-performance Turing AI chips delivering 3,000 TOPS of computing power. By relying on pure-vision solutions and eliminating high-definition map dependence, XPENG’s Robotaxis can operate across cities and even countries, providing a viable pathway toward global commercialization.

In robotics, XPENG unveiled the humanoid robot IRON, whose lifelike movement and control stunned audiences. Built with a biomimetic spine, bio-inspired muscles, and flexible artificial skin, IRON can perform precise, human-like motions with 82 degrees of freedom. XPENG plans to begin deploying the robot in service scenarios such as tour guiding, sales assistance, and patrol operations, with mass production targeted for late 2026.

Meanwhile, the company’s flying-car division, XPENG Huitian, continues to push the boundaries of low-altitude mobility. Its land aircraft carrier hybrid vehicle, capable of both road and air travel, has already garnered over 7,000 pre-orders and will enter mass production in 2026. The tilt-rotor A868 flying car for multi-passenger travel has also begun flight verification, marking another step toward realizing XPENG’s vision of three-dimensional transportation.

These developments collectively represent the essence of Physical AI—the seamless integration of intelligent software with diverse hardware platforms. Data collected from cars, robots, and flying vehicles feed into a shared base model, forming a multidimensional understanding of the physical world. As the model refines its comprehension of physical laws, all product lines benefit simultaneously, creating a self-reinforcing innovation loop. Through this unified architecture, XPENG demonstrates the advantage of China’s comprehensive industrial system, where AI research, hardware manufacturing, and large-scale application coexist within a single ecosystem.

Beyond the technological spectacle, XPENG’s progress mirrors China’s broader transformation from an engineering-driven manufacturing powerhouse to an intelligence-driven innovation leader. National strategies such as the 14th and 15th Five-Year Plans emphasize the deep integration of AI into physical industries, promoting autonomous and self-iterating production systems. XPENG’s achievements embody this vision: cars are no longer just products assembled from blueprints but evolving intelligent entities capable of learning from the world around them. Factories are becoming data hubs for continuous optimization, and China’s manufacturing logic is shifting from replication and efficiency toward independent innovation and digital self-growth.

At the close of Technology Day, He Xiaopeng reflected, “Those once-fanciful technological visions are gradually becoming reality.” Over seven consecutive years of Tech Days, XPENG’s trajectory has traced the rise of China’s intelligent manufacturing—from autonomous driving to flying cars, from robotic exploration to the development of its second-generation VLA large model. Each breakthrough reflects the country’s determination to redefine its position in global technology through self-reliance and creativity.

Behind the numbers lies a larger story. XPENG’s 10,000-strong team of engineers, its in-house chips, algorithms, and software-hardware integration, all point to a new model of competition—one rooted in comprehensive capability rather than isolated innovation. In this new global race toward embodied intelligence, Chinese enterprises are no longer followers; they are shaping the rules.

XPENG’s Physical AI is more than a concept—it is a demonstration of what China’s technological rise truly means: embedding intelligence into the physical world, transforming imagination into mass-produced reality, and leading humanity toward a new era where the boundary between the virtual and the real is no longer fixed, but fluid, adaptive, and profoundly intelligent.

Source: XPENG, CnEVPost, KMJ, CGTN, Sina

How China Stands Apart: The Civilizational Logic Behind Its Absence of Large Religious Wars

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How China Stands Apart: The Civilizational Logic Behind Its Absence of Large Religious Wars

Although humanity has entered the 21st century, wars and conflicts continue to smolder in various regions. Behind many hotspots lie religious entanglements that have endured for millennia. Every explosion echoes an old question: why does peace remain elusive?

Across world history, religion has frequently served as a catalyst for conflict. At the end of the 11th century, Crusader armies marched eastward and drenched Jerusalem in blood. In the 13th century, the papacy launched ferocious inquisitions that reduced countless so-called heretics to ashes. The 16th-century French Wars of Religion led to rivers of Protestant blood flowing down the Seine. Even today, in the Balkans, the Persian Gulf, and the Indian subcontinent, religious divides remain embedded in many confrontations.

Yet when the lens of history shifts eastward to China, a markedly different picture emerges. Although the Yellow Turban uprising invoked apocalyptic prophecy and the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom bore the banner of the God Worshipping Society, the underlying drivers of these upheavals were not religious doctrine but land concentration, socioeconomic inequality, and systemic oppression. Faith served as an idiom, not a cause.

The contrast begins with fundamentally different social and political structures. Early Chinese society, like many ancient civilizations, revered natural phenomena as divine forces and practiced harsh sacrificial rites. However, as shamanistic authority grew dangerously unrestrained—when anyone could claim to speak for the gods—Chinese rulers undertook a civilizational reform that altered the trajectory of political development. Ancient texts record the deliberate “severing of the connection between Heaven and humanity,” a governance innovation that centralized the right to interpret divine will. Communication with Heaven became the exclusive prerogative of the ruler and state-sanctioned ritual experts, curbing religious privatization and preventing charismatic individuals from mobilizing divine authority for rebellion.

This early institutional arrangement, consolidated in the Zhou dynasty’s rites-and-music system, gradually transformed Chinese society into one governed by secular ethics rather than priestly theocracy. While other civilizations still relied on sacrificial violence to secure divine favor, the Zhou political order placed social hierarchy, ritual propriety, and moral governance at its core. The ruler derived legitimacy not from divine command alone but from the ethical requirement to “match Heaven’s virtue.” Divine will become a moral criterion rather than an instrument of domination.

This shift marked a profound divergence from the West. Western intellectual history evolved under the towering influence of theology; Chinese thought moved toward ethical humanism. Confucius’s famous admonition—If one cannot yet serve humans, how can one serve spirits?—encapsulates this transformation. Religious life persisted, but its authority was subordinated to moral cultivation, social relations, and political order. Over time, this human-centered orientation solidified into a stable civilizational pattern: rulers upheld Confucianism as the ideological orthodoxy, while diverse beliefs—Buddhism, Daoism, folk religions, and foreign faiths—were allowed to coexist within a secular state framework.

This orientation was reinforced by China’s social structure. Genealogical networks and ancestral halls created deeply rooted kinship order long before temples and churches emerged. In the Mediterranean world, the mobility of traders and the fragmentation of communities gave religions a unique bridging function; in China, lineage-based order endowed society with cohesiveness, reducing the need for religious authority to manage social bonds.

Religion in China was also shaped by the distinctive conception of “Heaven.” Unlike monotheistic traditions centered on a single, exclusive deity, Chinese culture envisioned an abstract, transcendent, and impersonal Heaven—omnipresent yet formless, moral rather than dogmatic. Numerous deities existed in popular worship, but none eclipsed Heaven as the supreme moral order. This nonexclusive, nonanthropomorphic Heaven served as a universal reference point that could accommodate multiple faith traditions without generating doctrinal conflict.

This worldview intertwined naturally with ancestral reverence, extending ethical relationships outward from family to society. Concepts such as ruler and subject, father and son, teacher and student, and sworn brothers functioned as quasi-kinship ties, binding unrelated individuals within a shared moral framework. Philosophers such as Cheng Hao and Wang Yangming later expanded this ethic of kinship into cosmological humanism, proposing the unity of humanity with nature and all beings. In such a worldview, religious difference rarely escalated into existential confrontation, because ethical integration overrides metaphysical exclusivity.

Thus, when Buddhism, Islam, and later Christianity entered China, they encountered a civilizational logic predisposed toward accommodation rather than confrontation. Foreign religions were transformed—Sinicized—in ways that allowed them to coexist with Confucian norms, and in turn contributed new philosophical elements to Chinese thought. The result was an evolving ecosystem of beliefs rather than a battlefield of competing dogmas.

