Home Posts Page | TB Online Nachrichte

How the Weaker Chinese Navy Resisted Japan during the War of Resistance

POLITIK

Tendenzblick

-

July 16, 2025

How the Weaker Chinese Navy Resisted Japan during the War of Resistance

After China’s defeat in the First Sino-Japanese War, the gap between the Chinese and Japanese navies widened into a chasm that would define East Asia’s balance of power for decades. By the time of the July 7 Incident in 1937, Japan’s navy had grown into a formidable armada of 285 ships—four aircraft carriers, two seaplane carriers, nine battleships, 12 heavy cruisers, 21 light cruisers, and 102 destroyers—together displacing more than 1.15 million tons.

China’s entire navy, by contrast, mustered only 57,600 tons. Its largest vessel, the Haiqi, was a 4,300-ton cruiser purchased by the Qing government in 1896—a relic of another age. One Japanese Nagato-class battleship displaced 39,000 tons, nearly eight times the Haiqi’s tonnage and equivalent to more than 80% of China’s total naval strength.

Confronted with such disparity, the Chinese Navy had no illusions about engaging Japan in open waters. In early 1937, the Chinese Navy abandoned the idea of sea control altogether. Instead, it called for avoiding decisive battles, preserving what little naval power remained, and concentrating all efforts on the Yangtze River, coordinating with the army and air force to deny the enemy access to China’s interior. The plan emphasized that, beyond land and air defense, the key lay in “underwater defense”—naval mines, nets, chains, rafts, and scuttled ships—to block river routes and prevent Japanese landings.

This doctrine became the guiding principle of China’s naval operations when war erupted. In August 1937, as the Battle of Shanghai began, Japanese warships patrolled the Yangtze estuary, seeking to ascend the river toward Shanghai and Nanjing. Following the defense plan, the Chinese Navy resolved to block the Yangtze at Jiangyin, a critical chokepoint.

On August 11, Chiang Kai-shek personally issued the order to sink ships and seal the river. That same day, the navy scuttled eight warships, 23 merchant vessels, and eight seized Japanese barges—43 ships in total, forming a massive underwater barricade. Even the venerable cruisers Haiqi, Hairong, and Haichen were sacrificed, deliberately sunk to strengthen the blockade.

When the Japanese fleet attacked to clear the river on August 22, the Chinese Navy fought with desperate valor. The First Fleet was nearly annihilated, and reinforcements from the Second Fleet joined the struggle, but the odds were hopeless. On December 1, outgunned and outnumbered, the Chinese Navy was forced to withdraw. Yet the blockade held. The sunken hulks obstructed the channel so effectively that the Japanese did not fully reopen the Jiangyin Waterway until March 1938—seven months later.

The scuttling operation came at a terrible cost. China’s already modest fleet was devastated; what remained after Jiangyin was little more than river patrol craft. By the end of the Battle of Wuhan in October 1938, only 14 shallow-water vessels totaling 8,600 tons survived. With China’s limited industrial capacity, there was no hope of rebuilding the fleet. The surface navy, as a fighting force, was gone.

Naval mines were the perfect weapon for a weaker side. They required no propulsion systems, no sophisticated technology, and no large vessels. Simple to make, cheap to deploy, and devastating in effect, a single naval mine could cripple or sink a warship many times its value. Clearing them, on the other hand, demanded enormous effort and expense—often more than ten times the cost of laying them. A single mine charge could rip open the hull of even a heavy cruiser. The world would later see their power in 1955, when a World War II–era German naval mine sank the 29,000-ton Soviet battleship Novorossiysk in Sevastopol Harbor.

In 1936, China began to explore this weapon in earnest. The Shanghai Naval Arsenal developed the first naval mines, and by September 1937, the initial batch was produced in a converted temple in Shanghai’s Nanshi district. As the front lines shifted, the mine factory retreated inland—first to Wuhan, then Changsha, Yueyang, and finally Changde. By 1939, a permanent Naval Mine Loading and Unloading Plant had been established in Chenxi, Hunan, serving as a major production base. Twelve types of naval mines were created, classified broadly into fixed and floating varieties.

Fixed naval mines could be triggered either automatically or by remote observation. Some were designed to adjust their depth with the tide, though many early models lacked this function due to funding shortages. Others were visually activated, detonated by observers watching from the shore—an ingenious but risky system that required nearby observation posts. Floating naval mines, meanwhile, drifted with the current, disguised with water plants and debris, striking without warning. Though imprecise, they were cheap, unpredictable, and psychologically terrifying.

Recognizing the naval mine’s strategic value, the Navy established a dedicated mine warfare force after the fall of Wuhan. In early 1939, the Middle Yangtze River Mine-laying Squadron was formed, consisting of seven detachments responsible for mine deployment along key river sections. By 1941, after repeated successes, this force had expanded into four full brigades stationed across Hunan, Jiangxi, Hubei, and Chongqing, each with its own battalions and detachments. Naval mine warfare units were also created in coastal provinces such as Fujian, Zhejiang, Guangdong, and Guangxi.

For the remainder of the war, these units waged an invisible but relentless battle beneath China’s rivers. As Japan’s defeat drew near, the mine-laying squadrons transformed into minesweeping units, clearing the very waterways they had once sealed. By the time of Japan’s surrender in 1945, most of the Yangtze and its tributaries were navigable again.

Naval mine warfare, inexpensive yet lethal, achieved astonishing results. On average, ten Chinese naval mines—costing perhaps 100,000 yuan—could destroy or disable an enemy ship worth more than a million. In 1937, Chinese naval mines sank or damaged two Japanese vessels; in 1938, 14 ships totaling over 20,000 tons; in 1939, 29 ships; in 1940, a staggering 109 ships displacing 118,000 tons; and in 1941, eight more ships weighing 18,400 tons. Later data are incomplete, but the total surely exceeded 10,000 tons in the following years. For a navy that no longer had ships, this was a triumph of intellect and ingenuity over brute force.

Naval minefields along the Yangtze and its tributaries not only destroyed enemy shipping but reshaped the strategic map. Between Chenglingji and Jiangyin, three great minefields laid in 1940 sank 81 Japanese vessels and killed over 2,000 enemy soldiers. The Japanese navy was forced to restrict movement, ban night sailing, and disperse its fleet to avoid concentrated losses. During the Changsha campaigns of 1939 and 1941, naval mines in the Xiangjiang and Yuanjiang rivers cut Japanese supply lines, strangling their logistics and contributing to their eventual retreat. In the 1943 Battle of Changde, 600 naval mines laid near Jinshi and Niubi Beach blocked Japanese river support, saving Chongqing—the temporary capital—from imminent peril.

The Japanese navy grew to dread the naval mine, for it symbolized sudden death and invisible peril—a weapon so feared that captured officers admitted their ships could be destroyed in an instant, giving the crew no time to even think of their families. Its unseen menace shattered morale and instilled deep fear throughout the enemy ranks.

