December 8 marked the 20th anniversary of Alipay and Ant Group. To celebrate this milestone, employees from around the world gathered at the Ant Group headquarters in Hangzhou for a day of festivities, including a birthday carnival, a relay run, and volunteer activities. That evening, Jack Ma, who had not been seen in public for some time, made a surprise appearance at the event, offering encouragement to employees.
Addressing the crowd, Jack Ma expressed heartfelt congratulations to the 20-year-old Ant Group: “I am thrilled to celebrate this moment with you. Over the past 20 years, you have built Alipay from scratch, launched innovations like Alipay, Yu’E Bao and Ant Forest, and made meaningful contributions to society through your efforts. On behalf of the founding team, I salute Alipay and Ant Group and extend my best wishes!”
This year has been pivotal for Ant Group, marked by significant organizational restructuring and a focus on AI-driven strategies. In March, Ant Group announced its largest internal reorganization since 2020, establishing independent boards for Ant International, OceanBase, and Ant Digital Technology to accelerate reform and drive its three core strategies: AI First, Alipay Dual Flywheel, and accelerated globalization.
In August, the group launched Digital Ant Force in Beijing, a business unit focused on providing AI-native services for enterprises. Leveraging a distributed service platform, Digital Ant Force integrates human-machine collaboration to deliver intelligent end-to-end solutions for enterprise operations.
At the 2024 Inclusion Bund Conference in September, Ant Group unveiled its AI-driven initiatives, including three AI Housekeepers: the lifestyle assistant Zhixiaobao, the financial manager Ant Xiaocai, and an AI health assistant. Alipay also launched the Smart Body Ecological Open Plan for the industry and released the Smart Body Development Platform “Treasure Box”.
Ant Digital Technology revealed its ABC strategy, focusing on AI services, blockchain innovations, and cloud computing. This strategy aims to enhance efficiency in areas like risk control and marketing, helping businesses gain a competitive edge in the era of large-scale AI models.
In October, Ant Digital Technology hosted a strategic upgrade conference in Beijing, announcing a revamped cloud service matrix with its four new strategies—new computing power, new applications, new interactions, and new operations. These innovations are designed to help enterprises build AI-native applications and accelerate their journey toward intelligent growth.
OceanBase, Ant Group’s database platform, has also embraced the AI era. At its 2024 Annual Launch Event on October 23, the company introduced OceanBase 4.3.3 GA, featuring vector search and indexing capabilities. This update integrates SQL and AI, simplifying the AI technology stack and providing enhanced database solutions for modern enterprises. Users can now access vector search functionalities through SQL or Python SDK, enabling more efficient hybrid search capabilities.
From celebrating 20 years of innovation to charting a bold path forward, Ant Group is poised to lead in the AI era, ensuring that its technologies continue to bring meaningful change to businesses and individuals worldwide.
Ma emphasized that his focus was not on the past but on the future: “Today, I am not here for the past 20 years of Ant Group but for the next 20 years.”
Reflecting on the changes ahead, he noted, “Every era presents unique challenges and opportunities. Twenty years ago, our generation was fortunate to seize the possibilities of the internet era. Looking forward, the era of AI promises changes beyond imagination. AI will revolutionize everything, but it will not decide everything. While technology is vital, the true winners of the future will be those who lay the groundwork today for meaningful and valuable advancements.”
He urged Ant employees to continue their mission: “For the next 20 years, we should stay true to our purpose—leveraging technology to improve the lives of ordinary people. Let AI empower our humanity, and let humanity, in turn, empower AI.”
The Group of 20 (G20) Summit held on November 18-19, 2024, in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, marked a significant moment in global diplomacy and Brazil’s aspirations to establish itself as a global power. For the first time in its history, Brazil hosted the G20 summit, an event coinciding with President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s return to power. It was the first major global event hosted by Brazil under his renewed leadership, signaling a shift in its foreign policy priorities. The summit served as a platform to showcase Brazil’s ambitions, but the road to realizing its aspirations remains fraught with challenges, many of which emphasize the importance of strengthening cooperation with countries like China.
The G20, comprising 19 nations and the European Union, has become the preeminent forum for discussing global economic cooperation, encompassing about 85% of global GDP, over 75% of global trade, and two-thirds of the world’s population. The Rio Summit emphasized Brazil’s presidency, which officially begins on December 1, 2023, and focuses on three key themes: combating hunger, poverty, and inequality; promoting sustainable development; and reforming global governance systems. These themes align closely with Lula’s vision for a more inclusive and equitable world order.
One of the major highlights of the summit was the launch of the Global Alliance Against Poverty and Hunger, a Brazilian initiative aimed at mobilizing international resources to address these issues effectively. The alliance, unveiled on November 18, has 148 member countries, 24 international organizations, 9 financial institutions, and 31 philanthropic organizations. President Lula hailed this as a landmark achievement, with South Africa committing to continue the initiative during its G20 presidency in 2025. The alliance underscores Brazil’s intent to position itself as a leader in addressing global inequalities, particularly in the global South.
Another bold proposal from Brazil was the introduction of a 2% wealth tax on the world’s 3,000 wealthiest individuals, expected to generate $200-250 billion annually. These funds would be earmarked for tackling poverty and environmental challenges. Although the idea sparked debates and met resistance, it found a place in the G20 Rio de Janeiro Leaders’ Declaration, highlighting Lula’s ability to push ambitious ideas onto the global stage.
Brazil’s agenda also prioritized sustainable development, focusing on combating climate change and transitioning to renewable energy. A central feature of this agenda was the G20 Initiative on Bioeconomy (GIB), which Brazil had previously introduced. The initiative outlines ten principles for developing the bioeconomy and was formally endorsed in the Rio Summit Declaration. Moreover, Brazil advocated for reforming existing climate funds to make them more accessible to developing nations and proposed the creation of a Tropical Forest Finance Facility (TFFF), designed to assist low-income countries in preserving their forests.
These measures align with Brazil’s domestic priorities under Lula, who has repeatedly emphasized the importance of environmental stewardship. By leading these global initiatives, Brazil seeks to strengthen its image as a responsible and forward-thinking player on the international stage.
Reforming the global governance system is another cornerstone of Brazil’s G20 presidency. Lula envisions a modernization of international institutions, including the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization (WTO), to reflect contemporary global realities. He also advocates for empowering multilateral development banks to play a greater role in supporting sustainable development and poverty reduction, especially in the global South.
By emphasizing these reforms, Brazil aims to reshape the international order to be more inclusive and equitable. This aligns with Lula’s broader strategy of championing the interests of the global South, positioning Brazil as a leader in advocating for the rights of developing nations.