At the civilizational level, this inclusiveness was reinforced by the Chinese conception of “all under heaven” (tianxia), a political and cultural imagination that transcended geography. Unlike the Western concept of the “world” as a collection of rival polities, the Chinese tianxia referred to a moral and cultural sphere unified by shared norms—something larger than territory but more cohesive than mere geography. It formed the ideological foundation for repeated historical unifications across a landmass comparable to Europe, where no analogous unifying concept existed.

When dynasties collapsed or foreign powers conquered the Central Plains, tianxia consciousness enabled re-integration. Ethnic differences, religious diversity, and regional particularities were subsumed into a broader civilizational identity. Buddhist bells, Daoist rituals, Confucian ceremonies, steppe traditions, and frontier customs coexisted within a common cultural framework that emphasized harmony over domination.

Over thousands of years, this cultural logic prevented large-scale religious wars in China and discouraged missionary conquest or cultural extermination. Instead, Chinese civilization absorbed and transformed external influences, generating a historically rare model of cultural continuity without theocratic conflict or colonial expansion.

The wisdom embedded in this tradition carries contemporary relevance. In an era of geopolitical tension and global fragmentation, the Chinese ethos of harmony, inclusiveness, and cultural symbiosis offers an alternative to zero-sum confrontation. As modern Chinese leaders emphasize, the ideals of “all under heaven as one family” and “harmony among all nations” derive from deep historical roots and reflect a worldview committed to coexistence rather than domination.

A genuine global perspective does not demand uniformity or erasure; it requires the capacity for different civilizations, ethnicities, and faiths to share the same sky peacefully. The inclusive and humanistic foundations of Chinese civilization, formed over millennia, continue to offer valuable insight for building a shared future for humanity.

Source: neac gov, scmp, sohu, zhihu, cuhk

The Future of Europe — A Conversation between Chinese Professor Zhang Weiwei and Former Foreign Minister of Serbia Vuk Jeremić

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The Future of Europe — A Conversation between Chinese Professor Zhang Weiwei and Former Foreign Minister of Serbia Vuk Jeremić

On China Dragon TV’s China Now program, Professor Zhang Weiwei, Director of Fudan University’s China Institute, and Mr. Vuk Jeremić, former Serbian Foreign Minister and President of the UN General Assembly, recently discussed the future of Europe together.

Vuk Jeremić believes the European Union, born from the devastation of World War II and founded on reconciliation and shared prosperity, now stands at a critical crossroads. Once united by the vision of peace between France and Germany and supported by the United States during the Cold War, the EU became a model of integration and cooperation after 1991. However, Jeremić argues that a sense of complacency and arrogance emerged after the Cold War, as the EU assumed history had ended.

He sees the crises of the 21st century—the financial crash, the 2015 refugee crisis, Brexit, and deteriorating relations with Russia—as evidence of deep structural weaknesses within Europe. Today, he believes the EU faces major challenges: economic stagnation, demographic decline, social division, and uncertainty in its relationships with major global powers, including the U.S., Russia, and China.

Despite these difficulties, Jeremić maintains that the EU remains the most successful example of regional integration in modern history and that its founding ideals of unity and shared destiny still hold the key to Europe’s future.

What is the most urgent challenge facing the EU and Europe today?

Vuk Jeremić: The most pressing issue is that Serbia’s EU accession process, which began in 2001, has effectively stalled. While Serbia formally remains a candidate and is expected to implement reforms to meet EU standards, progress is blocked by powerful EU countries demanding it compromise its sovereignty over Kosovo—a condition Serbia considers both constitutionally and morally unacceptable. No country could accept such terms. As a result, Serbia remains outside the EU, despite being geographically surrounded by member states, and there is little chance this situation will change in the near future. This, in my view, is the core challenge facing Serbia’s European integration.

Zhang Weiwei: Years ago, I spoke with a Serbian ambassador to Geneva about Yugoslavia and its relations with Europe. He suggested that if Tito had lived longer, Yugoslavia might have joined the European Community, which could have helped prevent its fragmentation, as membership in an international organization supports unity and protects collective interests. Later, I asked Vuk whether he thought this was a real possibility.

Vuk Jeremić: It’s impossible to know for certain what might have happened if Tito had lived longer. Perhaps, had Yugoslavia implemented reforms similar to China’s in the 1970s and 1980s, the country might have avoided disintegration. Instead, Yugoslavia split into six sovereign states, leaving unresolved issues like Kosovo. Today, these historical realities, combined with the EU’s internal challenges—such as each member state’s veto under the Treaty of Lisbon—make it difficult for a country like Serbia to join. Ultimately, we can only speculate about what might have been if Yugoslavia had remained united.

What challenges are ordinary Europeans facing today? Are issues like unemployment, the refugee crisis, or the decline in industrial and technological leadership among them?

Vuk Jeremić: Most EU countries face a complex mix of crises. Illegal migration, weak economic growth, and long-term demographic decline create deep uncertainty, while the media often exaggerates security threats from Russia. In this climate, many Europeans turn to political figures offering simple, immediate solutions, fueling support for populist movements. These dynamics contribute to the severe political instability and upheaval seen across multiple EU states today.

Zhang Weiwei: Europe’s biggest challenge today is missing the Fourth Industrial Revolution driven by the internet and digital economy. None of the world’s top 20 internet companies are European, leaving big data and platforms dominated by the U.S. Even Germany’s Industry 4.0 initiative, once a model for industrial intelligence, has faded into obscurity. Energy is another critical issue: the phase-out of nuclear and coal, combined with insufficient green alternatives, has created a significant power shortage—estimates suggest Germany’s industrial sector faces a 30% deficit—undermining economic competitiveness.

Why did Europe miss the information revolution, and how did it fail to seize these key opportunities for growth?

Vuk Jeremić: This issue stems from several factors. First, Europe’s energy landscape shifted dramatically: Germany phased out nuclear power after Fukushima, and strained relations with Russia cut off cheap energy, driving production costs up. Second, heavy bureaucracy, regulation, and high taxes have pushed innovators and tech talent abroad, leaving Europe’s internal innovation ecosystem underdeveloped. Third, Europe’s reliance on imports—especially from China—for key technologies revealed vulnerabilities when geopolitical and national security concerns limited access. Together, these factors explain Europe’s current economic and technological challenges.

Why does Europe seem reluctant to deepen cooperation with China?

Vuk Jeremić: I come from Serbia, a European country with distinct differences from mainstream EU states, and I currently teach at Sciences Po Paris and the University of Salzburg. I believe Europe and China share substantial long-term interests, but current political factors, especially the war in Ukraine, complicate cooperation. European media portrays Russia as an imminent threat, which I do not believe is accurate. Yet as long as Europeans perceive this threat, they rely on U.S. protection, which carries conditions—particularly regarding China. This dynamic creates a short-term obstacle to Europe-China cooperation, even though the long-term shared interests remain significant.

Source: China Dragon TV

China’s Greater Bay Area’s 1,997 km² Aviation Powerhouse: 4 Hours to Southeast Asia, 12 Hours to the World

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China’s Greater Bay Area’s 1,997 km² Aviation Powerhouse: 4 Hours to Southeast Asia, 12 Hours to the World

On October 30, after more than five years of construction, Guangzhou Baiyun International Airport’s Terminal 3 officially entered operation together with its fifth runway. This marks a major leap in capacity: the airport’s near-term annual passenger throughput now reaches 120 million, with cargo throughput at 3.8 million tons, and its ultimate terminal capacity is planned to reach 140 million passengers and 6 million tons. The opening of this new terminal represents not only a physical expansion, but also a strategic elevation of Baiyun Airport’s role in the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area’s aviation ecosystem.

The Greater Bay Area currently hosts 11 civil transport airports, seven of which lie within its core region. These airports jointly handled more than 227.94 million passengers and over 9.3573 million tons of cargo in 2024. As global economic activity becomes increasingly time-sensitive, airports—by virtue of their unmatched speed and wide transit radius—are assuming a central role in drawing international resources. 

