-0.7 C
Berlin
Wednesday, January 28, 2026
spot_img
Home Blog Page 13

China’s Next-Gen Chip Research Outpaces U.S. by 2-to-1

0

Despite U.S. efforts to suppress China’s microchip industry through export controls, China is making significant advances in fields like photophysics.  

A recent analysis found that the majority of foundational research supporting future computing hardware now comes from China. If this research translates into commercial applications, the U.S. may find that maintaining its dominance in high-performance microchip design and manufacturing through export restrictions alone is unrealistic.  

Published on March 3, the study found that between 2018 and 2023, Chinese institutional authors appeared more than twice as often as U.S. authors in chip design and manufacturing research. And it’s not just about quantity—50% of the top 10% most-cited papers in their publication year had Chinese institutional co-authors, compared to 22% for U.S. institutions and 17% for European ones.  

This research spans various disciplines, from traditional compute chips and AI-optimized graphics processors to entirely new architectures. To compile and categorize the data, ETO analysts trained a machine learning algorithm, focusing on emerging chip technologies rather than commercial advances, which tend to be incremental and proprietary, Arnold explained.  

The study included only papers with English abstracts, which are more likely to target an international audience when authored by Chinese researchers. China has pushed aggressively for scientific output across many fields.  

These findings align with what Yunji Chen observes in China. Chen, director of the National Key Laboratory of Processors in Beijing and co-founder of AI chip design company Cambricon, pointed out that while China’s chip design is advancing, its manufacturing capacity lags—partly due to U.S. export controls.  

Since October 2022, the U.S. Department of Commerce has restricted the sale of advanced chips and manufacturing equipment to China, citing concerns that China uses AI to surveil citizens and modernize its military.  

However, Chinese research is making a major academic impact. Chen noted that his group’s work on deep-learning architectures has amassed over 10,000 citations on Google Scholar. While the U.S. still holds the largest share of publications in this field at 41%, China is rapidly expanding its influence.  

The ETO team also identified key growth areas in chip research, particularly neuromorphic computing—architectures inspired by neuron biophysics—and optical computing, which transmits information via light instead of electrons. China is leading in both subfields in terms of publication volume.  

These speculative technologies hold promise for AI if they can be commercialized, China is heavily experimenting with next-generation technologies, and once they reach commercial viability, suppressing them will be difficult for the U.S. If China succeeds in commercialization, it’s not just about catching up—it’s about potentially leaping ahead.

Europe Cut Off from Russian Gas Again: Can U.S. Gas Transmission Bridge the Gap?

0

Russia’s termination of natural gas transit via Ukraine on January 1, 2025, marks a major shift in Europe’s energy landscape, with serious economic and geopolitical consequences. Gazprom cites the expiration of the transit deal and Ukraine’s refusal to renew it, cutting off nearly half of Russia’s gas supply to Europe. 

With Ukrainian transit accounting for 4.5% of EU gas consumption, the disruption threatens market stability. The January 1, 2025, closure of the Ukrainian transit route has intensified the crisis. While once a secondary supply channel, its importance has grown following the shutdown of Nord Stream and the Belarus-Poland pipelines. Eastern European nations—Hungary, Slovakia, and Austria—are particularly exposed. 

Negotiations for alternative gas routes have largely failed. Ukraine’s refusal to renew the transit deal or accept rerouted Russian gas has left Europe scrambling. Proposals to channel gas through Azerbaijan or resell Russian supply at the border face logistical and political roadblocks, fueling market instability. 

While U.S. LNG exports have increased, replacing Russian pipeline gas remains uncertain. LNG is costlier, less reliable, and logistically complex, potentially exacerbating Europe’s energy vulnerability. Greater reliance on LNG may lead to supply bottlenecks and sustained high prices. 

Europe faces a deepening energy crisis as an unexpectedly harsh winter, weak renewable output, and the shutdown of Russian gas transit via Ukraine collide. December 2024 saw a sharp drop in wind power generation, with Germany’s wind output plunging 85% from the previous year. This shortfall has forced greater reliance on fossil fuels, particularly natural gas, to sustain heating and electricity needs. 

Electricity prices have soared—UK rates hit £485/MWh in last mid-December, far above the 2023 average of £70, while German prices doubled year-over-year. Gas reserves are depleting rapidly, falling below the five-year average by late December. Maxar Technologies warns of further cold spells in January, exacerbating supply pressures.

The 3.35% rise in European TTF gas futures on December 31, 2024, to 50.53 euros signals immediate market anxiety. The memory of the 2022 crisis, when prices surged 100–200%, heightens concerns over another energy shock. Europe’s economic recovery remains fragile, and soaring energy costs could reignite inflation and industrial slowdowns. 

With demand set to rise in January, Europe’s dependence on natural gas, weak renewable output, and geopolitical deadlock underscore its energy vulnerability. High costs and strained supply chains could define the continent’s toughest winter in years.

EU-US tensions have escalated after Trump’s ultimatum, demanding greater European reliance on American oil and gas under threat of tariffs. European Commission President von der Leyen signaled openness to increasing US LNG imports after Trump’s election, reflecting the EU’s evolving energy strategy. The shift is evident: Russia’s 41% share of EU gas imports in 2021 fell sharply, while the US rose to 16% by mid-2024, second only to Norway. 

The launch of the Plaquemines LNG export facility in Louisiana—the largest in the US—marks a major step in expanding American gas exports. Its first shipment left in late December 2024 and is expected in Germany by early January. With Russia’s Ukrainian pipeline shut, the US is poised to fill the gap, but challenges remain. Delays in US export facilities and Europe’s rapid gas inventory depletion amid a harsh winter have tightened the market, limiting short-term relief.