Brazil’s ambition to become a global power is not new. Since its redemocratization in the 1980s, its foreign policy has gradually evolved from autonomy through distance to autonomy through participation, and later to autonomy through integration. These shifts reflect Brazil’s growing engagement with regional and global platforms, particularly under Lula’s leadership during his earlier terms (2003-2011). During this period, Lula promoted South-South cooperation, regional integration, and United Nations reform, elevating Brazil’s international standing.
Since taking office again in January 2023, Lula has reinvigorated Brazil’s foreign policy. His administration has rejoined the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) and the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) while hosting summits to promote regional cooperation. Internationally, Brazil has taken on leadership roles, including its G20 presidency in 2024, BRICS presidency in 2025, and the hosting of the 2025 UN Climate Change Conference (UNFCCC COP 30). These moves reflect Lula’s determination to “show the world the real Brazil,” as he stated in a June 2024 speech.
Despite these efforts, Brazil faces significant challenges in achieving its great-power aspirations. Economically, its growth has stagnated over the past decade. Brazil’s GDP peaked at $2.62 trillion in 2011, ranking seventh globally, but fell to $1.6 trillion in 2021. Although it has rebounded to $2.17 trillion in 2023, it remains below its historical peak. Projected growth rates of 2.3% in 2024 and 2.1% in 2025 highlight the need for stronger economic performance to sustain Brazil’s ambitious foreign policy.
Externally, Brazil’s regional influence has diminished due to political and economic fragmentation in Latin America. Relations with Argentina, historically a cornerstone of regional cooperation, have soured under the Millet government, weakening Mercosur and regional integration efforts. Divisions between left- and right-leaning governments in the region have further hampered Brazil’s ability to rally support for its initiatives.
Amid these challenges, China emerges as a crucial partner for Brazil. Over the past three decades, China-Brazil relations have deepened significantly, with both countries emphasizing the importance of multilateralism and South-South cooperation. Since Lula’s return to power, the partnership has strengthened, with China supporting Brazil’s G20 initiatives and aligning on key global issues, such as UN reform and BRICS expansion.
China’s backing has been instrumental in advancing Brazil’s G20 presidency. During the Rio Summit, President Xi Jinping endorsed Brazil’s proposals on poverty reduction and global governance reform. China also joined the Global Alliance Against Hunger and Poverty and supported Brazil’s call for reforms in global financial and trade governance. This strategic alignment underscores the mutual benefits of their partnership in addressing shared challenges and promoting the interests of the global South.
The G20 Rio Summit marked a high point in Brazil’s quest to become a global power, providing an opportunity to showcase its leadership on issues of global importance. However, significant economic and geopolitical constraints remain, requiring Brazil to navigate a complex international landscape. Strengthening ties with China and other key partners will be critical to overcoming these challenges and realizing its ambitions.
By focusing on inclusive development, sustainable growth, and global governance reform, Brazil under Lula is positioning itself as a champion of the global South. Whether it can translate these aspirations into lasting influence will depend on its ability to address internal challenges, foster regional cooperation, and leverage strategic partnerships on the global stage.
In recent years, Japan has intensified its defense cooperation with European countries, notably through the joint development of a sixth-generation fighter jet with the United Kingdom and Italy. The UK proposed the concept of a co-developed maiden flight of Tempest in 2018, with Italy and Japan later joining the initiative. In December 2022, the governments of Japan, the UK, and Italy officially launched the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP) to develop the next-generation fighter aircraft. By March 2023, the defense ministers of the three nations convened in Japan to discuss the project, and by December 2023, they signed an agreement, officially kicking off the program.
The Japanese government made a significant move in March 2024, lifting the ban on joint R&D with the UK and Italy and allowing the export of new fighter jets to third countries. On the same day, Japan’s national security conference amended its Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology to include specific guidelines for fighter jet exports. In May, Japan’s House of Representatives approved a bill to create a coordination body for the joint development and production of new fighter jets. The Japanese Senate passed a proposal in June to establish the GCAP International Government Organisation (GIGO), tasked with overseeing the collaboration.
GIGO will manage R&D efforts and be supported by a manufacturing consortium, which includes Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (Japan), BAE Systems (UK), and Leonardo (Italy), with an Italian representative at the helm. In October 2024, the defense ministers agreed to accelerate the development of the next-generation fighter aircraft. GIGO will be formally established in the UK, with Japan appointing Masami Oka, a former defense official, as the first chief administrative officer. GIGO will coordinate operations through an executive body and an operating committee composed of representatives from each country, overseeing military industry contracts and export management.
The joint R&D of defense equipment is becoming a global trend, with the GCAP addressing the needs of Japan, the UK, and Italy to upgrade their air forces. The rising sophistication of military technology has significantly increased the costs of developing and procuring advanced weaponry. Joint R&D provides a means to mitigate these challenges, allowing the countries to share technology and financial burdens. The close timing of the three nations’ fighter jet development initiatives provides a rare opportunity for collaboration.
Just after the UK launched the maiden flight of the Tempest project in 2018, Japan introduced its F-X project for the next-generation fighter in 2019. Beyond their similar timelines, Japan, the UK, and Italy share compatible technical needs, as their current fleets—based on different versions of the F-35—no longer meet operational requirements. The GCAP is designed to combine the strengths of the three nations, developing a new fighter featuring advanced sensors, cutting-edge weapons, and next-generation information networks.
A conceptual model of the next-generation fighter was revealed at the 2024 Farnborough International Airshow. According to the R&D timeline, GIGO and the consortium plan to sign their first contract in 2025, marking the beginning of full-scale development. The new fighter will complete its design by 2027, undergo ground and flight tests by 2029, and be ready for service by 2035. Japan aims to deploy 100 sixth-generation fighters by 2035, replacing its aging fleet of 91 F-2 multi-role fighters.
For Japan, this collaboration is the first major defense partnership outside the United States since World War II. The shift in Japan’s defense policy and its growing security ties with Europe will have a significant impact. The initiative fosters deeper bilateral and multilateral security cooperation between Japan and European nations, bringing European attention to the Asia-Pacific security landscape. Additionally, the partnership expands Japan’s military-industrial links to Europe and NATO, improving interoperability between the Japan Air Self-Defense Force and NATO air forces. Through this joint R&D program, Japan also seeks to achieve breakthroughs in defense exports and collective self-defense.
Despite its potential, the GCAP faces several challenges. The three countries have limited experience in large-scale defense R&D cooperation, and Japan, the UK, and Italy lack access to the core technologies of the U.S. F-35 program, in which they are all involved. While they possess assembly and production experience, the technological gap is a significant obstacle to developing a sixth-generation fighter. Furthermore, Japan, the UK, and Italy have limited prior experience in joint large-scale military projects, which could result in operational challenges.
