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How China Chenghai Commands a Third of Global Toy Production

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The global toy industry looks to China, and China’s toy industry looks to Chenghai. Walking through Chenghai, toy brand stores line the streets, and rows of towering buildings house over 50,000 toy production and management units, cultivating industry leaders like Sunfun Toys, Alpha Animation and Culture, Rastar Group, and Sembao Blocks. In 2023, the industry’s revenue exceeded $6.98 billion.

Known as China’s Toy and Gift Capital, Chenghai has developed a comprehensive industry chain from R&D and design to manufacturing and trade. The district produces half of China’s plastic toys, with the nation’s highest number of authorized brands, IPs, and patents, launching over 300,000 new toys annually for export to more than 120 countries. In 2024, Chenghai’s Toy Creative Industry Cluster was recognized as a specialty industrial cluster in Guangdong Province for small and medium-sized enterprises.

Despite this success, Chenghai’s toy industry faces challenges of low overall quality and homogeneous competition. As international competition intensifies, many Chenghai companies are shifting from contract manufacturing to building their own brands, moving up the value chain to higher-end segments.

Toy Factories Embrace Digital Intelligence

In Moyu Cube’s exhibition hall, there is an array of Rubik’s Cubes, including various types like traditional, anisotropic, magnetic, maglev, and AI-enhanced models, spanning hundreds of styles. “We’ve embedded Bluetooth chips, sensors, and gyroscopes in our Rubik’s Cubes, allowing users to follow guided steps for solving the cube and learning formulas,” explained Yang Jiandong, Moyu Cube’s marketing director. Since 2016, the company has utilized a fully automated production line, where AI-enabled machines have boosted production efficiency by 80 times. Moyu Cube’s digital upgrades reflect the broader transformation underway in Chenghai’s toy industry.

Huang Liang, Executive Vice President of the Shantou Chenghai District Toy Association, highlighted that in the 21st century, Chenghai’s toy sector adopted CNC machine tools, automated CNC injection molding machines, and other advanced equipment, resulting in large-scale production and industry clustering. Today, Chenghai has developed China’s most complete toy production chain, covering raw materials, R&D, IP creation, manufacturing, sales, and trade. The city’s products span early education, blocks, video games, and remote-controlled toys, producing one-third of the world’s and nearly half of China’s plastic toys.

Data from Shantou’s Bureau of Industry and Information Technology show that in 2023, Shantou’s 264 toy and creative companies generated an industrial output value of $4.31 billion, accounting for 8.8% of the city’s regulated industries, with an added value of $990 million.

Hong Kong’s Chen Hsong Holdings, a global leader in injection molding machinery, entered Chenghai in 2000. Over two decades, Chen Hsong’s machines have evolved from quantitative and variable injection models to servo and all-electric versions, aligning with Chenghai’s toy industry’s advancements. In 2016, Chen Hsong launched a specialized machine for building blocks and educational toys, capturing 50% of the local market and establishing Chenghai’s first smart factory in 2019 with local partners.

“With 12,000 injection molding machines in Chenghai, the toy industry has largely automated and is moving toward digital, intelligent production,” noted Chen Jianbo, a senior manager at Chen Hsong. Chen Hsong now holds a 60% local market share and up to 85% in sectors like blocks and Rubik’s Cubes. The company is exploring AI models for the toy industry, aiming to improve quality and yield by using big data for real-time adjustments and enhanced process intelligence.

Moving from Product to IP Overseas

Globally, nearly 75% of toys are IP-based, with popular IPs often driving growth across related industries. Recognizing this potential, Chenghai companies began exploring IP’s value over a decade ago. In 2009, Alpha Animation and Culture went public on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, pioneering the “IP + industry chain” model with popular animation series like Super Wings, ​​Balala the Fairies, Pleasant Goat and Big Big Wolf, and others.

Chenghai’s toy manufacturers are leveraging the domestic animation IP boom, expanding brands internationally. “Our foreign sales increased 35% this year, reaching $42–56 million,” shared Xie Yipeng, assistant general manager of Guangdong Jianjian Intelligent Technology. By tapping into markets in North America, Europe, and Asia, the company has doubled its overseas sales, responding to demand for remote-controlled vehicles with 30–40 new models annually.

Chenghai exports toys to over 120 countries through multiple channels, controlling about one-third of the world’s toy production. Sembao Blocks, a local leader in block-based toys, has grown through both independent IP and licensed partnerships since 2019, collaborating on themes like the Wandering Earth, Shandong aircraft carrier, CASCI, and Forbidden City Culture. Popular series such as Huayan Tea Language Flower sold 1 million units immediately after launch, achieving $2.8 million in single-product sales.

Chenghai’s “toys + IP” model has fostered numerous top IP-based toy companies, like Sembao Blocks and Rastar Group, giving the district the largest concentration of toy patents in China, with over 10,000 patents authorized each year. 

To support this industry, Chenghai’s government has strengthened IP protections, establishing the country’s only dedicated rapid intellectual property rights center for toys. “Ordinary patent applications take three to five months, but our center’s fast track reduces this to just ten days, a critical advantage for product development and sales,” explained Chen Shunli, Director of Shantou’s (Toys) Intellectual Property Rights Center. This support helps Chenghai’s toy manufacturers thrive in a competitive global market.

Building a New Industrial Ecosystem through Chain Innovation

In the Guangdong Yuxing Technology, a streamlined process unfolds: blocks are sorted into barcode-labeled boxes by 36 robots, while an intelligent platform collects and analyzes production data in the cloud. Six years ago, company founder Xie Weichun, with nearly 20 years in toy manufacturing, saw an urgent need for automation due to labor shortages and quality control challenges. In response, Yuxing partnered with Shantou Gooders Precision Technology in 2018 to create an automated production line, marking a pivotal shift toward intelligent manufacturing.

Michael Porter’s competitive strategy model underscores the importance of new production factors—like skilled talent and research facilities—in bolstering industrial clusters. Chenghai exemplifies this model, evolving from traditional competition to collaborative innovation. Shantou Gooders Precision Technology, founded by Du Kehong in 2017, epitomizes this shift by specializing in precision block toy production through advanced mould-making and large-scale manufacturing. By adopting industrial-scale production and sharing resources like public warehouses, Chenghai’s toy industry has fostered a cooperative, resource-efficient ecosystem.

This collaborative model drives cost-effectiveness and competitiveness: Huang Liang notes that mass production enables Gooders to lower the cost per block to as little as 0.0014 dollar, reducing overall manufacturing costs by over 20%. Through initiatives like shared design spaces and a “community of destiny” for brands, Gooders has positioned Chenghai as a hub for high-end, scalable, and digitally advanced toy manufacturing. Sembao Blocks, one of Gooders’ first partners, leverages this model to sustain a 200-person design team and launch 500 new products annually, achieving a 102% increase in revenue in 2022.

In a broader push for industrial modernization, Shantou Chenghai has formed a plastic precision manufacturing alliance and China Telecom’s Toy Industry Digital Intelligence R&D Center, supporting automated production methods, where factories operate with minimal lighting and human intervention. Chenghai now hosts 78 national high-tech creative toy enterprises and over 40,000 support units, further solidifying its leadership in smart toy manufacturing.

Chenghai is driving digital and green transformations, integrating new information technology and digital trade networks. This chain innovation approach is propelling Chenghai up the “smile curve” of high-value production, reinforcing its status as a global leader in the toy industry’s digital future.

Source: amazon, aliexpress, CGTN, xinhua, guangdong news

Why Has India Struggled to Develop an Electric Car in Eight Years?

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On October 12, Ratan Tata, a titan of Indian business, passed away. From Tetley Tea to Jaguar Land Rover and Air India, he fulfilled nearly every goal on his life’s wish list—except for one: the Tata Nano EV. This car became his only regret.

Tata’s ambition throughout his career was to provide affordable, efficient transportation to millions of Indian families. Had the Tata Nano EV succeeded, it could have been a groundbreaking achievement for both India and the global electric vehicle (EV) market. 