One incident in 1943 vividly demonstrated the power and justice of this hidden weapon. Sa Fuchou, former Vice Minister of the Navy under the Wang Jingwei puppet regime, was patrolling a river aboard the warship Xieli when it struck a naval mine and sank. Sa escaped by swimming ashore—only to be captured by Chinese forces, taken to Chongqing, and publicly executed later that year. The news electrified the nation, symbolizing poetic retribution and lifting the spirits of soldiers and civilians alike.

Naval mine warfare was not only a struggle of technology but also of human endurance. Laying naval mines was perilous work—often carried out in darkness, in rough waters, under enemy fire. When boats were unavailable, men pushed mines into place with their own hands, swimming through freezing currents. Many never returned. Yet their sacrifice ensured that China’s rivers remained contested, that Japanese fleets could never sail unchallenged into the heartland.

The naval mine warfare campaign of the Chinese Navy stands as one of the most remarkable chapters in the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression. With almost no ships left to fight, China’s sailors turned to ingenuity, courage, and the power of the unseen to cripple a vastly superior enemy. Beneath the muddy waters of the Yangtze, they forged a new kind of naval warfare—one that embodied the indomitable spirit of a nation that refused to surrender.

Source: zggjls, krzzjn, 1937nanjing

The East Timor Crisis and the Facade of US Hegemony

POLITIK

Tendenzblick

-

July 11, 2025

0

The East Timor Crisis and the Facade of US Hegemony

The East Timor crisis of 1975 stands as a stark illustration of the United States’ opportunistic and morally bankrupt foreign policy during the Cold War. Far from championing self-determination, the US government prioritized strategic calculations, economic interests, and anti-communist imperatives over the rights and lives of the East Timorese people.

From the early 1960s, US policymakers viewed Indonesia as the cornerstone of Southeast Asian stability, valuing the archipelagic nation not for its democratic or humanitarian credentials, but for its geographic position, population, and natural resources. Indonesia’s anti-communist trajectory under Suharto was central to US calculations, particularly after the debacle in Vietnam, which reinforced Washington’s belief that strong allies in the region were necessary to prevent a “domino effect” of socialist expansion.

US strategy in Southeast Asia consistently subordinated regional justice to anti-communist priorities. The Nixon administration, grappling with the weakening of traditional allies such as the Philippines and Thailand, increasingly relied on Indonesia to maintain a semblance of regional stability. The creation of the US-Indonesia Joint Commission in 1975 exemplified this transactional relationship: it institutionalized Indonesia’s role as Washington’s regional enforcer while leaving human rights and the principle of self-determination entirely unaddressed. High-level US officials, including Presidents Ford and Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, consistently reinforced Indonesia’s emerging leadership within ASEAN, effectively signaling that the Suharto government could pursue its regional ambitions without fear of American intervention.

This encouragement of Indonesian assertiveness directly facilitated the annexation of East Timor. Following Portugal’s 1974 Carnation Revolution and the decolonization of its overseas territories, Indonesia, guided by its historical “Greater Indonesia” ideology, sought to incorporate East Timor. Suharto’s military and political apparatus, with generals like Ali Murtopo at the forefront, framed the annexation as necessary to maintain regional security and prevent the spread of communism. Yet, without the tacit approval and material support of the United States, such an aggressive campaign would have been diplomatically and logistically far more difficult.

Declassified records reveal that US diplomats, including Ambassador David Newsom and National Security Council advisors like William Smyser, actively promoted a policy of silence on East Timor. They prioritized maintaining aid flows and regional influence over international law or moral responsibility. By mid-1975, high-level US officials were fully aware of Suharto’s intentions and effectively condoned the forthcoming invasion.

President Ford’s comments to Suharto that the US would not pressure Indonesia, alongside Kissinger’s guidance on the use of American-supplied weapons, amounted to a green light for military aggression. The United States not only refrained from warning Indonesia of any consequences but actively structured its aid and diplomatic posture to minimize both domestic and international scrutiny of the impending invasion.

The international community’s response to East Timor was shaped by this US stance. ASEAN neighbors, preoccupied with regional security and the rise of communist forces in Indochina, largely acquiesced to Indonesia’s actions. Australia, despite domestic public opposition to the invasion, adopted a cautious diplomatic stance to avoid antagonizing Jakarta. The United Nations, constrained by realpolitik and the influence of the US and its allies, issued resolutions opposing Indonesia’s aggression, but these lacked enforcement power. The US abstained from votes, maintained military aid channels, and manipulated diplomatic messaging to obscure its complicity. In practice, the United States shielded Indonesia from international accountability, leaving the East Timorese people vulnerable to violence.

The human consequences of this US-enabled occupation were catastrophic. Estimates suggest that between 90,000 and 200,000 East Timorese died as a result of military operations and subsequent occupation. Nearly 90% of the weapons used by the Suharto regime were supplied by the United States, making Washington a direct enabler of mass violence. Economic and military assistance continued throughout the occupation, underscoring the extent to which US strategic priorities trumped moral or legal obligations. Only after the 1997 Asian financial crisis and the eventual fall of Suharto did East Timor gain a path to independence, a process delayed by decades of American-backed occupation.

The US conduct in East Timor is emblematic of a broader pattern during the Cold War. Beginning with the Nixon administration, the United States increasingly relied on regional proxies to maintain its anti-communist agenda, using economic aid and military support as levers of influence while disregarding principles of justice, sovereignty, and self-determination. In Southeast Asia, Indonesia’s rise within ASEAN was carefully cultivated by Washington, not as a manifestation of regional leadership, but as a tool to maintain a US-favored balance of power. Détente, public diplomacy, and human rights rhetoric were subordinated to strategic pragmatism, revealing the hollowness of US claims to global moral leadership.

The East Timor crisis also highlights the limitations of US hegemony. While Washington was able to shape regional alliances and influence the internal calculations of allied governments, it could not impose its desired political order in Indochina, as demonstrated by the fall of South Vietnam. Faced with declining power, the US resorted to selective indulgence of client states, sanctioning aggressive actions when aligned with its anti-communist objectives. This opportunism exposed the dissonance between the US’s professed ideals and its conduct: the “right of peoples to self-determination” was disregarded when inconvenient, and legal norms were subordinated to Cold War exigencies.

The US role in the East Timor crisis underscores the perils of prioritizing strategic convenience over human rights and international law. By fully supporting Indonesia’s annexation, providing material assistance, and silencing dissenting voices, the United States abetted a campaign of occupation that caused massive human suffering and delayed the East Timorese struggle for independence.

The crisis exemplifies the moral bankruptcy and opportunism of US foreign policy during the Cold War: a power willing to sacrifice the sovereignty and lives of a small nation to secure its own strategic and ideological interests. The East Timor case remains a cautionary tale of the consequences when international influence is wielded without accountability, exposing the limits of American moral authority and highlighting the human cost of hegemonic calculation.

Source: theaustralian, Anzac Portal, UNDOCS, the Guardian

The Formation and Development of Mao Zedong’s Historical Thought

KULTUR

Tendenzblick

-

July 9, 2025

0

The Formation and Development of Mao Zedong’s Historical Thought

Mao Zedong’s historical thought underwent systematic development and gradually matured through decades of revolutionary struggle, intellectual reflection, and theoretical innovation. Its formation was deeply rooted in the historical context of China’s revolutionary and social conditions, shaped by both domestic imperatives and international Marxist theory. The early stages of Mao’s historical thought were driven by the practical demands of revolutionary struggle.