Wang Guowen, director of the Institute of Logistics and Supply Chain Management of the China (Shenzhen) Institute for Comprehensive Development, emphasized that the 21st century is an era shaped by aviation, in which airports increasingly function as engines of urban development. He noted that the commissioning of Terminal 3 will further strengthen Guangzhou Baiyun International Airport’s position as a world-class hub and reinforce the Greater Bay Area’s standing as an international aviation gateway.

Since beginning operations in 2004, Baiyun Airport has processed more than 950 million passengers and over 28 million tons of cargo and mail. Today, the first group of domestic flights from China Eastern Airlines (including Shanghai Airlines and China United Airlines), Juneyao Airlines, and Okay Airways have already moved into Terminal 3. 

By January 2026, Air China, Shenzhen Airlines, Kunming Airlines, Shandong Airlines, Hainan Airlines, Capital Airlines, West Air, Tianjin Airlines, Lucky Air, Urumqi Air, Spring Airlines, as well as foreign carriers operating out of Terminal 1, are expected to join them. With Terminal 3 in operation, Baiyun Airport will be capable of handling up to 150 flights per hour during peak periods, averaging about 2,100 flights per day. Operational capacity in the near term will support 120 million passengers and 3.8 million tons of cargo annually, a sharp rise compared to the airport’s 2024 figures of 76.369 million passengers and 2.3819 million tons of cargo.

The doubling of capacity from 70 million to 140 million passengers may seem bold, but demand trends fully justify such ambition. In 2018, when Terminal 2 opened with a design capacity of 45 million passengers, Baiyun Airport aimed to raise total throughput to 80 million. Yet only one year later, the airport had already surpassed 73 million passengers, nearing 80% of its designed limit. As Guangzhou’s economy has expanded and the Greater Bay Area has grown more tightly integrated, air-transport demand has accelerated sharply. In October alone, Baiyun Airport handled more than 7.6 million passengers, an 11% year-on-year increase and a new monthly record.

Terminal 3’s design reflects a shift toward integrated, multimodal transport. As an air-land transportation hub, T3 incorporates 6 platforms and 14 tracks, enabling high-efficiency air-rail transfers. Wang Guowen highlighted that T3 enables vertical connections between high-speed rail and air travel, which shorten transfer distances, improve overall efficiency, and enhance user experience compared with the more common horizontal transfer models. Baiyun Airport is therefore no longer a stand-alone aviation node; it has become a “transportation heart” that drives the rapid circulation of people, goods, and capital throughout the Greater Bay Area. This integration strengthens Guangdong’s ability to allocate global resources and deepens the region’s participation in international industrial-chain networks.

Behind the opening of Terminal 3 is the emergence of a world-class airport cluster. Among the seven civil transport airports within the Greater Bay Area, Guangzhou Baiyun Airport, Shenzhen Bao’an International Airport, and Hong Kong International Airport have each surpassed the 50-million-passenger threshold, forming the core triad of the region’s aviation network. 

In 2024, Baiyun Airport reached 76.369 million passengers, up 20.89% year-on-year and setting a new record; Shenzhen Bao’an Airport handled 61.477 million passengers, making it the fourth airport in mainland China to exceed 60 million; and Hong Kong International Airport processed 53.1 million passengers and more than 363,000 aircraft movements, representing increases of 34.3% and 31.6% respectively compared with 2023. Hong Kong also handled 4.9 million tons of cargo, a 14% rise year-on-year, reaffirming its position as a leading international air-cargo hub.

Each of these airports plays a distinct role. Hong Kong Airport offers the highest level of internationalization with extensive global connectivity and strong passenger and cargo flows. Macau Airport maintains close links with Portuguese-speaking countries. Shenzhen Airport has built its development strategy around serving high-tech industries and strengthening ties with Southeast Asia. Guangzhou Baiyun Airport, meanwhile, is positioned as a world-class hub serving the entire country, supported by a dense network of intercontinental routes.

With the coordination of these major facilities, the Greater Bay Area has achieved 4-hour coverage of Southeast Asia and 12-hour access to most major global destinations. Yet experts believe that the region still has significant room for growth. Unlike Beijing, Shanghai, and Chengdu—cities that have already entered an era of dual-airport systems—the Greater Bay Area’s aviation layout, though extensive, has not yet fully matched the region’s economic scale, population base, and industrial strength. As industrial upgrading accelerates and population continues to concentrate within the region, both passenger and cargo aviation demand are expected to grow substantially.

Major airports across the region are already advancing their next phase of development. The Guangzhou New Airport project has been approved, and preliminary supporting works are underway. Shenzhen Bao’an Airport’s third runway has completed flight calibration and will soon begin operations. Macau Airport began its expansion and reclamation project last year, while the three-runway system at Hong Kong International Airport has already been fully commissioned. Together, these developments signify a collective upgrade of the region’s aviation infrastructure.

Looking ahead to the 15th Five-Year Plan period, the Greater Bay Area’s airport cluster will need to focus on improving connectivity, strengthening network resilience, and addressing structural shortcomings. According to Wang Guowen, seamless integration between different modes of transportation is essential for both development efficiency and risk resistance. He suggests that the region should deepen coordination among airports, high-speed railways, urban transit, and port systems, build additional interconnection corridors, and enhance the overall robustness of the transportation network. By reducing system vulnerability and improving transfer convenience, the Greater Bay Area will be better positioned to support global supply-chain flows and capture future opportunities in aviation.

As Terminal 3 comes into operation and major airports across the region move forward with expansion, the Greater Bay Area’s world-class airport cluster is entering a new stage of high-quality, high-efficiency growth. Together, these coordinated advancements will help the region strengthen its international competitiveness and continue shaping its role as a major global transportation gateway.

Source: ycwb, sina finance, cnbayarea org, sfccn

China’s Ocean Economy Surpasses €1.28 Trillion as Growth Accelerates

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China’s Ocean Economy Surpasses €1.28 Trillion as Growth Accelerates

China’s National Development and Reform Commission and the Ministry of Natural Resources of China recently released the China Marine Economy Development Report 2025. The Report reviews the progress of China’s marine economy at both national and regional levels in 2024, highlighting steady expansion, industrial restructuring, and technological innovation across the sector. 

In 2024, China’s marine gross domestic product (GDP) reached around €1.28 trillion , reflecting continuous growth in scale. Over the past year, the restructuring of marine industries accelerated, marine science and technology innovation capabilities were significantly strengthened, and the efficient utilization of marine resources continued to improve. Efforts in marine ecological protection, restoration, early warning, and monitoring produced positive outcomes, while openness and cooperation in the marine economy deepened further.

Coastal regions actively explored marine resource potential, maintained strong economic vitality, and accelerated the development of regional marine economies, achieving notable progress in establishing key growth poles. The three major marine economic zones—Northern, Eastern, and Southern—continued to expand their capacity. 

The Northern Marine Economic Zone advanced the transformation from old to new growth drivers, the Eastern Zone achieved initial success in integrated marine economic development, and the Southern Zone made new progress in deep-sea development and conservation. In 2024, the marine GDP of the three zones reached €387.8 billion, €405.7 billion, and €459.3 billion respectively, representing nominal growth rates of 33.1%, 37.7%, and 33.3% compared with 2020.

Marine power provinces and modern maritime cities also accelerated their development. Shandong strengthened its marine science and technology leadership and launched the world’s fastest supercomputer, Sunway Ocean Light. Zhejiang’s port integration reform unleashed new growth potential, with Ningbo-Zhoushan Port recording its highest container throughput growth in seven years. 

Meishan Port Area surpassed 10 million TEUs for the first time, joining Chuanshan Port Area to form the world’s only dual ten-million-TEU-class container terminal cluster. Guangdong began forming large-scale industrial clusters worth hundreds of billions of yuan in offshore engineering equipment and offshore wind power. Major projects such as the Shenzhen-Zhongshan Bridge opening, the commissioning of the ocean-going drilling vessel Dream in Guangzhou, and the successful trial operation of the world’s first megawatt-scale seawater electrolysis hydrogen production facility further strengthened the province’s marine industrial base.