In 2015, the Tata Group, in partnership with Indian automotive company Jayem, sought to develop a low-cost electric car, the Jayem Neo EV, which later became known as the Tata Nano EV. Ratan Tata personally oversaw the project, and hopes were high. The Nano EV was designed in two versions: a 48-volt and a 72-volt model. By 2018, Jayem produced 400 units, selling them to Ola Cabs for use in Hyderabad and Bengaluru during the early stages of the pandemic. However, despite the anticipation, the car was never officially launched, and Tata’s company never publicly explained why it was withheld. 

Speculation surrounds the reasons for the Nano EV’s failure, but one key factor is India’s slow pace in adopting electric vehicles. Bhavish Aggarwal, the founder of Ola, has credited Tata as his guiding influence. He recalls a pivotal moment when Tata personally invited him to Coimbatore to test drive the Nano EV prototype. This experience inspired Aggarwal to launch Ola Electric, which today commands a third of India’s electric two-wheeler market, having sold over 300,000 units within three years. In contrast, the electric four-wheeler market has not seen similar growth.

The Nano EV, if it had materialized, would have been positioned as an affordable, compact car with an estimated price range of INR 400,000 to INR 600,000, a speed of 60-70 km/h, and a range of 300 km. Despite these appealing specifications, the car never came to market, leaving behind only unanswered questions.

The Nano EV’s failure is particularly striking given the legacy of its predecessor, the Tata Nano, which was launched in 2009 as one of the world’s cheapest cars, priced at around $9,000 today. The Nano was born from Tata’s vision to provide an affordable alternative to unsafe two-wheelers, sparked by a personal experience where he saw a family riding in the rain on a motorcycle. 

The Nano’s design was a testament to cost-saving innovation: metal was replaced with plastic where possible, glue was substituted for welding, and features were minimal—only one rear-view mirror, hand-cranked windows, no airbags, and a sealed boot. Despite the strong initial demand, with nearly 70% of sales occurring in the first three to four years, fewer than 300,000 units were sold over a decade, in a country with over 1.4 billion people. 

Many analysts argue that the Nano’s failure wasn’t due to its simplicity or safety features, but because of its stigma. In a class-conscious society like India, owning the “cheapest car” was seen as a social liability. Some believe the Nano EV, launched under the same name, would have been similarly tainted. Puneet Gupta, an automotive analyst, suggests that consumer preferences have shifted away from small cars, as reflected in the decline of sales in India’s fuel-car market.

J Anand of Jayem Motors, a key partner in the Nano EV project, has been reluctant to discuss its failure. He cites factors such as government regulations, the COVID-19 pandemic, and stringent crash standards as impediments. While reports suggest that engineers struggled to reduce the cost of the 72-volt version and that the car failed crash tests, Anand has stated that there are no plans to revisit the Nano EV project. 

India, with its vast population and growing market, was once seen as a blue ocean for the automotive industry, but this notion has proven to be false for many international brands. Tesla has yet to deliver an electric car, and Chinese brands, after several attempts, have withdrawn from the market. Despite these struggles, India remains a highly attractive market for electric vehicles. By 2030, the Indian government aims to have 50 million EVs on its roads, with the market size projected to reach $48.6 billion, and electric vehicles expected to account for nearly one-third of the passenger car market.

While the government has expressed strong support for the growth of EVs, the reality is mixed. The highest penetration is in the three-wheeler segment (54%), followed by two-wheelers (6%), while electric four-wheelers account for a negligible share of the market. In FY2023, electric four-wheeler sales were just 90,000 units, or 2% of total vehicle sales, despite doubling year-on-year.

India’s electric vehicle market lags far behind China, which has rapidly expanded its EV offerings. As of July 2024, only 13 Indian automakers had at least one EV model, compared to China’s far more extensive range. Tata, BMW, and Audi lead the Indian market, with Tata capturing nearly two-thirds of the electric passenger car market. However, Maruti Suzuki, the leader of India’s passenger car market, has yet to launch any EV models. Moreover, the electric taxi market in India is underdeveloped, with BluSmart scaling back its ambitious plans for 100,000 electric taxis by 2025 to just 10,000 by early 2024.

Despite these challenges, India’s shift to electrification is inevitable. Hyundai’s new unit in India is set to launch a compact electric car, and Tata is planning to expand its EV lineup in the near future.

China, as a leader in the global electric transition, demonstrated how affordable EVs could become mainstream. The Wuling Hongguang MINI EV, priced at around $4,152, played a key role in this transition. In contrast, India’s EV market still lacks such affordability.

However, in early 2024, as battery costs fell, India began taking steps to make electric vehicles more accessible. The MG Comet EV became the cheapest EV in India, priced at approximately $60,000, while the Tiago EV is priced at around $68,486. Despite these price reductions, the Nano EV remains a highly anticipated model, with rumors circulating that Tata might soon release it.

Reports suggest that Tata could partner with Jayem, an unknown company, to release the Nano EV. While the design, interiors, and exteriors may be identical to the petrol-powered Nano, the logo would change from Tata to Neo. Since Jayem is largely unknown, the Nano EV will likely carry Tata’s legacy. If successful, it would be a triumph for Tata, but if it fails, Jayem would bear the blame, with Tata’s reputation and stock price unaffected.

The new Nano EV represents a significant departure from its predecessor. It includes modern features such as an infotainment system, Bluetooth, six speakers, power steering, power windows, ABS with EBD, and a 7-inch touchscreen. With a range of 100-120 km per charge and a top speed of 80-90 km/h, the Nano EV would be an excellent choice for daily commuting. Moreover, with an expected starting price of about $38,000, it is set to be one of the most affordable options in the Indian EV market.

Eight years after its initial unveiling, questions remain: will the Nano EV fulfill its promise? Can it become India’s answer to the Wuling Hongguang MINI EV, or is the Indian EV market still a distant dream? The success or failure of the Nano EV will determine whether Ratan Tata’s vision—and his regrets—can be redeemed.

Source: Times of India, Shifting Gears

Who Remembers That AI Was Never Meant to Replace People?

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When OpenAI released Sora, a Vincentian video AI tool, on February 15, 2024, its video results amazed many. However, once the novelty wore off, the question arose: who will watch short, emotionless videos that lack a storyline? Similar to the metaverse, technologies that don’t address real-world needs or lack a stable business model eventually fade into hype. Sora, contrary to claims of advancing General AI, is a product of computing driven by heavy capital, lacking true technological innovation. 

Technically, Sora’s foundation relies on innovations like the Transformer, Diffusion, and GAN models. But these breakthroughs are not unique to OpenAI. Their success stems from scaling algorithms, data, and computing power, reflecting the political economy effects of Moore’s and Metcalfe’s Laws. Big models rely on massive computing through high-performance GPUs processing massive data sets, with companies like Microsoft investing heavily in supercomputing infrastructure, such as tens of thousands of NVIDIA A100 chips, providing immense computing power for training models like ChatGPT.

The training of big models is energy- and capital-intensive, raising the question: do the benefits outweigh the costs? A cost-benefit analysis should consider overlooked externalities, such as environmental impact and systemic risks, which are borne by the public. While big models can boost productivity by automating tasks like content creation, diagnosis, research, and legal reviews, they also risk replacing human workers, especially when ordinary consumers and content creators lack influence over the technology’s deployment. Thus, AI is not just a technological issue but a public one, shaped by political, economic, and legal forces beyond technology itself.

Human labor is being devalued, reduced to auxiliary services for machines. The AI-generated content from tools like ChatGPT and Sora, which lacks emotion or a storyline, is often praised, while human-created work is criticized or ignored. This shift is influencing education and the future of humanity, with parents questioning the value of traditional education when many future jobs may not require human workers. While experts know this isn’t true, the industry’s promotion of AI as a solution may lead to a self-fulfilling prophecy. Teenagers might increasingly rely on AI, leading to a decline in the quality of human work, which could ultimately justify replacing humans with machines.