Europe has steadily reduced Russian energy dependence since the Ukraine conflict, strengthening its ability to withstand disruptions. This strategic decoupling has emboldened the EU to consider further sanctions on Russia. However, the sudden pipeline closure will strain member states like Hungary, which remain heavily dependent. Rising LNG transport costs and infrastructure constraints add to concerns over price volatility and economic strain.

In the long term, the EU’s pivot toward US LNG and diversified energy sources signals a broader geopolitical realignment. Yet, short-term supply risks and rising costs expose Europe’s continued energy vulnerability in an increasingly unstable global landscape.

The global natural gas market is shifting, with 2025 expected to bring both increased supply and continued volatility. Following the shortages of 2022 and price spikes during Asia’s 2024 heatwaves, the key question remains: will shortages return in 2025? 

Market projections indicate ample supply. The World Bank forecasts 2.3% global natural gas growth, while S&P Global expects an additional 27 million tons of LNG, driven largely by North American projects.

However, risks remain. Trump’s energy deregulation and infrastructure expansion could exacerbate oversupply. If Russia-Ukraine tensions ease and sanctions lift, downward price pressure may intensify. Potential disruptions—strikes, natural disasters, or bottlenecks at LNG terminals— could destabilize markets, as seen in the 2023 Australian LNG strike that spiked European prices by 10%.

The concentration of new capacity among the US, Qatar, and Australia—set to supply over 60% of global LNG—adds another layer of risk. Any disruption in these hubs could trigger supply chain shocks, amplifying volatility.

Climate extremes further complicate forecasts, temperature swings could drive sudden demand spikes, while global market interconnectivity means local shocks ripple worldwide.

While 2025 promises increased supply, the market’s structural fragility—geopolitical risks, supply chain vulnerabilities, and climate-driven demand surges—suggests that price swings and instability will persist.

The West’s Semiconductor Restrictions Fuel China’s Domestic Industry Growth

0

The semiconductor industry is witnessing heightened tensions amid evolving international dynamics. The United States’ December 2 export restrictions on China’s semiconductor industry, targeting equipment, software, and chips, coupled with the blacklisting of 136 Chinese entities, has underscored these challenges. In response, several Chinese industry associations urged domestic companies to reconsider purchasing U.S. chips. Soon after, China’s regulators launched an antitrust investigation into NVIDIA, leading to a sharp decline in its stock price.

These developments have reignited discussions around the localization of CPUs and other hardware in China. While Intel and AMD continue to dominate the global CPU market, their pursuit of high margins creates opportunities for emerging players. Restrictions on Western technology have also expanded the potential for Chinese CPUs, particularly in infrastructure projects linked to the Belt and Road Initiative.  

An example of this shift is the recent collaboration between domestic CPU manufacturer Phytium and China Huadian Corporation (CHD). Their partnership led to the successful overseas deployment of the Huadian RuiLan, the distributed thermal control systems (DCS), which uses Phytium’s embedded and server CPUs. These systems were installed in Eritrea’s Beleza and Hirgigo power stations within the span of a year, marking a milestone for Chinese energy projects abroad.

To shed light on the role of domestic CPUs in global competition, Chengyi Zhang. Deputy General Manager, PHYTIUM, recently shared insights on the sector’s trajectory. 

Has the overseas expansion of Chinese products been smooth? How has it changed in recent years? What are your thoughts on the prospects of the Belt and Road Initiative and Western markets?

Phytium aims to expand globally, focusing on both the Information technology application innovation industry (ITAI) and ARM-compatible technology, leveraging a mature ecosystem. The initial strategy involves collaborating with major domestic projects that are venturing abroad, while future plans include direct partnerships with foreign machine and solution providers. 

Currently, Phytium relies on domestic vendors and integrators for overseas operations, as this approach balances cost, technical support, and after-sales service. As the overseas market grows, Phytium plans to establish direct relationships with international partners.

With Phytium expanding overseas, how do you plan its market and capacity layout amid competition with Intel and AMD?

Phytium offers a comprehensive CPU lineup covering server, desktop, and embedded products. The CPU used in China Huadian’s Eritrea project is part of the embedded line. All three product lines are advancing rapidly, with applications across various industries, forming a balanced growth.

Does Phytium’s current market demand support achieving scale efficiency?

Despite a slowdown in recent years, Phytium’s CPU sales surpassed 10 million units by December 2024, marking a milestone for China’s domestic CPU industry. The sector shows a positive upward trend, with growing opportunities as international restrictions on Chinese chips intensify. However, domestic manufacturers must deliver higher-quality products to meet the increasing market demand.

With multiple approaches in domestic CPU development, how do you view this trend? What are your thoughts on the industry’s ecosystem and future?

The diversity in instruction sets is a natural phase for a developing chip industry, as seen historically in the U.S., which had numerous instruction sets like X86, Alpha, MIPS, and Power during its early stages. Today, China’s three or four instruction sets reflect a similar trend, and the market will likely converge over time.

From a technical perspective, instruction sets act as interfaces, while the CPU hardware design determines performance. High-performance or low-power products can emerge from any route, but the real challenge lies in building a robust ecosystem. Without a strong user base and application scenarios, product maturity and iteration slow significantly.

For less-established routes, the focus must be on building targeted application scenarios and ecosystems rather than spreading efforts too thin. Market trends suggest that ARM and X86 remain dominant, especially in domestic Xinchuang initiatives and international markets, though niche opportunities may exist for other routes. The industry must balance scaling ecosystems with the diversity of application needed to drive long-term growth.

Source: Guancha, Wccftech, Phytium 

How exactly is the Sino-Vietnamese cross-border railroad upgraded and docked?