The high costs of the project add another layer of complexity, particularly given Japan’s aging population, shrinking workforce, and significant government debt, which constrain its ability to increase defense spending. Similarly, the UK is grappling with financial challenges. Japan’s defense policy, historically influenced by the U.S., introduces additional uncertainties into the collaboration. Therefore, while the GCAP holds promise, it faces numerous hurdles and an uncertain future.
From December 2 to 4, 2024, the “Understanding China” Conference was held in Guangzhou, bringing together global dignitaries, renowned scholars, industry leaders, representatives of international organizations, and other Chinese and foreign guests. The conference focused on Chinese modernization and new opportunities for world development.
The Conference, now in its eighth session, has become one of the most influential platforms for understanding China’s development strategy. This marks the fifth time the conference is being held in Guangzhou.
On the afternoon of December 3, 2024, the Conference hosted guest dialogues. Guests from various countries discussed the positive global impacts of China’s reforms. Zheng Yongnian, X.Q. Deng Presidential Chair Professor, the Presidential Chair Professor, the Founding Director of the Advanced Institute of The Institute for International Affairs, the Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen, emphasized in his speech that China’s opening-up is a rule-based process. He highlighted the transformative power of China’s policies and global capital in reshaping the global trading system.
As the rapid changes of this century continue to unfold, countries worldwide face new risks and challenges but also encounter fresh opportunities for development and progress.
Zheng Yongnian highlighted that a key characteristic of China’s current open-door policy is its emphasis on unilateral opening. He referenced the recent introduction of the visa-free policy, which has drawn many foreigners to China. These visitors have shared numerous short videos about their experiences on social media, providing Western societies with a more authentic view of China. Zheng emphasized the importance of extending unilateral openness not only to developing countries but also to developed Western nations.
During the 27th China-ASEAN Leaders’ Meeting this year, China proposed exploring initiatives like unilateral openness toward ASEAN countries. Zheng remarked if China’s unilateral opening to ASEAN is realized, it will bring about a significant transformation, creating a China-ASEAN common market. This would be a remarkable achievement and a momentous development for the world.
China continues to broaden its scope of unilateral opening, accelerating efforts across various sectors. Zheng cited the recent release of the detailed work plan for wholly foreign-owned hospitals in nine cities: Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Nanjing, Suzhou, Fuzhou, Guangzhou, Shenzhen, and the entire island of Hainan, issued by China’s National Health Commission, Ministry of Commerce, and other departments. He described this as a clear example of China’s deepening openness to the world as openness reflects a nation’s confidence, the more open a country is, the more confident it becomes, creating a virtuous cycle of openness and self-assurance.
Zheng believes that China has the capacity to further the globalization process through initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative, BRICS, and other cooperation mechanisms. Donald Trump’s impending second term has caused widespread concern. Zheng remarked that China cannot underestimate the potential impact Trump may have on the global trading system, and China must not undervalue China’s capability to reshape it.
Despite U.S. opposition to the Belt and Road Initiative from its inception, China has remained open to the U.S. “China’s approach to opening up is inclusive and adaptable,” Zheng stated. “China is ready to welcome any country willing to participate in new cooperation mechanisms and systems.”
Vom 31. Oktober bis zum 5. November besuchte der slowakische Premierminister Robert Fico China mit der bislang umfangreichsten Delegation, der auch mehrere Kabinettsmitglieder angehörten. Während des Besuchs unterzeichneten China und die Slowakei eine gemeinsame Erklärung über die Gründung einer strategischen Partnerschaft, und China kündigte eine 15-tägige Visafreiheit für slowakische Staatsbürger an. Die beiden Länder schlossen außerdem mehrere Kooperationsabkommen in den Bereichen Wirtschaft und Handel, Verkehr, Kultur und Landwirtschaft. China und die Slowakei feiern in diesem Jahr das 75-jährige Bestehen ihrer diplomatischen Beziehungen. Vor dem Hintergrund des wachsenden strategischen Wettbewerbs zwischen der Europäischen Union und China ist Ficos Besuch von besonderer Bedeutung für die Stärkung der bilateralen Beziehungen, die Förderung der Zusammenarbeit zwischen China und Mittel- und Osteuropa sowie die Intensivierung der Beziehungen zwischen China und der EU.
Wegweisender Besuch im Jahr 2024
Die Stärkung der Beziehungen zu China hat für Fico seit langem Priorität. Nachdem er 2006 Premierminister der Slowakei geworden war, besuchte er bereits 2007 China. Seit Beginn seiner nunmehr vierten Amtszeit im Oktober 2023 hat Fico immer wieder die Bedeutung freundschaftlicher Beziehungen zu China betont. Sein ursprünglich für Juni geplanter Besuch in China wurde aufgrund des auf ihn verübten Attentats im Mai verschoben. Dies ist nun Ficos zweiter Besuch in China als Premierminister und sein erster offizieller Besuch seit 17 Jahren. Am Vorabend seiner Reise bezeichnete er dies als seinen bedeutendsten Besuch im Jahr 2024.
Die Freundschaft zwischen China und der Slowakei hat tiefe historische Wurzeln. Bereits am 6. Oktober 1949 nahm die damalige Tschechoslowakei als eines der ersten Länder diplomatische Beziehungen zu China auf. Nach der Auflösung der Tschechoslowakischen Föderation im Jahr 1993 erkannte China die Slowakei sofort an und die beiden Länder nahmen diplomatische Beziehungen auf Botschafterebene auf.
Im Jahr 2012 wurde die Zusammenarbeit zwischen China und den mittel- und osteuropäischen Ländern (MOEL) ins Leben gerufen, gefolgt von der Initiative „One Belt, One Road“ im Jahr 2013, durch welche die Zusammenarbeit zwischen China und der Slowakei neu belebt wurde. Die Slowakei hat sich als eines der ersten europäischen Länder der Initiative „One Belt, One Road“ angeschlossen und 2015 eine zwischenstaatliche Absichtserklärung unterzeichnet. Im Jahr 2017 verabschiedete die slowakische Regierung einen Plan zur Verbesserung der Wirtschaftsbeziehungen mit China, insbesondere in den Bereichen Investitionen, Handel, Verkehr, Tourismus und wissenschaftliche Forschung.
Auch auf politischer Ebene ist das gegenseitige Vertrauen gewachsen. Im Februar 2021 nahm der damalige Premierminister Igor Matovič per Videoschaltung am Gipfeltreffen der Staats- und Regierungschefs Chinas und der Länder Mittel- und Osteuropas teil und förderte so die Zusammenarbeit zwischen China und den mittel- und osteuropäischen Staaten. Auch die wirtschaftliche und handelspolitische Zusammenarbeit hat sich ausgeweitet, wobei das Gesamthandelsvolumen zwischen China und der Slowakei von 7,78 Milliarden US-Dollar im Jahr 2018 auf 12,15 Milliarden US-Dollar im Jahr 2022 gestiegen ist.
