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Shanghai’s AI Industry Gains Momentum as the City Builds a Real-World Testing Ground

Shanghai’s artificial intelligence industry is gathering pace as the city’s long-term investment in computing power, capital, data and real-world applications begins to translate into faster growth.

On July 20, the Shanghai Municipal Bureau of Statistics reported that the city’s GDP reached 27.89 trillion yuan ($3.89 trillion) in the first half of 2026, up 5.6% year on year in real terms.

Industry remained an important driver. Output from manufacturing in Shanghai’s three strategic emerging industries rose 14.5% from a year earlier. Integrated-circuit manufacturing increased 19.5%, AI manufacturing jumped 21.8%, and biopharmaceutical manufacturing grew 7.2%. Output of railway, shipbuilding, aerospace and other transportation equipment also expanded 15.6%.

Foreign trade provided another source of momentum. Shanghai’s total imports and exports reached 2.55 trillion yuan in the first half, a record for the period. Imports rose 17.4% and exports 20.1%. Trade in high-tech products increased 21.6% to 662.14 billion yuan.

The acceleration of AI, however, reflects more than a strong technology cycle. It is the result of years of investment and policy experimentation coming together at a critical moment.

“Shanghai’s AI industry accelerated in the first half of the year because multiple conditions that had been accumulating for years are now being released at the same time,” said Zhong Huiyong, an associate researcher at Antai College of Economics and Management and the China Institute for Development Studies at Shanghai Jiao Tong University.

The city has been building up computing capacity, attracting investment, opening application scenarios and developing innovation platforms. Together, these efforts are lowering the cost of experimentation for companies and shortening the path from technology to commercial use.

Shanghai’s upgraded “Model Shanghai” initiative focuses on three basic inputs for AI development: computing power, data and capital. The city has developed several domestic intelligent-computing chips, is investing in advanced networking technologies and is building a unified citywide intelligent-computing network.

Data infrastructure is expanding as well. Shanghai has established what it describes as China’s first data-content operation platform and has assembled datasets totaling 10,000 terabytes in fields including scientific research and industrial manufacturing.

“Shanghai has spent years developing high-performance domestic computing clusters, public data platforms and open-source developer communities,” said Wu Yiping, a distinguished researcher at the Institute for Chinese Modernization Studies at Shanghai University of Finance and Economics. The concentration of universities, research institutes, investors and start-ups, he said, has strengthened the supply of talent and cutting-edge technology.

The government is also using financial incentives to reduce the cost of innovation. Shanghai provides 1 billion yuan a year in vouchers for computing power, AI models and data, allowing companies to use the resources first and pay later. The city has also attracted a national AI fund with a total size of 60 billion yuan and established a municipal AI leading-industry fund worth 22.5 billion yuan.

The objective is increasingly to build an ecosystem rather than simply subsidise individual companies.

“Technology, capital and industry are beginning to form a virtuous cycle,” Wu said. Public funds are working with private investors to channel capital into areas such as intelligent chips, autonomous driving and embodied intelligence.

Perhaps the most distinctive part of Shanghai’s strategy is its emphasis on real-world applications.

At Zhangjiang AI Innovation Town, a two-square-kilometre core area has effectively become a testing ground for emerging technologies. Autonomous patrol vehicles operate around the clock, working with drones to provide coordinated air-and-ground monitoring. Autonomous boats monitor an 11.8-kilometre waterway, while autonomous buses are preparing to operate on 329 kilometres of open roads.

These are not laboratory simulations. They involve real roads, real users and real feedback, allowing companies to test and refine their products in operating environments.

That approach was also visible during the “WAIC City Walk 2026”, held from July 15 to 20 alongside the World Artificial Intelligence Conference. Six industry-themed routes and eight open-access locations connected laboratories, industrial parks and innovation spaces across Shanghai, bringing AI out of exhibition halls and into the city.

Shanghai is increasingly looking to industrial pain points to determine where AI should be deployed. Its “AI + manufacturing” programme focuses on industries such as electronics, advanced equipment and automobiles, while efforts in consumer technology are targeting products including AI glasses and AI smartphones. In services, the city is promoting AI applications in areas such as finance, consulting and auditing.

The city’s state-owned enterprises have also been asked to accelerate the adoption of AI. A programme launched in March identified 50 urgent, high-value business scenarios across finance, manufacturing, transportation and construction, covering processes such as design, quality control, production scheduling, maintenance and dispatch.

“Shanghai has a rich range of application scenarios in manufacturing, finance, healthcare, automobiles and urban governance,” Zhong said. “AI technologies can enter actual business processes relatively quickly, creating a cycle of technological breakthroughs, scenario validation, product iteration and industrial value creation.”

Shanghai is simultaneously trying to build an ecosystem that is attractive to developers.

Its “1+3+N” model framework combines Shanghai AI Laboratory’s open-source InternLM series with three commercial foundation-model providers—StepFun, MiniMax and SenseTime—and a growing number of industry-specific models for sectors such as manufacturing, healthcare and finance.

The city is also experimenting with new approaches to talent development and entrepreneurship. Shanghai Innovation Institute, for example, is exploring an integrated model linking research, innovation and education, while using an “investment-incubation-exit” mechanism to support promising projects. More than 20 high-valued innovative companies have already been incubated under the programme.

Physical proximity is another part of the strategy. Innovation hubs such as ModelSpeed Space and Model Power Community aim to put developers, investors and industrial partners within easy reach of one another. The Zhangjiang and Beiyang AI Innovation Towns are designed to strengthen industrial clustering and create complementary innovation hubs.

The logic is straightforward: reducing the friction between an idea and a commercial product can be just as important as providing money or computing power.

The 2026 World Artificial Intelligence Conference offered a vivid example. More than 1,100 companies took part, showcasing over 3,000 products, with more than 300 making their global debut.

The conference is not merely a showcase for the latest technology. It also reduces the costs of finding information, identifying partners and understanding where the industry is heading. Chipmakers, model developers, application companies, investors and industrial users can meet in the same physical space, turning what might otherwise take months of searching and negotiation into a much shorter process.

Shanghai’s AI strategy is therefore becoming less about building technology for its own sake and more about making technology useful.

Its competitive advantage may ultimately lie not in any single model, chip or application, but in the ecosystem being built around them: abundant computing power, accessible data, patient capital, open application scenarios, concentrated talent and dense industrial networks.

As these elements reinforce one another, Shanghai is attempting to create a shorter and cheaper route from technological breakthrough to commercial value.

The acceleration of its AI industry is consequently not the product of one policy or one breakthrough. It is the result of years of groundwork reaching a point where infrastructure, capital, policy and demand are beginning to move in the same direction. For Shanghai, turning the city itself into a testing ground may be the next step in turning AI from technological promise into measurable economic value.

Source: paper, sohu, sina, people, yahoo, xinhuanet, sh gov cn

China Meteorological Administration Launches “Fenghe” AI Model and Global Open-Source Initiative

At the 2026 World Artificial Intelligence Conference (WAIC) Meteorological Session, the China Meteorological Administration (CMA) unveiled “Fenghe,” an AI-powered large language model designed specifically for meteorological services, and launched its global open-source initiative. 

As China’s first meteorological service domain model with hundreds of billions of parameters, Fenghe is expected to accelerate the integration of artificial intelligence into the full chain of meteorological services and help transform traditional weather services into more intelligent, efficient and personalized systems.

Developed by the CMA Public Meteorological Service Centre in collaboration with the Xiong’an Institute of Artificial Intelligence Innovation, Zhipu and other partners, Fenghe is described as the world’s first open-source meteorological large language model at the 100-billion-parameter scale. 

Unlike conventional numerical weather prediction models, Fenghe is designed more like an “AI meteorological service officer.” Built on a large language model architecture, it combines artificial intelligence with professional meteorological knowledge and massive amounts of weather and climate data to support weather analysis, risk assessment and decision-making.

Wang Muhua, a senior engineer at the CMA Public Meteorological Service Centre, said one of Fenghe’s key features is its foundation model with hundreds of billions of parameters. Through multimodal integration and generative AI technologies, the model is designed to improve the resolution, efficiency and responsiveness of meteorological services.

Fenghe is built on a comprehensive Earth system data infrastructure and has been trained on 50 million tokens of high-quality meteorological service data. It also integrates authoritative meteorological datasets and has completed the required filing process for generative AI services in China, providing users with a more secure and controllable model application environment.

Fenghe differs in its positioning from several AI-based forecasting systems previously developed by the CMA, including Fengqing, a global medium- and short-range forecasting system; Fenglei, an AI-based nowcasting system; and Fengshun, a global subseasonal-to-seasonal prediction system. 

These systems are primarily designed for professional meteorological operations and focus on improving forecasting capabilities across different time scales. Fenghe, by contrast, is aimed mainly at the public and industries, serving as an intelligent interface between professional weather forecasts and real-world service needs.

According to Wang, Fenghe is not intended to replace traditional numerical weather prediction, nor does it simply use a large language model to generate weather forecasts. Instead, it builds on forecasting information produced by systems such as Fengqing, Fenglei and Fengshun, while combining professional meteorological knowledge with generative AI and application scenarios. This approach is intended to address limitations of general-purpose large language models, which may struggle to fully understand specialized meteorological needs, generate sufficiently professional information or adapt effectively to complex service scenarios.