0

At the end of 2024, the Sino-Vietnamese cross-border standard railroad project, which has been in the discussion phase for years, finally began to take concrete steps. On December 10, during the 16th meeting of the Viet Nam-China Steering Committee for Bilateral Cooperation in Beijing , both countries signed the intergovernmental Cooperation Agreement on three key railroad projects: Lao Cai–Hanoi–Hai Phong , Lang Son–Hanoi , and Mong Cai–Ha Long–Hai Phong.

Vietnam’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bui Thanh Son, proposed speeding up rail connectivity and prioritizing the launch of these projects, which would significantly enhance transportation between the two nations. The agreement also included the resumption of international railroad intermodal transport routes, further strengthening the connectivity between China and Vietnam.

Among the three projects, the Lao Cai – Hanoi – Haiphong line has been identified as the highest priority. Standing Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Nguyen Minh Vu, expressed the hope that China would soon approve non-reimbursable aid to assist in preparing feasibility studies for the Lao Cai – Hanoi – Hai Phong railroad. 

This initiative marks a significant milestone in Sino-Vietnamese cooperation on transportation infrastructure and is expected to pave the way for new opportunities in economic and trade relations between the two countries.

Why is the cross-border railroad of China and Vietnam attracting much attention?

The three key cross-border rail projects have unique histories and varying stages of development. 

The Lao Cai – Hanoi – Hai Phong railroad, built in 1906 during French colonial rule, is 398 kilometers long and originally designed as a meter-gauge line. This line is historically significant as part of the Yunnan-Vietnam Railway, China’s first meter-gauge railroad, connecting Vietnam to China’s Yunnan Province. The line facilitated trade and cultural exchanges between the two countries and was considered an engineering marvel at the time. However, due to its meter-gauge infrastructure, it is less efficient in handling the growing trade between China and Vietnam, and its upgrade to a standard gauge is a priority. 

The Dong Dang – Hanoi railroad, a 167-kilometer track, was constructed in 1902 with a rice-track design, later upgraded to a set of rails system during the Vietnam War, allowing dual-track operation. This railroad connects Vietnam’s Hanoi to the Chinese border at Dong Dang, Guangxi Province. Although essential for the transportation network, its outdated infrastructure limits capacity, and efforts to standardize it to handle modern freight needs are ongoing. 

The Mong Cai–Ha Long–Hai Phong railroad, still under planning, spans 195 kilometers and will connect Vietnam’s Haiphong and Ha Long with China’s Guangxi Province. Once completed, it will integrate into the broader rail network in northern Vietnam and connect with the Beibu Gulf region in China, forming part of the Trans-Asian Railway Network. This project is critical in enhancing the connectivity and economic integration of both countries. As the Sino-Vietnamese trade continues to grow, the modernization and standardization of these railroads are key to improving trade efficiency and fostering closer economic cooperation between China and Vietnam.

How to connect the meter rail to the standard rail?

To plan new routes and ensure the interoperability of Vietnam’s metre-gauge railways (with a track width of 1,000 millimeters) with China’s standard-gauge railway (with a track gauge of 1,435 millimeters), the fundamental issue lies in the differences between the two track gauges. The capacity differences between these two rail types create challenges for efficient cross-border transportation, especially as Vietnam’s railway infrastructure limits the volume of goods it can carry.

The long-term solution involves upgrading Vietnam’s existing meter-gauge system to the standard gauge. However, this transformation is not as simple as replacing the old tracks with new ones. The most practical approach is to build new standard gauge rail lines alongside or replacing the old system, particularly for cross-border connections with Kunming-Yuxi-Hekou Railway. 

This allows for matching the cargo capacity on both sides of the border, mitigating bottlenecks that arise from the mismatch in rail capabilities. The upgraded Yunnan-Vietnam Railway would include an electrified standard track, providing faster and higher-capacity services for both passengers and freight, mirroring the success seen in other projects like the China-Laos Railway.

In parallel, Vietnam’s metre-gauge railway could continue to function, especially as an auxiliary freight line to ease the load on the new infrastructure. There is also the example of narrow-gauge railroads in Southeast Asia, like those in Thailand, where China has provided custom locomotives that can enhance the performance of narrow-gauge systems. Despite these efforts, the performance of even the most advanced  metre-gauge railway locomotives lags behind the high-power electric locomotives used on standard tracks, making the eventual shift to standard rails inevitable.

With the unification of railroad construction standards and the adoption of electrification and high-power locomotives, the future of cross-border rail connections lies in building more efficient, high-capacity lines. This would facilitate the flow of goods across regions, benefiting the countries involved by enhancing trade and economic development. 

Additionally, improved logistics and customs processes, as seen in China-Laos Railway’s multimodal transport system, would further expedite the movement of goods, reducing delays and inefficiencies caused by outdated infrastructure and differing standards.

China’s Leadership Brings Hope as Economic Governance Deficit Grows

0

Xu Mingqi, Senior research fellow and Deputy Director of Institute of World Economy at ShanghaiAcademy of Social Sciences, asserts that the economic shift towards the global South is inevitable, as emerging markets continue to strengthen. Despite global economic growth remaining subdued in 2024, with a forecast of 2.6%, it is unlikely to return to pre-pandemic levels of 3.1% in the short term. Geopolitical tensions are exacerbating the negative economic effects, further deepening the imbalance in global economic growth. In this context, emerging markets and developing countries, particularly India and China, are performing relatively well. Developing Asian economies grew by an average of 5.2%, whereas the G7 nations, with the exception of the U.S., saw growth rates in the low 1% range. This indicates a clear and irreversible trend of economic power shifting towards the global South.