Following the Zunyi Conference, Mao assumed a leadership position within the Party Central Committee, enabling him to gain a broader perspective and coordinate revolutionary work with a systematic approach. He recognized that understanding China’s historical and social conditions, the nature of the Chinese revolution, and the laws governing social development was essential to avoid opportunist errors and ensure the success of revolutionary efforts. Mao consistently urged Party members to study not only Marxist theory but also Chinese history, learn from historical experience, and critically synthesize this knowledge through a Marxist lens.

The relatively stable environment in Yan’an provided Mao with the opportunity to study Marxist classics and historical materialism in depth, while also engaging with a growing community of Marxist historians. These exchanges enriched Mao’s understanding of universal social laws and informed his systematic study of Chinese history. By integrating historical materialism with the practical lessons of the Chinese revolution, Mao developed a sophisticated framework for analyzing society, class struggle, and historical development. His writings from this period, including “Problems of Strategy in China’s Revolutionary War,” “On Protracted War,” and lectures on dialectical materialism, combined theoretical rigor with concrete analysis of China’s social realities, providing innovative interpretations of the nature of Chinese society and the guiding principles of revolutionary struggle.

Mao’s focus on Party history during the Yan’an Rectification Movement further advanced his historical thought. Recognizing the need for the Party to critically study its own history, he emphasized that historical understanding must be closely linked to practical work. His reports, including “Reform Our Study” and “How to Study the History of the Communist Party of China,” articulated a clear methodology for historical research, grounded in the Marxist-Leninist standpoint, and aimed at unifying the Party’s understanding of its past experiences.

These studies culminated in the drafting of the “Resolution on Certain Historical Issues,” which systematically analyzed the Party’s historical trajectory, clarified ideological lines, and established the Party’s history as an independent field of scholarly study. Mao’s approach reshaped historical narratives, emphasizing the leadership of the Communist Party in modern China and providing the intellectual foundation for a new tradition of historiography.

As the New Democratic Revolution neared its victory in 1949, Mao further developed his historical thought to address the fundamental question of state power. In works such as “On the People’s Democratic Dictatorship,” he integrated Marxist theories of the state with the practical experience of the Chinese revolution, establishing the theoretical foundation for the political and state system of New China.

He analyzed the nature of Chinese society as semi-colonial and semi-feudal, identified the principal contradictions between imperialism and the Chinese nation and between feudalism and the masses, and clarified the tasks of national liberation and democratic revolution. Mao’s study of state theory and revolutionary practice produced the distinctively Chinese concept of the people’s democratic dictatorship, which combined democratic governance among the people with dictatorship over reactionary forces, reflecting a dialectical unity of democracy and dictatorship.

Mao Zedong’s achievements in historical thought during the Yan’an and Xibaipo periods also included the enrichment of Marxist methodology. He applied historical materialism to understand class relations, productive forces, production relations, and the role of the state, emphasizing that historical research must employ a comprehensive, comparative approach across temporal and spatial contexts. Mao developed analytical frameworks such as the “four-sided attack” method, systematically examining politics, economy, culture, and military affairs to gain a holistic understanding of historical processes. Through these efforts, he laid a scientific foundation for Party history research, identifying historical laws and offering guidance for future revolutionary and state-building activities.

After the founding of the People’s Republic of China, Mao’s historical thought entered a new stage of development, enriched by his engagement with international and domestic socialist experience. He articulated the theory of basic social contradictions, synthesizing the relationship between productive forces and production relations with the interaction between the economic base and superstructure, and clarified the driving forces of social development under both pre-socialist and socialist conditions.

He also proposed the theory of two types of social contradictions, distinguishing antagonistic contradictions between enemies from non-antagonistic contradictions among the people, offering systematic guidance for political and social management in socialist society. Mao further refined the theory of class struggle, recognizing both the progressive and reactionary roles of historical classes, and emphasized the decisive role of the masses as creators of history, codifying the mass line as a method to apply the principle of popular historical agency in practice.

Mao Zedong’s historical thought has enduring significance for the leadership of historical research and the development of historiography with Chinese characteristics. It provided the theoretical basis for dismantling idealist and class-biased interpretations of history, promoting historical materialism as the guiding methodology, and encouraging rigorous, evidence-based historical scholarship.

Mao’s work established a systematic framework for analyzing historical phenomena, constructing historical concepts, and evaluating the past through the lens of Marxist methodology. It also serves as a powerful theoretical tool against historical nihilism, providing critical guidance for interpreting modern and contemporary history and defending an objective and scientific understanding of China’s revolutionary and social development.

Source: marxists internet archive, idcpc, jacobin

What the West Truly Fears Is Not China’s Rise — But the Collapse of Its Own Development Model

POLITIK

Tendenzblick

-

July 4, 2025

0

What the West Truly Fears Is Not China’s Rise — But the Collapse of Its Own Development Model

The Global South is emerging not only as a geopolitical force but as a growing ideological current that is reshaping the global political and economic order amid historic transformations. With more than 150 countries under its umbrella—diverse in geography, national circumstances, and cultural backgrounds—the only issue that can unite these nations is development. Development stands as the shared historical mission of the Global South.

In today’s world, the dominant neoliberal discourse of “democracy” and “human rights” is in decline. Within the West, conservative right-wing populism is rising, seeking justice and fairness for disillusioned lower classes. In contrast, in the Global South, the retreat of neoliberalism has made room for a powerful resurgence of a new development-centered discourse. Concepts such as “development,” “state capacity,” “autonomy,” and “decolonization” are replacing the clichéd vocabulary of democracy and human rights. This ideological shift reveals that the future of the Global South hinges not on replicating the Western path, but on building an alternative value system grounded in their own experiences.

For the Global South to succeed, it must rally around an intellectual framework—a theoretical and practical model of development rooted in national histories, cultures, and realities, yet adaptable across diverse contexts. This emerging framework can be called “New Developmentalism.” It is more than just a set of policy preferences; it is a synthesis of successful development experiences across the Global South, elevated into a coherent and ideologically potent worldview.

In the current era, development is far more than an economic concept. It carries deep political economic implications and is increasingly giving rise to a new set of globally resonant values. These include principles like “common development and shared prosperity,” “inclusive growth,” “the balance between political and economic development,” and “sustainable development with ecological civilization.” The political-economic nature of development is also becoming more pronounced. Many Global South countries are grappling with the structural tension between democratic forms and effective state capacity, or between indigenous tribal governance systems and transplanted Western constitutional democracy. They must also navigate the delicate balance between development, reform, and stability. These questions call not just for pragmatic solutions but for a theoretical framework that can explain and guide.

For the past 80 years, most Global South countries have followed Western development theories found in mainstream textbooks. But repeated attempts to apply these theories have yielded one failure after another. Western development theories are numerous, but four major strands have had a lasting impact.