Modern maritime cities leveraged their unique advantages to build new centers for marine economic growth. Shanghai, Shenzhen, and Qingdao enhanced their international maritime competitiveness, while Tianjin, Dalian, Ningbo, and Xiamen deepened their strengths in marine industries, achieving breakthroughs in port-industry-city integration, marine fisheries, modern shipping services, and marine pharmaceuticals. Cities such as Qinhuangdao, Lianyungang, Beihai, and Sanya promoted distinctive marine development by building high-quality marine tourism destinations and showcasing harmonious coexistence between people and the sea.

Demonstration zones for marine economic development also advanced innovative practices. Sixteen such zones achieved remarkable results through key demonstration projects. Tianjin established China’s first domestically produced seawater desalination production line, and Weihai’s Shawo Island National Offshore Fisheries Base achieved a return rate of over 90% for self-caught aquatic products. 

Rizhao operated 38 sea-rail intermodal freight trains, while Qingdao Blue Valley released the “Hanhai Xingyun” large model with parameters reaching the hundred-billion level. Lianyungang launched 911 China-Europe freight trains, up 13% year-on-year, and Yancheng was recognized as a Biodiversity 100+ Global Special Recommendation Case.

Shanghai’s Chongming District delivered the world’s first 14,000m³ river-sea direct LNG bunkering vessel, independently constructed in China. Ningbo completed China’s first blue carbon auction, and Wenzhou guided private capital into strategic sectors such as deep-sea energy development and high-end marine equipment. 

Fuzhou built the nation’s first county-level marine carbon sink trading service platform, and Xiamen established the world’s largest deep-sea microbial strain repository. Shenzhen’s marine enterprises secured more than 82,000 invention patents, while Zhanjiang developed a modern port-based industrial system focusing on green steel, petrochemicals, and energy. 

Beihai promoted the development of border port industrial parks and the China-ASEAN Industrial Cooperation Zone, and Lingshui advanced projects highlighting the cultural and tourism charm of the Tanka fishing community. Hunchun maintained stable operations of the “Hunchun-Europe” freight train service, contributing to cross-border marine economic connectivity.

Source: ycwb, xinhua, sina finance, gov cn  

China Becomes the World’s Third 600 km/h Maglev Power

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China Becomes the World’s Third 600 km/h Maglev Power

Since the advent of rail transit, the pursuit of higher operating speeds has remained a constant human aspiration. Maglev transportation, emerging a century after the development of traditional railways, reshapes the fundamental relationship between train and track by replacing physical contact with electromagnetic interaction. Suspended and propelled solely through magnetic forces, maglev systems overcome the mechanical limitations of wheel–rail friction and open a new frontier of ultra-high-speed ground transportation.

China’s systematic push in this field began in 2016, when the Ministry of Science and Technology launched the Program of Building National Strength in Transportation. Among its priorities was the development of a 600 km/h high-speed maglev system—identified in the national transportation strategy as a core technological reserve alongside 400 km/h wheel–rail trains and low-vacuum tube high-speed systems. 

In the decades prior, Germany and Japan had already invested heavily in maglev research, the former focusing on conventional electromagnetic suspension (EMS) using attraction forces and closed-loop controls, and the latter on superconducting electrodynamic suspension (EDS), which relies on the powerful magnetic fields produced by superconductors. China began exploring both maglev and wheel–rail options in the 1990s during planning for the Beijing–Shanghai high-speed railway, laying the foundation for later breakthroughs.

In 2021, China’s first 600 km/h high-speed maglev transportation system was officially released in Qingdao, signaling a major step forward in independent technological capability. On May 27, 2024, China Railway Construction Corporation (CRCC) completed its major research undertaking on the construction technologies for 600 km/h conventional-conductor high-speed maglev systems. This achievement made China the world’s third country to master the complete set of technologies for a 600 km/h maglev system and filled longstanding gaps in independent intellectual property, industrial chain integration, and practical engineering methods. Over four years, the project team carried out research across seven key fields—including bridge engineering, tunnel engineering, and infrastructure-vehicle interaction—resulting in 70 patents, multiple new processes and specifications, several newly developed products, and engineering software that has already been applied in real-world projects.

CRCC’s engagement with maglev research dates back to the 1990s, and its subsidiaries later became deeply involved in the Ministry of Science and Technology’s “Maglev Transportation Systems” program. As one of the principal contributors, the institute helped develop the national “Maglev Railway Technical Standards,” which took effect in 2020. With major urban clusters such as the Guangdong–Hong Kong–Macao Greater Bay Area and the Yangtze River Delta now planning high-speed maglev corridors, the demand for long-distance, high-capacity, ultra-fast ground transportation offers broad prospects for engineering application. 

The completion of CRCC’s latest project indicates that China has fundamentally mastered the engineering construction technologies necessary for 600 km/h conventional-guide maglev lines, establishing both a complete system of independent intellectual property and clear design principles for future implementation.

But how fast is 600 km/h? A large commercial aircraft typically cruises at 800 to 1000 km/h, while regional jets operate at around 500 km/h. A 600 km/h maglev runs almost like a “zero-altitude aircraft,” traveling at aviation speeds while remaining grounded. Maglev trains themselves, however, are not limited to high speeds alone. Depending on their suspension technology, materials, and rail structure, they can serve varied transportation needs: high-speed maglev reaching 400–600 km/h, medium-speed systems around 200 km/h, and low-to-medium-speed systems at approximately 100 km/h. The latter are technologically simpler and more economical, suited for urban and suburban transit. China currently operates three such low-to-medium-speed lines: Changsha Maglev Express (2016), Beijing’s S1 line (2017), and the Fenghuang Maglev Sightseeing Express (2022).

The target of 600 km/h is not arbitrary. China’s vast geography requires strong, efficient connections between major regional clusters such as the Yangtze River Delta, the Pearl River Delta, the Beijing–Tianjin–Hebei region, the Middle Yangtze River area, and the Chengdu–Chongqing economic circle. Many core cities—Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou—lie over a thousand kilometers apart. High-speed rail takes more than four and a half hours for some of these journeys, while flights are fast but costly and subject to weather and airport logistics. To maximize time efficiency, transportation scholars argue that intercity trips between major metropolitan areas should ideally be completed within about three hours, including intermediate stops. A commercial operating speed of 600 km/h is the practical threshold at which this goal becomes feasible.

At the 17th China International Modern Railway Technology and Equipment Exhibition in July 2025, three major maglev prototypes—conventional high-speed maglev, superconducting high-speed maglev, and conventional medium-low-speed maglev—were unveiled together for the first time. Among them, the superconducting electric high-speed maglev attracted particular attention. Its levitation relies on electromagnetic induction between onboard high-temperature superconducting magnets and coils embedded in the track. These superconducting poles generate magnetic fields exceeding 5 tesla, producing strong, stable forces for levitation and propulsion. 

The train integrates cryogenic thermostats, refrigeration units, and advanced thermal management systems to ensure reliable operation of the superconducting components. Lightweight aluminum alloys and carbon-fiber composites form the vehicle body, while an aerodynamically optimized nose reduces drag at high speeds. The system is designed for GoA4 fully autonomous operation, incorporating 5G communication, AI-based monitoring, multilayer redundancy, and comprehensive electromagnetic shielding to balance efficiency, safety, intelligence, and ride comfort. As CRRC senior engineer Shao Nan noted, the independent completion of materials, coils, cryogenic systems, and other core components represents not only a technological milestone but also a catalyst for broader industrial advancement across superconductivity, advanced manufacturing, and high-end rail equipment.