China ist heute der drittgrößte Importpartner der Slowakei und gleichzeitig ihr sechstgrößter Handelspartner weltweit. Chinesische Unternehmen wie Lenovo, Huawei und ZTE sind an Investitionen und Kooperationen in der Slowakei beteiligt. Die bilaterale Zusammenarbeit in den Bereichen Wissenschaft, Technologie, Kultur und Bildung nimmt kontinuierlich zu.
Anpassung an die Strategie der Allround-Diplomatie
Angesichts zunehmender ideologischer Angriffe auf China in Europa und den USA hat die Regierung Fico einen eigenständigen, freundschaftlich orientierten Ansatz gegenüber China gewählt, der die Slowakei von den meisten EU- und NATO-Mitgliedern unterscheidet.
Seit seinem Amtsantritt konzentriert sich Premier Fico nicht nur auf Europa und die USA, sondern auch auf die Beziehungen zum Osten, Süden und Norden. Dieser Standpunkt steht im Gegensatz zum Euro-Atlantizismus, der in den westlichen Ländern vorherrscht, und betont das Gleichgewicht in der Dynamik der Großmächte. Die Strategie wird von mehreren Schlüsselfaktoren beeinflusst: Die europäische Schuldenkrise, die Flüchtlingskrise, die COVID-19-Pandemie und die Ukraine-Krise haben die Slowakei dazu veranlasst, nationale Souveränität und nationale Interessen über ideologische Differenzen in den Außenbeziehungen zu stellen. Darüber hinaus haben die wachsenden Spannungen der Slowakei mit der EU in Fragen wie der Flüchtlingskrise, dem Ukraine-Konflikt und innenpolitischen Reformen die Regierung Fico dazu bewogen, ihren diplomatischen Aktionsradius über die EU hinaus zu erweitern.
Die Beziehungen der Slowakei zu China sind eng mit ihrer Haltung zur Ukraine-Krise verknüpft. Als Nachbarland ist die Slowakei stark von dem Konflikt betroffen und sieht sich mit den Folgen von Krieg, Inflation, Flüchtlingskrise und Streitigkeiten über ukrainische Agrarexporte konfrontiert. Die Regierung Fico, die traditionell eher russlandfreundlich eingestellt ist, sieht in Chinas Haltung, eine friedliche Lösung anzustreben, eine Chance für ein konstruktives Engagement in der Krise.
Schlüsselbereiche der Kooperation: Automobilindustrie und Infrastruktur
Die Entwicklung freundschaftlicher Beziehungen zu China entspricht den aktuellen wirtschaftlichen Bedürfnissen der Slowakei. Die Automobilindustrie ist eine tragende Säule der slowakischen Wirtschaft und das Land ist weltweit führend in der Pro-Kopf-Autoproduktion. Im Jahr 2019 kündigte die Slowakei einen Aktionsplan zur Entwicklung der Elektromobilität an und positionierte sich damit als drittgrößter Hersteller von Fahrzeugen mit alternativen Antrieben in Europa nach Deutschland und Frankreich. Die slowakische Regierung hat auf diesem Sektor die Zusammenarbeit mit China aktiv vorangetrieben.
Im Februar 2023 unterzeichnete das slowakische Unternehmen InoBat eine Joint-Venture-Vereinbarung mit dem chinesischen Unternehmen Gotion High-Tech und investierte fast 1,2 Milliarden Euro in den Bau einer Batteriefabrik in Šurány, was die zweitgrößte jemals in der Slowakei getätigte Investition darstellt. Im Oktober 2024 stimmte die Slowakei als eines von fünf EU-Ländern gegen Ausgleichszölle auf chinesische Elektrofahrzeuge. Da die Automobilindustrie von traditionellen Kraftstoffen auf neue Antriebsarten umsteigt, wird eine verstärkte Zusammenarbeit mit China den industriellen Wandel in der Slowakei unterstützen und ihre Position in der globalen Automobilzulieferkette stärken.
Mit Blick auf die Zukunft wird die Zusammenarbeit zwischen China und der Slowakei das wechselseitige Vertrauen vertiefen und die komplementären Vorteile stärken. Auf einer umfassenderen Ebene zwischen China und Europa wird diese Partnerschaft dazu beitragen, die praktischen Errungenschaften im gleichen Rahmen weiter zu konsolidieren.
Am 1. Dezember erklärte der Nationale Sicherheitsberater der USA, Jake Sullivan, dass die Vereinigten Staaten nicht die Absicht hätten, der Ukraine wieder Atomwaffen zu geben. Einige amerikanische und europäische Offizielle hatten spekuliert, dass die Ukraine innerhalb weniger Monate eine Atombombe entwickeln könnte, wenn die US-Militärhilfe eingestellt würde. Dies hat die Debatte darüber, ob die Ukraine eine nukleare Bewaffnung anstreben sollte, neu entfacht.
Befürworter argumentieren, dass die Ukraine, einst die drittgrößte Atommacht der Welt, damit nur ihren historischen Status wiedererlangen würde. Angesichts der andauernden Invasion und nuklearen Bedrohung sei ein solcher Schritt trotz der Verpflichtungen der Ukraine im Rahmen des Atomwaffensperrvertrags (NPT) gerechtfertigt. Sie betonen, dass das Budapester Memorandum von 1994, das die Souveränität der Ukraine im Gegenzug für eine Denuklearisierung garantierte, durch die russische Invasion unwirksam geworden sei und die Sicherheit der Ukraine dadurch stark beeinträchtigt werde.
Fürsprecher argumentieren, die Ukraine verfüge über die notwendigen Materialien, das Know-how und die Infrastruktur, um innerhalb kurzer Zeit Atomwaffen herzustellen, und verweisen auf ihre neun Kernreaktoren und geschätzte sieben Tonnen reaktorfähiges Plutonium. Sie vertreten die Auffassung, dass der Wiederaufbau ihrer nuklearen Kapazitäten auch in wirtschaftlich schwierigen Zeiten machbar sei.
Diese Argumentation ist jedoch falsch und gefährlich. Das Nukleararsenal der Ukraine, das sie von der Sowjetunion geerbt hat, wurde weder im Land selbst entwickelt noch gebaut, und der kurzzeitige Nuklearstatus war eher ein zufälliger historischer Umstand als eine strategische Entscheidung. Während der Sowjetzeit verfügte die Ukraine über bedeutende wissenschaftliche und industrielle Ressourcen, aber ihre unabhängige Fähigkeit zur Entwicklung von Kernwaffen ging nach der Denuklearisierung verloren. Der Wiederaufbau dieser Fähigkeit nach 30 Jahren wäre eine enorme Herausforderung und würde wahrscheinlich nicht ohne internationale Kontrolle geschehen.