For the public, this could mean a shift from simply being told what the weather will be to receiving practical advice on what to do. Yu Tingzhao, a senior engineer at the CMA Public Meteorological Service Centre, said Fenghe could provide more precise and scenario-specific support for travel and outdoor activities by combining weather information with location, timing and individual needs.

For example, a conventional forecast might say that an area will be cloudy with occasional showers over the weekend. For someone planning a hike or camping trip, such information may not be sufficient to determine whether or where to go. In the future, Fenghe could combine high-resolution weather forecasts with local environmental and geographical information to analyze conditions in complex areas such as mountains and lakes. It could identify differences in rainfall, wind speed and visibility between locations and time periods, and then provide practical recommendations, such as choosing a particular route or completing a hike before deteriorating conditions arrive.

This could gradually shift weather services from regional forecasts toward highly localized, point-specific services, and from passive information delivery toward proactive, AI-assisted decision-making.

Fenghe is already supporting meteorological services across China and providing the public with personalized weather information, service recommendations and risk warnings. Its international version has also been launched and integrated into “Mazu,” an intelligent meteorological early-warning solution developed in support of the Early Warnings for All initiative. It provides users around the world with bilingual Chinese-English intelligent question answering, weather information and risk analysis.

With the launch of the global open-source initiative, the CMA plans to make Fenghe’s complete model weights available through platforms including GitHub, Hugging Face and ModelScope. Standardized APIs, cloud services and customized deployment solutions will also be provided. The initiative therefore goes beyond simply opening the model code and weights: it aims to provide a complete technology and deployment framework that allows developers, research institutions and international partners to integrate Fenghe into applications ranging from mobile apps and mini-programs to embodied AI systems.

The broader goal is to build an open and collaborative global ecosystem for meteorological artificial intelligence. By making advanced meteorological AI capabilities more accessible, Fenghe could help transform large volumes of weather and climate data into intuitive risk information, convert complex warnings into easy-to-understand natural-language guidance, and eventually translate weather risks into concrete actions.

In sectors such as transportation, energy, electricity, healthcare, logistics and tourism, meteorological warnings could be further connected with operational decisions, enabling AI systems to recommend specific responses to changing weather conditions. From public weather services to professional analysis, and from risk identification to emergency response, Fenghe is intended to make meteorological warnings more understandable, accessible and actionable, providing new technological support for global disaster risk reduction and the development of more inclusive early-warning systems.

Source: people, xinhua, yicai, ceic, kpzg, cctv

BYD Chief Scientist Lian Yubo on How Basic Research Has Driven China to Global Leadership in New Energy Vehicles

On April 30, 2026, Chinese President Xi Jinping attended a symposium on strengthening basic research in Shanghai and delivered an important speech. He emphasized that basic research is the source of the entire scientific system and the starting point for solving technological problems. He called for greater efforts and more effective measures to strengthen basic research, enhance China’s capacity for original innovation, and lay a stronger foundation for building the country into a leading scientific and technological power.

The fundamental importance of basic research lies in the fact that major technological breakthroughs ultimately depend on a deep understanding of underlying mechanisms and scientific laws. Without long-term accumulation in basic research, applied technologies become like water without a source, making it difficult to overcome technological bottlenecks at their roots. Without the forward-looking guidance of basic research, industrial development can also become like a ship without a rudder, struggling to find its direction in unexplored areas. The development of China’s new energy vehicle (NEV) industry over more than three decades provides a compelling example of the value of long-term commitment to scientific research.

In 2025, China’s NEV production and sales ranked first in the world for the eleventh consecutive year, while new energy passenger vehicles accounted for 68.4 percent of the global market. The industry has therefore achieved a leading position in terms of scale and engineering capabilities. However, this leadership does not necessarily mean that China has achieved the same level of strength in fundamental theories, original scientific discoveries, or underlying technologies. Engineering excellence is not equivalent to deep theoretical accumulation. 

As global competition in the automotive industry increasingly moves from application-oriented technologies toward fundamental theories and core underlying technologies, breakthroughs in basic research have become essential for China to consolidate its leadership in NEVs and transform itself from a major automobile producer into a true automotive power.

The evolution of China’s NEV industry illustrates this transition. In the early stage, during the periods of the Eighth and Tenth Five-Year Plans, electric vehicles were incorporated into national science and technology programs, and the “Three Verticals and Three Horizontals” technical framework under the 863 Program established major directions for research. Universities and research institutes played the leading role, creating the initial technological foundation and cultivating China’s first generation of NEV researchers. 

However, investment was relatively limited, and research was often disconnected from industrial needs and focused insufficiently on fundamental scientific questions. Some companies had already begun independent exploration. BYD, for example, established a central research department and invested in electrochemical research, particularly in battery cycle life and safety, laying the groundwork for its later development.

As the industry entered the commercialization stage, research became increasingly driven by practical engineering requirements. The launch of the “Ten Cities, Thousand Vehicles” demonstration program in 2009 accelerated the market adoption of NEVs. Consumer demand for longer driving ranges and greater reliability encouraged research into battery materials, manufacturing processes, and other key technologies. This market-driven approach improved the performance of critical components, but many fundamental research achievements remained concentrated in universities and research institutes, while connections between scientific discoveries and industrial engineering were still relatively weak.

With the rapid expansion of the NEV market, Chinese companies began to develop stronger in-house research capabilities. They established independent research departments, joint laboratories, and other collaborative innovation platforms. Basic research gradually shifted from simply supporting existing products to helping define future technology directions. BYD’s Blade Battery is one example. 

By starting from actual vehicle requirements and combining fundamental electrochemical understanding with innovative product and manufacturing design, the company significantly improved battery safety and system integration, contributing to the renewed prominence of lithium iron phosphate batteries. 

Nevertheless, much of the research during this stage remained incremental, focusing on optimization rather than genuinely disruptive innovation. Leading companies therefore began to deepen cooperation with universities and research institutes, forming new models in which companies identify industrial problems and academic institutions help address the underlying scientific questions.

Today, however, the industry is entering a new phase. As NEVs become increasingly widespread and their applications more diverse, conventional theories and engineering approaches are approaching their limits. Requirements for longer range, faster charging, greater safety, and more intelligent driving are pushing the industry into technological “uncharted territory.” At this point, simply improving existing products is no longer sufficient. Companies must increasingly define new research questions themselves and invest in original scientific exploration.

For enterprises operating at the technological frontier, basic research should therefore be closely connected with long-term strategic needs. The NEV industry can be understood as a five-level structure, progressing from mechanisms and materials to components, systems, and complete vehicles. 

Chinese companies have developed strong capabilities at the component, system, and vehicle levels, but their accumulation of fundamental research at the mechanism and material levels remains comparatively limited. Strategic basic research can help bridge this gap. Such research typically requires five to ten years or even longer, has the potential to redefine products if successful, and provides a technological foundation that can support multiple products and applications.

Its value can be seen in several ways. First, a deeper understanding of underlying mechanisms can reduce engineering uncertainty and the cost of trial and error. For example, battery safety under collision involves complex interactions among material damage, structural dynamics, and electrochemical processes. 

Understanding these mechanisms scientifically can provide quantitative guidance for engineering design and significantly reduce repetitive testing. Second, basic research can transform vague engineering experience into clearly defined scientific boundaries. In electric drive systems, for instance, understanding the fundamental limits of power density, temperature, noise, and other parameters can make system design more predictable, measurable, and reliable. 

Third, fundamental breakthroughs can enable entirely new technological architectures. BYD’s e⁴ platform, for example, moves beyond conventional mechanical four-wheel-drive structures by using independently controlled electric motors and advanced coordination algorithms. This represents a shift from optimizing individual components to fundamentally restructuring vehicle dynamics and control.

Looking forward, several areas deserve particular attention. Next-generation batteries will require breakthroughs in energy density, safety, cycle life, and performance under extreme conditions, as conventional electrochemical systems approach their theoretical limits. Comprehensive vehicle intelligence will also require fundamental research into perception, cognition, vehicle dynamics, and control, enabling intelligent driving and intelligent chassis systems to work together at millisecond-level speeds. 

In addition, automotive semiconductors and industrial software are becoming common foundations for both electrification and intelligent vehicles. Research into chip architecture, real-time operating systems, functional safety, and reliability will be critical to achieving greater technological autonomy.

The key challenge, therefore, is not simply to conduct more basic research, but to establish an effective pathway connecting scientific discovery, engineering development, and industrial commercialization. This requires stronger coordination between industry and academia. 

Companies are often focused on engineering problems, cost, and development cycles, while universities tend to prioritize scientific questions and theoretical contributions. Companies should consequently translate complex industrial and commercial problems into clearly defined scientific questions and regularly communicate these research needs to universities and research institutes.

At the same time, major strategic research projects require stable, long-term, and concentrated investment. For areas of high strategic importance, resources should not be dispersed across numerous short-term projects. Instead, interdisciplinary teams should be formed and sufficient resources concentrated on key scientific challenges. Talent development is equally important. Enterprises, universities, and research institutes should establish more flexible mechanisms for two-way talent mobility and develop interdisciplinary researchers who understand both fundamental science and industrial engineering.