To avoid this downward spiral, AI education must include humanistic and social science perspectives, rather than solely following narratives set by industry giants. The public must understand that AI is not a neutral technology; it is embedded within political, economic, and legal structures. While AI can learn and evolve, it remains a tool designed to achieve human-defined goals. We cannot abandon the pursuit of purpose, or our future could be shaped by those who control AI, like Microsoft and OpenAI.

OpenAI, once a non-profit aiming to “create value for everyone,” has shifted toward a for-profit model after its 2019 decision to abandon its non-profit status. Despite its initial promises of openness, OpenAI’s focus on protecting intellectual property grew stronger, particularly after Microsoft’s $1 billion investment. Now, OpenAI is effectively a research division of Microsoft, which strengthens its monopoly in operating systems and productivity tools. Microsoft’s strategy of acquiring platforms like GitHub and integrating AI into its products, such as Office Copilot and Bing, ensures its continued dominance.

Monopolies can lead to arbitrary pricing and decreased service quality, harming consumers. Microsoft’s strategy of subsidizing users and later imposing higher prices and lower quality is a common pattern in digital markets. In such cases, public oversight and regulation are necessary to protect consumer welfare. This includes price regulation, minimum service standards, and data security requirements.

Institutional leadership is essential to ensure AI development aligns with human values. Some argue for abandoning the human-centered approach, envisioning a future where AI surpasses human intelligence. However, this view, akin to extreme ecological beliefs, is not widely accepted. A humanistic stance is necessary, where AI remains a tool that supports human activities and is developed with human needs at the forefront.

In the era of artificial intelligence, machines are increasingly taking over tasks that once required human intellect, leaving humans with work that relies more on instinct. This shift, driven by a blend of technical, political, and economic forces, reflects a desire to reduce labor costs. For example, in industries like takeaway and express delivery, AI-driven algorithms are now performing managerial tasks, optimizing routes and schedules for human laborers. This allows capitalists to replace expensive brain work with cheaper automation.

The true purpose of creating machines is not to replicate human beings, as there are already billions of people on Earth, but to assist in tasks that are repetitive, tiresome, or beyond human capacity. AI’s role is to enhance productivity, not to fulfill emotional or existential needs. Therefore, the goal of AI development should be to create tools that help us perform necessary but monotonous tasks or to do things that are difficult or inefficient without AI.

From a humanistic perspective, the current direction of generative AI, such as OpenAI’s tools, is misguided. Generative AI tools like ChatGPT and Sora replicate what human creators can already do but lack the contextual depth, purpose, and adaptability that human-created content offers. As a result, they often only serve to entertain or confuse, rather than contribute to meaningful, authentic, or rigorous content creation.

There are three primary models of digital economy regulation shaped by distinct political and economic systems: the U.S. market-driven model, which fosters innovation and supports winner-takes-all dynamics; the state-driven model of China, which balances development and stability; and the rights-based model of the European Union, which strives to protect human dignity, privacy, and autonomy. The competition among these digital powers plays out across two dimensions: horizontally, between countries, in terms of technology, business models, and norms; and vertically, between countries and enterprises, particularly concerning foreign versus domestic tech companies.

The global expansion of digital technologies, including AI, has led to the U.S. advocating for the free flow of data and AI deployment across borders, a strategy known as digital imperialism. This allows U.S. companies to dominate the global digital market. On the other hand, countries that lack powerful local digital giants, such as those in the European Union, emphasize data sovereignty and restrict cross-border data flows to protect personal data rights and limit foreign companies’ access to local data.

Meanwhile, China’s approach to AI regulation is walking a tightrope—balancing progress and stability while facing immense pressure. This delicate balance may be essential for AI regulation, as allowing the market to drive AI development could lead to exploitation by digital giants and exacerbate fears of runaway AI, as expressed by figures like Elon Musk. 

However, maintaining an individual rights-based approach may stifle AI development, hindering the industry from progressing. In either case, the result could be exploitation, with digital giants like those in the U.S. reaping the benefits of AI without adequate oversight or regulation.

Source: softwarium, tech co, the job blog

Donald Trump Was Elected To Continue His Imaginary Second Revolution

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Republican candidate Donald Trump declared an early victory on the morning of the 6th. Trump’s previous term was marked by unpredictable and controversial policies, both domestically and internationally. Once he returns to the White House, his brand of governance—dubbed the “Trump revolution”—will likely intensify. This raises questions: Could such a “revolution” reshape the U.S., or deepen its divisions? And how will social and economic powers influence this trajectory? 

Zheng Yongnian, a prominent Chinese political economist and professor at the Chinese University of Hong Kong (Shenzhen), shared insights on the potential implications of Trump’s return..

Where does the current American ‘anger’ stem from, and what are the profound changes shaping the U.S. today?

Elections capture the core of U.S. politics, which are now deeply linked with global dynamics. American politics, shaped by decades of globalization, in turn, affects global developments. Today, nations view the U.S. through varied lenses, with reactions split along personal biases—some favoring Trump, others Harris. However, a shared concern is palpable, driven by what some term as the second revolution in the U.S., mirroring the transformative impact of its Independence War.

While Harris symbolizes continuity from an elite political tradition, Trump’s populist approach alarms many, especially given his promise of a Trump Revolution. This potential revolution signifies not violent upheaval, but radical policy shifts reshaping diverse interest groups.

Zheng identifies several groups, both domestic and international, deeply anxious about Trump’s potential return. Domestically, this includes political elites within both parties, marginalized social groups, and corporate leaders wary of his unpredictability. Internationally, close U.S. allies like Japan and South Korea, as well as global powers such as China and Russia, are concerned about possible isolationist policies.

Zheng draws parallels with historical revolutions, noting that unlike the French Revolution, driven by economic stagnation, the U.S. faces a crisis stemming from a thriving economy but misaligned governance structures. Figures like Elon Musk, supporting Trump, illustrate the divide between the economic base and outdated political systems. This “revolution” arises from dissonance between America’s economic forces and its political framework.

In Zheng’s view, the U.S. intelligentsia is largely detached from societal realities, clinging to ideals of democracy as the “end of history” without acknowledging the need for reform. This elite blindness echoes pre-Renaissance clerical defense of tradition. Today’s American revolution is not merely partisan but involves clashes between traditional and tech-driven industries, and between diverse social and racial groups.

So how has such a profound internal revolution for the United States changed its external policy?

As the world’s leading power, U.S. domestic shifts have substantial international effects. Internally, the U.S. has seen a “Trumpification” of its politics, where Trump’s influence permeates both major parties. While initially reshaping the Republican Party, Trump’s approach has gradually pushed the Democrats to adopt similar stances on key issues, such as tariffs and immigration.

In foreign policy, the U.S. prioritizes national interests under both administrations. Trump’s “America First” agenda and Biden’s “middle-class diplomacy” differ little in their focus on protective trade measures like tariffs. Immigration is another area where the Democrats are adjusting, reflecting broader public concerns, though Democrats maintain an emphasis on political correctness, covering issues like minority rights and climate change, where Trump diverges sharply.

On global cooperation, Trump’s exit from climate agreements contrasted with Biden’s re-engagement, but the commitment remains limited, as seen in the U.S.’s reduced climate actions amid the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Despite nuanced differences, the “Trumpification” of U.S. policies highlights a domestic and diplomatic convergence shaped by Trump’s legacy.

What do you make of the phenomenon where Trump is held in similar esteem to Reagan in recent Republican polls, especially considering his opposition to government corruption and alignment with anti-establishment sentiments?

The American spirit, often depicted in Hollywood’s hero narratives, has long celebrated figures who arise to meet societal needs. Figures like Reagan and Trump reflect this archetype, each arriving at critical junctures to appeal to citizens’ desires for decisive change. Reagan embodied a hero who tackled the era’s economic excesses through deregulation and tax cuts, championing globalization. Trump, by contrast, appeals to an anti-establishment, populist sentiment, opposing globalization’s outcomes, such as income inequality, that have alienated middle- and working-class Americans.