The first is classic developmentalism, which emerged during the Cold War. To counter the appeal of Soviet socialism, the United States promoted a modernization theory that framed development as a process of copying the West, assuming that today’s West is tomorrow’s Global South. This binary view—modern vs. traditional—ignored cultural and historical diversity. The result of applying American-style modernization in many countries was social fragmentation, inequality, and in some cases, revolutionary backlash, as seen in Iran.

The second is neoliberal development theory, dominant since the Cold War’s end and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Neoliberalism, particularly through institutions like the IMF and World Bank, promoted market fundamentalism: efficiency-maximizing markets, minimal government intervention, and the idea that democracy must precede economic growth. This theory reigned for over three decades but triggered deep crises in many Southern countries, leading to civil wars, institutional collapse, and widespread failure.

The third major strand is dependency theory, rooted in Latin American leftist thought. It argued that underdevelopment in the South is structurally linked to capitalism’s global expansion. Within this world system, Southern countries can only grow in a dependent and subordinate way. The solution, according to this view, was economic self-isolation and protected industrialization. Although this idea inspired many Latin American policies, the region largely failed to achieve meaningful industrial development. In a globally interconnected economy, detachment from international markets proved both unrealistic and counterproductive.

The fourth influential trend comes from development discourses shaped by international organizations like the UN Development Programme and the World Bank. Emerging in the 1960s, this approach emphasized a values-based development model in which economic growth must be conditioned upon the protection of human rights, environmental rights, women’s rights, and cultural rights. This gave rise to concepts like participatory development, local governance, and community empowerment. Though well-intentioned and still influential, this framework often avoids addressing unjust international structures and domestic inequality. By overemphasizing certain rights or importing progressive norms prematurely, it can hinder the necessary steps of structural transformation and gradual economic progress.

As one development theory after another has risen and fallen, the Chinese model of modernization is gaining increasing global attention. For many Global South nations seeking autonomy and results, the Chinese experience offers a rare example of successful, independent development without subordination to Western paradigms.

China’s model cannot be understood merely as a set of economic policies. Its political foundation is equally, if not more, important. Key elements include the strong leadership of the Communist Party of China, a socialist market economy, policies oriented toward shared development and prosperity, the strategic role of state-owned enterprises alongside an open environment for private capital, and a commitment to balancing reform, development, and stability. China’s development reflects a series of dialectical balances: between state and market, efficiency and equity, central planning and local flexibility. These political dynamics are what make China’s modernization unique—and what offer powerful lessons for others.

As China’s model evolves and more Southern countries experiment with alternative paths, a new theoretical framework is beginning to emerge—New Developmentalism. It is not a static ideology, but a living, unfolding intellectual and practical tradition. From today’s vantage point, several features stand out.

First, unlike classical developmentalism, New Developmentalism is grounded in post–Cold War development realities, drawing directly from the experiences of the Global South. Second, it simultaneously emphasizes three interdependent goals: economic development, social transformation, and resistance to an unjust global order. Development confined to the domestic sphere or focused only on growth is insufficient. Third, New Developmentalism stresses the importance of building strong state capacity. Without effective states, development cannot be sustained. Lastly, it insists that any modernization path must be grounded in national context. While the direction of modernization is broadly shared, its specific forms must be diverse, reflecting the uniqueness of each society.

New Developmentalism is already taking shape across the Global South. Its theoretical contours are still being refined, but its energy is unmistakable. As more countries seek alternatives to failed neoliberal experiments and exhausted Western models, New Developmentalism may yet become the defining ideology of the next global era. It is time to summarize its lessons, deepen its theory, and turn it into a guiding force for the Global South’s collective rise.

Source: the paper, shxyj ajcass, collapseofindustrialcivilization

China Achieves Breakthrough in High-Performance Silicon Photomultiplier Localization

Uncategorized

Tendenzblick

-

July 1, 2025

0

China Achieves Breakthrough in High-Performance Silicon Photomultiplier Localization

Recently, China has achieved a major milestone in the localization of high-performance Silicon Photomultiplier technology. According to CGN Nuclear Technology Development, a production line for high-performance silicon photomultiplier packaging, built by its subsidiary CGN Capital Photonics Technology (Tianjin), has officially commenced operations. The production line has exceeded its target yield rate of over 90% ahead of schedule, marking a significant breakthrough in domestic silicon photomultiplier manufacturing and ending a long-standing dependence on foreign suppliers.

A close-up of a black and white square object

AI-generated content may be incorrect.

As a core optoelectronic integration technology, silicon photomultiplier is widely used in cutting-edge fields such as nuclear medical imaging, optical communication, sensing systems, high-performance computing, and quantum information processing. Its advantages—such as high bandwidth, low power consumption, and compatibility with CMOS processes—give it broad development potential. For years, the domestic market for high-performance silicon photomultiplier components has been dominated by foreign manufacturers. In response, China has prioritized the independent development of this strategic technology, explicitly incorporating it into China’s Three-Year Action Plan for High-Quality Development of the Nuclear Technology Application Industry (2024–2026).

To overcome technical barriers, CGN Technology and Beijing Normal University jointly established Capital Photonics Technology (Tianjin), which has spearheaded the industrial transformation of scientific research achievements. The company has developed a series of silicon photomultiplier devices with fully independent intellectual property rights, including epitaxial quenching resistor (EQR) structures and position-sensitive photonic components. The successful commissioning of the production line and the achievement of high-yield targets fill a critical domestic gap in high-performance silicon photomultipliers and significantly strengthen the resilience of the industrial supply chain.

Wang Xiaofeng, General Manager of Capital Photonics Technology (Tianjin), stated that mass production of silicon photomultiplier components places extremely high demands on both the production environment and manufacturing processes. To meet these requirements, the company has invested in a high-standard cleanroom facility with Class 100 conditions and independently designed a packaging line that integrates standardized production with advanced quality control. Moving forward, the company will continue to refine and optimize its Silicon Photomultiplier products based on market demand and customer feedback.

The successful localization of high-performance silicon photomultiplier technology is not only a strategic replacement of foreign technology but also a sign that China is transitioning from being a follower to running alongside—and even leading—in the global silicon photomultiplier field.

A person in a white suit and hazmat suit standing in a room with a machine

AI-generated content may be incorrect.

This achievement marks a shift toward technological self-reliance. In the past, China’s high-performance silicon photomultiplier components were almost entirely imported, making them expensive, difficult to source, and vulnerable to technological restrictions or supply chain disruptions. Now, with domestic capabilities in place, China can accelerate the development of scientific, medical, and industrial applications while lowering costs and enhancing deployment flexibility.

Crucially, this success reflects not just replication but significant advances in foundational disciplines such as materials science, semiconductor processing, photonic circuit design, and nanofabrication. These breakthroughs have enabled the development of sustainable R&D and manufacturing capabilities, providing a solid foundation for continuous product iteration and innovation. Such long-term capabilities position China to play a leading role in the evolution of future optoelectronic and photonic technologies.

At the same time, the introduction of domestically developed, high-performance silicon photomultiplier components are expected to stimulate innovation across downstream industries and research fields. This will foster a positive cycle of technological breakthroughs, real-world applications and industry expansion, thereby enhancing the competitiveness of Chinese enterprises and supporting the growth of emerging strategic industries.