Most importantly, China needs to establish a complete innovation chain from “0 to 1 to 10 to 100.” The 0-to-1 stage is the discovery of new scientific principles, in which universities and research institutes play a major role while companies participate at an early stage. The 1-to-10 stage focuses on turning scientific discoveries into stable technologies through engineering validation and prototype development, with enterprises taking the lead. The 10-to-100 stage is the large-scale commercialization of mature technologies, which requires companies to integrate them systematically into products and industrial systems. Building research platforms, pilot-testing facilities, and evaluation mechanisms that support all three stages will help ensure that scientific discoveries can become genuine industrial capabilities.

China’s more than thirty years of NEV development demonstrate that sustainable technological leadership cannot rely solely on manufacturing scale or engineering efficiency. The most important competitive advantages often lie beneath the visible product, in the scientific principles, materials, algorithms, and technological architectures that make innovation possible. As China moves from being a major automobile producer toward becoming an automotive power, the decisive competition will increasingly take place at the level of basic research.

The next stage of China’s NEV development therefore requires greater strategic patience, sustained investment, and a willingness to tolerate failure. Basic research cannot always produce immediate commercial returns, but it creates the technological options that determine what industries can achieve years or even decades later. 

By strengthening original scientific research, connecting it more effectively with engineering and commercialization, and building a long-term innovation ecosystem, China can turn its existing engineering and industrial advantages into deeper and more sustainable technological leadership, providing a stronger foundation for the development of a world-leading automotive industry.

Source: bulletin cas cn, BYD, global times, scmp

2026: The Year Physical AI Enters Mass Production Through the Automobile

The automotive industry has reached a defining moment in 2026. After years of rapid advances in large language models, the AI industry has arrived at a shared realization: intelligence confined to a screen is ultimately limited. To unlock its full potential, AI must move beyond generating information and begin interacting with the physical world. It needs a body.

The evolution of AI is therefore entering a new phase. While foundation models and AI agents have transformed digital experiences, the next frontier is Embodied AI, intelligence capable of perceiving, reasoning, and acting in real-world environments. This marks a shift away from competing solely on model size and cloud computing power toward integrating AI deeply with physical products. Among all intelligent devices, the automobile has emerged as the most compelling platform for this transition.

Unlike smartphones or smart home devices, which are largely limited to touchscreens and voice interfaces, vehicles combine rich multimodal perception, powerful onboard computing, mobility, and precise physical control. They are uniquely positioned to connect digital intelligence with real-world execution.

This transformation is far more significant than introducing a smarter voice assistant into the cabin. It fundamentally redefines the relationship between people and their vehicles. Traditional in-car systems require users to adapt to predefined commands and rigid interaction logic. A true AI agent reverses that relationship. Instead of demanding precise instructions, it understands human intent, interprets context, anticipates needs, and responds proactively. It recognizes fatigue, stress, urgency, and changing circumstances, enabling a more natural, intuitive, and human-centered driving experience.

This vision became tangible when Geely introduced its cockpit-driving integrated AI agent, Super EVA, and brought it into mass production on the Zeekr 8X. Rather than treating AI as another software feature, Geely positioned it as the central intelligence that connects perception, decision-making, vehicle control, and digital services into one unified experience.

As AI enters the automotive industry, not every approach is equally meaningful. Many manufacturers have simply integrated third-party large language models into their infotainment systems, enabling conversations, content generation, or entertainment while marketing these capabilities as intelligent transformation. However, the future of automotive AI extends far beyond conversational interfaces.

The intelligent agent is becoming the primary gateway through which users interact with every aspect of the vehicle, from hardware and chassis control to navigation, mobility services, payments, and an expanding ecosystem of digital experiences. Whoever controls this layer controls the user’s intent. Relying entirely on external AI providers risks reducing automakers to hardware manufacturers while strategic control over user experience shifts elsewhere.

Geely has pursued a different path. Super EVA is built upon the company’s long-term investment in self-developed voice technologies, integrated with StepFun’s Step 3.7 end-to-end foundation model and customized automotive AI agents. This combination allows Geely to retain ownership of interaction design, safety boundaries, engineering optimization, and long-term service evolution while leveraging the reasoning capabilities of advanced foundation models.

Building an automotive AI agent, however, is fundamentally different from developing consumer software. Unlike digital applications, every AI decision inside a vehicle has physical consequences. The challenge is not simply making AI more intelligent in the cloud, but ensuring that every decision can be translated into safe, reliable, real-time vehicle actions.

Achieving this requires deep integration between the intelligent cockpit and autonomous driving systems. The cockpit must understand driving scenarios, road regulations, and vehicle dynamics, while autonomous driving systems must expose decision-making processes that have traditionally remained within black-box architectures. Only through this two-way integration can AI move seamlessly from understanding human intent to executing safe physical actions.

Equally important is the underlying engineering foundation. High-bandwidth communication, cross-domain computing, real-time scheduling, and multiple layers of safety redundancy are essential prerequisites for turning AI reasoning into physical vehicle control.

Geely’s ability to commercialize this vision is the result of years of investment across the full AI technology stack. Its service-oriented vehicle architecture, Xingrui Intelligent Computing Center with 23.5 EFLOPS of computing power, millions of newly collected real-world driving data points every year, and continuous development of proprietary voice technologies and AI algorithms together form the infrastructure that enables fast, reliable, and safe cross-domain collaboration.

The value of this integration becomes clear in everyday situations. Imagine driving to work on a busy Monday morning with an important meeting approaching. You simply say, “Hi Super EVA, I need to arrive before nine. I’m feeling tired, please drive me to the office.” During the journey, you add, “Order me an iced Americano along the way.”

Without requiring multiple separate commands, the AI understands your priorities, plans the optimal route, activates intelligent driving assistance where appropriate, coordinates the journey, locates a nearby coffee shop, places the order, completes payment, and ensures everything aligns with your arrival time. Instead of executing isolated instructions, the AI orchestrates multiple services across the physical and digital worlds to complete an entire mobility task on your behalf.

This represents a fundamental shift from reactive software to proactive intelligence.

The AI industry has never lacked ambitious visions. Tesla’s integration of Grok into its broader ecosystem points toward a future in which automotive AI and humanoid robotics share common intelligence. Across the industry, demonstrations of AI agents have become common at major auto shows and technology events.

Yet the automotive industry is ultimately defined not by demonstrations, but by production.

Mass production remains the only meaningful benchmark capable of separating technological breakthroughs from conceptual hype. Automotive AI must perform consistently not just in ideal testing environments, but across millions of kilometers, countless weather conditions, unpredictable traffic situations, and complex long-tail scenarios while maintaining uncompromising safety standards.

This is where engineering discipline becomes more important than marketing narratives.

Super EVA has already moved beyond the demonstration stage into large-scale deployment. Following its production launch on the Zeekr 8X, the system is scheduled to reach hundreds of thousands of existing Zeekr owners through over-the-air updates before expanding across Lynk & Co and Geely models. Such rapid deployment across multiple brands and vehicle platforms reflects not only technological maturity but also manufacturing capability, software validation, supply chain coordination, and organizational execution at scale.

Ultimately, the significance of automotive AI extends beyond the vehicle itself.

As discussions around embodied intelligence continue, many ask whether future digital experiences will revolve around smartphones or automobiles. The answer is increasingly that they will complement one another. Smartphones remain indispensable companions for everyday digital life, while vehicles occupy a unique role as intelligent physical spaces capable of movement, perception, and real-world interaction.

The automobile therefore becomes the bridge connecting people, vehicles, homes, and services into one continuous intelligent ecosystem. Super EVA represents more than a new product or feature. It demonstrates how AI can move beyond conversation and begin creating tangible value in the physical world. More importantly, it reflects a broader direction for the industry, one in which intelligence is measured not by how convincingly it talks, but by how safely, reliably, and naturally it acts.

As the era of Physical AI begins, the companies that will shape the future are unlikely to be those with the loudest announcements or the most impressive demonstrations. They will be the ones capable of translating advanced intelligence into products that millions of people can trust and use every day. In that sense, the journey from digital intelligence to physical execution has already begun, and the automobile is emerging as its most important proving ground.

Source: 36kr, zgqcdt, sina, sohu, zhihu

AI and the Metropolis: A Mutual Journey Toward the Future of Civilization

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The 2026 World Artificial Intelligence Conference and High-Level Meeting on Global AI Governance marked more than another milestone in technological development. It signaled a turning point in humanity’s relationship with artificial intelligence. 

With the establishment of the World AI Cooperation Organization, alongside the release of the conference’s Chair’s Statement and national action plans, global AI governance began moving beyond fragmented national approaches toward coordinated institutions, shared rules, and collective responsibility. This transition reflects a profound reality: artificial intelligence is no longer simply a technological issue, and it has become a defining force shaping the future of human civilization.

Few places illustrate this transformation more vividly than Shanghai. As one of the world’s largest and most dynamic cities, it has become not only a center for AI innovation but also a living laboratory where intelligent technologies and urban life continuously reshape one another. The relationship between AI and the modern metropolis is no longer one of technology serving the city. Instead, cities and artificial intelligence are entering an era of mutual evolution, where each becomes both the catalyst and the beneficiary of the other’s transformation.

