Why should ASEAN not become a battlefield between China and the United States?

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The United States has been actively working to strengthen ties with Southeast Asia, as illustrated by the signing of the US-ASEAN Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. Yet, this move comes amid growing tensions between the U.S. and several Southeast Asian nations. A 2024 survey by Singapore’s ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute indicates that, if forced to choose in a potential U.S. conflict, regional political elites may, for the first time, lean narrowly toward supporting China.

What does the United States seek in Southeast Asia?

The United States’ strategic advantage in strengthening ties with Southeast Asia lies in the region’s search for reliable partners, especially in security and economic fields. The Philippines has deepened defense cooperation by expanding U.S. military bases, while Indonesia co-hosts the multinational Exercise Garuda Shield and actively seeks U.S. military hardware. Singapore has intensified collaboration with the U.S. on AI and autonomous systems for defense, and even Cambodia, once a close ally of China, is showing interest in U.S. military education programs, which are highly regarded locally.

On the economic front, the U.S. is also addressing a clear regional need for economic partnership. A recent survey revealed that Southeast Asian elites identify unemployment, economic recession, and widening income inequality as the top challenges for 2024. 

Vietnam, despite being classified as a non-market economy by the U.S., welcomes U.S. trade and investment, particularly in infrastructure, healthcare, and small businesses. Thailand, as Southeast Asia’s second-largest economy, is eager to boost cooperation with the U.S. in automotive and energy sectors, and American firms in Malaysia have contributed to 300,000 local jobs and education programs aimed at transforming the economy.

However, the U.S. approach often frames Southeast Asia as a battleground within the U.S.-China competition narrative. Although China’s size, proximity, and historical ties position it as a lasting influence in the region, a zero-sum competition strategy could be counterproductive. 

Most Southeast Asian nations seek a balanced approach, welcoming U.S. cooperation as part of a broader strategy that includes other partners like India and Japan. Yet, ASEAN leaders also express concerns about U.S. inconsistency, especially when realpolitik pressures arise, fearing coercion from both the U.S. and China.

The U.S. aspires to more than stable security and economic ties, positioning itself as a counterbalance to China and advocating its human rights and governance model. However, its treatment of Southeast Asia remains largely instrumental, where “partnership” rhetoric does not always translate into respect for the sovereignty and autonomy of “smaller” nations. Despite acknowledging Indonesia’s rising influence in the Indo-Pacific, U.S. engagement often appears superficial, as seen in the brief visits by top U.S. officials and sporadic attention to regional leaders, such as the single state visit to Cambodia during its ASEAN chairmanship.

Additionally, ASEAN members resent perceived double standards. While the U.S. tolerates media restrictions in Vietnam, Cambodia faces U.S. criticism over democracy and freedom, creating skepticism about U.S. commitment to democratic ideals. The selective focus of U.S. policy, like omitting human rights concerns in defense engagements with Cambodia, casts doubt on the sincerity of its democratic advocacy. Abandoning this inconsistent approach could enable the U.S. to support democratic principles more credibly.

Lingering memories of U.S. military involvement in Southeast Asia—particularly in Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and Indonesia—are sensitive issues, reinforced in Muslim-majority countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brunei by U.S. inaction on recent Middle Eastern conflicts. Although Southeast Asian leaders take a pragmatic stance toward U.S. relations, these historical grievances are likely to influence younger generations’ perceptions, potentially shaping U.S.-Southeast Asia relations for decades to come.

What does it mean for the new White House?

ASEAN leaders adopt a pragmatic approach, remaining open to collaboration with the United States and other key partners as part of a balanced diplomatic and strategic stance. The next U.S. president will encounter a region moving in multiple directions under evolving leadership. The Philippines is poised to adopt a stronger stance against China’s actions in the South China Sea, while Malaysia under Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim and Cambodia under Hun Sen may draw closer to China. Indonesia under Prabowo may pursue a firmer foreign policy toward the West, while leadership changes in Vietnam and Singapore are unlikely to shift their stable foreign policy strategies, which balance relations with major powers.

This adaptability among ASEAN members suggests the U.S. should not interpret closer ties between some countries and China as a loss. China holds comparative advantages in fields like telecommunications and infrastructure investment, while the U.S. can continue investing in areas of established cooperation that align with Southeast Asian priorities.

Economic growth remains Southeast Asia’s top priority. Although the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) marks a U.S. effort to engage economically, it offers limited market access and tariff benefits. This limited engagement has raised doubts about the U.S.’s long-term economic involvement. By addressing Southeast Asian concerns over free trade and expanding opportunities to non-IPEF members like Cambodia, Myanmar, and Laos, the U.S. can help foster sustainable economic growth and lessen regional reliance on China.

In security, the U.S. remains the partner of choice for high-end military exercises essential for humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and evacuations in the face of climate-driven crises. Additionally, cybersecurity has emerged as a priority for Southeast Asian countries. A recent ransomware attack in Indonesia exposed vulnerabilities across 282 government agencies. While the U.S. and Indonesia already cooperate on cybersecurity through their Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, such incidents underscore the importance of enhancing Southeast Asia’s cyber resilience and public trust in digital services.

The U.S. also has the chance to bolster ASEAN’s food security. By collaborating with Southeast Asia and other partners, such as Australia, the U.S. can support long-term strategies, including development in insect-resistant crops and fortified foods to meet the nutritional needs of the region’s growing population.

However, Southeast Asian nations are wary of escalating U.S.-China tensions that could pressure them into choosing sides, raising concerns about becoming targets if perceived as aligned with either power. Following the election, Southeast Asia’s ideal outcome would be a U.S. president who seeks not only to compete with China but also to deepen relationships with the region. Competition is inevitable, yet it should not become a zero-sum game. U.S. strategy in Southeast Asia must prioritize ASEAN’s interests and aim for mutually beneficial partnerships.

Source: ygadwq, chinaglobalsouth, IFAIR