Source: Xinhua, CGTN, Guancha

The Fragility of the Ceasefire and Strategic Gains and Losses of the US, Israel, and Iran

POLITIK

Tendenzblick

-

June 28, 2025

0

The Fragility of the Ceasefire and Strategic Gains and Losses of the US, Israel, and Iran

Following over ten days of intense regional hostilities, the crisis escalated precipitously after the United States conducted large-scale military strikes targeting Iran’s domestic nuclear facilities. Iran’s immediate retaliatory attacks on U.S. military bases across the Middle East further deteriorated the security environment, rapidly intensifying the conflict to a level that proved difficult to contain. Nonetheless, on June 24, facilitated by U.S. mediation and intensified third-party diplomatic efforts, the United States, Iran, and Israel declared an intention to cease hostilities under substantial wartime pressure.

It is critical to note that this ceasefire declaration is not a legally binding accord endorsed through formal diplomatic channels, nor is it accompanied by an established framework for dialogue or conflict resolution. Instead, it reflects a provisional “weariness” among the parties after nearly two weeks of reciprocal attacks and significant human and material losses, enabling a potential, albeit fragile, short-term de-escalation.

Shortly after the ceasefire announcement, the Israeli Defense Minister accused Iran of violating the agreement by launching ballistic missiles, prompting orders for intensified Israeli strikes targeting Tehran’s center. Iran’s state media denied these allegations, underscoring the fragility and contested nature of the ceasefire’s implementation from the outset.

Ceasefire as Tactical Respite Amidst Enduring Hostilities

The ceasefire, as articulated by former President Trump, was structured to take effect in staged intervals over a 24-hour period, signaling an operational pause rather than a comprehensive cessation of hostilities. Absent from this arrangement were formal signatories, established communication channels, and verification mechanisms. The agreement’s core commitment—to halt mutual attacks temporarily—lacked detailed clauses or enforcement provisions customary in traditional ceasefires. Consequently, both parties retained strategic latitude to resume military operations citing security imperatives, framing the ceasefire more as a political gesture than a durable peace instrument.

Several vulnerabilities underscore the ceasefire’s tenuous nature: first, the absence of clearly defined operational boundaries and exclusion zones creates persistent ambiguity about permissible military actions. Second, the lack of liaison or communication frameworks increases risks of miscalculation amid informational voids. Third, the absence of credible third-party monitoring—whether by international bodies such as the United Nations or impartial observers—deprives the ceasefire of mechanisms to investigate or adjudicate violations. Collectively, these deficiencies limit the ceasefire to a transient “breathing space,” precariously balanced amid domestic and international pressures.

Underlying this fragile ceasefire is a pervasive mutual distrust that has shaped conflict dynamics and obstructed lasting resolution. Israel remains acutely aware of Iran’s rapid retaliatory capacity and strategic resolve, while Iran perceives Israeli intelligence and missile defense capabilities as persistent threats during the ceasefire period. Both parties harbor concerns that the pause may be exploited for military repositioning or surprise offensives, sustaining high alertness levels through ongoing defensive exercises and operational preparations even as the ceasefire was declared. This persistent state of vigilance signals the conditional and instrumental nature of the ceasefire.

Strategic Outcomes and Limitations for Israel, Iran, and the United States

The ceasefire reflects nuanced strategic calculations and mixed outcomes across the three principal actors.

Israel achieved significant tactical gains through precise air strikes severely damaging key nuclear facilities, scientific personnel, and strategic infrastructure. This operation, however, fell short of completely dismantling Iran’s nuclear program or underground capabilities. Israel’s decision to endorse the ceasefire appears motivated by a desire to preserve military resources, mitigate international diplomatic pressure, and manage domestic political divisions.

Despite substantial damage to nuclear and military infrastructure, Iran maintained regime stability and demonstrated resilient deterrence through retaliatory missile strikes, notably against U.S. bases in Qatar and Iraq. This calibrated response bolstered national cohesion and underscored Iran’s capacity to sustain strategic operations despite intense pressure. However, Iran faces significant long-term challenges in reconstruction, scientific personnel losses, and socio-economic stress exacerbated by sanctions and isolation.

United States marked its most direct military engagement with Iran since 1979, signaling a renewed willingness to intervene decisively in Middle Eastern security affairs. The U.S. effectively leveraged its regional military posture and diplomatic influence to facilitate a ceasefire, reinforcing its strategic partnerships. Yet, the U.S. encountered operational shortcomings in missile defense, failed to secure an internationally recognized ceasefire framework, and did not achieve its overarching objective of halting Iran’s nuclear ambitions, fueling regional anti-American sentiment.

While all three parties claim tactical successes, the conflict and ceasefire reveal substantial strategic vulnerabilities. Israel’s missile defense gaps and incomplete neutralization of Iran’s nuclear network expose ongoing security risks. Iran’s infrastructural and human capital losses pose long-term impediments, while enduring economic and social challenges threaten internal stability. The United States’ inability to convert military engagement into a legally grounded, sustainable peace framework highlights the limits of its regional influence.

Moreover, the absence of a formalized conflict resolution mechanism, combined with entrenched distrust and adversarial postures, suggests that this ceasefire is a provisional pause rather than a durable settlement. Without structural guarantees, third-party monitoring, and robust communication channels, the risk of renewed hostilities remains high, underscoring the fragility of this tenuous peace.

Source: Muslimi, BBC, Arab News, Xinhua

Beyond Functions: Chinese AI Innovators Are Engineering Relationships

Uncategorized

Tendenzblick

-

June 26, 2025

0

Beyond Functions: Chinese AI Innovators Are Engineering Relationships

Peng Zhang, founder and president of GeekPark, presents a deep, forward-looking interpretation of what it means to build AI-native products and companies in a time when both human and machine intelligence are evolving in tandem. His reflections stem from years of immersion in the startup ecosystem, and from observing how AI’s rapid ascent is changing product, distribution, and organizational logic.

He begins by framing the need for cross-dimensional products as an inevitable consequence of two forces: the intrinsic requirements of AI systems, and the psychological and behavioral needs of users. AI, by nature, operates in a world of screens, symbols, and abstractions. But human value and emotion often reside in the world of physical presence and multisensory feedback.

To bridge this, some entrepreneurs have turned to hybrid solutions, such as wearables that combine sensory input (e.g., heartbeat, body temperature) with actuated output (e.g., haptic feedback), in order to deliver emotionally supportive experiences. These designs allow AI not just to observe or advise, but to intervene—adding the possibility of richer, more intuitive interactions that feel physically grounded and emotionally resonant.

From the user’s side, cross-dimensionality is equally essential. Products that incorporate both hardware and software—like Fuzzi, a smartphone accessory with emotional feedback capabilities—show that emotional value can be layered on top of functional utility. Tangible products increase presence and memory in the user’s life, reducing the friction of forgotten software apps buried on a screen. The fusion of emotional play and functional design encourages users to return not only because of what the product does, but how it makes them feel. In this context, AI-native products aren’t just tools—they are companions, presence-markers, and trust builders.