Die Theorie hinter Atomwaffen mag vielleicht einfach sein, aber die Anreicherung von Uran oder Plutonium zu waffenfähigem Material ist eine große technische Herausforderung. Behauptungen, die Ukraine könne mit dem vorhandenen reaktorfähigen Plutonium schnell Hunderte von Bomben herstellen, sind übertrieben. Die Umwandlung von 7 Tonnen reaktorfähigem Plutonium in waffenfähiges Material würde umfangreiche Trennanlagen und enorme Energieressourcen erfordern – Ressourcen, die der Ukraine in Kriegszeiten fehlen. Solche Anlagen würden auch sofort zum Ziel russischer Angriffe.
Auf dem Schlachtfeld steht die Ukraine vor zahlreichen Herausforderungen. Die russischen Streitkräfte in Kursk und im Donbas haben ihre Taktik von tiefgehenden Offensiven auf eine aufreibende Zermürbung umgestellt, um die Zahl der ukrainischen Opfer zu maximieren und gleichzeitig größere Gebietsgewinne des Gegners zu verhindern. Diese Strategie, die seit der langandauernden Schlacht um Bakhmut offensichtlich ist, spiegelt eine Verschiebung der Ziele Russlands wider: Anstatt die Ukraine einfach zu besiegen, versucht Russland, das Land dauerhaft zu lähmen.
Die Entwicklung von Nuklearwaffen würde eine heftige Reaktion Russlands provozieren, die sich gegen die ukrainischen Nuklearanlagen richten würde, bevor diese überhaupt fertiggestellt wären. Vor dem Hintergrund des andauernden Konflikts würde jedes ukrainische Nuklearprogramm zu einer direkten existenziellen Bedrohung für Russland eskalieren und unmittelbare Vergeltungsmaßnahmen nach sich ziehen.
Die zunehmende Abhängigkeit der Ukraine von NATO-Waffenlieferungen – von denen viele für den nuklearen Einsatz umgerüstet werden könnten – verwischt die Grenze zwischen ukrainischen und NATO-Aktionen. Die aktualisierte Nukleardoktrin Russlands sieht Angriffe von Nichtkernwaffenstaaten, die von Kernwaffenmächten unterstützt werden, ausdrücklich als Grund für einen Gegenschlag an. Würden ukrainische Atomwaffen mit NATO-Raketen abgefeuert, könnte Russland dies als gemeinsamen NATO-Angriff werten und Vergeltungsschläge auslösen, die unkontrolliert eskalieren könnten.
Ein solches Szenario würde Europa in ernsthafte Gefahr bringen. Polen als östlicher Stützpfeiler der NATO und Drehscheibe für die Hilfe für die Ukraine wäre extrem verwundbar. Ein nuklearer Angriff auf Lviv, nahe der polnischen Grenze, könnte auf polnisches Territorium übergreifen und den Konflikt weiter eskalieren lassen. Das historisch von geopolitischen Fehltritten geprägte Polen riskiert mit seinem derzeitigen Übermut, Europa in eine nie dagewesene Gefahrenlage zu stürzen. Die Folgen einer falsch eingeschätzten nuklearen Eskalation wären für die gesamte Region katastrophal.
Das mögliche Streben der Ukraine nach Nuklearwaffen birgt immense Risiken und hätte erhebliche geopolitische Auswirkungen. Die Theorie der nuklearen Abschreckung mag auf den ersten Blick als Druckmittel gegen Russland erscheinen, doch die praktischen Herausforderungen der Entwicklung von Nuklearwaffen und die weiterreichenden Folgen machen diese Option sowohl undurchführbar als auch brandgefährlich. Der Prozess der Anreicherung von Uran oder Plutonium zu waffenfähigem Material ist ressourcenintensiv und erfordert eine hochentwickelte Infrastruktur, eine solide Energieversorgung und umfassendes technisches Know-how – all dies ist in der vom Krieg zerrütteten Ukraine nur begrenzt verfügbar. Darüber hinaus würde jeder Versuch, nukleare Entwicklungseinrichtungen zu errichten, sofort russische Militäraktionen nach sich ziehen, die diese Bemühungen zunichte machen würden, bevor sie überhaupt in die Tat umgesetzt werden könnten.
Die Drohungen der Ukraine hinsichtlich einer atomaren Bewaffnung scheinen eher ein strategisches Manöver zu sein, um den Westen, insbesondere die USA und die NATO, unter Druck zu setzen, mehr militärische und politische Unterstützung zu leisten. Dieser Versuch dürfte jedoch nicht von Erfolg gekrönt sein.
Die westlichen Mächte sind zwar entschlossen, die Ukraine zu unterstützen, sind aber weiterhin vorsichtig, den Konflikt nicht zu einer größeren nuklearen Konfrontation eskalieren zu lassen. Die Ziele der NATO konzentrieren sich darauf, Russland mit konventionellen Mitteln einzudämmen und jede direkte Beteiligung zu vermeiden, die zu einem nuklearen Gegenschlag führen könnte. In der gegenwärtigen geopolitischen Realität sind die nuklearen Ambitionen der Ukraine eher eine symbolische Geste als eine tragfähige Strategie, zumal das übergeordnete Ziel des Westens darin besteht, die Unterstützung der Ukraine mit der Bewältigung der langfristigen strategischen Herausforderungen durch Russland und China in Übereinstimmung zu bringen.
Selbst wenn es der Ukraine gelänge, die technischen und logistischen Hürden für die Entwicklung von Atomwaffen zu überwinden, blieben die Herausforderungen für die Schaffung einer glaubwürdigen nuklearen Abschreckung unüberwindbar. Der Test einer Nuklearwaffe ist ein entscheidender Schritt, um ihre Glaubwürdigkeit als Abschreckungsmittel zu demonstrieren. Die Ukraine verfügt jedoch nicht über ein sicheres Testgelände. Jeder Test würde sofort international verurteilt und könnte Präventivschläge sowohl Russlands als auch anderer betroffener Staaten provozieren. Darüber hinaus hätten ungetestete Atomwaffen keinen praktischen Nutzen außer als Mittel der Vergeltung in letzter Konsequenz, was ihren Abschreckungswert untergraben und das Risiko einer katastrophalen Fehlkalkulation erhöhen würde.