Global economic downturn

The declining governance responsibility and willingness of developed countries, particularly those led by the United States, to address global issues has led to a rising global governance deficit. In international trade and investment, the U.S. has introduced geopolitical competition and ideological security concerns, which have reshaped global supply chains and disrupted the efficiency-driven system. This shift has weakened the global free trade framework, with the World Trade Organization losing its influence. If protectionist policies, such as high tariffs proposed by President-elect Trump, are implemented, the global free trade system would face even more significant harm, and trade wars would disproportionately affect smaller countries.

In the financial sector, the U.S.’s monetary policy adjustments have caused market shocks, currency depreciation, and debt crises in many developing countries. Many U.S. and European banks have collapsed, unable to stabilize themselves or provide sufficient resources to rescue distressed countries. The lack of international coordination in monetary and financial policies has resulted in nations prioritizing their own interests at the expense of others. The comprehensive sanctions imposed by the U.S. and Europe on Russia in response to the Ukraine crisis have also caused ripple effects, with many businesses involved in trade and investment with Russia facing extended sanctions. As a result, developing countries are increasingly seeking alternatives to the U.S. dollar and launching more bilateral and regional monetary and financial cooperation, challenging the existing international financial system and contributing to its fragmentation.

China’s prominent role

Amid increasing global governance deficits, China has actively stepped forward to provide more resources and support to developing countries. Through the “Belt and Road” initiative, China has offered development resources, financing, and project construction, assisting developing countries in fostering economic growth. For example, at the 2024 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), President Xi Jinping pledged RMB 360 billion in financial aid to African nations over the next three years, underscoring China’s commitment to supporting Africa’s development. Additionally, China has provided debt relief and preferential loans to underdeveloped countries, particularly in Africa.

China has also made significant strides in opening its economy, unilaterally expanding market access for foreign investors. This has contributed to the maintenance of the global free trade system. China has supported the G20’s initiatives to improve financial risk monitoring and early warning systems and has been a vocal advocate for strengthening international cooperation in areas such as the digital economy and taxation. The country has also pushed for the acceleration of the G20 Roadmap for Sustainable Finance.

In 2024, China became the world’s largest investor in green and renewable energy, with investments reaching $675 billion. Furthermore, Chinese Premier Li Qiang’s “1+10” dialogue in December emphasized China’s unwavering support for economic globalization and multilateralism. The dialogue also highlighted China’s determination to continue enhancing its openness, introducing policies to foster a favorable business environment based on market principles, the rule of law, and internationalization. Through these efforts, China aims to make a sustained contribution to global economic growth and governance.

Source: xinmin, China Daily

Korean Wave in France and Europe: K-pop as a Middle-Class Cultural Phenomenon

0

An interview with Hong Seok-kyeong, Director of the Center for Hallyu Studies and Professor of Communication at Seoul National University. Hong Seok-kyeong, who taught at the University of Bordeaux in France for many years before joining Seoul National University, has conducted in-depth research and studies on Korean pop culture, including Korean dramas and K-pop in France. 

Does today’s K-pop-dominated Korean pop culture continue or break from the earlier Korean drama-led wave?

The Korean Wave is a continuous phenomenon shaped by evolving media. I identify three stages: its East Asian spread via radio, its digital globalization, and the platform era starting in 2016, driven by China’s market restrictions and global platforms like Netflix.  

Rather than disrupting earlier media environments, this phase builds on them, reshaping content circulation while maintaining continuity. Each stage reflects adaptation, not a cultural break.

What is the biggest difference between K-pop in Europe, especially France, and the U.S.?

The 2011 SM concert in Paris was K-pop’s first major international showcase, even preceding similar events in the U.S. Despite initial uncertainty, tickets for the 6,000-seat venue sold out instantly at high prices, proving K-pop’s global appeal and sparking interest in Korean culture beyond music.  

France’s cultural pluralism, distinct from Anglo-American multiculturalism, supports diverse cultural imports despite national identity concerns. This openness, along with France’s strong anime and manga fan base—the largest outside Japan—helped Korean dramas gain traction. Many early K-drama fans came from anime communities, reflecting the broader interconnectedness of East Asian pop culture in Europe.

While race and gender, especially the latter, dominate K-pop studies in the English-speaking world, class remains underexplored but is more significant in Europe. How does class influence K-pop’s spread in Europe?”

K-pop fandom reflects class dynamics, though often subtly. Full engagement—buying merchandise, attending events, and participating in fan activities—requires financial means, making it largely a middle- and upper-middle-class phenomenon.  

In Europe, especially France, parents often support their children’s fandom, seeing it as culturally enriching. Fans not only enjoy music but also learn Korean and explore broader cultural aspects. This demographic’s stability reinforces K-pop’s image as a middle-class space, free from associations with substance abuse or violence.  

Class thus shapes K-pop’s accessibility and fan practices, highlighting the economic and cultural capital needed for deep engagement.

With France’s strong affinity for Japanese culture, especially anime, has this helped spread K-pop in France?

Japonisme in France emerged in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, while Chinese fever dates back to the 17th and 18th centuries. In contrast, the Korean Wave is a grassroots movement that began with marginalized youth, not intellectual elites, making it distinct from earlier cultural trends like Japonisme.  

This bottom-up nature sets the Korean Wave apart, as it challenges traditional aesthetic paradigms. Many intellectuals still find it ‘uncool,’ highlighting the divide between popular and elite tastes.  

The Korean Wave’s people-driven nature gives it transformative power, even influencing politics in some countries. Unlike Japan or China, its democratic appeal fosters cultural shifts and social change, making it a globally significant phenomenon.