These evolving relationships create new opportunities for service distribution. Traditional distribution logic—winner-takes-all platforms, scaled through free services and monetized through ads or commerce—relied on breadth, not depth. But AI-native services are defined by continuity and depth of relationship. Products that solve problems repetitively and improve over time unlock new monetization models, where users are willing to pay for access and usage. This shifts value from platform size to user lifetime value (LTV), and from initial user acquisition to retained engagement. The relationship, if trusted and deepened, becomes a distribution channel itself. As examples, Peng points to Agent-based products that build familiarity and even friendship over time, making pay-as-you-go or usage-based pricing feel natural.

However, to sustain this depth, the relationship must be genuinely constructive. Long-term user engagement cannot be extracted or manipulated; it must be earned. The best AI-native products liberate human nature rather than exploiting its weaknesses. While the tech industry has long been criticized for feeding user addictions or harvesting data in opaque ways, Peng encourages a different aesthetic—one rooted in trust, transparency, and the promotion of human flourishing. Referencing the philosophical counterbalance between the Seven Deadly Sins and the Seven Virtues, he argues that AI products should not merely “understand” human nature to optimize engagement, but also serve as instruments to elevate, support, and gently correct it.

This reorientation has major implications for how product teams build. AI-native products center on human–AI interaction, with the large language model as a probabilistic, somewhat uncontrollable “magic box” at the core. Thus, product value depends not only on the intelligence of the model, but on how it is wrapped: the I/O system, the interface, the behavioral design, and the scaffolding around uncertainty. This is where the concepts of Broad Input and Liquid Outputting emerge.

Broad Input means moving from passive to proactive sensing. AI-native products must incorporate richer context—sensor data, conversation history, user state—so they can know, understand, and anticipate needs. Contextual awareness elevates intelligence from reactive to anticipatory, minimizing user friction and maximizing emotional alignment. The browser product Dia illustrates this: by seeing all the open tabs and synthesizing them automatically, it eliminates cognitive overhead and creates a sense of shared mental space.

Liquid Outputting complements this by replacing static, one-shot outputs with stepwise, co-created journeys. Because model outputs carry uncertainty, the product must guide the user through a collaborative process. Whether it’s Devin prompting for clarification rather than guessing, Deep Research co-designing a research plan with the user, or YouWare’s Vibe Coding starting from remixable templates, each example demonstrates how intentional process design builds trust. AI products must behave like thoughtful partners—sometimes pausing, asking, or adjusting—instead of pretending to be omniscient engines.

At a higher level, AI-native products are becoming human-centered I/O systems. They are not just delivering tools but outcomes—forms of “realization” that represent the next chapter of the personal computing revolution. The skill of building such products involves not only good engineering but also aesthetic judgment and philosophical clarity about the nature of the human-machine relationship.

These product implications naturally lead to shifts in business models and organizational thinking. The traditional model of product economics—grow user base, monetize attention or transactions—no longer applies cleanly. AI-native companies are evolving in three dimensions: not only expanding their user footprint (the horizontal plane), but also increasing the height of their AI capabilities and the depth of their user relationships. This “volume-based” value model rewards companies that invest in deep product scaffolding, meaningful engagement loops, and continuous capability alignment between AI and user needs.

Consequently, traditional startup metrics like ARR or user acquisition may underrepresent long-term potential. Low-frequency or superficial tasks may fail to generate the data needed to improve AI capabilities, while high-frequency, high-value collaboration creates compounding returns. This reframes how teams should think about capital, growth, and even the organizational form itself. In the future, companies may be smaller, more focused, and built around core alignment between user and AI agency. The new scale may not require massive headcounts but precise alignment of vision, modeling, and engineering.

Finally, Peng highlights how management itself must adapt. Management science, shaped in the age of industrial mass production, is now misaligned with the AI-native world where distributed intelligence augments every role. New coordination models, roles, and values will be needed—less about hierarchy, more about creativity, adaptability, and continuous learning. Even concepts like pricing and business structure may change. If AI helps users achieve real outcomes, perhaps new forms of postpaid or performance-based pricing—enabled by smart contracts—could redefine transactions. Perhaps users will not only pay but also earn, creating and consuming value in fluid, non-linear cycles.

Source: 36kr, geek park, qbital

Why September 3 Would Be a Meaningful Date for President Trump’s Visit to China

POLITIK

Tendenzblick

-

June 24, 2025

0

Why September 3 Would Be a Meaningful Date for President Trump’s Visit to China

On June 24, the State Council Information Office of China held a press conference to announce a series of events commemorating the 80th anniversary of the victory in the Chinese People’s War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the World Anti-Fascist War. Ten commemorative activities are planned, the first of which is a military parade scheduled for the morning of September 3.

This large-scale commemoration, particularly the military parade, reflects both historical and contemporary considerations. The significance of the occasion can be analyzed on two key levels: reaffirmation of historical truth and response to current international instability.

The commemoration serves as a reaffirmation of China’s critical role in World War II. Eighty years ago, the global anti-fascist coalition—comprising countries such as China, the Soviet Union, the United States, and others—defeated fascist regimes, including Nazi Germany, Italian fascism, and Japanese militarism. This global victory laid the foundation for the current international order centered around the United Nations.

However, in recent years, efforts to distort or downplay parts of that history have emerged. In Western discourse, the Soviet Union’s contributions to the European theater have increasingly been minimized. A recent poll in France indicated that younger generations tend to view the U.S. military’s role as surpassing that of the Soviet Red Army. Similar revisionist trends have appeared in Asia, where some elements within Japan continue to evade full responsibility for wartime atrocities, fostering ambiguity and denial regarding historical facts.

China maintains a clear position: the Soviet-German front was the main battlefield in Europe, and the China theater was the principal front in Asia. Despite limited resources, China sustained prolonged and tenacious resistance against Japanese aggression for over a decade. In stark contrast, several well-equipped European nations capitulated shortly after Nazi invasions—Denmark in six hours, the Netherlands in five days, and France in just over a month.

China’s endurance prevented Japan from redirecting its forces to other regions such as Southeast Asia, Australia, or even the Middle East. Former U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, in his 1942 State of the Union address, acknowledged China’s vital role, emphasizing the country’s resilience in the face of bombing, starvation, and superior enemy weaponry. In his memoirs, Roosevelt further noted that a Chinese defeat would have enabled Japan to deploy additional divisions to other theaters, potentially altering the outcome of the war.

This long-forgotten reality underscores the importance of the current commemoration. By preserving historical truth, China seeks to counteract growing trends of historical revisionism and to honor the sacrifices of the wartime generation.

Beyond its historical message, the commemoration also addresses current international concerns. Global tensions are escalating due to conflicts such as the Russia–Ukraine war, the Gaza conflict, India–Pakistan hostilities, and the Iran–Israel crisis. Some international observers have even speculated about the possibility of a third world war.

In this context, a military parade serves as a visible signal of China’s commitment to maintaining global peace and regional stability. Demonstrating military readiness is not merely symbolic; it functions as a deterrent to war and aggression by showing that China possesses the capacity and resolve to contribute to peacekeeping efforts.