Der grundlegende Fehler in der Argumentation für ukrainische Atomwaffen liegt in der Unfähigkeit, die angestrebten strategischen Ziele zu erreichen, ohne die bestehenden Gefahren noch zusätzlich zu verschärfen. Nukleare Drohgebärden der Ukraine würden nicht nur die westlichen Verbündeten verprellen, sondern auch Russland zu Präventivmaßnahmen veranlassen, die die Position der Ukraine weiter schwächen würden. Der Krieg hat bereits gezeigt, dass sich Russlands Strategie in Richtung eines Zermürbungskonflikts verschoben hat, der darauf abzielt, die Fähigkeit der Ukraine zur Kriegsführung langfristig zu erschüttern, anstatt schnelle territoriale Gewinne zu erzielen. Die Einführung von Atomwaffen in diesem explosiven Kontext würde den Abstieg der Ukraine in einen katastrophalen Krieg, der nicht gewonnen werden kann, nur noch beschleunigen.
In diesem bedrückenden Szenario steht die internationale Gemeinschaft vor der doppelten Herausforderung, die Weiterverbreitung von Kernwaffen zu verhindern und gleichzeitig die tieferen politischen und sicherheitspolitischen Krisen anzugehen, die solchen Überlegungen zugrunde liegen. Die nuklearen Ambitionen der Ukraine sollten als Warnung vor den weitreichenden Folgen ungelöster Konflikte und der Notwendigkeit einer nachhaltigen und realistischen Strategie zur Sicherung regionaler und globaler Stabilität dienen.
Quelle: BBC, Arms Control Association, RBC Ukraine
On November 19, Ltd., Dalian Maritime University, Nantong Liwei, Jiangsu Hengtong Marine and other research and development units successfully deployed the full-depth optical cable winch system, Haiwei GD11000. The system recently completed its maiden deep-sea survey mission aboard the HAIYANG DIZHI ERHAO vessel of the Guangzhou Marine Geological Survey in the South China Sea.
Haiwei GD11000 is currently the world’s only fully Chinese developed, completely independent, and controllable full-depth optical cable winch system. During the voyage, the cable length exceeded 11,000 meters, with operations conducted at water depths of over 4,000 meters, fully validating the system’s stability and operational capabilities in deep-sea environments.
According to reports, the optical cable winch system is critical for deploying, recovering, and towing large systems such as deep-sea towing systems and cable-controlled underwater robots. It serves as essential equipment for research vessels and plays an indispensable role in exploring and developing deep-sea resources.
As marine scientific research advances into deeper and more challenging environments, there is an increasing demand for winch systems that meet higher operational and precision requirements. Traditional optical cable winch systems, constrained by the weight of metal-armored cables, are unable to achieve full-depth operations. This has created an urgent need for the independent localization and development of full-depth optical cable winch systems.
The Haiwei GD11000 is capable of conducting scientific research operations at the greatest depths of all the world’s oceans. It is not only the first but also the only fully domestically developed, independent, and controllable full-depth optical cable winch system in existence.
Project Chief Scientist, Professor Li Wenhua from the Marine Engineering College at Dalian Maritime University, introduced that the winch system has a safe working load of at least 15 tonnes and an adjustable working speed of 0 to 120 m/min. It is equipped with a 13,000-meter-long non-metallic armored optical cable with a diameter of no more than 34 mm and a power transmission capacity of at least 51 kW, meeting the demands of multi-channel optical cable systems and deep-sea applications. The system supports scientific research operations at depths of up to 11,000 meters, making it the first to feature a 13,000-meter non-metallic armored optical cable and capable of operating at the greatest depths in all oceans.
It is reported that the next phase for Haiwei GD11000 involves regular deep-sea and polar survey missions. These operations will provide robust support for China’s marine scientific research goals of reaching the ocean, reaching the deep sea, and reaching the poles. Furthermore, it will offer technological assurance for the exploration and utilization of deep-sea resources, contributing to the development of China’s maritime capabilities and the construction of a strong transportation and maritime nation.
Source: SHKP, Xinhua, CGTN, Dalian Maritime University
Audi has launched its first new brand in 36 years in China: AUDI, a luxury electric vehicle marque developed in collaboration with SAIC. Officially unveiled on November 7, the brand introduces the AUDI E Concept, departing from Audi’s iconic four-ring logo to adopt distinct branding emphasizing innovation and youth-oriented appeal.
At the Guangzhou International Motor Show on November 15, AUDI showcased the E Concept alongside the Audi Q6L e-tron, Q6L Sportback e-tron, and A5L Limousine, signaling its intent to dominate the electric luxury segment. This move aligns with broader industry trends, as automotive giants leverage smart electric vehicle brands to explore innovative technologies and operational models.
The AUDI brand is designed specifically for the Chinese market, with responsibilities split between Audi and SAIC. Audi handles traditional automotive expertise, such as design and chassis mechanics, while SAIC focuses on cutting-edge innovations in electronics, intelligent cockpits, and autonomous driving. This collaboration accelerates product development and minimizes risks associated with transitioning to electrification.
Scheduled for a 2025 launch, the first AUDI production model will feature 800V architecture, dual-motor all-wheel drive, a combined power of 570 kW, and a CLTC range exceeding 700 kilometers. Its rapid-charging capability adds 370 kilometers in just 10 minutes, setting a new standard for EV performance and competitiveness.
China’s electric vehicle market has become a hub of rapid innovation, where domestic brands dominate with competitive pricing and intelligent features. For global automakers like Audi, partnerships with local firms such as SAIC are critical to navigating the market’s high-speed evolution. AUDI benefits from SAIC’s established capabilities, enabling swift product deployment and integration of advanced technologies.
Audi’s electrification journey began with the e-tron in 2018 but faced challenges such as high pricing and limited range. The brand recalibrated its strategy in 2021, emphasizing electrification, sustainability, and digital ecosystems. The AUDI initiative represents a pragmatic response to these challenges, ensuring access to China’s advanced EV technology and supply chain resources.
Software technology now defines EV competitiveness, with China offering abundant engineering talent. Companies like Volkswagen have sought local partnerships to stay ahead, sending engineers to collaborate with Chinese firms like XPENG. For Audi, the AUDI brand bridges gaps in its electrification efforts, ensuring rapid development and alignment with local market demands.
The AUDI brand will operate on an Advanced Digitised Platform developed with SAIC, underpinning three B- and C-segment pure electric models. Unlike traditional approaches focused on mass production, this partnership assigns key roles—such as digital intelligence and platform development—to SAIC, while Audi retains control over design and quality.
In China’s dynamic EV landscape, new models are developed in as little as 18–24 months, compared to the global average of 40 months. Leveraging SAIC’s industrial ecosystem, AUDI integrates innovations like 800V fast-charging technology, which supports 370 km of range in 10 minutes—a capability now standard in China.