High-speed maglev is an ultra-complex, large-scale systems engineering endeavor that must follow rigorous R&D, validation, and testing procedures before reaching commercial readiness. While China’s conventional high-speed maglev technologies have now reached engineering implementation standards, true commercial operation will require building a dedicated high-speed maglev test line to verify running speeds, operational stability, and long-term safety. Only after these validations can the system officially welcome passengers and open a new chapter in ultra-fast ground transportation.

Source: wuhan gov, xinhua, cjrb, news bjd

China–ASEAN Free Trade Area 3.0: Regional Integration and High-Quality Cooperation

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China–ASEAN Free Trade Area 3.0: Regional Integration and High-Quality Cooperation

More than five months after the conclusion of negotiations, the upgraded 3.0 version of the China–ASEAN Free Trade Area Protocol was formally signed, marking a new milestone in regional cooperation.

On October 28, during the 47th ASEAN Summit held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, China and ASEAN signed the 3.0-version upgrade protocol of the China–ASEAN Free Trade Area. Negotiations for the 3.0 upgrade began in November 2022 and reached substantive completion in October 2024. Based on the existing China–ASEAN Free Trade Agreement and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), this new version further expands mutually beneficial cooperation in emerging areas, strengthens interconnection in standards and regulations, and promotes regional trade facilitation and inclusive development.

The 3.0 upgrade covers nine key fields: the digital economy, green economy, supply-chain connectivity, standards and technical regulations with conformity assessment, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, customs procedures and trade facilitation, competition and consumer protection, micro-, small- and medium-sized enterprises, and economic and technological cooperation. These areas reflect both sides’ determination to lead in the formulation of international rules and to deepen cooperation in new domains.

As China’s first foreign free trade partner and ASEAN’s first FTA partner, the China–ASEAN Free Trade Area has always held a pivotal position in the regional economic landscape. From its early 1.0 stage to the current 3.0 era, the evolution of this partnership demonstrates the steady progress of both sides in promoting regional economic integration. After the signing of the protocol, both parties will complete their domestic ratification procedures to bring the agreement into force as soon as possible.

With this upgrade, China–ASEAN economic cooperation has reached a new starting point. Scholars note that while globalization was once defined primarily by free trade and investment on a global scale, today the trend is shifting toward regional integration. China and ASEAN, as leaders in regional cooperation, have built one of the world’s most dynamic economic relationships. For sixteen consecutive years, China has remained ASEAN’s largest trading partner, while ASEAN has been China’s largest partner for the past five years. The 3.0 version thus reflects not only a higher standard of openness but also a new direction for global economic cooperation led by regional partnerships.

Experts believe that at a time when the global economy faces mounting uncertainty, the signing of this upgraded protocol represents a significant step toward high-quality openness and cooperation. It shows China and ASEAN’s shared commitment to defending the multilateral trading system, countering protectionist trends, and strengthening regional economic resilience through deeper institutional cooperation. For both sides, this means a more stable space for small and medium-sized enterprises and reduced exposure to external risks. The 3.0 version is also a leap beyond tariff reduction: it embodies rule-making, standard integration, and governance innovation — a systemic upgrade that reflects Asia’s capacity to craft its own solutions for regional trade and development.

From focusing on tariff reduction in goods to expanding markets in services, the China–ASEAN Free Trade Area has evolved in scope and sophistication. The 3.0 version marks a fundamental shift — from a “list of goods” approach to one led by “rules and standards.” It introduces mutual recognition of standards within its framework, establishes a unified standard for electronic invoices in digital trade, promotes a “white list” mechanism for cross-border data flows, and creates a carbon-footprint tracing system and photovoltaic component standard recognition in support of green transformation.

Analysts also point out that ASEAN has never been a uniform entity — internal rules and standards vary significantly from one country to another. The 3.0 version seeks to break through these regulatory barriers by fostering convergence in rules. In the field of green economy, for instance, both sides are working to remove trade barriers related to environmental goods and services and to promote mutual recognition of industrial standards, thus facilitating cooperation in green industries and sustainable production capacity.

Under the framework of high-standard rules, China and ASEAN are not only enhancing traditional trade and investment but also broadening collaboration into new sectors. The nine areas covered by the 3.0 upgrade — particularly digital and green economies — are at the heart of global trade transformation. Experts emphasize that these two fields exemplify the complementary advantages between China and ASEAN. In the green economy, for example, Chinese companies in new energy vehicles, photovoltaics, and energy storage are rapidly expanding in Southeast Asia, helping to upgrade local industries and accelerate the region’s green transition. This cooperation not only represents new opportunities for China’s high-tech industries but also injects momentum into ASEAN’s sustainable development.

Despite the current climate of uncertainty in global trade, China and ASEAN have maintained remarkable resilience in their economic relations, sending a clear signal of openness, cooperation, and shared prosperity. According to the General Administration of Customs of China, in the first three quarters of this year, China’s trade with ASEAN reached 5.57 trillion yuan, up 9.6 percent year on year, accounting for 16.6 percent of China’s total foreign trade — reaffirming ASEAN’s position as China’s largest trading partner.

Both sides have long been committed to deepening regional economic integration. Their industrial and supply chains are closely intertwined, with rapid growth in both upstream and downstream trade. As multiple bilateral and multilateral free trade agreements between China and ASEAN members take effect, tariff reductions and trade facilitation continue to deliver tangible benefits, strengthening the integration of regional production networks. In the first three quarters alone, China’s exports of textile machinery and raw materials to ASEAN rose by 28.2 percent and 13.4 percent respectively, while imports of garments increased by 9.3 percent. Imports of rubber from ASEAN surged by 40.7 percent, and exports of tires and auto parts grew by 19.8 percent.

Experts consistently highlight the complementary nature of both sides’ industrial structures. China provides ASEAN with intermediate goods, digital technology, green equipment, and capital, while ASEAN contributes abundant natural resources, labor, and vast emerging markets. China’s technological capability, skilled workforce, and advanced manufacturing combine naturally with ASEAN’s youthful demographics and resource advantages. This synergy allows both sides to maximize their respective strengths.

Such complementarity extends into high-tech sectors. Many Chinese semiconductor companies, for instance, are investing in Malaysia’s Penang region, symbolizing a new wave of two-way industrial cooperation. Institutional frameworks such as RCEP and now CAFTA 3.0 are providing the legal and structural backbone that sustains this dynamic integration.

China’s consistent advocacy of free trade and open regionalism continues to benefit ASEAN economies. As RCEP marks its third anniversary, cooperation between China and ASEAN has grown closer than ever. With China actively pursuing accession to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) — of which several ASEAN countries are already members — the foundation for broader regional cooperation is steadily expanding.

The signing of the China–ASEAN Free Trade Area 3.0 upgrade protocol thus stands as a landmark achievement. It embodies China’s determination to safeguard multilateralism, deepen institutional openness, and jointly shape the future of regional economic governance with its ASEAN partners. Beyond economic integration, it showcases a distinctly Asian model of cooperation — one rooted in equality, mutual respect, and shared progress — and offers the world a new vision of globalization led not by confrontation, but by collaboration and common development.

Source: Global Times, Reuters, CGTN, ASEAN Main Portal

Why Were Tianjin Merchants Indispensable in the Qing Campaign to Reclaim Xinjiang?

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Why Were Tianjin Merchants Indispensable in the Qing Campaign to Reclaim Xinjiang?

In the winter of 1942, inside a modest apartment in Tianjin, a ninety-one-year-old man quietly passed away. His death attracted little attention in the chaos of wartime China, yet the life behind it was extraordinary. Born into a poor boatman’s family and later celebrated as a pioneering merchant, An Wenzhong embodied a rare fusion of personal grit, national commitment, and commercial ingenuity. His story, though rooted in one man’s fate, reflects a broader historical transformation in which ordinary people became unwitting participants in the reshaping of China’s frontier.