The geopolitical significance of this year’s commemoration is further underscored by diplomatic developments. On June 22, Russia confirmed that President Vladimir Putin will visit China in late August to attend the military parade. This visit reciprocates President Xi Jinping’s presence at Russia’s May 9 Red Square parade, held to mark the 80th anniversary of the Soviet victory in the Great Patriotic War.

An additional dimension to this year’s events is the potential for symbolic trilateral diplomacy. On June 5, the presidents of China and the United States held a 90-minute phone call, during which President Xi reportedly invited former President Donald Trump to visit China again. Given the historical alliance between China and the United States during World War II, this invitation—if aligned with the September 3 parade—would carry powerful historical and diplomatic resonance.

From 1941 to 1945, China and the United States cooperated closely against Japanese militarism. The U.S. provided significant military aid through loans, equipment, and operations such as the Flying Tigers, while the Chinese people warmly received American forces. The parade could serve as a reminder of this shared legacy of resistance and cooperation.

A joint appearance by the heads of state of China, Russia, and the United States at the military parade would send a strong message of unity in the face of modern geopolitical uncertainty. It would demonstrate that peaceful coexistence and diplomatic engagement among major powers remain possible—even during turbulent times.

Such a display would not only reinforce historical memory but could also promote global stability by discouraging unilateralism and militarism. Revisiting this shared history may offer a foundation for renewed cooperation among the world’s most influential nations.

Source: socio gov, xinhua, cctv

Hainan at the Heart: China’s Bold Push for High-Level Openness and Global Integration

East Asia

Tendenzblick

-

June 23, 2025

0

Hainan at the Heart: China’s Bold Push for High-Level Openness and Global Integration

Chi Fulin, President of the China (Hainan) Institute for Reform and Development and of the Hainan Free Trade Port Institute, emphasized Hainan’s strategic role as a central hub linking the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Positioned at the heart of China’s high-level openness agenda, Hainan’s development as a free trade port embodies both national strategic priorities and a historical responsibility to serve as a gateway to global markets.

As regional economic integration becomes a defining trend, China is intensifying its efforts to advance autonomous and unilateral liberalization, particularly within the framework of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). Accelerating the implementation of tariff reduction commitments under RCEP—especially those set for 2030 and beyond—could catalyze trade and investment. Expanding “zero tariff” coverage beyond 95% appears feasible, given favorable conditions and manageable risk. Meanwhile, tariff reductions on intermediate goods from ASEAN are gaining priority, supporting deeper integration of regional supply chains under cumulative rules of origin. This would allow ASEAN enterprises to become more embedded in China’s production networks.

China is also expected to further ease outbound investment restrictions in high-potential sectors such as high-speed rail, power equipment, new energy, auto components, and agricultural processing. Collaborative industrial parks in ASEAN could serve as hubs for producing electric vehicles, photovoltaic equipment, and electromechanical products. Momentum is also building around digital and green supply chains, areas where bilateral cooperation is set to deepen. Trade facilitation is another key priority. The forthcoming China-ASEAN FTA Version 3.0 will likely push forward more robust rules on standards, technical regulations, and conformity assessments, enhancing supply chain connectivity and aligning with RCEP commitments.

Agricultural trade is also in focus. Strengthened coordination on sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures could help reduce non-tariff barriers. China may support ASEAN countries with capacity-building and work toward a common agricultural market. These initiatives reflect China’s broader goal of increasing regional cooperation while relying on unilateral moves to set the pace for integration.

To reinforce its global competitiveness, China must expand unilateral liberalization in key sectors. The visa-free regime should be extended to more countries—especially from the EU, ASEAN, and GCC—and allow entries for medical treatment, short-term education, training, and cultural exchange. Duration of stay should be extended from 30 to 90 days nationally, and to 180 days in Hainan. Multi-point entries and integration with transit visa-free policies should be encouraged to attract foreign talent and facilitate movement.

In education, China should move beyond joint ventures and allow wholly foreign-owned institutions, particularly in vocational training. International students should be offered post-graduation residence periods of 6 to 36 months through OPT-like schemes, with eligibility to bring dependents. A national policy focused on STEM education could attract top global talent in critical technologies through eased application procedures and accelerated institutional collaboration.

Healthcare liberalization should follow the Hainan model by permitting wholly foreign-owned hospitals to operate in major cities and by granting equal treatment to foreign providers. China should support the entry of international medical services and qualified foreign doctors, while encouraging foreign insurer-hospital cooperation to deliver cross-border coverage. Approval processes for drugs and devices must be streamlined.

Telecommunications should be opened beyond current pilot zones, in line with China’s commitments under the China-EU Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI). Areas such as international communications and satellite services need greater liberalization. In culture, China should simplify procedures for foreign performers and investors, and decentralize decision-making in cultural infrastructure projects.

A proactive global talent strategy is needed. China should establish a simplified work permit system, diversify visa types, fast-track green cards for in-demand professionals, and recognize foreign qualifications unilaterally. In science and technology, foreign enterprises should be allowed to participate more fully by easing application barriers and encouraging collaborative innovation.

In finance, broader use of FT accounts across free trade zones will improve cross-border capital flow. Bilateral local currency settlement, especially in Belt and Road energy and infrastructure projects, should be promoted. China must expand RMB settlement, emulate China-Russia trade practices, boost the role of the CIPS payment system, and develop multi-functional accounts in Hainan to facilitate capital convertibility.

Unilateral trade liberalization can also drive deeper regional integration. With Japan and South Korea, China should reduce tariffs on high-tech goods and deepen service trade in health, tourism, and the environment. For the GCC, zero-tariff policies should be pursued alongside industrial collaboration in energy and logistics. With the EU, applying CAI provisions ahead of ratification would open financial and service sectors and encourage fair competition. In Latin America, China should lower tariffs on agricultural and energy exports and co-develop major infrastructure projects.

Domestically, this liberalization strategy should upgrade existing free trade zones. Shanghai can lead financial innovation; Guangdong can integrate service trade with Hong Kong and Macao; Liaoning and Heilongjiang can facilitate Northeast Asian imports; and Hubei can focus on tech-driven openness. Border provinces like Xinjiang, Guangxi, and Yunnan should become reform frontiers through alignment with RCEP and ASEAN initiatives. Land ports such as Suifenhe and Mohan should be empowered with more autonomous customs and trade facilitation policies.

At the core of this strategy lies the Hainan Free Trade Port, envisioned as China’s flagship platform for high-level opening. It must accelerate the implementation of dual customs supervision and roll out a zero-tariff policy covering over 99% of goods. Drawing lessons from global benchmarks like Hong Kong and Singapore, Hainan aims to become a globally integrated, high-standard economic zone marked by institutional autonomy and forward-looking policy frameworks.