The fusion of labor and advanced technology interests in the U.S. today represents a synthesis unprecedented in American history. This restructuring reflects a new era where traditional political alignments of left and right are blurred. Trump’s brand of populism attempts to unify high-tech industry and labor, breaking with past political distinctions. This shift raises critical questions about the future of U.S. politics as AI and automation transform economic power dynamics.

Traditional Marxist ideas—where capital opposes labor—face challenges in explaining this alignment. With technological advances reducing the need for a large workforce, the emergence of a “pastoralist” social structure is possible, where economic elites support a reduced, “managed” labor class. This potential structure suggests that U.S. political reorganization is underpinned by profound economic shifts, where social structure, influenced by the economic base, shapes the political landscape. This reorientation highlights a moment in American society that defies traditional frameworks, suggesting that we are witnessing a unique transformation in U.S. socio-political structures.

Trump attempted to disrupt the U.S. foreign policy establishment during his first term but failed. With another chance at the White House, could he dismantle this establishment in his second term? If so, how would that impact the international order?

We’ve been examining U.S. internal dynamics, but it’s crucial to consider the international ripple effects as well. America’s allies, particularly those closely tied to the U.S., are the most concerned. Trump’s approach, including withdrawing from international treaties and offering limited support to allies, signaled a clear shift. Yet, even under Biden, with his Democratic platform, the dynamics of these alliances are not reverting to previous norms. 

Historically, access to U.S. markets was a primary incentive for many allies. However, Biden’s focus on “middle-class diplomacy” does not involve significant market openings, even under initiatives like the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, which lacks provisions for U.S. market access. This approach reflects a broader trend of economic protectionism and cautious immigration policies that address U.S. domestic priorities. 

In the context of the Russia-Ukraine war, the U.S. support has largely translated to indirect costs for the EU, who bears much of the immediate impact, while the U.S. benefits economically, particularly in arms sales. This underscores a strategic shift where the U.S. appears less inclined to shoulder the costs of global leadership, focusing instead on pragmatic economic gains. Regardless of the administration—whether Trump or a future Democratic leader like Harris—the U.S. is likely to continue shrinking its international commitments, albeit with different rhetorical styles. Trump’s diplomacy is blunt, while Biden (or Harris) might maintain a more traditional, yet perhaps less transparent, diplomatic front. 

The essence of U.S. foreign policy now seems increasingly rooted in pragmatism, as it balances domestic demands with scaled-back global engagement, leaving allies to recalibrate their expectations of American leadership.

Source: Guancha, CNews

Chinese Scientists Successfully Transform Corn into Clothing in Eight Years, Where Others Have Failed

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China is a powerhouse in the global amino acid market, producing approximately 60% of the world’s supply. Despite this significant contribution, the country grappled with challenges related to production efficiency and innovation, primarily stemming from underdeveloped microbial fermentation strains and a limited number of domestic patents. 

Wen Tingyi, Principal Investigator at the Institute of Microbiology of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, has been pivotal in addressing these issues since joining the institute in November 2005.

Upon entering the institute, Wen quickly recognized that China was predominantly relying on traditional mutagenesis breeding techniques, which employed ultraviolet rays and chemical agents like diethyl sulfate (DES) to induce genetic mutations in microorganisms. This method was time-consuming and uncertain, requiring extensive screening to identify viable strains. 

At the same time, foreign researchers were advancing rapidly with synthetic biology, allowing for precise gene editing at the DNA level. This technological gap motivated Wen to adopt gene editing techniques he learned abroad, aiming to create a platform for personalized strain transformation and innovation in industrial microorganisms.

Wen’s innovative approach involved creating a comprehensive network model of bacterial metabolic pathways by inputting all relevant genes into a computer system. This model enabled predictions about which genes needed transformation. By iteratively applying synthetic biology techniques—designing, building, testing, and learning—Wen and his team managed to increase the yield of production strains while minimizing unwanted byproducts.

In 2007, a company in Ningxia approached Wen, seeking assistance with their lysine production strain, which was yielding unsatisfactory results. The company, then a mid-level player in the domestic amino acid market, was looking to cut costs and boost profits. Utilizing the synthetic biology platform he had developed, Wen meticulously modified the strain through computer simulations, altering a total of 17 genes. This process dramatically improved the sugar-acid conversion rate and output, elevating the company’s production capabilities to international standards.

However, the landscape shifted once again. In 2005, lysine prices were around 30,000 yuan per ton, but by 2020, excess production capacity had surged, driving prices down to as low as 5,400 yuan per ton. This decline significantly impacted profit margins, leaving many companies struggling to remain viable. 

Amid these challenges, Wen had a revelation. He discovered that by removing a carboxyl group from lysine, it could be transformed into 1,5-pentanediamine, a key precursor for nylon production, particularly in high-demand markets. The historical context of nylon production is notable; DuPont’s development of nylon involved 5-carbon pentamethylenediamine, later switching to a more cost-effective 6-carbon variant—hexamethylenediamine. This shift underscored the need for an alternative pathway for producing pentamethylenediamine that would not be hindered by foreign monopolies on the essential precursor, adiponitrile.

In 2021, the global nylon market surpassed 10 million tons, valued at approximately 1.5 to 1.8 trillion yuan, yet more than 90% of production was dominated by nylon 6 and nylon 66, with the latter’s precursor being largely controlled by international corporations. This left Chinese manufacturers at a disadvantage, primarily receiving only a fraction of the profits.

To tackle this issue, Wen decided to use E. coli as a production strain due to its rapid reproduction cycle of just 17 minutes, complete genetic information, and established metabolic pathways. However, E. coli inherently lacked the ability to utilize lysine for synthesizing pentamethylenediamine. Therefore, the first step was to genetically modify E. coli to incorporate foreign genes, enabling it to synthesize the desired compound.

The project faced additional challenges when it became apparent that pentamethylenediamine was cytotoxic to E. coli, inhibiting its growth once a certain concentration was reached. To overcome this, the team engineered a transport pump to expel pentamethylenediamine from the cells, allowing E. coli to thrive while continuously producing the compound.

After numerous experiments and refinements, the output of pentamethylenediamine reached world-leading levels, with nearly 100% conversion of lysine to pentamethylenediamine. Purification processes yielded a product with over 99% purity, making it suitable for industrial applications. The successful laboratory results led to plans for pilot production.

Initially, the laboratory utilized a rotary evaporator with a capacity of 5 to 20 liters, correlating to fermentation liquids produced by a 50-liter fermentation tank. However, scaling up to commercial production required significantly larger fermentation systems, presenting challenges in cost and energy efficiency. Over three years of intensive development reduced the pilot production cost of pentamethylenediamine from over 90,000 yuan to about 20,000 yuan.

By August 2020, the project culminated in the establishment of the world’s first 10,000-ton pentamethylenediamine production line in Daqing City, Heilongjiang Province. This facility utilized a distillation tower, drastically lowering production costs and improving efficiency. Following this, the team successfully polymerized pentamethylenediamine into nylon 56, producing both long and short fibers suitable for various textile applications.

Nylon 56 boasts several advantages over nylon 66, including enhanced moisture retention, ease of dyeing, flame resistance, and improved wear resistance. The resulting fabric is soft, cool to wear, and exhibits superior performance, making it ideal for activewear, underwear, and protective clothing. Collaborative ventures with leading brands have further solidified nylon 56’s market position, paving the way for its adoption in high-end products.

As demand for bio-based materials rises, Wen Tingyi’s work exemplifies a significant shift in sustainable manufacturing. The journey from corn to clothing symbolizes a broader movement towards bio-based nylon production, setting China on a path distinct from traditional petroleum-based nylon production. This innovative approach not only addresses local industry challenges but also enhances China’s competitive edge in the global market, positioning the country as a leader in sustainable textile solutions.

Source: zshq, jiemian, biotechnologyforbiofuels

China Proposes 13 Fertility Support Measures

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The results of China’s seventh national census indicate that the total fertility rate (TFR) for women of childbearing age in my country was just 1.3 in 2020, reflecting a concerningly low level. 

The TFR represents the average number of children born to each couple, with an international benchmark of 2.1 for generational replacement. This figure accounts for mortality risk, indicating that couples need to have about 2.1 children to maintain population levels. 