Humanity once debated whether machines could think. Today, the more pressing question is different: as machines increasingly think alongside us, how should humanity redesign its cities, institutions, and values? This question may ultimately define the next chapter of civilization.

Large cities have always been engines of progress because they concentrate on what innovation requires most: people, industries, infrastructure, capital, and ideas. Yet these same characteristics also generate extraordinary complexity. Population density, massive transportation networks, intricate public services, environmental pressures, and increasingly interconnected economic systems make governing a megacity one of humanity’s greatest organizational challenges.

For decades, urban governance largely relied on human experience, fragmented information, and reactive decision-making. Congestion was managed after it occurred. Infrastructure failures were repaired after damage became visible. Public services responded to demand rather than anticipating it. Such approaches proved increasingly insufficient as cities expanded beyond the limits of traditional management.

Artificial intelligence changes this equation.

What makes AI particularly valuable is not merely automation but its ability to perceive patterns invisible to human observation, integrate enormous volumes of data, and generate predictive insights at unprecedented speed. In cities like Shanghai, intelligent traffic systems forecast congestion before roads become gridlocked. 

Smart infrastructure continuously monitors bridges, pipelines, and flood defenses. Digital government platforms eliminate administrative silos by connecting agencies that once operated independently. AI-assisted healthcare, elderly care, and community services increasingly bring high-quality public resources closer to every neighborhood rather than concentrating them in city centers.

The city itself becomes a vast learning environment. Every street, hospital, subway station, industrial park, and residential community generates data that continuously improves intelligent systems. Unlike laboratory experiments, cities provide real-world complexity, uncertainty, and diversity. They are not simply places where AI is deployed; they are environments where AI matures.

At the same time, artificial intelligence fundamentally reshapes how cities function.

Urban governance is gradually shifting from responding to crises toward anticipating them. Instead of merely repairing problems, intelligent systems help prevent them. Instead of relying solely on periodic inspections, cities increasingly operate through continuous perception and dynamic coordination. Decision-makers gain the ability to understand urban systems as interconnected networks rather than isolated departments.

Yet AI is not replacing human governance. On the contrary, its greatest value lies in strengthening human judgment. Algorithms excel at processing information, but cities are ultimately governed by values, ethics, and political choices that remain profoundly human. The future belongs not to machine-led cities but to cities where human wisdom and artificial intelligence complement one another. The influence of AI extends far beyond public administration. It is also redefining urban economies.

Megacities have long served as economic powerhouses because they connect innovation with industrial capacity. Artificial intelligence accelerates this role by transforming manufacturing through digital twins, intelligent quality control, and industrial foundation models. Financial services become more resilient through intelligent risk management. Global trade benefits from smarter logistics and cross-border digital platforms. Cultural industries increasingly combine historical heritage with generative technologies, allowing cities to preserve memory while creating entirely new forms of expression.

This creates a powerful cycle of mutual reinforcement. Cities provide the ecosystems where AI technologies are developed, tested, and refined. AI, in turn, strengthens cities by generating new industries, improving productivity, and enhancing competitiveness. Urban development and technological innovation no longer advance separately, and they increasingly evolve together.

Yet perhaps the most meaningful transformation occurs not in industry but in everyday life.

The true measure of a great city has never been its skyline or economic output alone. It lies in whether ordinary people experience dignity, opportunity, and security. Artificial intelligence possesses remarkable potential to reduce longstanding inequalities that have challenged urban development for decades.

Remote medical diagnostics can extend high-quality healthcare to underserved communities. Intelligent educational platforms can narrow disparities in learning opportunities. Smart elderly care technologies enable aging populations to live more independently and safely. Accessible digital public services allow governments to respond more precisely to diverse social needs.

Technology reaches its highest purpose when it becomes nearly invisible—when it quietly removes barriers, expands opportunity, and improves daily life without drawing attention to itself. The ultimate success of AI will not be measured by the sophistication of algorithms but by the extent to which every citizen benefits from their application.

Nevertheless, every technological revolution carries its own paradox. The same algorithms that optimize public services can also reinforce hidden biases. The same interconnected data that enable intelligent governance can expose societies to unprecedented cybersecurity risks. The same predictive capabilities that improve efficiency may also raise difficult questions about privacy, transparency, accountability, and individual autonomy.

As artificial intelligence assumes greater influence over public decision-making, technical excellence alone is no longer sufficient. Governance must evolve as rapidly as innovation itself. This requires moving beyond the traditional belief that regulation inevitably slows technological progress. In reality, well-designed governance creates the trust that allows innovation to flourish sustainably. Ethical standards, transparent algorithms, data protection, and clear institutional accountability are not obstacles to AI development; they are the conditions under which society is willing to embrace it.

Technology without governance risks becoming uncontrolled power. Governance without innovation risks becoming a stagnant bureaucracy. Sustainable progress demands that both evolve together. This is precisely why the emergence of international AI governance institutions represents more than diplomatic symbolism. Artificial intelligence is inherently global. Algorithms cross borders. Data flows transcend jurisdictions. Risks and opportunities alike cannot be managed by any single nation acting alone.

The establishment of the World AI Cooperation Organization represents an important step toward building shared global mechanisms capable of balancing innovation with responsibility, national development with international cooperation, and technological competition with common human interests. It reflects an increasingly recognized understanding that the future of AI governance must be collaborative rather than fragmented.

Shanghai occupies a uniquely significant position within this historical transformation. As one of the world’s largest metropolitan regions, it combines advanced technological capacity, complex governance challenges, global economic connectivity, and a longstanding tradition of openness. Its experience demonstrates how local innovation can contribute to global public goods.

More importantly, it illustrates a broader shift in China’s role within global AI governance, from participating in existing discussions to helping shape international agendas and institutional frameworks. The evolution of Chinese megacities increasingly provides practical experience that may inform how other rapidly urbanizing societies approach intelligent governance.

History reminds us that every great leap in civilization has emerged from the interaction between transformative technologies and evolving social institutions. Steam power reshaped industrial cities. Electricity transformed modern life. The internet redefined global connectivity. Artificial intelligence may now become the foundational technology of the intelligent city.

Yet history also teaches another lesson: technology alone never determines the future. Human choices do. The cities of tomorrow will not be remembered simply for deploying the most advanced AI systems. They will be judged by whether they used intelligence to deepen justice rather than inequality, strengthen trust rather than surveillance, expand opportunity rather than exclusion, and enrich humanity rather than diminish it.

The future therefore is not about cities becoming more intelligent while people become less essential. It is about creating cities where artificial intelligence amplifies human wisdom, where governance remains rooted in human values, and where innovation serves the enduring aspirations of civilization.

Perhaps the most profound relationship emerging in the twenty-first century is not between humans and machines, nor between technology and governance, but between artificial intelligence and the city itself. One supplies the complexity that inspires innovation; the other provides the intelligence that enables complexity to flourish.

When cities cultivate artificial intelligence responsibly, and artificial intelligence elevates cities humanely, they do more than transform urban life, and they redefine what civilization itself can become.

Source: the paper, cgtn, south china morning post, x

From Security Cooperation to Strategic Confrontation: How Japan and the Philippines Are Raising Tensions in the South China Sea

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Ten years after the so-called South China Sea arbitration award was issued on July 12, 2016, the dispute has long ceased to be merely a legal disagreement between China and the Philippines. 

It has increasingly been instrumentalized by external powers as a political and strategic tool for shaping the regional security order and constraining China. The latest example came on July 12, 2026, when 14 countries, including the United States, Japan, Australia and the Philippines, issued a joint statement purportedly commemorating the tenth anniversary of the award. 

By using the anniversary to reaffirm support for Manila’s unilateral maritime claims, these countries have once again turned a bilateral dispute into a platform for political mobilization and strategic alignment.

China has consistently maintained that it does not accept or recognize the arbitration award and does not accept any claims or actions based on it. Beijing’s position is that China’s territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests in the South China Sea are not affected by the award under any circumstances. 

Whatever one’s view of the legal merits of the case, the more consequential development over the past decade has been the transformation of the arbitration issue into a broader instrument of geopolitical competition.

The Philippines has played an active role in this process. On the one hand, Manila has sought greater coordination with other South China Sea claimant states, including Vietnam, on issues ranging from maritime boundaries to the construction and occupation of disputed features. On the other hand, it has deepened security cooperation with external powers such as Japan, the United States and Australia in an effort to compensate for its own limited maritime capabilities and increase its leverage in dealing with China. 

Japan’s growing involvement deserves particular attention because bilateral security cooperation has moved well beyond traditional maritime law-enforcement assistance and capacity building.

The trajectory of Japan-Philippines relations illustrates how the South China Sea is becoming embedded in a much broader regional security architecture. Following the entry into force of the Reciprocal Access Agreement between Japan and the Philippines in September 2025, the two countries signed an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement in January 2026, further institutionalizing their defense cooperation. 

In April, around 1,400 Japanese Self-Defense Force personnel reportedly participated in the Balikatan exercises alongside U.S. and Philippine forces, while maritime cooperation involving Japan, the United States, Australia and the Philippines continued to expand. 