Korean journalists note that K-pop fans in Europe are mostly white, unlike in the US. Why is there this difference?

In France, K-pop attracts diverse multicultural teens, but their visibility is limited by fewer resources compared to middle-class fans. As K-pop becomes more mainstream, especially with groups like BTS, the label “K-pop fan” has gained positive connotations. While Korean dance events emerge in urban areas, teens today prefer online spaces for self-expression.

In the U.S., K-pop intersects more with race and gender issues, with Black and Latino teens using it to express their identities. In contrast, European K-pop culture is shaped by class distinctions, with middle-class teens dominating the scene, while race and gender play less of a role. This shows how K-pop’s reception differs across regions based on social and cultural factors.

Do you think the “soft masculinity” in K-pop reflects both Koreanness and Asianness, aligning with traditional East Asian cultural ideals like Confucianism?

The relationship between traditional Confucian masculinity and modern soft masculinity in K-pop is complex. Confucian principles, such as caring for others and prioritizing communal well-being, influence the portrayal of masculinity in K-pop. However, K-pop idols, especially male ones, embody a modern form of masculinity that emphasizes physical discipline and self-management. Unlike Confucianism’s focus on moral duty and restraint, K-pop emphasizes bodily discipline and performance-driven excellence, reflecting a shift in cultural and gender norms. While soft masculinity in K-pop may draw on historical values, it aligns more with contemporary, postmodern ideals.

Do you think the rise of transmedia in Korean entertainment, as discussed with Bang Si-hyuk in 2015, reflects the influence of academic research on the industry, and will Korean producers pay more attention to academic discussions on K-pop?

The K-pop industry’s rapid exchange of ideas and practices, driven by close relationships among professionals, fosters quick innovation and adaptation. Transmedia storytelling, though not formally recognized at first, was implemented long before the term gained traction, highlighting the industry’s practical understanding of audience engagement. The interconnectedness of the industry, where small-scale key players share innovations, accelerates the diffusion of ideas. Examples like the zombie dancers in *The Busan Walk* illustrate the blending of creative sectors. This collaborative environment drives K-pop’s evolution, demonstrating how the genre’s success is tied to its unique, agile production ecosystem.

Source: the paper, Medium

India at the Crossroads: Can the World’s Office Survive the Age of Artificial Intelligence?

0

India, long hailed as the “World’s Office,” faces a historic turning point. The rise of artificial intelligence (AI) threatens the very foundation upon which its modern economic success was built. For decades, India’s ascent in global services—powered by its vast English-speaking workforce, technical talent, and competitive costs—transformed it into a hub for IT outsourcing, customer support, and business process management. 

Giants like Tata Consultancy Services, Infosys, and Wipro became synonymous with dependable, low-cost tech solutions for the world’s biggest corporations. But the advantages India enjoyed in the software era will not automatically carry forward into the age of AI. The country must now confront an uncomfortable question: Will it ride the next wave of technological transformation, or be overwhelmed by it?

AI systems thrive on structured, repetitive tasks—precisely the kind of work that has defined India’s IT services industry for decades. From writing and debugging code to fielding customer enquiries, many core functions of India’s outsourcing economy are increasingly being automated by generative models, AI agents, and other emerging tools. Unlike earlier disruptions that largely complemented India’s service economy, AI presents a direct and potentially existential threat. What was once a competitive advantage—its large pool of relatively low-cost tech talent—now risks being replaced not by cheaper labour elsewhere, but by machines.

India’s predicament is made more complex by a structural imbalance in its economy. Unlike China, which built a vast manufacturing base alongside its rise in technology, India leaned heavily on services while its industrial sector remained underdeveloped. This dependence on service exports to drive growth and maintain foreign exchange reserves exposes India to disproportionate risks in the AI transition. Should global demand for routine service tasks collapse, the resulting unemployment would ripple across the economy—undermining consumption, straining social stability, and curbing domestic investment.

The country’s much-celebrated demographic dividend—its vast, youthful population—is also at risk of becoming a liability. In an era when machines increasingly outperform humans in basic knowledge work, population size alone is no longer a guarantor of economic strength. The traditional pathway from surplus labour to industrial prosperity is narrowing. If India cannot generate high-skill, innovation-driven employment at scale, its demographic advantage may quickly transform into a demographic burden.

Even more troubling is India’s persistent innovation deficit. Despite playing a central role in the global IT industry for decades, the country has produced few globally recognised original technologies or platforms. Its strengths lie in service execution, not in product creation. Research and development spending stands at just 0.65% of GDP—far behind China’s 2.6% and the United States’ 3.5%. India lacks a robust venture capital ecosystem, a risk-taking business culture, and the kind of deep, state-backed industrial policy that fuels long-term innovation. As a result, it remains largely a technology consumer rather than a creator.

Recognising the magnitude of the threat, the Indian government has begun to mobilise. The Modi administration has pledged $1.25 billion toward a National AI Mission, which includes plans to develop a domestic large language model (LLM) tailored to India’s multilingual society. Major conglomerates like Reliance and Tata have been tasked with providing computing power and GPU resources. While these moves signal intent, they cannot resolve deep-rooted structural issues overnight. India’s higher education system still struggles to cultivate top-tier research talent. Bureaucratic inertia stifles agility. The country’s startup ecosystem, while vibrant, remains undercapitalised and outpaced by peers in the US and China. Most critically, India’s heavy reliance on imported hardware—particularly advanced semiconductors—leaves it exposed to supply chain shocks and geopolitical risks that it cannot control.