A TFR of around 1.5 is viewed as a critical threshold; falling below this level raises the risk of entering a low fertility trap. While updated data has yet to be released, experts predict that the TFR may have declined further. This sustained low fertility rate contributes to a declining population and an aging demographic, undermining economic and social development potential.

Du Peng, Dean of School of Population and Health, and Director, Institute of Gerontology of Renmin University of China, emphasizes that recent birth statistics suggest the TFR is now even lower than in 2020, indicating an extreme decline. If this trend persists, it will have long-lasting effects on society, including a reduced birth cohort that exacerbates negative population growth. 

The shrinking population will influence future educational needs, labor supply, and the distribution of social resources. Moreover, while the willingness to have children remains higher than the current TFR, many families face challenges related to childbirth, child-rearing, and education, indicating that the TFR does not accurately reflect societal intentions regarding childbearing.

To assist families wishing to have one or two children, it is essential to cultivate a fertility-friendly environment that genuinely reduces the costs of childbirth, child-rearing, and education. This support is vital for stabilizing and potentially increasing the TFR, which is crucial for the social and economic development of the country.

Since implementing the universal two-child policy in 2016, followed by the three-child policy in 2021, the Chinese government has been actively promoting fertility support measures to enhance reproductive health and prenatal care services. A preliminary system of fertility support policies has been established. According to officials from China’s National Health Commission, provinces typically offer over 60 days of extended maternity leave, approximately 15 days of spouse maternity leave, and 5 to 20 days of parental leave, with maternity leave extended to over 158 days in all provinces.

Additionally, the country’s capacity for preventing birth defects has improved significantly. National rates for pre-pregnancy examinations and prenatal screenings now exceed 90%, with screening for neonatal genetic disorders and hearing impairments reaching over 98%. The optimization of fertility policies extends beyond service enhancements to economic support as well.

In January 2022, the government began including care for children under three in personal income tax deductions. In 2023, the deduction standard increased from 1,000 yuan to 2,000 yuan per child per month, benefiting many families with young children.

In August 2022, the National Health Commission, alongside 17 other departments, issued guiding opinions to focus on optimizing the maternity leave system, enhancing hospitalization and delivery conditions, and expanding labor analgesia options.

On October 28, the General Office of the State Council released the Several Measures for Accelerating Improvement of Reproduction Policy Support Systems and Promoting the Establishment of a Reproduction-friendly Society.

These measures propose a comprehensive approach to fertility support through four key areas:

Strengthening Fertility Services: Enhancing maternity insurance coverage to include flexible workers, migrant workers, and new employment forms, ensuring that maternity and paternity leave are fully implemented, and establishing a maternity subsidy system. Local governments are encouraged to improve reproductive health services and include appropriate labor analgesia and assisted reproductive technologies in medical insurance.

Enhancing Childcare Services: Improving children’s medical services and incorporating eligible children’s medications into medical insurance. Increasing the availability of inclusive childcare services and supporting diverse childcare models, while also enhancing policies to provide operational subsidies for inclusive child care institutions.

Supporting Education, Housing, and Employment: Expanding access to quality educational resources, encouraging after-school services and social projects, and implementing policies to support multi-child families in housing and employment, including flexible work arrangements.

Creating a Fertility-Friendly Social Atmosphere: Promoting a new culture of marriage and childbearing that emphasizes positive views on family life, enhancing public awareness of high-quality population development, and integrating education on national population policies into school curricula.

The Measures stress the importance of improving political commitment and responsibility among all stakeholders, including governments, employers, and individuals, to ensure the effective implementation of fertility support policies.

Source: Xinhua, CCTV13, CGTN, guandian

Can trade secrets become an alternative means of intellectual property protection in the AI ​​era?

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With generative AI technology advancing, the industry faces new challenges to the intellectual property system, from AI algorithm patentability and copyright implications of AI-assisted creations to AI’s role as a potential patent inventor and the handling of vast commercially valuable data generated by large models. 

These developments heavily impact traditional IP protections. Trade secrets, a defensive IP right, bypass statutory authorization and the restrictive requirements of patents and copyrights, potentially offering a natural protection barrier for AI technology and applications. 

Unique Trade Secret Challenges of Generative AI

Generative AI learns patterns from data to generate new outputs, using iterative training to improve accuracy. This process relies on algorithms and big data to conduct inductive reasoning, find rules, make predictions, and deliver results. 

Data and algorithms are critical for accurate outputs, especially the weights generated during training, but they pose challenges for traditional copyright protection due to disputes over their status as copyrightable expressions. These elements, hidden in the model’s “black box,” align closely with trade secret confidentiality requirements.

In practice, users create new content by inputting prompts, which generative AI uses to predict results. If the input includes trade secrets, AI providers may inadvertently access these secrets. For example, Samsung faced a data breach when an employee used ChatGPT for work purposes, and Cyber Haven found that 11% of employee-pasted data into ChatGPT was confidential. Consequently, companies using generative AI are increasingly focused on protecting their trade secrets.

Given these issues, this article will analyze trade secret protection in AI research, development, and application from the perspectives of both AI technology providers and users.

Protecting Trade Secrets in AI Technology

Trade secrets are defined as technical, business, and commercial information not publicly known, holding commercial value and safeguarded by the right holder. To claim a trade secret, the right holder must show that the information is non-public, commercially valuable, and subject to reasonable confidentiality measures.

Generative AI often relies on data like public works, personal data, and trade secrets, assuming legal acquisition of training data. This article evaluates whether the data created through generative AI development, including model training and algorithm adjustments, qualifies for trade secret protection.

Generative AI development involves raw, labeled, and weighted data, mostly derived from public sources like books, academic papers, and media. While raw data is public and thus non-confidential, processed training data, weights, and other enterprise-handled data may qualify as trade secrets if confidentiality is maintained. However, trade secrets are vulnerable; any leakage undermines their value. 

Moreover, right holders face challenges in defining the distinctive and non-public aspects and proving the information’s proprietary nature, particularly for large data sets where comparison is complex. To mitigate these vulnerabilities, data ownership rights may offer alternative protections.

Large AI models often build on open-source projects. Open-source code lacks trade secret protection due to public access, but modifications made by the enterprise may qualify if they remain confidential. However, certain open-source licenses require disclosure of derivative works, potentially complicating a company’s IP strategy. To avoid conflicts, R&D entities should review open-source license obligations carefully before using such models.

Algorithms, defined as rules for transforming input into output, may not qualify for copyright or patent protections, as they fall under intellectual activity methods. However, algorithm trade secrets face a unique challenge: transparency requirements. Regulatory frameworks like China’s Personal Information Protection Law, the EU’s AI Act, and the U.S. NIST’s Four Principles of Explainable AI require AI providers to explain their decision-making logic without full disclosure of proprietary details. China’s first algorithm trade secret case highlighted that even publicly known algorithms may be trade secrets if the enterprise has developed distinctive methods, such as unique settings and weights, that are commercially valuable and not publicly known.

Trade Secret Protection in AI Application Processes

When artificial intelligence processes user input containing trade secrets, it may generate content that builds on this input, potentially embodying trade secrets. Some argue that AI could even create trade secrets independently. Since AI service providers might access input data for model improvements, input content containing trade secrets risks exposure. Likewise, if output content with trade secrets is shared online, network security concerns may also pose a risk.

Despite these risks, AI’s efficiency gains make it essential to enterprise competitiveness, prompting businesses to pursue compliant, secure applications of AI. Enterprises should create comprehensive solutions addressing both input and output content handling, with special attention to personnel and systems involved in data flow. Determining if AI-generated content meets trade secret criteria is crucial.

In line with reasonable measures for trade secret protection, enterprises could adopt several strategies:

1. Using localized or internally deployed AI systems enables control over storage, processing, and generation within a secure, private cloud. Measures like data isolation, permission controls, and download restrictions enhance content confidentiality.