In May, Japanese and Philippine leaders also reached an understanding on promoting the transfer of defense equipment, including destroyers, TC-90 aircraft and radar systems. These developments suggest that Japan’s involvement is shifting from diplomatic support and capacity building toward a more operational and institutionalized military role.

Japan’s motivations are broader than the South China Sea dispute itself. One objective is to strengthen the linkage among the South China Sea, the East China Sea and the Taiwan Strait within a single regional security framework. 

By repeatedly emphasizing a narrative of alleged Chinese “coercion” at sea, Tokyo can portray developments far beyond its immediate territorial waters as part of a common strategic challenge. This, in turn, provides additional political justification for expanding defense capabilities, increasing defense-equipment exports and broadening the scope of the Self-Defense Forces’ overseas activities.

The Philippines also serves as an important strategic node in Japan’s wider regional strategy. By working more closely with Manila, Tokyo can connect its “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” vision with the U.S.-Japan alliance and a growing network of minilateral security arrangements in Southeast Asia. 

Support for the arbitration award meanwhile allows Japan to present itself as a defender of the “rules-based order,” while blending legal arguments with broader geopolitical competition. The danger is that international law may increasingly be invoked not simply as a framework for resolving disputes, but as a political instrument for consolidating strategic blocs.

For the Marcos administration, closer security ties with Japan, the United States and Australia offer clear political and strategic advantages. External assistance can strengthen the Philippines’ maritime capabilities, respond to domestic nationalist sentiment and provide Manila with greater leverage during maritime confrontations with China. Yet external backing can also create unintended risks. 

If political or military support from partners is interpreted as a security guarantee for increasingly forward-leaning actions, Manila may have greater incentives to test the limits of the existing status quo. At the same time, external powers may regard individual maritime incidents as opportunities to demonstrate alliance credibility or expand their military presence. What begins as a localized confrontation could therefore acquire wider strategic implications.

The continued deepening of Japan-Philippines security cooperation risks producing three broader consequences for the South China Sea. First, it could intensify the regional security dilemma. More warships, military aircraft, coast guard vessels and joint exercises inevitably mean more frequent and complicated encounters at sea and in the air, increasing the possibility that an accident or tactical miscalculation could escalate into a broader interstate crisis.

Second, it could accelerate the transformation of the South China Sea dispute from a collection of specific maritime disagreements into a form of bloc-based strategic confrontation. Issues that should primarily be managed by the directly concerned parties through dialogue and negotiation are increasingly being framed as part of a broader struggle against unilateral actions. This risks placing additional pressure on ASEAN members to take sides in a competition they have strong interests in avoiding.

Third, greater involvement by external military powers could undermine ASEAN’s central role in regional governance. ASEAN documents have repeatedly emphasized dialogue, restraint and cooperation as the preferred means of maintaining regional stability, while negotiations toward an effective and substantive Code of Conduct in the South China Sea remain an important regional objective. If major-power rivalry and alliance politics increasingly shape the environment in which these negotiations take place, the space for ASEAN-led diplomacy could become narrower.

The South China Sea cannot achieve lasting stability through an ever-expanding cycle of military deployments, deterrence and counter-deterrence. China rejects the arbitration award and advocates resolving maritime disputes through negotiations and consultations among the directly concerned states. Whatever differences exist over competing legal and political narratives, the practical alternative to confrontation remains dialogue.

Regional countries should therefore continue implementing the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, accelerate consultations on the Code of Conduct, and strengthen mechanisms for maritime communication, crisis management and the prevention of accidental escalation.

External countries can make constructive contributions through search and rescue, disaster relief, environmental protection and navigational safety. They should not, however, turn the South China Sea into another arena for demonstrating military power or constructing exclusive security blocs.

The tenth anniversary of the arbitration award should not become another occasion for deepening division. If the South China Sea is increasingly treated as a stage for alliance politics, legal disputes will become harder to manage and regional security dilemmas more difficult to contain. The sustainable path forward lies not in transforming maritime disputes into geopolitical confrontation, but in restoring restraint, dialogue and cooperation to the center of regional diplomacy.

Source: scmp, navy mil, mofa go jp, japanupclose, indo pacific defense forum, xinhua

The Algorithmic Violence of the West: Digital Capitalism, Cognitive Control, and the Erosion of Freedom

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“Algorithmic violence” refers to a new form of power constructed by contemporary digital capitalism through the appropriation of data, platform monopolies, and algorithmic governance. Unlike the Hobbesian Leviathan, which exercises power through visible coercion, or the Orwellian model of overt surveillance and repression, algorithmic violence operates through a softer and more sophisticated form of domination. 

Capital functions as the hidden sovereign, algorithms as its instrument of power, and digital platforms as the institutional infrastructure through which this power is exercised. Individuals appear to possess more choices than ever before, yet increasingly lose the capacity to determine what they see, what they believe, and why they believe it. The greatest danger of algorithmic violence therefore lies not in its explicit destruction of freedom, but in its ability to disguise control as convenience, discipline as personalization, and obedience as individual choice. Its ultimate achievement is the production of a social environment in which people experience themselves as free precisely while their autonomy is being progressively diminished.

Digitalization has not dissolved the fundamental power relations of capitalism. Instead, it has provided capital with new technological mechanisms for accumulation and domination. In digital capitalism, data functions as a new form of productive resource, platforms constitute new centers of economic and social power, and algorithms provide the crucial mechanism through which economic power is transformed into the capacity to shape social behavior. 

Capital continuously captures the traces individuals leave behind through searches, clicks, browsing histories, purchases, interactions, locations, and even emotional responses. These traces are transformed into calculable and commercially exploitable assets. Smart devices, social media, and the Internet of Things have extended this process from public spaces into the most intimate dimensions of everyday life. Individuals are increasingly rendered visible, measurable, predictable, and governable.

The problem is therefore not merely the loss of privacy. It is the emergence of a social condition in which individuals know that their behavior may constantly be observed, recorded, analyzed, and evaluated. Such awareness can produce a chilling effect: people modify what they say, what they search for, and what they do because they anticipate possible consequences. Power no longer needs to prohibit an action directly. It only needs to create the perception that one is being watched. Surveillance thus becomes self-discipline, and external control becomes internalized restraint.

Data accumulation subsequently becomes platform monopoly. Companies such as Google, Meta, Amazon, Apple, and Microsoft have consolidated enormous economic and informational power through network effects, economies of scale, proprietary infrastructures, and control over user data. Traditional monopolies primarily involved control over physical means of production and markets. Digital monopolies extend this power to the infrastructures through which information, social relations, and public attention are organized. The more users a platform attracts, the more data it collects; the more data it collects, the more precisely its algorithms can predict and personalize; the more personalized its services become, the more users it attracts. This self-reinforcing cycle produces a form of digital enclosure in which a small number of private corporations increasingly determine the conditions under which social communication takes place.

Algorithms transform this economic concentration into a deeper form of social power. Data can record behavior, but algorithms can predict, classify, rank, and influence it. Algorithms are not politically or economically neutral. Their objectives, training data, optimization criteria, and recommendation systems embody particular institutional priorities. When platforms optimize for clicks, engagement, watch time, and advertising revenue, algorithms are structurally encouraged to privilege whatever captures attention rather than whatever is most accurate, rational, or socially valuable. Technological “optimization” thus becomes a mechanism of capitalist discipline.

This discipline begins at the level of cognitive input. Individuals are confronted with an unprecedented abundance of information, yet abundance does not necessarily produce knowledge. Personalized recommendation systems increasingly replace active exploration with automated selection. Algorithms infer users’ preferences from previous behavior and continuously provide similar content, thereby producing filter bubbles and information cocoons. 

Confirmation bias is consequently reinforced by technological design: individuals encounter more information that confirms what they already believe and fewer arguments that challenge their assumptions. Society appears to inhabit one interconnected information space, while in reality citizens increasingly occupy different algorithmically constructed realities.

The consequences become even more serious when algorithms contribute to the production of simulated reality. Under an attention-driven business model, factual accuracy is not necessarily what determines visibility. Content capable of generating outrage, fear, excitement, or controversy often performs better than complex and carefully contextualized information. Fake news, conspiracy narratives, political manipulation, and synthetic media can therefore acquire substantial visibility. 

The political controversies surrounding the 2016 U.S. presidential election and the British referendum, as well as the subsequent proliferation of AI-generated political deepfakes, demonstrate that algorithms do not merely filter reality; they can increasingly participate in producing alternative versions of reality. When citizens can no longer reliably distinguish between fact, opinion, propaganda, and synthetic fabrication, the shared epistemic foundation necessary for democratic politics begins to erode.

Algorithmic domination does not stop at determining what people see. It increasingly influences how they think. In the attention economy, complex arguments are structurally disadvantaged because they require time, concentration, and cognitive effort, whereas short, emotionally charged, and highly stimulating content can be consumed and circulated almost instantaneously. Deep reading and sustained reflection are gradually displaced by fragmented consumption. 

Algorithms do not need to prevent people from thinking. They only need to make thinking appear unnecessary. When individuals become accustomed to receiving preselected information, simplified explanations, and algorithmically generated conclusions, independent judgment is gradually replaced by cognitive outsourcing.