An Wenzhong’s life intersected early with the turbulence of the late Qing dynasty. As a young laborer hauling towboats along the rivers of Zhili, he had already grown familiar with hardship. In 1868, when Zuo Zongtang prepared to transport massive quantities of military supplies to Shaanxi after suppressing the Western Nian rebels, the government issued a public call for vessels and boatmen. The wages were attractive, but the task was demanding and dangerous. War had barely receded, the route was long, and few were willing to gamble their lives for silver. Driven by poverty but also by a keen sense of opportunity, An volunteered immediately. It was a decision that would reshape not only his own future, but also the commercial history of China’s northwest.

When the supplies reached Xi’an, An observed the severe scarcity of daily necessities within Zuo Zongtang’s camp. Soldiers possessed money but had nowhere to spend it; the rugged frontier terrain made access to basic goods nearly impossible. Sensing both need and opportunity, An modified his role: instead of returning home, he acquired a pair of shoulder baskets, filled them with locally sourced essentials, and followed the army, selling goods as the troops marched. His small mobile business—improvised, risky, and physically exhausting—proved remarkably successful. Within a few years, he had saved three hundred taels of silver, a fortune for a man of his background, and returned home to Yangliuqing amid the admiration of neighbors who saw in him a rare example of upward mobility.

But fortune never promised constancy. While later transporting grain with partners, An encountered a sudden sea storm and lost everything he had worked for. Stripped again to poverty, he made a familiar decision: he repacked his baskets and rejoined Zuo Zongtang’s forces, which were now advancing into Xinjiang to confront the regime of Yakub Beg. This recurrence marked more than personal persistence—it signaled the beginning of a commercial phenomenon. His example inspired other Yangliuqing men to follow military camps westward, forming what later became known as the camp merchants.

By 1875, when Zuo Zongtang, already past sixty, launched the grand campaign to reclaim Xinjiang, the logistical deficiencies of the expedition became painfully clear. Supply lines stretched thin across desolate terrain, leaving over 100,000 soldiers without reliable access to basic provisions. Recognizing the crisis, Liu Jintang, commander of the vanguard, proposed recruiting merchants to accompany the army and provide goods. Zuo agreed without hesitation. In that moment, a symbiotic relationship emerged: the military gained supplemental supply chains, while merchants gained unprecedented access to new markets across the frontier.

Among these merchants, An Wenzhong became a central figure. His understanding of soldiers’ needs was intimate and pragmatic. Beyond staple goods, he carried medicinal plasters, simple clothing, toiletries, and even small luxuries like tobacco, dried fruits, and wine—items that restored a sense of humanity to men stationed far from home. The journey was grueling. Caravans traveled through barren deserts and snow-covered passes, losing men to illness, bandit attacks, and extreme weather. Many who followed the advancing camps never returned. Yet the merchants persisted, propelled by necessity, opportunity, and a growing sense that their work served not just their own survival but also the survival of the army.

As the campaign progressed, Yangliuqing peddlers expanded their presence across the frontier, eventually spreading into nearly every major settlement in Xinjiang. Recognizing their contributions to the supply effort and the stabilization of newly reclaimed territories, the Qing court granted An Wenzhong and others permission to build rammed-earth houses near the Grand Crossroads of Ürümqi. What began as itinerant, precarious commerce thus transformed into permanent settlement. Shops emerged, markets formed, and a new commercial ecosystem took root.

Once settled, An established a store called Wenfengtai, which became a key node in Xinjiang’s developing economy. He supplied troops with necessities but also served local residents of various ethnicities. Xinjiang’s communities were eager for goods from inland China—copperware, medicinal herbs, silk, and household items—while merchants like An recognized the high value of local specialties such as Hetian jade, Ili animal furs, and Turpan raisins. Through these exchanges, a two-way commercial bridge emerged between Tianjin and the distant frontier.

Trade between the camp merchants and nomadic groups followed rhythms shaped by season and tradition. Barter dominated: flour, tea, cloth, and tools were exchanged for livestock, fine pelts, and high-quality leather. Transactions were grounded in trust and mutual benefit, qualities that enabled merchants to operate safely in regions where political control was often fragile. Over time, these exchanges strengthened economic links between the interior and the frontier, contributing to broader patterns of cultural interaction and mutual dependence.

As commerce flourished, so did cultural exchange. Through the merchants’ movement, technologies, artistic styles, and social ideas from inland China gradually reached Xinjiang. At the same time, frontier customs and goods entered the consciousness of the interior. The merchants’ presence fostered a subtle but significant process of integration. It supplemented the Qing government’s frontier strategy with grassroots economic and cultural networks that the state itself struggled to build. In this sense, An Wenzhong and his peers were not merely merchants; they were intermediaries between worlds.

Over the decades, the Great Camp Merchants evolved from battlefield suppliers into fully entrenched participants in the frontier economy. Their families took root, communities formed, and a new generation grew up speaking multiple languages and navigating multiple cultures. Their work supported soldiers but also facilitated exchanges among Han, Uyghur, Hui, Kazakh, Mongol, and other ethnic groups. In doing so, they shaped a century-long record of ethnic interaction and commercial integration in China’s northwest.

When An Wenzhong died in 1942, his personal fortune mattered less than the transformation he helped initiate. His life was a microcosm of resilience: a man repeatedly battered by circumstance yet continuously rebuilding, innovating, and expanding the possibilities of his environment. From a poor boatman’s son to a frontier magnate, he demonstrated how individual agency—when aligned with national needs and historical opportunity—can leave a lasting imprint far beyond one lifetime. His journey remains a reminder that history is often advanced not only by generals and officials, but also by the ordinary individuals who shoulder their baskets, follow the uncertain road, and carve new paths across unfamiliar lands.

Source: dzh, tjxqda, xinhua

As the World Rushes for Gold, China’s Past Reveals How It Once Guarded Thrones and Prosperity

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As the World Rushes for Gold, China’s Past Reveals How It Once Guarded Thrones and Prosperity

In recent years, gold prices have surged relentlessly. Entering October, international gold prices hovered at a high of $3,900 per ounce. As the world is enveloped by unilateralism and uncertainty, gold has once again become the reliable ark amidst the stormy seas. Its soaring value reflects humanity’s quest for security amid turmoil.

Why has gold been revered as currency from ancient city-states to modern nations? And why does it continue safeguarding wealth in today’s modern world? The reasons lie not only in its high density, divisibility, and stable properties, but also in its scarce reserves and arduous extraction—this very scarcity acts as a bulwark against hyperinflation.

China ranks seventh globally in gold reserves, yet its preciousness remains evident relative to its vast territory. So how did ancient people, with limited technology, carve through mountains, refine pure gold, and safeguard this rare splendor?

Beneath all the Song Dynasty’s prosperity lay a crucial foundation: ample currency. This brings us to the unsung hero behind the Song Dynasty’s economic boom—Pan Mei—and the Linglong Gold Mine he personally oversaw.

In popular imagination, Pan Mei is the real-life inspiration for Pan Renmei, a villainous minister in the Generals of the Yang Family. Yet historical truth is often more complex than the stage. 

In the fourth year of the Jingde era (1205 AD), Pan Mei arrived at Luoshan Mountain in Zhaoyuan (present-day Zhaoyuan City, Shandong Province). Fresh from a crushing defeat on the northern front, he now carried a mission to redeem his failures through action: the Liao forces in the north loomed menacingly, while years of warfare had drained the imperial treasury. Gold had become the “lifeblood” sustaining the Northern Song Dynasty.

In Zhaoyuan, he witnessed miners still using inefficient, millennia-old sand-washing methods, rampant illegal mining, and bandit-infested wilderness. This had to change.

Thus, a quiet revolution unfolded in these mountains: Pan Mei implemented a system of government-established mining sites overseen by supervisors, with mining rights granted to private operators, merging state will with private initiative. He boldly introduced gunpowder into mining operations, using blasting to fracture rock layers. This innovative break first, sift later technique unlocked the buried gold treasures deep underground. He also established tax supervisors and enforced strict regulations, transforming the chaotic mines into orderly production bases through decisive action.