2. Guidance and training on compliant AI use are essential, especially as private deployment can be costly and limit real-time model updates. Training should cover trade secret scope, protection methods, risks, and benefits, detailing work content, desensitization, and storage practices as permitted.

3. Updating confidentiality clauses in procurement contracts ensures AI-specific terms are included. These should clarify input/output information’s confidentiality, ownership, and purpose restrictions, prohibiting use for model training, and define network security measures for storage, processing, and deletion.

4. Other technical measures, such as custom trade secret filtering tools, could be implemented to screen content before AI processing, offering an added layer of protection for enterprises with stringent confidentiality needs.

Source: Linkedin, Medium

Why should ASEAN not become a battlefield between China and the United States?

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The United States has been actively working to strengthen ties with Southeast Asia, as illustrated by the signing of the US-ASEAN Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. Yet, this move comes amid growing tensions between the U.S. and several Southeast Asian nations. A 2024 survey by Singapore’s ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute indicates that, if forced to choose in a potential U.S. conflict, regional political elites may, for the first time, lean narrowly toward supporting China.

What does the United States seek in Southeast Asia?

The United States’ strategic advantage in strengthening ties with Southeast Asia lies in the region’s search for reliable partners, especially in security and economic fields. The Philippines has deepened defense cooperation by expanding U.S. military bases, while Indonesia co-hosts the multinational Exercise Garuda Shield and actively seeks U.S. military hardware. Singapore has intensified collaboration with the U.S. on AI and autonomous systems for defense, and even Cambodia, once a close ally of China, is showing interest in U.S. military education programs, which are highly regarded locally.

On the economic front, the U.S. is also addressing a clear regional need for economic partnership. A recent survey revealed that Southeast Asian elites identify unemployment, economic recession, and widening income inequality as the top challenges for 2024. 

Vietnam, despite being classified as a non-market economy by the U.S., welcomes U.S. trade and investment, particularly in infrastructure, healthcare, and small businesses. Thailand, as Southeast Asia’s second-largest economy, is eager to boost cooperation with the U.S. in automotive and energy sectors, and American firms in Malaysia have contributed to 300,000 local jobs and education programs aimed at transforming the economy.

However, the U.S. approach often frames Southeast Asia as a battleground within the U.S.-China competition narrative. Although China’s size, proximity, and historical ties position it as a lasting influence in the region, a zero-sum competition strategy could be counterproductive. 

Most Southeast Asian nations seek a balanced approach, welcoming U.S. cooperation as part of a broader strategy that includes other partners like India and Japan. Yet, ASEAN leaders also express concerns about U.S. inconsistency, especially when realpolitik pressures arise, fearing coercion from both the U.S. and China.

The U.S. aspires to more than stable security and economic ties, positioning itself as a counterbalance to China and advocating its human rights and governance model. However, its treatment of Southeast Asia remains largely instrumental, where “partnership” rhetoric does not always translate into respect for the sovereignty and autonomy of “smaller” nations. Despite acknowledging Indonesia’s rising influence in the Indo-Pacific, U.S. engagement often appears superficial, as seen in the brief visits by top U.S. officials and sporadic attention to regional leaders, such as the single state visit to Cambodia during its ASEAN chairmanship.

Additionally, ASEAN members resent perceived double standards. While the U.S. tolerates media restrictions in Vietnam, Cambodia faces U.S. criticism over democracy and freedom, creating skepticism about U.S. commitment to democratic ideals. The selective focus of U.S. policy, like omitting human rights concerns in defense engagements with Cambodia, casts doubt on the sincerity of its democratic advocacy. Abandoning this inconsistent approach could enable the U.S. to support democratic principles more credibly.

Lingering memories of U.S. military involvement in Southeast Asia—particularly in Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and Indonesia—are sensitive issues, reinforced in Muslim-majority countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brunei by U.S. inaction on recent Middle Eastern conflicts. Although Southeast Asian leaders take a pragmatic stance toward U.S. relations, these historical grievances are likely to influence younger generations’ perceptions, potentially shaping U.S.-Southeast Asia relations for decades to come.

What does it mean for the new White House?

ASEAN leaders adopt a pragmatic approach, remaining open to collaboration with the United States and other key partners as part of a balanced diplomatic and strategic stance. The next U.S. president will encounter a region moving in multiple directions under evolving leadership. The Philippines is poised to adopt a stronger stance against China’s actions in the South China Sea, while Malaysia under Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim and Cambodia under Hun Sen may draw closer to China. Indonesia under Prabowo may pursue a firmer foreign policy toward the West, while leadership changes in Vietnam and Singapore are unlikely to shift their stable foreign policy strategies, which balance relations with major powers.

This adaptability among ASEAN members suggests the U.S. should not interpret closer ties between some countries and China as a loss. China holds comparative advantages in fields like telecommunications and infrastructure investment, while the U.S. can continue investing in areas of established cooperation that align with Southeast Asian priorities.

Economic growth remains Southeast Asia’s top priority. Although the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) marks a U.S. effort to engage economically, it offers limited market access and tariff benefits. This limited engagement has raised doubts about the U.S.’s long-term economic involvement. By addressing Southeast Asian concerns over free trade and expanding opportunities to non-IPEF members like Cambodia, Myanmar, and Laos, the U.S. can help foster sustainable economic growth and lessen regional reliance on China.

In security, the U.S. remains the partner of choice for high-end military exercises essential for humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and evacuations in the face of climate-driven crises. Additionally, cybersecurity has emerged as a priority for Southeast Asian countries. A recent ransomware attack in Indonesia exposed vulnerabilities across 282 government agencies. While the U.S. and Indonesia already cooperate on cybersecurity through their Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, such incidents underscore the importance of enhancing Southeast Asia’s cyber resilience and public trust in digital services.

The U.S. also has the chance to bolster ASEAN’s food security. By collaborating with Southeast Asia and other partners, such as Australia, the U.S. can support long-term strategies, including development in insect-resistant crops and fortified foods to meet the nutritional needs of the region’s growing population.

However, Southeast Asian nations are wary of escalating U.S.-China tensions that could pressure them into choosing sides, raising concerns about becoming targets if perceived as aligned with either power. Following the election, Southeast Asia’s ideal outcome would be a U.S. president who seeks not only to compete with China but also to deepen relationships with the region. Competition is inevitable, yet it should not become a zero-sum game. U.S. strategy in Southeast Asia must prioritize ASEAN’s interests and aim for mutually beneficial partnerships.

Source: ygadwq, chinaglobalsouth, IFAIR 

Warum interessiert sich die ASEAN für die inneren Angelegenheiten Myanmars, schweigt aber weitgehend zum Südchinesischen Meer?

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Der 44. und 45. ASEAN-Gipfel und die dazugehörigen Treffen fanden vom 9. bis 11. Oktober in Vientiane, Laos, unter dem Motto „Improving ASEAN Connectivity and Resilience“ (Verbesserung der Konnektivität und Widerstandsfähigkeit der ASEAN) statt. Die Situation sowohl in Myanmar als auch im Südchinesischen Meer erregte große Aufmerksamkeit, wobei einige Länder durchaus konfrontative Ideen vorbrachten. Lei Xiaohua, stellvertretende Direktorin und Forscherin am Institut für Südostasienforschung der Guangxi Akademie für Sozialwissenschaften, teilte ihre Erkenntnisse zu diesen Themen mit.

Was bedeutet das Thema „Verbesserung der Konnektivität und Widerstandsfähigkeit der ASEAN“?

Konnektivität bezieht sich in erster Linie auf die Interkonnektivität der Infrastruktur, während Resilienz die Flexibilität und Sicherheit der Lieferketten innerhalb des wirtschaftlichen Rahmens hervorhebt. Konnektivität wurde aus zwei Hauptgründen als Thema des diesjährigen Gipfels gewählt.

Erstens ist der Integrationsgrad der 2015 gegründeten ASEAN-Gemeinschaft nach wie vor gering, so dass die Infrastrukturkonnektivität für ihre Entwicklung von entscheidender Bedeutung ist. Zweitens stimmt jede ASEAN-Präsidentschaft das Thema des Gipfels auf ihre eigene nationale Entwicklungsstrategie ab.