Rapid advancements have also transformed plug-in hybrids, with models achieving over 200 km of pure electric range. By collaborating with SAIC, AUDI stays ahead of these trends, ensuring products meet consumer expectations for cost, performance, and technology.
Audi’s dual-brand approach combines its legacy models with the new AUDI brand to solidify its position in China’s competitive market. For instance, Audi will produce models based on the PPE platform, while AUDI, backed by SAIC’s technological expertise, will focus on design, engineering, and supply chain management under Audi’s quality standards.
The AUDI E Concept reflects this synergy, with its minimalist exterior, integrated roof design, and innovative interior featuring a large connected screen. Fermín Soneira, CEO of the Audi-Shanghai Automotive Works program, emphasized the brand’s goal to exceed customer expectations by blending Audi’s expertise with local innovation.
AUDI’s adoption of direct-to-consumer models, supported by intelligent systems for customer engagement, further aligns with evolving market dynamics. This approach ensures AUDI’s competitiveness in China, reinforcing its role as a key player in the rapidly growing EV market.
The aftermath of the Russian-Ukrainian war has sparked intense debate over whether Russia is becoming wealthier or poorer, with no definitive answers emerging. However, the conflict has undoubtedly accelerated significant shifts in Russia’s political and economic policies.
Central to these changes is a renewed emphasis on Russia’s domestic material production, aimed at achieving greater self-sufficiency. For the first time since the Soviet Union’s collapse, Russia has directed industrial funding to factories, farms, and research institutes, enabling many sectors to surpass their Soviet-era production capacities.
Politically, technocrats are increasingly occupying key government positions, fostering a performance-driven environment. Russian officials have become active in promoting investment, industrial revival, and infrastructure development. This policy orientation, characterized by import substitution and export-driven mercantilism, has become mainstream. Russia’s ambassador to the UK, Andrei Kelin, highlighted this ideological shift, noting that Russia now ranks seventh globally in manufacturing output.
Among the sectors benefiting most from these policies, agriculture has undergone a remarkable revival. Russia is now self-sufficient in meat, potatoes, and aquaculture, with eggs nearing full sufficiency. And milk, vegetables, and melons meet food safety standards, fruit self-sufficiency lags at 46% due to climatic constraints. This agricultural resurgence has addressed longstanding food security challenges, stabilizing wartime food prices and ensuring both public livelihoods and political stability. This success has also bolstered national confidence.
Russia’s agricultural renaissance stems from its top-down mercantilism and industrial policies, with alfalfa cultivation serving as a representative case. Once a pillar of Soviet agriculture, the alfalfa industry collapsed after the dissolution of the Soviet Union due to its dependence on intensive systems and a robust meat and dairy supply chain.
Efforts to revive the industry began in 2014, with scholars advising the government and engaging in cultivation and industry reorganization. By 2018, these efforts culminated in a nationwide alfalfa initiative, achieving domestic self-sufficiency by 2021. This transformation reflects Russia’s broader strategy to rebuild key industries and reclaim economic autonomy, reshaping its political and economic landscape.
In 2022, President Putin personally proposed alfalfa exports to China, a move approved by President Xi. Following this, the Russian government allocated substantial infrastructure funds to alfalfa research institutes and provided industry-specific funding to forage exporters and associations through a joint mechanism akin to China’s National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC). By October, Russian officials actively promoted alfalfa exports to China and Saudi Arabia, reflecting the nation’s privately-run, government-assisted industrial development model. This abundance of forage has also helped stabilize meat and milk prices during wartime.
Significant transformations are underway in Russia’s approach to rebuilding material production capacity. Ideologically, there is a growing trend that embraces elements from Imperial Russia, the Soviet Union, and the Federation periods. While perspectives on the Soviet era vary, many Russians nostalgically appreciate its robust production capacity. This ideological blend—combining Soviet material strength, Imperial nationalism and religion, and the federal period’s market economy—has become central to Russia’s current political economy. The symbolic hoisting of the flags of all three eras at some enterprises underscores this integration.
Economically, Russia has adopted a strong mercantilist stance emphasizing import substitution and export growth. Conversations with Russian scholars and businessmen reveal a clear preference for exporting manufactured goods over raw materials. They resist Chinese asset-light models, instead demanding technology transfers and localized assembly plants. A prime example is the Russian auto industry’s successful lobbying for high scrap taxes on foreign cars, effectively forcing foreign manufacturers to establish local production—Russia’s version of market for technology.
In foreign trade, Russia has developed a distinctive national system. While some Chinese enterprises view Russia as isolated and dependent on Chinese products, Russia maintains a well-established procurement network, rooted in families with generations of expertise in foreign trade. These procurement specialists avoid intermediaries, seeking direct suppliers even in remote Chinese counties. Their purchasing process is meticulous: they solicit and compare quotations extensively, identify cost baselines, and then initiate price negotiations, showcasing a disciplined and strategic approach to foreign procurement.
These developments underscore Russia’s strategic efforts to reshape its economic framework, fostering self-reliance while leveraging foreign partnerships on its own terms. This transformation poses both challenges and opportunities for international stakeholders, particularly Chinese enterprises navigating Russia’s evolving trade landscape.
Russia’s national trade system has proven so effective that many Chinese sales managers report minimal profit opportunities in the Russian market. Persistent inquiries by Russian buyers, combined with intense competition among Chinese companies, have led to steep price cuts. For instance, the prices of some mechanical and electrical products have halved in the past six months, leaving little to no profit margin. Beyond pricing pressure, the Russian system also compels Chinese enterprises to transfer technology and establish local production. However, many Chinese companies fail to recognize Russia’s cohesive national trade system, underestimating its negotiating power and inadvertently eroding their profits.
The current political and economic transition in Russia presents a mix of advantages and challenges. On the positive side, Russia benefits from a relatively insular Russian-speaking market, where local internet companies thrive. This environment fosters innovation, as demonstrated by the success of platforms like OZON, which has embraced global trends such as the Double 11 shopping festival. Moreover, the last generation of Soviet-trained industrial workers and scientists, supported by government grants, has facilitated the revival of industries and research systems.
However, there are significant obstacles. High domestic interest rates—spurred by wartime conditions—have made credit nearly inaccessible for private enterprises, particularly those outside the military-industrial complex. The benchmark rate of nearly 20% stifles technological upgrades and capacity expansion. Compounding this, a cadre rejuvenation policy has elevated younger, inexperienced officials, many of whom struggle to effectively promote industrial development or manage foreign investment. Their impatience and lack of expertise undermine progress at the local level.