Meanwhile, the global AI race is accelerating. The United States, home to Silicon Valley and the world’s most powerful AI firms, is leveraging its talent and capital to redefine productivity, national security, and industrial strategy. AI is being used not just to improve services, but to revive advanced manufacturing and reduce dependence on offshore labour. In China, a blend of aggressive industrial policy and market dynamism is pushing forward domestic AI development, from autonomous vehicles to smart cities. Beijing’s recent release of an open-source large model, Deep Quest, underscores its ambition to compete at the frontier.

India, by comparison, is caught in a dilemma. While its allies in the West view it as a strategic counterweight to China, those same nations may unintentionally undercut India’s economic base. If US firms begin to “reshore” services using AI, India’s outsourcing advantage will erode rapidly. Calls within the US for taxes on outsourced services, such as those supported by the Trump administration, would further pressure India’s export-led service model. In a geopolitical irony, the very technologies that are enabling the West to consolidate its advantage against China may inflict the deepest economic damage on India.

This moment carries implications beyond India’s borders. For the Global South, India has long served as a case study in how service-led growth can lift millions out of poverty. But if AI closes off that path prematurely, many emerging economies may be forced to abandon the Indian model altogether and rethink their development strategies from the ground up. The once-cherished concept of a “demographic dividend” may have to be redefined in a world where labour increasingly competes—and loses—to machines.

India’s future remains uncertain. In an optimistic scenario, the country could harness AI to improve public services, education, and governance—leveraging its population to drive inclusive growth through applied innovation, even without leading the charge in basic research. In a darker outcome, India may face simultaneous job losses in its core industries and an inability to build new ones fast enough. In this case, the nation could suffer widespread unemployment, economic stagnation, and rising inequality. An intermediate path is perhaps most likely: India continues to make gains in areas like fintech, medtech, and digital governance, while its outsourcing sector finds resilience in specialised niches. Yet this outcome would leave India as a supporting actor rather than a protagonist in the AI era.

At its heart, India must resolve a foundational contradiction: it is a service superpower without a manufacturing backbone. The rise of artificial intelligence will only magnify this imbalance. The world is entering a phase where economic power will be increasingly defined by the ability to build, adapt, and control advanced technologies. Without a stronger industrial base and a deeper innovation ecosystem, India will remain exposed to global shocks, dependent on external demand, and vulnerable to the very technologies it once helped deliver to the world.

Artificial intelligence is not just a technological transition—it is a restructuring of global economic order. For the United States, it promises renewed dominance; for China, an opportunity to leapfrog into high-value innovation; for others, a looming challenge. India, despite its past success, stands at a crossroads. Its legacy as the “world’s office” may prove irrelevant—or even obstructive—in this new era. To thrive, India must ask harder questions of itself: Can it become a creator rather than just a provider of technology? Can it convert its demographic advantage into an innovation advantage? Can it craft bold, forward-looking policy rather than leaning on past triumphs? The answers to these questions will determine not only India’s place in the AI century, but the broader balance of power in the 21st-century global economy.

AI will not wait for those who hesitate. India must act—or risk being left behind.

Source: Service Now, Amazon, Klark

Hong Kong’s Century of Transformation: From Chiang Kai-shek’s Abandoned Reclamation to Modern Self-Governance

0

The name Hong Kong is widely believed to mean Fragrant Harbor. Historical research suggests that the area was once a port for spice trading, which may have inspired this elegant name. During the Ming Dynasty, Dongguan, Bao’an, and Hong Kong were known for producing agarwood. The English name Hongkong derives from the Cantonese pronunciation; in the local dialect, “xiang” is pronounced “heung” or “hong,” leading to the form “Hongkong” instead of “Heung Kong.”

The earliest recorded administration of the region dates to the Qin Dynasty. After Emperor Qin Shi Huang unified China by conquering the six states, he sent troops to pacify the Lingnan region, inhabited by the Yue people, incorporating it into the Qin Empire. The three commanderies of Nanhai, Guilin, and Xiang were established, and 500,000 people—including merchants and exiles from the Central Plains—were relocated to strengthen defense and develop the area. From this time onward, the Hong Kong region remained under successive imperial regimes.

During the Han Dynasty, Emperor Gaozu of Han Liu Bang was unable to exert direct control over Lingnan and adopted conciliatory measures. The region was then under the rule of Zhao Tuo, King of Nanyue, recognized by the Han court. The Han established nine commanderies, including Nanhai, Hepu, and Jiaozhi; Hong Kong was administered as part of Boluo County in Nanhai Commandery, a status maintained until the Western Jin period.

In 331 CE, under the Eastern Jin, the eastern part of Nanhai Commandery was separated to form Dongguan Commandery, which administered six counties, including Bao’an. Bao’an County encompassed present-day Hong Kong, Shenzhen, and Dongguan. The Sui Dynasty later abolished Dongguan Commandery, merging it back into Nanhai under Guangzhou Prefecture, though Hong Kong remained under Bao’an County.

In 757 CE, during the Tang Dynasty, Bao’an County was renamed Dongguan County, bringing Hong Kong under its jurisdiction once more. In 1573, under the Ming Dynasty, the coastal areas of Dongguan were separated to create Xinan County, which then governed the Hong Kong area.

A turning point came in 1842, when the Qing Dynasty, defeated in the First Opium War, ceded Hong Kong Island to Britain under the Treaty of Nanking. Colonial control followed the standard model of the era: military dominance, economic exploitation, and population management. Britain’s superior naval power and economic leverage were evident, while the opium trade underscored its social impact.

Following the Second Opium War (1856–1860), the Treaty of Beijing ceded southern Kowloon and Stonecutters Island to Britain. By 1898, the Convention for the Extension of Hong Kong Territory leased the New Territories to Britain for 99 years, completing its control over the region.