Konnektivität umfasst sowohl harte als auch weiche Komponenten. Harte Konnektivität bezieht sich auf die Vernetzung der Land-, See- und Luftverkehrsinfrastruktur, wobei die Schienenkonnektivität für die Entwicklung der ASEAN besonders dringlich ist. So strebt Kambodscha die Verlängerung der China-Laos-Eisenbahn auf sein Territorium an. Premierminister Li Qiang traf sich kürzlich mit dem kambodschanischen Premierminister Hun Manet, um die Vorbereitungen für die China-Kambodscha-Eisenbahn voranzutreiben.

Weiche Konnektivität hingegen umfasst die Harmonisierung von Regeln, Vorschriften, Standards und Richtlinien. ASEAN hat in diesem Bereich große Fortschritte erzielt. Seit Januar 2016 haben die zehn Mitgliedsländer wechselseitig die Visumspflicht aufgehoben. In der ersten Hälfte dieses Jahres schlug Thailand ein gemeinsames Visaprogramm für fünf ASEAN-Länder – Vietnam, Kambodscha, Laos, Malaysia und Myanmar – vor, ähnlich dem Schengen-Visum, das internationalen Reisenden mit einer Einreisegenehmigung aus einem Land erlaubt, sich frei zwischen den anderen zu bewegen.

Darüber hinaus ist die Verbesserung der Konnektivität in aufstrebenden Sektoren wie der digitalen Wirtschaft, den Energienetzen und der Kommunikation von entscheidender Bedeutung. So kämpft beispielsweise der Industriesektor in Vietnam mit Energieknappheit, während Laos danach strebt, die „Batterie der ASEAN“ zu werden. Wenn die Stromnetze der zehn ASEAN-Länder miteinander verbunden wären, könnten sie die Energieversorgung ausgleichen und das industrielle Wachstum unterstützen. Neben der Infrastruktur ist auch die wirtschaftliche und handelspolitische Integration für die Vernetzung von entscheidender Bedeutung. Während China nach wie vor der größte Importeur und die USA der größte Exportmarkt der ASEAN sind, nimmt der Handel innerhalb der ASEAN stetig zu, was auf eine stärkere wirtschaftliche Verflechtung innerhalb der Region hindeutet. Die Widerstandsfähigkeit konzentriert sich auf die Sicherheit und Flexibilität der Lieferketten. In der heutigen komplexen internationalen Landschaft greifen viele Länder auf Handelsprotektionismus und Anti-Globalisierungsmaßnahmen zurück, was zu Exportbeschränkungen und Zollerhöhungen führt, insbesondere in Hochtechnologiesektoren. Darüber hinaus verlagern sich die Lieferketten zunehmend auf kürzere, stärker lokalisierte Vereinbarungen wie Onshoring, Nearshoring und Friendshoring.

Die jüngsten Pandemien haben die Schwachstellen in den Lieferketten noch deutlicher gemacht und die Notwendigkeit unterstrichen, Sicherheit und Widerstandsfähigkeit zu verbessern. Um ihre wirtschaftliche Widerstandsfähigkeit zu stärken, müssen die südostasiatischen Länder ihre Rohstoffquellen diversifizieren, ihre internen Unterstützungssysteme stärken und enge Wirtschaftsbeziehungen zu wichtigen Partnern wie China, den USA, Japan und Südkorea aufrechterhalten. Mit anderen Worten: Es ist wichtig, nicht alles auf eine Karte zu setzen.

Welche Spaltungen und Gräben innerhalb der ASEAN hat der malaysische Premierminister Anwar im Zusammenhang mit den wachsenden globalen Spannungen angesprochen?

Erstens haben territoriale Streitigkeiten erhebliche Auswirkungen auf die Einheit und den Zusammenhalt innerhalb der ASEAN. In den letzten Jahren kam es immer wieder zu Zwischenfällen, bei denen Fischer verhaftet wurden, und zu Protesten zwischen Malaysia, Indonesien, Singapur und Vietnam. Darüber hinaus kam es zu Konflikten zwischen Kambodscha und Thailand um den Tempel Preah Vihear. Obwohl solche Territorialstreitigkeiten in den letzten Jahren abgenommen haben, sind ihre Auswirkungen noch immer spürbar. So kündigte Kambodscha am 20. September seinen Rückzug aus der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit im Dreieck zwischen Kambodscha, Laos und Vietnam (CLV-DTA) aufgrund von Grenzstreitigkeiten an, was die geopolitischen Beweggründe für den Bau des Funan-Techo-Kanals verdeutlicht.

Zweitens ist die Frage des Südchinesischen Meeres ein trennender Faktor. Die Philippinen haben sich zunehmend den USA angenähert, sind in tägliche Konfrontationen mit China verwickelt und suchen die Unterstützung anderer ASEAN-Länder. Andere ASEAN-Mitglieder halten die extreme Haltung der Philippinen jedoch für kontraproduktiv und zögern, sie zu unterstützen. Diese Meinungsverschiedenheit kann die Kluft innerhalb der ASEAN weiter vertiefen, insbesondere wenn sie von externen Kräften beeinflusst wird.

Drittens gibt es unterschiedliche Auffassungen über die Art der Zusammenarbeit mit externen Partnern. Während beispielsweise die Philippinen mit den USA ein Bündnis unterhalten, würden andere ASEAN-Staaten eher eine strategische Partnerschaft bevorzugen. Darüber hinaus gibt es unterschiedliche Auffassungen darüber, inwieweit sich die USA in die inneren Angelegenheiten der ASEAN-Staaten einmischen sollen. In Bezug auf die Situation in Myanmar lehnen die meisten Länder eine direkte Intervention der USA ab, aber Länder wie die Philippinen und Singapur könnten sich für ein stärkeres Engagement der USA einsetzen.

Nicht zuletzt sind sich die ASEAN-Mitglieder uneins, wie sie mit der Krise in Myanmar umgehen sollen. Während es einen allgemeinen Konsens über die generelle Haltung zum Bürgerkrieg in Myanmar gibt, gehen die einzelnen Strategien der Mitgliedsstaaten auseinander. Länder wie Thailand und Indonesien haben sich proaktiv für Verhandlungen zwischen dem Militär und lokalen Kräften eingesetzt, während Kambodscha, Laos und andere den „ASEAN-Weg“ der Nichteinmischung in innere Angelegenheiten bevorzugen.

Angesichts der anhaltenden Konzentration auf den Konflikt im Südchinesischen Meer auf dem diesjährigen Gipfeltreffen und des Mangels an substantiellen Fortschritten bei der Lösung dieser Spannungen, welche Rolle kann die ASEAN spielen, insbesondere angesichts des Prinzips der Nichteinmischung, wodurch die Autorität der ASEAN untergraben werden könnte? Und wie kann ASEAN mit den Spannungen zwischen ihren Mitgliedern umgehen, wenn sich die Philippinen unter Marcos Jr. den USA zuwenden?

Es ist höchst unwahrscheinlich, dass ASEAN sein Prinzip der Nichteinmischung in innere Angelegenheiten aufgeben wird. Die Unterschiede zwischen ASEAN und der EU sind beträchtlich. Die EU ist eine hoch integrierte Organisation mit einer robusten Struktur, die über fast alle notwendigen Institutionen verfügt, mit Ausnahme der militärischen Fähigkeiten, die sie durch die NATO ausgleicht. Im Gegensatz dazu agiert ASEAN als loser Staatenbund. Wenn wir von ASEAN sprechen, ist es präziser, von ASEAN-Ländern zu sprechen, um die Unabhängigkeit ihrer Mitglieder zu betonen.

Im Gegensatz zur EU betont ASEAN die Prinzipien des Friedens, der gewaltfreien Konfliktlösung und des Konsenses. Das Konsensprinzip erfordert die Zustimmung aller zehn Mitgliedsstaaten, um eine Resolution zu verabschieden, anstatt ein Mehrheitssystem anzuwenden, was zur Ineffizienz der Organisation beiträgt. Der relativ geringe Integrationsgrad der ASEAN und ihre lockere, unvollständige Struktur sind inhärente Schwächen.