The result is not conventional ideological indoctrination but a subtler form of cognitive impoverishment. Individuals retain the formal right to think for themselves while increasingly losing the intellectual conditions necessary to do so. Critical thinking requires exposure to disagreement, uncertainty, complexity, and competing interpretations. Yet algorithmically organized environments tend to reward familiarity, immediacy, and emotional confirmation. 

Users are therefore encouraged to remain within cognitive communities whose members share similar assumptions. These communities provide belonging and emotional security, but they also intensify polarization and distrust toward outsiders. Social differences are transformed into epistemic divisions, while political disagreement becomes a conflict between mutually exclusive identities.

The transformation of cognition becomes explicitly political when algorithms begin to govern emotional attention. Digital platforms systematically reward high-arousal emotions such as anger, fear, resentment, and moral outrage because such emotions generate interaction and prolong engagement. As a consequence, public discourse can undergo a process of adverse selection in which information with the greatest social value is displaced by information with the greatest capacity for circulation. Complex policy questions receive less attention because they lack the dramatic simplicity required by the attention economy, while polarizing narratives and symbolic conflicts are continuously amplified.

Political identity consequently becomes a form of digital currency. Divisions between left and right, red and blue, insiders and outsiders, are easier to circulate than nuanced arguments about public policy. Individuals are encouraged to interpret political questions through the lens of group belonging rather than independent judgment. The algorithmic organization of attention thus transforms social difference into commercial value: polarization produces engagement, engagement produces data, and data produces profit.

At this point, algorithmic violence begins to threaten the foundations of democracy itself. Democracy requires more than elections and formal political rights. It presupposes citizens capable of forming relatively autonomous judgments, accessing diverse information, expressing disagreement, deliberating with others, and translating their preferences into collective decisions. 

If individuals’ informational environments, political emotions, and cognitive frameworks are systematically shaped by privately controlled algorithms, formal political freedom may increasingly coexist with substantive political dependence.

The first consequence is the weakening of democratic decision-making. Traditional democratic theory assumes that citizens express political preferences and that institutions aggregate these preferences through procedures of representation and deliberation. Algorithmic systems introduce a disturbing reversal: citizens may increasingly be represented not by what they consciously express, but by what platforms infer about them. 

Political preferences can be predicted from behavioral data, segmented into micro-targeted audiences, and acted upon before individuals fully recognize those preferences themselves. The citizen risks becoming less a political subject than an object of political computation.

This creates the possibility of what might be called algorithmic representation. 

Platforms can simulate public opinion by aggregating behavioral traces, engagement statistics, and emotional reactions. Yet the resulting “public voice” may not represent autonomous political judgment at all. It may simply reflect the outcomes of algorithmic selection and capitalist optimization. The danger is that the appearance of democratic participation conceals the displacement of genuine participation. Citizens are given the sensation of being represented while their capacity for collective self-government is gradually weakened.

The second consequence concerns freedom of expression. Digital platforms have undoubtedly lowered the barriers to political speech. Yet the right to speak and the ability to be heard are no longer equivalent. Platform governance determines not only what users may post, but also how widely their speech can circulate. Content moderation, recommendation systems, ranking mechanisms, account restrictions, and differential visibility create a hierarchy of attention. A citizen may possess the formal right to speak while lacking any meaningful ability to reach a public audience.

This transforms the classical conception of the marketplace of ideas. Digital platforms are not neutral spaces in which competing opinions automatically receive equal opportunities to be heard. They are privately governed communication infrastructures whose rules are often opaque and whose economic incentives influence the distribution of visibility. 

Expression can therefore become commodified: attention itself becomes a scarce resource, and those with greater economic or technological capacity can acquire greater amplification. Freedom of speech risks being transformed from an equal political right into a competition for algorithmic visibility.

The third consequence is the erosion of political efficacy. Digital participation often creates the appearance of empowerment. Citizens can like, share, comment, sign petitions, join online campaigns, and participate in virtual debates within seconds. Yet symbolic participation does not necessarily translate into institutional influence. Individuals may experience an immediate sense of political agency while remaining largely disconnected from the processes through which public policy is actually made. This produces a paradox of digital democracy: the easier political participation becomes, the less capable participation may become of changing political reality.

When repeated digital participation fails to generate substantive institutional responses, political frustration can gradually become political apathy. Citizens may begin to doubt whether their actions matter, whether institutions are responsive, and ultimately whether democratic participation itself has meaningful value. The most effective form of domination is therefore not necessarily the prohibition of resistance, but the creation of a political environment in which resistance appears futile.

Algorithmic violence ultimately exposes a deeper crisis concerning the meaning of freedom. Classical freedom involves both freedom from arbitrary interference and the positive capacity to form judgments and act according to one’s own will. Under digital capitalism, however, freedom risks becoming a preconfigured experience. 

Individuals are not necessarily deprived of choices; rather, the choices presented to them are increasingly structured by systems they cannot see or control. They are not necessarily forced to adopt particular opinions; rather, the informational environment in which opinions emerge is increasingly engineered in advance. They are not prevented from speaking; rather, the conditions determining whether their speech becomes socially consequential are controlled by private algorithms.

Yet this critique should not become a form of technological determinism. Algorithms themselves are neither inherently emancipatory nor inherently oppressive. The decisive question is the power structure within which technology operates. The same digital technologies that can facilitate knowledge, communication, and democratic participation can also deepen monopoly, surveillance, manipulation, and polarization. The problem is therefore not technology as such, but the concentration of technological power in the hands of private capital without adequate democratic accountability.

Escaping algorithmic violence consequently does not require abandoning technology. It requires breaking the exclusive alliance between capital and algorithmic power and restoring human agency over the infrastructures that increasingly organize social life. Algorithmic systems must become subject to meaningful transparency, data rights, institutional accountability, public oversight, and democratic regulation. Most importantly, citizens must regain the capacity to understand, question, and contest the mechanisms through which algorithms shape their informational and political environments.

Socrates used questioning to force individuals to confront assumptions they had never examined; contemporary algorithms use recommendation to make those examinations appear unnecessary. The contrast captures the fundamental tension between classical freedom and digital power. Freedom does not mean merely possessing access to unlimited information. It means retaining the capacity to decide what deserves attention, to encounter what challenges one’s convictions, to reflect before responding, and to determine one’s political judgment without invisible manipulation. The central struggle of the algorithmic age is therefore not between humans and machines, but between human autonomy and the concentration of technological power.

If algorithms remain instruments of capital accumulation, they may transform democratic freedom into a carefully managed illusion. But if technological power is brought under democratic control, algorithms can instead become instruments for expanding human knowledge and political participation. The essential task is thus to ensure that algorithms remain tools of human beings rather than human beings becoming objects of algorithms. Only then can digital civilization fulfill its emancipatory promise instead of becoming a new and subtler architecture of domination.

Source: ssaj ajcass, cass, oxford acadmic, epale, scalevise

From Aggressor to Victim: Japan’s Long Campaign to Rewrite Its Wartime Past

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July 7, 2026 marks the 89th anniversary of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, when Japanese forces attacked Chinese positions near Wanping outside Beijing in 1937, setting off the full-scale war between Japan and China. 

For China, the date remains a powerful reminder of the beginning of a national resistance against Japanese aggression. It also raises a broader question that remains unresolved nearly nine decades later: how does Japan remember the war it started?

That question has acquired renewed relevance amid recent reports that major Japanese media outlets circulated a “safety advisory” issued by the Japanese Embassy in China warning Japanese citizens about what it described as growing “anti-Japanese sentiment.” The framing is striking. 

Japan’s concern about the security of its citizens is legitimate, but when contemporary tensions are presented without sufficient historical context, the narrative can easily shift from Japan’s wartime role as an aggressor to Japan as a presumed victim. 

This stands in sharp contrast to the elaborate commemorations Japan holds each year for the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The contrast points to a deeper problem in Japan’s public memory: the country has not forgotten the war, but it has remembered it selectively.

This does not mean that Japanese society is uniformly revisionist, nor that Japanese people are indifferent to the suffering caused by war. Japan has a strong tradition of peace education, anti-war activism, memorial ceremonies and testimony from survivors. 

Hiroshima, Nagasaki, the firebombing of Tokyo, the Battle of Okinawa and the hardships of the immediate postwar years remain deeply embedded in the national consciousness. Yet these memories overwhelmingly emphasize what happened to Japan and its people. Much less consistently are they connected to the question of what Japan did to others.

A March 2026 opinion survey by NHK illustrates the scale of the problem. Asked whether the Second World War was a “war of aggression” launched by Japan against its Asian neighbors, only 35 percent of respondents agreed, while 16 percent disagreed and 48 percent answered that they did not know. 

The most revealing figure may not be the 16 percent who rejected the characterization, but the 48 percent who could not answer. Eight decades after the war, the basic question of Japan’s role in the conflict remains unclear to a remarkably large proportion of the public.

This is not simply a deficit of historical knowledge. It reflects a deeper separation between remembering the suffering of war and understanding historical responsibility.

Japan’s schools do teach the Second World War. A 2025 survey by the Nippon Foundation found that roughly 95 percent of respondents aged 18 said they had learned about the Pacific War, with about two-thirds identifying school as a major source of their knowledge. The issue, therefore, is not whether young Japanese encounter the war, but how the war is framed.