Under British rule, Hong Kong adopted a colonial administrative structure headed by a governor, representing the British monarch. A legislative, judicial, and executive system was established to serve colonial interests. Economically, British conglomerates enjoyed monopolistic privileges: HSBC and Standard Chartered held exclusive currency issuance rights; British-owned telecommunications companies controlled external communications; and real estate was dominated by British firms.

On December 8, 1941, Japan attacked Hong Kong, coinciding with its assault on Pearl Harbor. After 18 days of fighting, including battles at Victoria Harbour and Wong Nai Chung Gap, British forces surrendered on December 25. Japanese occupation brought severe hardship—currency replacement with Japanese military notes, collapse of legitimate industries, food shortages, and widespread suffering. The occupation ended with Japan’s surrender in August 1945, but instead of returning to Chinese control, Hong Kong was restored to British administration on September 16, 1945, following Anglo-American diplomatic maneuvering.

From the 1970s, Hong Kong experienced rapid industrialization and cultural growth, particularly in its film industry. The city also faced waves of illegal immigration from mainland China, prompting changes in policy—from the “touch-base” arrangement (1974–1980) to an “immediate repatriation” system.

In 1997, sovereignty over Hong Kong was transferred from Britain to China, making it the first Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China. The city retained its capitalist system, independent judiciary, and free port status under the principle of “one country, two systems.”

From a small fishing village to one of the world’s leading cities, Hong Kong’s transformation reflects cycles of conflict, colonization, migration, and cultural fusion. It stands today as both a symbol of resilience and a crossroads between East and West—bearing the imprints of its layered history while shaping its own future.

Source: HK history museum, Gwulo, South China Morning Post, HKFP, GEAB

Why Do 10 European Countries Have Eagles on Their National Emblems?

0

Today, 10 of Europe’s 44 countries—nearly a quarter—feature eagles on their national emblems. Some use single-headed eagles, others the double-headed kind, in a range of colors and styles. Yet these nations span different regions, languages, ethnicities, and faiths. So why do they share this powerful symbol?

The eagle’s origin as a European emblem traces back to ancient Rome. As early as the 9th century BC, Romans regarded the eagle as a symbol of power, justice, and divine authority. In 103 BC, Roman Consul Gaius Marius officially adopted the eagle as the insignia of the Roman Legion. Soldiers revered and defended it with their lives.

As Rome expanded, so did the reach of its eagle. It became not just a military symbol but an imperial one—perched atop standards across the empire.

In 330 AD, Emperor Constantine I unified Rome again and made Byzantium—later Constantinople—the new co-capital. To represent unity and dual sovereignty over East and West, he introduced a double-headed eagle.

But after Constantine’s death, civil war split the empire again in 395 AD. The Western Roman Empire kept the single-headed eagle; the Eastern Empire adopted the double-headed version. After the Western Empire’s fall in 476, the single-headed eagle faded—but not for long.

The Germanic tribes who overran Western Rome soon embraced Christianity, positioning themselves as heirs of Roman legacy. The Frankish Kingdom, which unified much of Western Europe, retained the Roman single-headed eagle as a symbol of authority. It spread through their domains—including what would become modern Germany and Austria.

Meanwhile, in the East, the Byzantine double-headed eagle lived on. It came to represent more than just political dominion symbolizing the union of Europe and Asia, church and state, tradition and power.

As the Slavic people migrated and settled across Eastern Europe, they came under Byzantine influence. Serbia and Montenegro adopted the double-headed eagle, echoing their Orthodox Christian roots and ties to Byzantium.

Poland’s white eagle is a rare exception. According to legend, a tribal leader saw a white eagle soaring over Gniezno and took it as a divine sign. Poland, never ruled by Rome or Byzantium, still chose the eagle—but based on its own mythos. Today, it remains the only eagle emblem in Europe not derived from Roman heritage.

As the Ottoman Empire pushed into the Balkans in the 14th and 15th centuries, Orthodox Christian states like Serbia, Montenegro, and Albania rallied around the double-headed eagle. For them, it wasn’t just a symbol of empire, it was one of resistance.

Albanian hero Gjergj Kastrioti, of Byzantine descent, famously revived the double-headed eagle as a banner of independence during his 15th-century revolt. It became the foundation of Albania’s modern national symbol.

The Roman single-headed eagle reemerged in 911 AD with the rise of the Holy Roman Empire—what is now considered the First German Empire. Claiming the Roman legacy, German rulers adopted the black single-headed eagle. Later, the powerful Habsburgs switched to the double-headed eagle after Byzantium’s fall, asserting they were now the true heirs of Rome.

The double-headed eagle spread to Austria and the Czech lands, while the single-headed version remained popular in places like Prussia.

The fall of great empires after World War I—Germany, Austria-Hungary, Russia, and the Ottomans—reshaped Europe. Yet the eagle endured.

Austria reverted to the single-headed eagle to mark a break from the imperial Habsburgs. Poland, Albania, and the Czech Republic reclaimed their traditional eagle emblems. Romania and Moldova—descendants of Roman Dacians—revived the single-headed eagle as a nod to their Latin roots.

Even after the rise and fall of the Soviet Union, the eagle found its way back. In 1991, the Russian Federation reintroduced the double-headed eagle, signaling its renewed ambition and dual identity as both European and Asian.

Of the 10 countries with eagles in their national emblems—Russia, Germany, Austria, Romania, Poland, Serbia, Montenegro, Moldova, Czech Republic, and Albania—only Poland lacks a Roman or Byzantine connection. For the rest, the eagle is not just a bird; it’s a powerful reminder of empires, beliefs, and the endurance of heritage across centuries.