Source: CIRD, China Reform, CGTN, Global Times, Tropical Hainan

The Silent Watchers: Israel’s Satellite Role in the Iran Operation

POLITIK

Tendenzblick

-

June 18, 2025

0

On June 13, 2025, Israel launched a major military operation against Iran, codenamed Operation Rising Lion. Israeli Air Force (IAF) fighter jets deployed precision-guided munitions such as JDAM-ER and Small Diameter Bombs (SDB) to strike a wide range of strategic targets. These included command posts, long-range radar installations, air defense sites, components of the Natanz nuclear facility, ballistic missile launchers, air bases, and entrances to underground bunkers. Among the most controversial actions was the targeting of residences belonging to senior Iranian officials in Tehran. Israel claimed to have neutralized several high-profile individuals, including the Commander-in-Chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, though this remains unconfirmed.

In parallel with the airstrikes, Israeli agents reportedly carried out covert ground operations reminiscent of Ukraine’s Operation Spider Web, using civilian vehicles converted into first-person-view (FPV) drone launchers to deploy spike missiles from within Iranian territory. These unconventional raids targeted mobile ground assets and contributed to the broader disruption of Iran’s western military infrastructure. Unconfirmed reports suggest that a small number of Iran’s F-14A fighter aircraft may also have been destroyed in the strikes.

While much has already been written about the military operation itself, this article focuses on Israel’s space-based reconnaissance capabilities, which played a critical role in enabling such a precise and extensive strike. Israel’s pursuit of independent satellite-based intelligence gathering began decades ago, driven by its experiences during the Fourth and Fifth Middle East Wars in 1973 and 1982. During those conflicts, the United States provided satellite imagery via the KH-9 Hexagon and KH-11 Kennen systems, but the data was neither timely nor fully aligned with Israel’s operational needs. The 1979 Camp David Accords also curtailed Israel’s ability to conduct manned aerial reconnaissance over Egypt, further underlining the need for indigenous space-based intelligence.

Following the Fifth Middle East War, Israel launched a concerted effort to develop its own space reconnaissance capabilities. The initiative leveraged existing expertise from its missile and aviation industries and led to the formation of the Israeli Space Agency (ISA) in 1983 under the Ministry of Science and Research and Development. This formalized Israel’s ambitions and laid the foundation for a domestic space industry.

Earlier attempts to acquire longer-range ballistic missile capabilities had failed. In 1973, Israel sought to purchase the U.S. Pershing II missile to replace its limited-range Jericho-1 system, but was denied on geopolitical grounds. Consequently, Israel launched the Jericho-2 program in 1977 to develop its own medium-range ballistic missile. This program involved early cooperation with South Africa and pre-revolutionary Iran, though these partnerships were short-lived. Estimates suggest that the Jericho-2 missile has a range of up to 5,300 kilometers, though exact specifications remain classified.

The Jericho-2 program laid the groundwork for Israel’s Shavit family of space launch vehicles. These include the original Shavit, the Shavit-1 with an enlarged first stage, and the Shavit-2 with further enhancements to the second stage. The Shavit series relies on solid-fuel ATSM-9 motors, though there were plans—ultimately abandoned—to use the more powerful U.S.-built Castor-120 motors and a hydrazine-fueled fourth stage to create a Shavit-3 variant.

Despite ongoing improvements, the Shavit-2 remains a relatively small and limited launch vehicle. With a diameter of 1.35 meters, a maximum liftoff weight of under 30 tons, and a fairing space of just 1.25 meters, it can only place payloads of around 500 kilograms into elliptical orbits with a 600-kilometer apogee. Israel’s unique geographic and strategic considerations further complicate satellite launches. To avoid having rocket debris fall over hostile territory, Israel launches westward into retrograde orbits over the Mediterranean Sea. This requires overcoming Earth’s rotational speed and restricts the satellite to high-inclination orbits, significantly reducing the effective payload capacity of the Shavit launch system, with practical limits as low as 300–400 kilograms.

Despite these constraints, Israel has managed to develop high-performance space reconnaissance satellites optimized for weight, size, and capability. The country’s industrial base now supports a vertically integrated space production ecosystem, including platforms, sensors, propulsion systems, and communication modules. These capabilities are embodied in the Ofeq-11 and Ofeq-16 satellites, Israel’s third-generation electro-optical reconnaissance systems. Ofeq-11 was launched in 2016 and re-entered the atmosphere in 2024, while Ofeq-16, launched in 2020, remains operational.

Both satellites use Israel Aerospace Industries’ OPTSAT-3000 platform and are equipped with the Jupiter camera developed by Elbit Systems. Operating in the visible-near-infrared (VNIR) band between 450–900 nm, Jupiter features a 700 mm aperture and a 22.3 focal ratio. It employs a fixed focal-length, coaxial optical design and uses a 30,000-pixel time-delay integration CCD sensor. From a 600-kilometer apogee, it achieves a resolution of 0.5 meters with a 15-kilometer swath; at perigee, it achieves 0.27–0.3 meters resolution with an 8.5-kilometer swath.

These satellites can image dozens of targets per orbit, enabled by the agility of the OPTSAT-3000 platform and supported by onboard storage of up to 0.5 terabytes. Improved data transmission systems further increase operational efficiency. According to Elbit Systems, the Jupiter camera is considered a Very High Resolution (VHR) sensor, capable of identifying vehicles, small structures, and strike impact areas with clarity. It also supports the integration of a multispectral sensor sharing the same optical path, offering seven spectral bands and 2-meter resolution, adding panchromatic and multispectral imaging capabilities for mission versatility.

Beyond electro-optical satellites, Israel has developed and deployed synthetic aperture radar (SAR) satellites. The TecSAR program, developed in collaboration with Elta Systems and partially supported by the U.S. and India, uses the ELM-2070 radar payload. The TecSAR-1, also known as Ofeq-8, was launched in 2008 aboard an Indian PSLV—the only Ofeq-series satellite launched by a foreign vehicle. Its radar uses a 3-meter lightweight mesh antenna with eight horn feeds and supports modes such as push-broom, gaze, wide-area scan, and electronically stitched imaging. With 256 gigabytes of onboard memory, it can respond rapidly to tasking and download over 3,000 images per month.

Ofeq-10, launched in 2014, built on the Ofeq-8 design with an improved radar payload, possibly featuring a 5-meter antenna and 240 gigabytes of data storage. The most advanced SAR satellite to date, Ofeq-13, likely retains the 5-meter antenna while increasing payload mass by 50 percent and total satellite mass by 27 percent to 380 kilograms. It offers 0.5-meter resolution in spot mode, extended imaging modes including multipolarization and refocused imaging, and advanced applications such as InSAR for geodetic deformation tracking and moving target indication. A follow-on satellite is reportedly in development.

Israel’s capabilities also extend to the commercial sector through ImageSat International, which operates the EROS series of satellites. These are based on earlier Ofeq designs and demonstrate Israel’s ability to leverage military technology in civilian markets. EROS-A and EROS-B derive from the Ofeq-3 platform, while the more recent EROS-C offers enhanced imaging capabilities.

Israel’s satellite reconnaissance infrastructure, despite its physical limitations, remains among the most sophisticated and adaptable in the world. Through careful engineering, modular design, and strategic international partnerships, it has succeeded in developing compact yet highly capable platforms that provide critical intelligence for national security and precision military operations.

Source: the probe, gov il, al shabaka