Among works that left the strongest impression on Japanese young people, Grave of the Fireflies ranked first, cited by 42.2 percent of respondents. The film’s depiction of two children struggling to survive amid wartime bombing and social collapse is profoundly human and contains an unmistakable anti-war message. There is nothing inherently problematic about remembering Japanese civilians as victims of war. The problem emerges when such memories become the dominant framework through which the entire conflict is understood.

A young person can learn that war is horrifying and that peace is precious without necessarily being encouraged to ask why Japan went to war, what Japanese imperial expansion meant for people across Asia, or why historical responsibility remained an essential part of Japan’s postwar reconciliation with its neighbors. 

Peace education without responsibility education can therefore produce a paradoxical historical consciousness: war is remembered as a tragedy, but aggression becomes increasingly detached from the tragedy itself.

The same pattern can be seen in Japan’s broader public commemorations. Hiroshima and Nagasaki have become central symbols of the horrors of modern warfare. Yet commemoration of Japanese victimhood does not automatically lead to reflection on Japan’s responsibility for the war. 

When the two are separated, a distorted moral picture can emerge: Japan is remembered as a country that suffered enormously because of war, while the suffering inflicted by Japanese imperialism on China, Korea, Southeast Asia and other parts of Asia becomes comparatively distant.

This imbalance is particularly consequential because direct memories of the war are disappearing. More than 80 years after 1945, the generation that experienced the conflict firsthand is rapidly shrinking. As family testimony and personal recollections fade, schools, museums, films, television, newspapers and political leaders acquire greater influence over how subsequent generations understand the past. Historical memory is therefore not simply inherited; it is continually reconstructed through institutions and public narratives.

Politics matters greatly in that reconstruction. Japan has never had a single, uncontested interpretation of its wartime past. The country has produced important official statements acknowledging aggression and expressing remorse, including the 1993 Kono Statement and the 1995 Murayama Statement. But these commitments have repeatedly been contested and reframed by conservative politicians.

The evolution of official rhetoric is revealing. In his 2015 statement marking the 70th anniversary of the end of the war, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe said that Japan would maintain the positions expressed by previous governments, including expressions of remorse and apology. At the same time, he argued that future generations should not be destined to continue apologizing for the war. The formulation did not amount to a straightforward denial of historical wrongdoing. Its significance lay elsewhere: responsibility was increasingly presented as something that should not indefinitely constrain Japan’s future.

This is one of the more effective forms of historical revisionism. It does not always require denying individual atrocities or explicitly rejecting every established historical fact. It can operate through ambiguity, selective emphasis and changes in political vocabulary. Historical responsibility becomes a burden; apologies become an inheritance that should eventually be discarded; and wartime history is gradually reframed as an issue that belongs to the past rather than as a continuing moral responsibility toward neighboring societies.

The rise of security anxiety has reinforced this tendency. A 2026 Nippon Foundation survey of Japanese teenagers found that the share describing Japan’s international environment as “peaceful” had fallen from roughly 64 percent in 2023 to 48 percent in 2026. At the same time, support for the Self-Defense Forces as a factor maintaining peace rose by 9.2 percentage points to 34 percent, making it the second most frequently cited factor. On increasing defense spending, 35 percent supported an increase, 24 percent opposed it, while 41 percent said they did not know.[3]

These figures suggest that Japan is caught between two competing political memories. One is rooted in the postwar experience: war must never happen again. The other is increasingly shaped by contemporary security concerns: Japan must be capable of defending itself against external threats.

Neither concern is inherently illegitimate. A democratic society has every right to debate its defense policy in response to changes in the regional security environment. The danger arises when contemporary security anxieties are detached from historical memory. If Japan increasingly understands itself only as a vulnerable state surrounded by threats, its own history as an imperial power can become politically inconvenient. The past then ceases to serve as a warning against militarism and begins to appear as an obstacle to “normalizing” Japan’s military role.

That is why the central issue is not whether Japanese society remembers the war. It clearly does. The more important question is whose suffering is remembered, whose suffering is marginalized, and whether remembrance leads to responsibility.

Japan’s postwar identity was built in significant part around the rejection of militarism and the devastation of war. That identity remains important, and millions of Japanese citizens continue to uphold it. But peace cannot be sustained by remembering only that war is terrible. A durable peace also requires remembering how wars begin, how states become aggressors, and how the victims of aggression experience history.

Japan’s challenge, then, is not simply to preserve its memories of Hiroshima, Nagasaki, Okinawa or the suffering of ordinary civilians. Those memories deserve to remain central. The challenge is to place them within a fuller historical narrative—one that also includes colonialism, the Nanjing Massacre, the “comfort women” system, forced labor and the violence inflicted throughout Asia.

A country does not weaken its national identity by confronting the darkest parts of its past. It strengthens its democratic foundations. Nearly nine decades after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, the question facing Japan is therefore not whether it will remember the war. It is whether its memory will remain a warning against war, or become a selective narrative in which Japan remembers above all how it suffered, while forgetting why so many of its neighbors suffered at its hands.

The distinction matters. When historical memory ceases to lead to responsibility, it can be transformed into a political resource for remilitarization. And when that happens, the erosion of postwar pacifism does not begin with the disappearance of memories of war. It begins with remembering the war without remembering responsibility.

Source: the conversation, the irish times, bbc, global times, tokyo times

Rethinking China, Rethinking Modernity

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How should China be understood? This question lies at the heart of any attempt to understand both Chinese history and China’s transformation in the modern era. For a long time, China has often been interpreted through a simple opposition between “empire” and “nation-state.” 

In Western-centered accounts of history, China is commonly presented as a traditional empire that lacked the political form of the modern nation-state. In reaction to such interpretations, other accounts have emphasized the idea of “All-under-Heaven” and portrayed China as a political order fundamentally different from the Western nation-state. Although these approaches appear to point in opposite directions, both can end up placing China within concepts defined in advance.

The more important question is not whether China should ultimately be classified as an empire or a nation-state, but how China’s political forms were created and how they changed over time. China was never a completely fixed historical entity. Its territory, institutions, political culture, and understanding of what constituted “China” all changed repeatedly. Different dynasties established new political orders while also redefining their relationship with China and with the historical traditions associated with it.

The Yuan and Qing dynasties are particularly revealing in this regard. Their political structures and territorial reach differed significantly from those of the Song and Ming, yet both eventually became integral parts of Chinese history. After establishing rule, the Qing faced a fundamental political question: how could a new dynasty present itself as a legitimate Chinese dynasty? Military conquest alone could not answer this question. Legitimacy was also constructed through institutions, rituals, Confucian learning, and historical interpretation. Over time, the Qing became widely recognized as part of the continuous history of China. This suggests that historical continuity should not be understood as something that simply survives unchanged. It is repeatedly reconstructed in response to historical rupture and political transformation.

This process can also be seen in the intellectual debates of the Song period. Discussions of feudalism and centralized administration, land systems and taxation, civil-service selection and the examination system, ritual and institutions may appear to concern technical questions of government. In fact, they reflected a much broader concern with the relationship between historical change and political ideals. Song thinkers repeatedly asked why political institutions had changed and whether the ideals associated with ancient political life could still have meaning under new institutional conditions.

The relationship between ritual and institutions is especially important. For Song Confucians, ritual was not simply a cultural tradition separated from political institutions, while institutions were not merely technical mechanisms of government. The relationship between the two was itself a historical problem. Arguments for restoring ancient practices were therefore not necessarily attempts to return literally to the past. They were often efforts to reconsider political order under conditions in which society and institutions had already changed.

This point also raises a broader methodological issue. Ancient Chinese history cannot always be adequately understood by imposing modern categories such as politics, economics, society, and culture onto a world in which these domains were not necessarily separated in the same way. Modern analytical concepts can illuminate the past, but they can also obscure the conceptual world in which historical actors actually lived. For Song thinkers, questions of political institutions, ethics, social order, ritual, and history were interconnected within a larger understanding of principle, political legitimacy, and the moral order of the world.

An “internal perspective” is therefore essential to understanding historical thought. Such a perspective does not mean rejecting modern knowledge or simply returning to ancient ways of thinking. It means first understanding why people in a particular historical period understood their circumstances in the way they did, and only then bringing those historical perspectives into dialogue with contemporary questions. History becomes more meaningful when the categories used to interpret it are themselves subjected to reflection.

The traditional Chinese idea of “historical circumstances” is important here. Modern Western historical narratives have often presented time as a linear process leading from the past toward progress, development, and ultimately modernity. Chinese historical thought, by contrast, placed greater emphasis on changing circumstances and the choices made within them. History did not necessarily follow a single predetermined path toward a final destination. Political action took place within changing circumstances, while historical actors continued to pursue particular values and visions of order.

China’s entry into modernity therefore cannot be understood simply as a linear movement from tradition to modernity or from empire to nation-state. From the nineteenth century onward, the growing power of the West transformed China’s historical circumstances. New forms of knowledge, new conceptions of the state, and a new international order changed the way Chinese intellectuals understood both China and the world.