Einer der Hauptgründe, warum die ASEAN-Staaten ihre Prinzipien wahrscheinlich nicht wesentlich ändern werden, ist ihre begrenzte Fähigkeit, effektive Interventionen durchzuführen. Sich auf externe Unterstützung zu verlassen, würde der ursprünglichen Absicht der ASEAN widersprechen. Darüber hinaus liegt die grundlegende Herausforderung für eine Kursänderung der ASEAN in ihrer mangelnden Kapazität, den Erfolg ihrer Einsätze sicherzustellen. Im Falle Myanmars hat die ASEAN beispielsweise aufgrund der damit verbundenen Risiken auf eine Intervention verzichtet. Würde ASEAN die Militärregierung etwa zur Zurückhaltung auffordern, könnten die lokalen Streitkräfte dies zum Anlass nehmen, ihre Angriffe zu intensivieren. Umgekehrt könnte die Militärregierung die Aufforderung der ASEAN an die bewaffneten Gruppen zur Zurückhaltung als grünes Licht für eine Intensivierung ihrer Aktionen interpretieren. Ein verstärktes Eingreifen der ASEAN könnte somit den Konflikt zwischen den beteiligten Parteien noch weiter verschärfen.

Die Frage des Südchinesischen Meeres stellt einen anderen Kontext dar, der das Zögern der ASEAN erklärt, entschlossen zu handeln. ASEAN ist sich seiner Grenzen im Umgang mit einer Großmacht wie China bewusst. Eine öffentliche Stellungnahme zugunsten Chinas könnte sich in der Zukunft auszahlen, während eine negative Haltung unvorhersehbare Folgen haben könnte. Daher könnte es für das Bündnis die klügere Strategie sein, sich zum Südchinesischen Meer nicht zu äußern.

Quelle: Guancha, Main-Spitze

How Has Corn Changed China’s History and Agriculture?

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Four years after Columbus discovered the “New World” in 1492, corn made its way to Europe in 1496. The first written record of corn in China appeared in 1551 in Henan during the Jiajing era of the Ming Dynasty. By 1555, corn brought by a chieftain from Yunnan was documented in Henan as it passed through the area on its way to Beijing.

Historians identify three main routes for corn’s introduction to China: the southeast sea route, the southwest land route, and the northwest land route. The earliest records suggest that corn likely entered China through Yunnan, arriving via Myanmar.

Li Shizhen, a prominent scholar traveling from 1552 to 1578, noted corn’s cultivation in the Yangtze River area but remarked that it was “rarely planted” at that time. By 1758, over 200 years after its initial arrival, the prefecture records of Hunan indicated that corn was widely cultivated. 

Although corn was introduced early via the southwest and northwest routes, it didn’t spread significantly during the Ming Dynasty. Its real expansion in China began along the southeast sea route through Fujian. 

In 1575, missionary Herrera noted corn cultivation in Zhangzhou and Quanzhou. Fujian’s mountainous terrain, which became densely populated by the Song Dynasty, helped corn and sweet potatoes spread to the Jiangxi region.

After the Ming Dynasty’s collapse in 1644, China faced a turbulent period until 1681, when Emperor Kangxi quelled the Three Feudatories Rebellion. This paved the way for corn to flourish across the nation.

In 1661, the Qing Dynasty had a population of only 19.2 million. However, after the Yongzheng period abolished head taxes and implemented land allotments, the population surged: it reached 143 million by 1741 and 296 million by 1795. By 1849, it exploded to 412 million. 

To address the population and land pressure, the Qing government began relaxing restrictions in 1742, encouraging farmers to reclaim mountainous areas and exempting these lands from taxes. Residents of these areas were also given quotas for imperial examinations. These measures promoted the reclamation of mountainous regions, allowing drought-resistant corn to flourish.

As early as the late Ming Dynasty, increasing land annexation and frequent natural disasters prompted many farmers to move into mountainous areas. During the late Ming and early Qing dynasties, farmers moving into mountainous areas engaged in various occupations, including farming, iron smelting, charcoal burning, mushroom cultivation, and mining. The chaos of large-scale wars prompted many residents from plains to seek refuge in the mountains.

This influx led to significant gatherings of farmers in border areas, such as Hunan, Jiangxi, Hubei, Anhui, Fujian, Zhejiang, and Guangdong. The demographic boom during the Yongzheng and Qianlong periods intensified this movement, especially after the Qing government lifted restrictions on mountain reclamation in 1742. 

Traditional crops like rice, wheat, and millet require specific water and soil conditions, which made drought-resistant crops like corn, sweet potatoes, and potatoes, introduced from the Americas, more suitable for cultivation in these regions. Farmers typically planted sweet potatoes in the lowlands, corn in the higher elevations, and potatoes in colder, high-altitude areas. These American crops thrived in local conditions and were rotated to ensure a steady food supply, supporting both the shed dwellers and the growing population.

In places like Enshi, Hubei, corn became a staple food alongside rice. Local records from the Jiaqing era (1796-1820) noted that farmers burned their homes to cultivate various grains, particularly corn. 

As reclamation efforts continued, corn spread throughout the Fujian-Jiangxi-Huguang region, eventually reaching Guizhou and Yunnan. The influx of refugees from Hubei, Hunan, Fujian, and Guangdong during the Jiaqing and Daoguang periods further intensified corn cultivation in Yunnan. Lin Zexu, a prominent Qing official, noted that corn was widely planted in Baoshan County and became a staple in regions like Shunning and Xuanwei Prefecture, where it was used to make sugar, brew wine, and grind flour.

With the end of conflicts in the late Ming and early Qing dynasties, corn’s spread in China accelerated. Following the Qing government’s suppression of the Three Feudatories Rebellion in 1681, Sichuan’s population plummeted from 6 million in 1578 to under 500,000 due to the war’s devastation. In response, the Qing government encouraged mass immigration from Huguang to Sichuan, resulting in over 6 million migrants settling in the province from the Kangxi to the Jiaqing reigns, revitalizing its population and agricultural development.

Reports from the Qianlong period noted that barren areas transformed rapidly into fertile lands, as inhabitants cultivated corn alongside other grains. Corn’s adaptability and high yield were highlighted in local chronicles, indicating a newfound reliance on it as a staple food, which drastically improved food security for many families.

During this time, several counties in Shaanxi depended heavily on corn and coarse grains, with some communities relying on it as their primary sustenance. The introduction of American crops like corn and sweet potatoes initiated a second agricultural revolution, significantly enhancing grain production and contributing to population growth. Historians like Ge Jianxiong and Jiang Tao emphasized the role of these crops in both increasing food availability and fostering demographic changes during the Ming and Qing Dynasties.

However, the surge in corn cultivation had profound environmental implications. The aggressive deforestation and land reclamation efforts by new settlers led to severe soil erosion and ecological degradation, particularly in mountainous regions. By the Daoguang era, the adverse effects of these practices were evident, with reports indicating widespread erosion and loss of fertile soil, exacerbated by heavy rains and floods. As soil fertility diminished, tensions between the indigenous populations and settlers escalated, resulting in derogatory labels for the newcomers and highlighting social strife.

The interplay of environmental degradation and social unrest culminated in events such as the White Lotus Rebellion, which was fueled by the discontent of impoverished settlers struggling to survive in increasingly harsh conditions. This rebellion, along with the subsequent Opium War, further disrupted the Qing Dynasty, leading to significant challenges for rural populations, particularly as ecological disasters became more frequent.

By the late Qing Dynasty and into the Republic of China, the ecological crises—marked by floods, droughts, and locust infestations—significantly impacted agricultural practices. As traditional crops like rice and wheat became less accessible due to rising poverty, farmers increasingly turned to corn and sweet potatoes, which were more productive and affordable. This shift was not just a response to economic necessity but also a reflection of broader social changes.

Source: rmdfsy, South China Morning Post, Nature, National Geographic