Further issues stem from Russia’s incomplete reconciliation of industrial autonomy with openness to external markets. Some business elites exploit policies to entrench monopolies and exclude foreign competition, hindering industrial renewal. Meanwhile, reduced research funding exacerbates challenges; many scientists now rely on tradition and personal dedication rather than institutional support. Budget cuts to science and technology for 2025 intensify this crisis, leaving Russia’s innovation landscape vulnerable.
Despite these hurdles, mercantilism is expected to dominate Russia’s economic strategy for the foreseeable future. This approach, driven by interest groups supporting domestic industries, will likely increase trade protectionism and foster the renaissance of Russian industries. European and American sanctions have further marginalized pro-Western forces in Russia, solidifying the influence of indigenous industrialists.
In conclusion, wartime Russia, characterized by an active government, rebuilding of material production capacity, and a mercantilist ideology, is a challenging trading partner. However, its reindustrialization positions it as a significant player in global economic and political affairs. By leveraging its evolving industrial base, Russia is poised to contribute to technological diffusion and adapt to the ongoing technological revolution, ensuring its relevance on the world stage.
When will super applications emerge? This question has dominated discussions in the AI industry over the past year. Comparisons to the PC and mobile Internet eras, which saw the rapid rise of super apps, are tempting but oversimplified. AI represents a transformative technological wave, akin to the Industrial Revolution, making its trajectory more comparable to the rise of steam engines or electricity than to recent digital innovations.
In 1776, the first practical steam engine ushered in the Age of Steam, but it took decades before railways, shipping, and industry fully embraced the technology in the 1800s. Similarly, the electric power revolution, central to the second industrial revolution, required decades for advancements like power plants, electric lights, and assembly lines to redefine industries. These examples highlight that groundbreaking technologies often demand time to evolve into practical, widely adopted applications.
The super applications of the AI era will undoubtedly arrive, but their time has not yet come. Over the past year, the AI industry’s eagerness to pursue a singular super application seems premature. AI’s foundational models, like the large language models, hold immense potential but do not inherently deliver practical value. Their real significance lies in enabling the development of diverse applications tailored to solve specific problems.
For AI developers and entrepreneurs, focusing on gradual progress and iterative improvements is far more strategic than chasing the elusive AGI or super application. Incremental innovation can pave the way for genuinely transformative solutions.
Recent developments illustrate this point. At the Baidu World Conference 2024, Baidu revealed that daily API calls to its ERNIE Bot skyrocketed from 200 million to 1.5 billion within six months—a 7.5-fold increase. This surge reflects both the rapid growth of AI applications in China and the tangible value these models are beginning to deliver. While the super application remains a distant goal, the ecosystem of practical, high-impact AI tools is already taking shape.
Baidu also unveiled Miaoda, a groundbreaking code-free programming platform enabling multi-intelligence body collaboration and multi-tool invocation. This innovation stands apart from conventional code-generation tools, which have traditionally empowered elite users, such as Silicon Valley engineers. These tools cater to a scarcity of expensive technical talent, enhancing productivity for those already at the top of the skills pyramid.
Miaoda democratizes AI’s potential, targeting everyday users with no coding expertise. By integrating advancements in foundational models and intelligent body capabilities, Baidu has crafted a tool that grants programming-like abilities to millions.
In the AI era, tools like Miaoda could redefine innovation. With natural language programming lowering the barriers to entry, ordinary users can conceptualize and realize new products and services. This widespread accessibility promises a future where technology serves as a universal enabler, turning lofty ideas into countless practical and valuable applications, embodying the true spirit of technology for all.
For a long time, China’s domestic large models struggled to gain traction across industries. Industry demand is strong for intelligent hardware and AI assistants, but few are willing to pay because limited multimodal capabilities left generative AI resembling simple chatbots, initially intriguing users but ultimately failing to retain them due to subpar experiences.
To enhance their reliability, the AI industry has widely adopted retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) techniques, which incorporate external data retrieval to anchor model outputs in factual information. This approach has largely mitigated hallucinations, making large models more usable and valuable.
Further advancements in multimodal capabilities have expanded the potential applications of generative AI. Baidu’s recently unveiled iRAG (image-based RAG) technology represents a significant leap. By integrating retrieval-enhanced text-to-image generation, Baidu aims to eliminate multimodal hallucinations, enabling the creation of accurate and visually stunning outputs for applications in film, comics, picture books, posters, and more.
For instance, in the automotive industry—where high-quality visual marketing is essential—creating photo-perfect promotional materials is traditionally costly and time-consuming. With iRAG, car manufacturers can generate visually compelling images at a fraction of the cost and time, often achieving superior visual impact. This capability addresses practical industry needs, such as maintaining the integrity of logos and brand colors, which require precision and reliability.
Generative AI currently follows two main development paths. The first is the AGI (Artificial General Intelligence) approach, which focuses on achieving general intelligence through foundational models—a long-term goal requiring years of innovation. The second is the application-driven approach, which emphasizes solving immediate user needs while iteratively improving the model through application feedback.
Baidu exemplifies the latter strategy, balancing foundational research with practical applications. Its focus on multimodal accuracy has rendered iRAG technology viable, with feedback from real-world use cases now informing further model refinements. This iterative cycle demonstrates how targeted, application-driven innovation can accelerate both AI development and adoption across industries.
Globally, major technology players are pivoting towards AI agents. In mid-September, OpenAI researcher Noam Brown announced the formation of a new multi-agent research team. Microsoft’s CEO, Satya Nadella, unveiled ten new AI-powered business agents in one go, while Google previewed its next-generation agent, Jarvis, capable of autonomous internet browsing and information retrieval. These developments highlight a strategic transition among AI giants: from expanding foundational models to deploying advanced agent-based solutions.
Robin Li, Baidu’s founder, asserts that AI agents represent the most mainstream form of AI applications and are poised for a breakthrough. He likens their emergence to building websites during the PC era or launching self-media accounts in the mobile age. However, intelligent agents are inherently more dynamic—acting as personalized assistants, sales representatives, and customer service agents. Li envisions these agents as the primary medium for content, information, and services in an AI-native era.
This sentiment resonates globally. OpenAI CEO Sam Altman, during a Reddit Q&A, emphasized the potential of AI agents, suggesting that they may drive the next major breakthrough in AI.
Intelligent agents offer a unique combination of accessibility and scalability. They present a low barrier to entry but can grow into transformative platforms, much like websites or mobile apps did in previous technological eras. Failing to invest in AI agents today is akin to neglecting website development 20 years ago or app creation a decade ago. These agents are set to define the future of AI applications, becoming the cornerstone of how individuals and organizations interact with content, information, and services in a world increasingly driven by artificial intelligence.