People from all corners transformed the gold mine, and the mine, in turn, reshaped Zhaoyuan. Shandong artisans, Hebei farmers, Henan merchants, and technicians from various ethnic groups converged like countless streams into this bubbling land.

This gold mine became the veritable “economic ballast” of the Northern Song Dynasty. Historical records estimate that Linglong Gold Mine’s annual output provided nearly one-tenth of the precious metals sustaining the central treasury.

Beyond commercial circulation, gold flowing from these mountains was indispensable—whether for supplying military provisions at the frontiers, aiding disaster-stricken refugees across the land, or regulating the nation’s monetary flow.

During the Han Dynasty, Chao Cuo passionately argued that a wise emperor values grain over gold and jade, yet no emperor ever truly dared to devalue gold. As history’s wheel inevitably shifted from a natural economy toward a commodity-based one, gold’s status became increasingly unshakable.

The late Ming dynasty’s predicament stands as a bloody lesson: the imperial treasury lay bare, with fiscal revenues insufficient even to sustain the silver pay for a single army stationed in Liaodong. The shortage of gold and silver, coupled with economic decline and deflation, acted like an invisible noose that ultimately strangled the dynasty’s lifeline. This demonstrates that the functioning of a nation’s economy ultimately requires solid precious metals as its foundation.

This was the legacy of Pan Mei and the Linglong Gold Mine. The praise and criticism on the theatrical stage were but fleeting smoke and clouds; yet the veins of gold buried deep underground, and the river of currency they spawned, laid a silent yet solid foundation for the economic prosperity of the Northern Song Dynasty.

During the War of Resistance, the people protected the gold from Japanese plunder and supplied it to the Communist Party for the fight.

In 1938, the crackle of Japanese gunfire shattered the tranquility of Zhaoyuan. The invaders’ greedy eyes locked onto the Linglong Gold Mine—they intended to fund their war efforts by exploiting the veins our ancestors had mined.

Bunkers sprouted like poisonous mushrooms atop the hills, barbed wire severing the ancestral lands. Yet the people of Zhaoyuan refused to bow. A silent yet resolute “Battle to Protect the Gold” quietly commenced within the familiar mine shafts and the silent wilderness.

Miner Wang Dechang would forever remember those secret moments under dim miner’s lamps. Using the clanging of chisels as cover, he and his comrades carved hidden compartments into rock walls beyond the Japanese soldiers’ line of sight. They wrapped heavy gold bars in layers of coarse cloth, carefully tucked them into bamboo tubes, and hid them deep within the mine tunnels or in crevices along mountain streams.

Women concealed gold dust deep within their hair buns, calmly passing through Japanese checkpoints despite searches. Returning home, they bent over basins, gently shaking loose their black tresses—where specks of gold glimmered at the bottom.

As night deepened, guerrilla fighters disguised as porters shouldered these “special cargo” still warm from human touch. They navigated barbed wire and sentry posts, delivering this fiery devotion from the depths of Zhaoyuan step by step to distant Yan’an.

This gold-guarding route flowed with blood that knew no boundaries.

Under flickering miner’s lamps, Han Chinese miners—with their intimate knowledge of the tunnels—secretly handed spider-web-like mine maps to the guerrillas; Amidst the ringing of camel bells, Hui merchants leveraged their extensive trade networks to carve out covert routes for gold transit; Through forests and snowfields, Manchu hunters guided convoys through remote mountains using ancestral tracking skills.

This gold was no longer mere treasure—it transformed into steel rifles in soldiers’ hands, becoming the force for national salvation.

In those years, the gold transported from Zhaoyuan shone brightly in the darkest hour— During the War of Resistance, the gold sent to Yan’an funded the purchase of vast quantities of military supplies, propping up half the foundation of the Jiaodong Anti-Japanese Base Area.

By this point, Linglong Gold Mine had long transcended the significance of a mere mining site. It became a spiritual bastion forged in gold—a solemn oath to defend the nation, written in blood by the Chinese people when their homeland lay shattered.

From the Northern Song Dynasty to the War of Resistance, Zhaoyuan Gold Mine once underpinned the prosperity of an empire, and later became the pillar of survival when the nation faced ruin.

Though the world has changed and the seas have turned to fields, the veins of gold buried deep beneath the earth still shimmer silently in the depths of history. They bear witness to the resilience and dignity of the Chinese nation in the face of every storm. Gold and silver may fade, but the spirit forged by a nation in the act of protection will shine forever.

Source: dzh, cgsjournals, newsduan, goldmarket

Tibetan Buddhism and Its Sinicization through History

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Tibetan Buddhism and Its Sinicization through History

Tibetan Buddhism is a Buddhist tradition with distinct Tibetan characteristics that emerged and developed in the Snowland. Yet it has never been an exclusive belief of the Tibetan people alone. Rather, it has long been a shared faith among numerous ethnic groups within the Chinese nation, including Tibetans, the Tanguts of Western Xia, Han Chinese, Mongols, Manchus, and historically the Uyghurs. 

Throughout ancient Chinese history, Tibetan Buddhism served as the dominant religion under multiple dynasties, including the Western Xia, Yuan, Ming, and Qing. Its dissemination and flourishing among these diverse ethnic groups not only reflected but also strengthened the political and cultural unity of the Chinese state, profoundly reshaping the religious and ethnic landscape of ancient China.

Nearly two decades ago, the concept of “Han-Tibetan Buddhism” was proposed as a corrective to the long-dominant Western academic notion of “Indian-Tibetan Buddhism.” This framework emphasizes the historical emergence and development of Tibetan Buddhism from a Han-Tibetan perspective, highlighting its deep connections with Han Chinese Buddhism. In truth, Tibetan Buddhism represents not merely the localization of Buddhism in Tibet, but also a monumental achievement in the broader process of the Sinicization of Buddhism.

The early propagation of Tibetan Buddhism was closely intertwined with the introduction of Chinese Buddhism and its absorption of Han culture. Many of the Buddhist scriptures translated during the Tibetan Empire were derived from Chinese Buddhist texts. The great translator Chos grub (c. 755–849) was fluent in Chinese, Tibetan, and Sanskrit, and his achievements in translation rivaled those of the great translators of Chinese Buddhism, such as Kumarajiva (343–413) and Xuanzang (602–664).

One of the most significant events of the early propagation period was the Samye Debate (792–794) between the Indian gradualist master Padmasambhava and the Chinese Chan monk Moheyan. This debate represented a confrontation between the Chinese doctrine of “sudden enlightenment” and the Indian “gradual enlightenment” tradition. Although later Buddhist historians reinterpreted this event as a symbolic “memory field” in Tibetan Buddhist history, demonizing the “monk’s teachings” as heresy, it in fact reflected the vibrant presence of Chinese Chan Buddhism in early Tibet. The “monk’s teachings,” like the legendary boot left behind by Mahayana upon departing Tibet, never entirely disappeared. Their influence, possibly connected to later Tibetan doctrines such as the Great Perfection (Dzogchen), Mahamudra, and the “Other-Emptiness” philosophy, deserves continued scholarly attention.

Tibetan Buddhism turned eastward at an early stage, embarking on a long process of Sinicization. From the mid-eighth to the mid-ninth century, when the Tibetan Empire ruled the Western Regions, Tibetan culture centered on Buddhism became deeply intertwined with the civilizations of the Western Regions, initiating a long history of exchange and integration. Dunhuang, in particular, served as a pivotal meeting point for Han-Tibetan cultural interaction. Both Han and Tibetan Buddhist traditions converged there, forming the earliest expressions of Han-Tibetan Buddhism.