Source: Bird Guides, X, Reddit

The Great Wall Through Foreign Eyes: A Symbol of Civilization Across Cultures and Centuries

0

Throughout history, the Great Wall has stood as a powerful symbol of Chinese civilization, garnering global recognition and interpretation across time and cultures.

As early as the 4th century AD, the Roman historian Ammianus Marcellinus recorded the Great Wall in his work Res Gestae, describing it as a circular wall with high ramparts surrounding the land of the Seres. The Seres, as China was known in Greco-Roman times, referred to the land of silk. His description of the circular wall is understood to reference the Great Wall, making Marcellinus the earliest known European scholar to document it.

In 955, al-Mas’udi, a Baghdad-born scholar who had traveled to China’s coastal regions, wrote about the Wall in his work The Meadows of Gold. He described the easternmost edge of the world as the border between China and Silla, reaching as far as the Great Wall of Gog and Magog.

From its inception, the Great Wall has attracted attention from across China’s various social and ethnic groups. Internationally, it has come to symbolize Chinese civilization itself—interpreted and reimagined by many cultures, giving rise to both a tangible and a conceptual Great Wall.

From Myth to Reality: Cross-Cultural Encounters

During the Ming and Qing Dynasties, Joseon envoys traveled annually to Beijing, often along the post roads that paralleled the Great Wall in Liaodong and Jizhou. In their writings, these envoys not only praised the Wall’s grandeur and strength but also documented its surrounding multicultural life, where Han Chinese, Mongols, Manchus, and Koreans coexisted.

For instance, in 1598, the envoy Yi Hangbok noted encountering a Mongolian delegation en route to Beijing, observing that eight or nine out of ten were Han, and only one or two were true Tartars. Similarly, in 1602, envoy Min Yonghwan recorded that after the Longqing Peace Talks, the barbarians gathered outside the wall, came and went freely, and there was no longer a need for defense.

Meanwhile, Jesuit missionaries from Europe—having transitioned from hearsay to firsthand experience—began shaping Western perceptions of the Great Wall. Italian missionary Matteo Ricci praised it as an impenetrable line of defense built by the Ming. In 1575, Spanish monk Martin de Rada called it one of the world’s most famous architectural feats. In 1687, French Jesuit Jean-François Gerbillon, who participated in Sino-Russian negotiations, affirmed the Great Wall is indeed one of the most extraordinary engineering achievements in the world.

These missionaries spread their observations through letters and publications, igniting wide interest in Europe about the Great Wall.

Western Capitalism and Shifting Attitudes Toward the Wall

European attitudes toward the Great Wall evolved alongside the rise of capitalism. Initially, China—advanced in economy and culture—was admired as a model civilization. However, as Europe industrialized, its thinkers began to devalue ancient civilizations, including China. As the Wall symbolized China, evaluations of it mirrored this shift.

Voltaire praised the Great Wall as a construction greater than the pyramids in 1756 An Essay on Universal History, the Manners, and Spirit of Nations. Yet in his 1764 Philosophical Dictionary, he portrayed both monuments negatively that the Great Wall is a colossal work born of fear and anxiety; the pyramids are relics of vanity and superstition.

In 1792, King George III dispatched Lord George Macartney to establish diplomatic relations with the Qing Dynasty. When the British delegation passed through Gubeikou, Deputy Envoy George Staunton described the Wall with mixed emotions: admiration for its scale and construction, but skepticism about its strategic utility.

He remarked that the sheer scale of the project was awe-inspiring, and the challenges of transporting materials into such mountainous terrain were nearly unimaginable. Referring to it as merely a “wall” hardly did it justice. Still, he cautioned that no fortification could determine a nation’s fate—while it may delay an enemy, it cannot stop them entirely.

Despite the diplomatic failure, a moment of warmth occurred: 13-year-old Thomas Staunton, who had learned Chinese during the trip, conversed with Emperor Qianlong, who was so pleased he gifted the boy a silk purse.

Years later, as a Member of Parliament, Staunton played a pivotal role in advocating military action during the debates preceding the Opium War. His speech helped push the British House of Commons to approve war against China.

The Evolving Global Perception of the Great Wall

Despite early European prejudices, many Western scholars eventually offered more balanced and positive assessments of the Great Wall based on direct study and fieldwork.

American explorer William Edgar Geil, a member of the Royal Geographical Society, conducted the first systematic Western survey of the Wall in 1903—from Shanhaiguan to Gansu. 

He praised the wall’s peaceful purpose, noting that it was conceived to maintain peace, making it, in his view, one of the most remarkable achievements in both ancient and modern history. Geil emphasized that China’s commitment to defense over aggression had helped preserve its civilization, contrasting this with the fate of warlike nations that had vanished while the peace-loving Chinese endured through millennia. Reflecting on the wall’s symbolism, he expressed the belief that it was better to pile stones than to throw them, and better to build protective walls than to dig graves. He concluded with a tribute to the enduring virtue behind the Great Wall, which for over two thousand years had stood as a guardian of peace and a means of resolving conflict.

By the early 20th century, due to extensive research and glowing accounts by explorers like Geil, the Wall’s international image shifted to a more positive light. This foreign admiration influenced Chinese perceptions as well, strengthening the Wall’s symbolic power in national identity.

As a cultural icon, the Great Wall continues to attract global attention and interpretation. Its evolving image reflects broader historical shifts, changing values, and interactions between civilizations. The international discourse surrounding the Wall is now an integral part of its cultural legacy, enriching our understanding of its multidimensional nature.

This complex history supports the creative transformation and continued relevance of Great Wall culture, reinforcing its role as a source of national spirit and global cultural heritage.

Source: xinhua, cgtn, people’s, BBC, global times