In the past year, the wave of populism in Europe has resurfaced. The results of the European Parliament elections show that populism continues to grow, particularly in major nations like Germany, France, and the UK.
In the United States, Donald Trump was re-elected as president, attracting global attention. Populism is gaining momentum in the West, and with Trump back in power, the populist movement is strengthening on both sides of the Atlantic, with increasing influence on each other and globally.
Populism has become a prominent topic in global politics and area studies in recent years, sparking a wealth of academic research and contemporary analysis. Prior to the UK’s 2016 EU referendum, most scholars viewed populism as a transient phenomenon, believing that once the political system had adjusted, traditional political structures and institutions would return to normal. However, following the 2024 U.S. presidential election, the persistence of populism has become undeniable.
It must be acknowledged that populists are often able to portray themselves as more democratic than mainstream politicians. This is due to their skill in invoking the inherently ambiguous concept of “the people” in the Western political context. Populists boldly claim the power to define “the people,” asserting that they represent the “real” people, while labeling their opponents as the “enemies of the people.” For instance, Nigel Farage, then-leader of the UK Independence Party (UKIP), declared after the passage of the EU referendum that it was a victory for the real, ordinary, and decent people. This rhetoric implies that British citizens who voted against Brexit were not the people.
There is no single group that can be universally defined as people. The term can refer to blue-collar workers, small business owners, students burdened with loans, or the lower and middle classes. What defines populism is not these specific groups but the underlying conflict between “the people” and the “elite,” representing a series of demands that populists direct at the established political order.
It is crucial to note that this conflict exhibits significant variations across different political contexts. In other words, there is no consistent political agenda among populist ideas, parties, and their supporters. This diversity even challenges the traditional left-right political spectrum.
Populism is often viewed as a byproduct of mass democracy gone awry. However, if that were the case, populism would not be seen as a variant of political ideology and would pose far less danger. While populism often involves broad mass mobilization, it is, in fact, the antithesis of democracy. In a populist movement, mass mobilization does not enhance democratic participation or improve the quality of democratic deliberation. Instead, it frequently serves to elevate a charismatic political figure—today, figures like U.S. President Donald Trump, French National Rally Leader Marine Le Pen, British Reform Party chief Nigel Farage, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, German BSW leader Sarah Wagenknecht, Dutch Freedom Party head Geert Wilders, and Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán—to the pinnacle of power. From there, these figures often abandon true democratic principles. History has shown that populism frequently leads to reckless policies, and the current state of the United States serves as a sobering reminder of this.
It is essential to understand that populism is not a product of democracy itself. Populist forces have existed long before democracy became the dominant political system in the Western world and have erupted in periodic waves throughout history. Many analysts, when examining the current wave of populism, treat it as a contemporary phenomenon, often confining the study of populism to the post-Cold War era or even the period following the 2008 global financial crisis. However, a more comprehensive review of the evolution of Western political and economic systems since the Industrial Revolution reveals that developments in productive forces, technological advances, shifts in the social order, and globalization have repeatedly given rise to radical populist movements. These movements, in turn, have driven significant changes in modern political, economic, and social systems.
As early as the 1880s and 1890s in the United States, the concentration of wealth in the hands of the top 1% began to increase sharply. By the turn of the 20th century, U.S. economic power was dominated by families such as the Carnegies, Vanderbilts, Morgans, and Rockefellers, who amassed vast fortunes through emerging mega-corporations unencumbered by antitrust laws or regulation. The stagnation of middle-class incomes and the growing concentration of wealth in the U.S. after the Cold War should therefore not be seen as unique phenomena.
The U.S. addressed this issue of wealth polarization in the first half of the 20th century through a complex mix of internal and external policy adjustments, involving power struggles as intricate as those seen in today’s global political landscape. Populism played a significant role in this process, such as prompting the passage of the Immigration Act of 1917, which introduced stricter screening of immigrants on national security grounds.
This historical precedent offers insight into the current trend of tightening immigration policies in many Western nations. Events that might seem unrelated in the broader timeline, such as the Swing Riots (19th-century British farmer protests against new economic and agricultural practices), the Ku Klux Klan (a white supremacy group in the U.S.), and McCarthyism (the widespread persecution of suspected communists and progressive voices in mid-20th-century America), are deeply intertwined with populist movements.
While the triggers vary, groups drawn to populism tend to suffer from economic insecurity, nostalgia for a past way of life, and an inability to adapt to technological advancements or external competition.
Populism is not an isolated issue of contemporary politics, nor is it an irresistible force. If citizens can effectively articulate their interests and translate them into government policy, large-scale populism is less likely to proliferate. Elites are often aware that certain segments of the population have suffered persistent economic erosion, but as beneficiaries of the existing political and economic system, they are frequently reluctant to push for substantial reforms. This is a crucial lesson for late-developing countries: they must avoid allowing deep social polarization to take root during periods of economic growth, as it could lead to political fragmentation or mutual vetoes.
Source: FSI, BBC, SBS