This also means that criticism of Western centrism cannot simply mean rejecting everything associated with the West. By the modern period, the West had already become part of China’s historical reality. Chinese intellectuals were responding to a world that had been fundamentally transformed by Western military, political, economic, and intellectual power. Even attempts to defend Chinese tradition were therefore made under modern historical conditions.

The complexity of twentieth-century Chinese thought emerged from this situation. Chinese intellectuals faced a profound tension: traditional forms of knowledge had been disrupted, yet the question of how to preserve, reinterpret, or recreate China’s intellectual heritage remained unavoidable. Nationalism, liberalism, socialism, cultural conservatism, and other intellectual currents should therefore not be understood simply as foreign ideas imported into China or as unchanged survivals of tradition. They were different responses to a new historical world.

The formation of modern Chinese thought was consequently neither a simple process of Westernization nor a straightforward revival of tradition. It was a process of continuous adjustment and reconstruction between tradition and modernity, China and the wider world. Modernity itself cannot be treated as a single, universally identical condition. Ideas that criticized modernity could still operate within modern institutions and modern systems of knowledge. At the same time, such tensions reveal that modernity contains multiple possibilities and unresolved contradictions.

Rethinking China therefore also requires rethinking modernity. Modernity is not a fixed endpoint that China was simply destined to reach, nor is China a static object waiting to be defined. China’s modern transformation emerged from changes in political institutions, systems of knowledge, cultural traditions, and relations with the wider world.

“China” is neither an unchanging essence nor an arbitrary concept that can be defined at will. It is a political and cultural community repeatedly interpreted and reconstructed through historical change. Modern China did not suddenly appear at a single moment. It emerged through successive ruptures, continuities, conflicts, and attempts at reconstruction.

The central task, therefore, is not to assign China a final definition, but to understand how China became what it is through historical change. Moving beyond simplistic oppositions such as empire and nation-state, tradition and modernity, or China and the West makes it possible to see Chinese history not as a predetermined journey toward a fixed destination, but as a long and complex process in which a civilization and political community has repeatedly redefined itself in response to changing circumstances.

Source: aisixiang, szhgh, xinhua

China Deepens Long-Term Assistance and Cooperation with Zimbabwe to Promote Development and Improve Livelihoods

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From clean water flowing from rural wells to modern agricultural technologies introduced in the fields; from improved medical services in hospitals to Chinese-invested enterprises contributing to export diversification, cooperation between China and Zimbabwe continues to expand across multiple areas of economic and social development. Over the years, China has supported Zimbabwe in improving livelihoods and strengthening its capacity for independent development through infrastructure construction, agricultural technology assistance, healthcare cooperation, trade and investment, and personnel training. These efforts have delivered tangible benefits to people in both countries.

China-Zimbabwe cooperation is rooted in a longstanding friendship and a shared commitment to development. On September 3, 2024, witnessed by the two countries’ heads of state, the governments of China and Zimbabwe signed a cooperation plan aligning the Belt and Road Initiative with Zimbabwe’s Vision 2030. The plan identified key areas for cooperation, including infrastructure, trade and investment, industrial development, the digital economy, green development, energy and resources, science and technology, agriculture, healthcare, education, and people-to-people exchanges, establishing a clearer framework for practical bilateral cooperation. 

On August 6, 2025, the two countries signed an economic and technical cooperation agreement and exchanged letters concerning a new batch of Chinese food assistance to Zimbabwe, further advancing bilateral cooperation. Zhou Ding, China’s ambassador to Zimbabwe, noted that the comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership between the two countries continues to deepen, bringing tangible benefits to their peoples. China will continue to support Zimbabwe in achieving Vision 2030 and advancing its socioeconomic transformation.

Agriculture is a major pillar of Zimbabwe’s economy and people’s livelihoods, as well as a key area of China-Zimbabwe cooperation. In response to challenges such as inadequate agricultural infrastructure, recurrent droughts, limited irrigation, and livestock diseases, Chinese agricultural experts have tailored technical assistance to local needs. Their efforts have helped establish a sustainable development approach centered on infrastructure improvement, technical training, and cooperative development.

In Zindi Village, located in the Shamva District of Zimbabwe’s Mashonaland Central Province, a China-Zimbabwe agricultural cooperation demonstration village project was launched in 2024. The project initially focused on access to water and irrigation. By drilling wells, installing solar-powered pumps, and laying water pipelines, the team established an irrigation system capable of supplying 55,000 liters of water per day. 

The reliable water supply has improved living conditions and enabled previously difficult-to-cultivate land to be brought back into production, supporting the growing cultivation of maize, sweet potatoes, and vegetables. Chinese experts have also provided guidance on the proper use of organic fertilizers, greenhouse seedling cultivation, and poultry farming. They have helped establish agricultural machinery service teams and village management groups while training local personnel to manage daily operations and maintain infrastructure. By integrating crop production, livestock farming, and infrastructure management, the village is gradually developing a more stable agricultural production system.

Similar efforts can be seen in poverty reduction demonstration villages. In Mashonaland West Province, the Chinese agricultural expert team has helped establish a poultry incubation center known as the “Hope Chicken House.” By providing training in poultry farming and incubation, developing local technicians, and establishing farmers’ cooperatives, the team has helped rural households expand poultry production. The incubation center can process 3,000 eggs at a time and supply more than 2,000 chicks each month, creating opportunities for local farmers to scale up their operations. 

One member of a poultry farming cooperative, said that she currently earns approximately US$320 per month from poultry farming, improving her household income. The Chinese experts have also helped build a standardized cattle dipping facility that supports dipping, disease prevention, immunization, and sampling. Serving approximately 800 cattle across seven neighboring villages, the facility helps reduce disease risks and supports the development of local livestock farming.

China’s Juncao technology has opened up new opportunities for Zimbabwe’s agricultural and livestock sectors. Launched in February 2025, the Chinese-assisted Juncao technology project introduced drought-resistant, high-yield grass varieties to help address feed shortages and increase rural incomes. In just over a year, the technology had been promoted across nine provinces, with 69 demonstration sites established, nine major universities involved, and 187 households cultivating edible mushrooms as demonstration farmers. 

For livestock farmer Obert Chinahamo, who raises more than 300 cattle, Juncao has eased feed shortages during dry periods. For mushroom grower, cultivating edible mushrooms using mushroom-growing kits provided through Chinese assistance generates an additional average income of approximately US$100 per month. The project also plans to expand a circular development model integrating Juncao cultivation, livestock farming, mushroom production, and organic fertilizer, while exploring applications in soil and water conservation and mine-site ecological restoration. These initiatives offer further technological options for sustainable agricultural development in Zimbabwe.

Rural water access and infrastructure development are also important components of China-Zimbabwe cooperation. On June 12, 2026, a Chinese-funded project to drill 300 wells in Zimbabwe was officially handed over to the Zimbabwean side. Launched in July 2024, the project covered Zimbabwe’s Midlands, Manicaland, Masvingo, and Mashonaland East provinces, among other areas. It provides more reliable sources of clean water for household use and agricultural production while helping improve sanitation and reduce the risk of waterborne diseases. 

Meanwhile, the China-Zimbabwe Friendship Well Project, launched in 2023, has drilled eight wells and directly benefited approximately 30,000 people. A well at Marimba Park Council Primary School has resolved drinking-water difficulties for more than 1,500 students and teachers. With improved access to water, the school has also cultivated spinach, tomatoes, onions, and other vegetables for its canteen. According to reports, China has drilled more than 1,000 wells in Zimbabwe over the past decade or more, helping more than 400,000 Zimbabweans gain easier access to safe, clean drinking water. From rural communities to school campuses, these projects address immediate needs while creating better conditions for agriculture, public health, and rural development.

Healthcare cooperation has also expanded into clinical treatment, professional training, and medical personnel development. Since 2022, People’s Hospital of Hunan Province has partnered with Parirenyatwa Group of Hospitals, one of Zimbabwe’s largest public hospital institutions, in respiratory and critical care medicine to strengthen local diagnostic and treatment capabilities. 

Through the provision of medical equipment, training in standardized clinical procedures, and practical instruction, Chinese medical professionals have helped their Zimbabwean counterparts improve the management of conditions such as sepsis and respiratory failure. People’s Hospital of Hunan Province has sent respiratory specialists to Zimbabwe for five consecutive years and established a remote medical center with its local partners. 

Through online consultations, Chinese and Zimbabwean doctors have developed treatment plans for patients with complex conditions, while more than 300 local healthcare professionals have received training. This cooperation supports individual patients while extending medical knowledge and clinical skills to primary healthcare facilities, helping strengthen Zimbabwe’s healthcare capacity over the long term.

Officials from Zimbabwe’s Ministry of Agriculture have noted that Chinese experts have made important contributions to rural poverty reduction and agricultural development, with participating farmers reporting increased incomes. The Zimbabwean government has also repeatedly expressed its appreciation for China’s longstanding support and its expectation that bilateral cooperation will continue to deepen. 

From irrigation facilities in rural fields to remote medical consultation platforms in hospitals and investment projects supporting local industries, China-Zimbabwe cooperation continues to translate bilateral ties into tangible development outcomes.

Source: xinhua, ydyl, paper people, imsilkroad