Manuscripts unearthed at Dunhuang reveal that Chinese Chan literature was extensively translated into Tibetan, indicating the widespread dissemination of Han Chan Buddhism during the Tibetan Empire. At the same time, numerous Tibetan texts and artworks related to the Old Translation Tantras show that the Nyingma School’s tantric practices were already flourishing in the region by the ninth and tenth centuries. Although the Tibetan Empire’s rule over the Western Regions lasted less than a century, it left a deep and lasting cultural imprint. Tibetan remained a common language in the Khotan region until the twelfth century, and Tibetan Buddhism continued to thrive there. By the time of the Mongol Khanate and the Yuan dynasty, the Uyghurs—profoundly influenced by Tibetan Buddhism—served as crucial intermediaries in religious and cultural exchanges between Tibetan lamas and Mongol rulers.

In the early twelfth century, newly translated tantric teachings of Tibetan Buddhism became the dominant esoteric tradition in Tibet and spread widely throughout the Western Xia dynasty. Research on Tibetan Buddhist texts unearthed at Black Water City reveals that Western Xia Buddhism represents an important chapter in the Later Propagation period of Tibetan Buddhism. Among these texts are both Chinese and Western Xia translations of Milarepa’s (1052–1135) “Tummo Meditation” instructions, suggesting that their dissemination in both Tibet and Western Xia occurred almost simultaneously. Furthermore, the Black Water City manuscripts contain esoteric materials from diverse lineages, including Nyingma, Kadam, Sakya, and Kagyu, showing that Tibetan esotericism flourished in Western Xia nearly as early as in Tibet itself. Western Xia likely elevated Tibetan Buddhism to the level of a state religion, with Tibetan lamas serving as imperial tutors to its kings.

Following the fall of Western Xia, several tribal groups tracing their lineage to its royal house migrated into Tibet. Western Xia thus became deeply embedded in Tibetan historical memory, recognized by later Buddhist historians as a Buddhist kingdom and a vital part of Tibetan Buddhist lineage history.

Tibetan Buddhism spread even more extensively under the Mongol Khanate and the Yuan dynasty. Beginning with the alliance between the Mongol prince Köden and the Sakya Pandita uncle-nephew duo in Liangzhou, Tibetan Buddhism became the faith of the Mongols and profoundly transformed their spiritual world. It achieved its widest dissemination across the vast territories of the Mongol Empire. Numerous ethnic groups within the Yuan realm—including Han Chinese, Tanguts, and Uyghurs—embraced Tibetan Buddhism in significant numbers. Under Yuan rule, generations of Sakya lamas served as Imperial Preceptors to the emperors, presiding over the Bureau of Buddhist and Tibetan Affairs and overseeing Buddhist activity across the empire.

During this period, Tibetan masters of various schools—Sakya, Nyingma, and Kagyu—traveled to the Central Plains to teach. The Yuan capital Dadu (modern Beijing) became a major center of Tibetan Buddhism, with esoteric practices flourishing within and beyond the imperial court. Tibetan Buddhist texts were translated into Chinese, Mongolian, Uyghur, and other languages. Among the Uyghur manuscripts discovered in Turpan, a significant portion consists of Tibetan esoteric literature, showing that before their conversion to Islam in the late Yuan period, the Uyghurs were largely adherents of Tibetan Buddhism. Though the Yuan dynasty lasted less than a century, it left a profound political and cultural legacy: the close religious ties between Tibetan lamas, imperial rulers, and the populace helped sustain Tibet’s vassal relationship with successive Chinese central governments.

From the Yuan onward, Mongol devotion to Tibetan Buddhism reshaped the political and religious landscape of northern and northwestern China. The Mongols played a pivotal role in Tibet’s religious history: from Sakya Pandita and Kublai Khan to the Third Dalai Lama and Altan Khan, and later the Fifth Dalai Lama and Gushri Khan, they established enduring patron-priest relationships that embodied the fusion of politics and religion between Mongolia and Tibet. The Qianlong Emperor of the Qing dynasty explicitly stated that the Qing promotion of the Yellow Sect aimed to pacify the Mongols, affirming that Tibetan Buddhism had long served as a bridge uniting the Mongol and Tibetan peoples.

Under the unprecedented unification of the Mongol Khanate and Yuan Empire, Tibetan Buddhism spread widely among Han, Tibetan, and Mongol populations, as well as throughout Western Xia and the Western Regions, marking a glorious chapter in its Sinicization. The Mongols’ rapid adoption of Tibetan Buddhism had deep roots in the Western Xia legacy, while its flourishing during the Yuan dynasty laid the foundation for its broader acceptance in the Ming and Qing periods. From Western Xia through the Yuan, Ming, and Qing dynasties, Tibetan Buddhism became a shared faith among multiple ethnic groups and a crucial spiritual bond linking these successive dynasties.

Following the fall of the Yuan, the Ming emperors continued and even deepened imperial support for Tibetan Buddhism. The Yongle Emperor, shortly after ascending the throne, invited the Fifth Karmapa to the capital and hosted a grand Buddhist assembly at Linggu Temple in Nanjing attended by over twenty thousand monks to pray for the souls of his parents, the founding emperor and empress of the Ming dynasty. The Yongle Emperor also invited eminent Tibetan masters from Ü-Tsang, conferring upon them the titles of “Three Great Dharma Kings” and “Five Great Dharma Kings,” and allowed over two thousand Tibetan monks to reside permanently in the capital to serve the imperial court.

Throughout the Ming dynasty, Beijing became a major center for Tibetan Buddhism. The Tibetan Scripture Workshop in the city produced numerous translations, while the western suburbs housed large monasteries accommodating thousands of Tibetan monks. Nearly all major monasteries in Ü-Tsang maintained tribute relations with the Ming court. Most surviving Chinese translations of Tibetan esoteric texts date from the early Ming period, and the number of Han Chinese practitioners of Tibetan Buddhism far exceeded that of the Yuan era. Many high-ranking Ming court monks, bearing titles such as “National Preceptor” and “Dharma King,” were Tibetan lamas. Tibetan Buddhism thus achieved a remarkable level of Sinicization during the Ming dynasty, surpassing Han Buddhism in imperial prestige and influence.

The Qing rulers, like their Ming predecessors, actively supported Tibetan Buddhism, which became the dominant Buddhist tradition of the Qing era. Emperors Shunzhi, Kangxi, Yongzheng, and Qianlong all demonstrated sincere devotion to it. Although Emperor Qianlong often claimed his promotion of the Yellow Sect served political goals—chiefly to stabilize the Mongols—his personal faith was evident. He constructed the Fanhualou temple within the imperial palace for his own esoteric practice, collected extensive Tibetan ritual texts, commissioned the translation of the Tibetan Buddhist canon into Manchu, and even designed his mausoleum as a mandala. He also built the Eight Outer Temples around the Rehe Summer Palace, integrating political strategy with religious devotion and creating a permanent center for Tibetan Buddhism in the Chinese heartland.

The Qing dynasty’s state masters, including the Zhangjia Hutuktu and other lamas stationed in Beijing, played key roles in spreading Tibetan Buddhism throughout the empire. Together with the Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama, they served as spiritual leaders of the Qing realm. Tibetan Buddhism continued to flourish, reaching broader audiences among the multi-ethnic population and undergoing further Sinicization. Emperor Qianlong, who regarded himself as a Bodhisattva Emperor, actively shaped its development through policies such as the Golden Urn selection system, which formalized reincarnation recognition and strengthened state oversight of the faith.

Through continuous fusion across the Western Xia, Yuan, Ming, and Qing dynasties, this process produced the distinctive form of Tibetan Buddhism that endures today—a form deeply rooted in Chinese civilization and distinct from its Indian origins. Tibetan Buddhism, therefore, must be understood not merely as a regional adaptation of Buddhism, but as an integral and vital component of Chinese Buddhism itself.

Source: dzh, cpc people, kdl gov, xizang gov

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