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China’s Development of 6G: Technological Exploration, Industrial Development, and Future Opportunities

6G, the sixth generation of mobile communications, is expected to become a major technological foundation for the next stage of the digital economy. Unlike 5G, which primarily focuses on high-speed connectivity, 6G aims to integrate communications with artificial intelligence, sensing, and computing. 

It is expected to provide faster transmission speeds, lower latency, more extensive connectivity, and more intelligent network services. Key technologies include integrated sensing and communication, AI-native networks, and space-air-ground integrated networks. 

These capabilities could support emerging applications such as autonomous driving, industrial robotics, the low-altitude economy, immersive communications, and smart manufacturing. As international research moves towards standardisation and commercial deployment around 2030, China is actively strengthening its position in 6G research and industrial development.

China began exploring 6G relatively early and has gradually established a national research framework involving government departments, universities, research institutions, telecommunications operators, and technology companies. In 2019, China’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology supported the establishment of the IMT-2030 (6G) Promotion Group, providing a platform for coordinating research, technical experiments, and international cooperation. 

Since then, China has continued to increase investment in 6G-related technologies. Major telecommunications operators, including China Mobile, China Unicom, and China Telecom, have conducted research into network architecture, wireless transmission, satellite communications, and integrated sensing and communication. Leading technology companies such as Huawei and ZTE, together with emerging smartphone and electronics manufacturers, have also participated in developing key technologies and potential applications.

China has made considerable progress in building its 6G technology reserves. More than 300 key technologies have been accumulated, covering areas such as wireless transmission, advanced antennas, AI-integrated networks, terahertz communications, and space-air-ground integration. The country has completed its first phase of 6G technical trials and moved into a second phase focused on further technological verification and system integration. 

These trials are important because 6G development involves more than improving individual components. It requires the coordination of communication equipment, network architecture, computing resources, intelligent algorithms, and terminal devices. Through experimental platforms and prototype systems, Chinese research institutions and companies are gradually testing how these technologies can operate together in practical environments.

One particularly important direction of China’s 6G research is the integration of communication and artificial intelligence. Future networks are expected to use AI not only to provide services to users but also to manage and optimise their own operations. AI could help networks predict traffic demand, allocate spectrum resources, identify interference, and automatically adjust network configurations. 

At the same time, 6G networks could provide the connectivity and computing resources needed by AI applications. China has been exploring concepts such as AI-native networks, network intelligence agents, and AI-as-a-Service. These developments could allow intelligent network systems to make decisions and coordinate resources more autonomously, while supporting applications that require real-time processing. However, challenges remain in ensuring network reliability, controlling computing and energy consumption, and coordinating AI functions across different network layers.

Another major focus is integrated sensing and communication, which allows wireless networks to perform environmental sensing while transmitting information. Chinese research institutions have been developing experimental platforms to investigate how wireless signals can be used to detect the position, movement, and characteristics of surrounding objects. The Purple Mountain Laboratories has conducted research and system validation in integrated communication, sensing, computing, and intelligence, while exploring wide-area network coverage and low-altitude applications. 

These technologies could be particularly valuable for drone management, intelligent transportation, industrial monitoring, and urban governance. For example, future communication infrastructure could provide connectivity for drones while simultaneously detecting their positions and movements, helping to improve the safety and efficiency of low-altitude operations.

Chinese universities have also achieved notable breakthroughs in 6G-related fundamental technologies. A research team from Peking University and City University of Hong Kong developed an ultra-wideband optoelectronic integrated system capable of supporting high-speed wireless transmission across a frequency range from 0.5 GHz to 115 GHz. The system enables flexible frequency tuning and switching, allowing communication signals to avoid interference by moving between different frequency bands. 

Published in Nature, this research offers a potential solution for future broadband wireless communication systems. With further development and integration with AI algorithms, such technologies could support intelligent spectrum management, real-time environmental sensing, and more reliable wireless transmission. This achievement also demonstrates the importance of combining fundamental scientific research with engineering innovation in China’s 6G development.

Spectrum resources are another important part of China’s 6G strategy. In 2023, China allocated the 6425–7125 MHz frequency range for International Mobile Telecommunications, providing 700 MHz of continuous spectrum for mobile communication development. The 6 GHz band offers a useful balance between coverage and transmission capacity, making it a potential foundation for future 6G networks. 

In May 2026, MIIT granted the IMT-2030 (6G) Promotion Group permission to use the 6 GHz band for 6G trials. This provides an important opportunity to test network coverage, signal propagation, interference management, and system performance under real-world conditions. It also creates a foundation for the development of future communication equipment, antennas, chips, and terminal devices.

China’s telecommunications operators have also been actively developing 6G prototypes and experimental networks. China Mobile has explored cloud-native 6G architecture and developed prototype systems for technical validation. Its research has included high-speed wireless transmission and experimental network testing. China Unicom has focused on integrated communication, sensing, computing, and intelligence, as well as space-air-ground integration, green networking, and dynamic spectrum sharing. 

It has also proposed a “3+6+X” vision for future 6G services, covering new lifestyles, new production models, and a new digital world, alongside six major application scenarios and a wider range of potential services. These initiatives show that Chinese operators are not only investigating network technologies but also considering how 6G could create new business models and support the transformation of different industries.

Beyond research laboratories and telecommunications companies, China is increasingly connecting 6G development with national industrial priorities. In June 2026, MIIT launched a special provincial-level collaborative pilot programme for 6G innovation and development. The programme encourages cooperation between local governments, research institutions, operators, and industrial enterprises, with an emphasis on technological innovation, application testing, and industrial ecosystem development. 

Priority areas include communication and AI integration, satellite internet, wireless sensing, intelligent terminals, and key network equipment. By using different regions’ industrial strengths and application scenarios, China aims to accelerate the transition from laboratory research to practical technology development and commercial preparation.

The industrial opportunities created by 6G are expected to extend far beyond the telecommunications sector. One of the most promising areas is embodied intelligence, particularly humanoid robots and industrial robots. As robots become more capable of interacting with physical environments, they will require reliable real-time communication, environmental sensing, and substantial computing resources. 

6G could allow robots to connect with edge-computing platforms, coordinate tasks with other machines, and receive real-time instructions. This may create new demand for communication modules, sensors, AI chips, edge-computing equipment, and intelligent control systems. China’s existing strengths in robotics manufacturing, electronics, and AI development could provide a foundation for integrating these industries with future 6G networks.

The low-altitude economy is another important area in which China could develop distinctive 6G applications. Drone delivery, aerial inspections, emergency rescue, and urban air mobility all require reliable connectivity, accurate positioning, and real-time monitoring. Through the integration of terrestrial networks, satellites, and aerial communication platforms, 6G could help provide more comprehensive coverage and coordinated management of low-altitude aircraft. 

This could support the development of intelligent low-altitude transportation systems and create opportunities in drone manufacturing, satellite communication equipment, positioning technologies, and airspace management platforms.

In industrial manufacturing, 6G could support the development of more intelligent and flexible production systems. Future factories will increasingly depend on networks connecting robots, sensors, production equipment, and automated control systems. By combining high-reliability communication with sensing and AI, 6G could enable real-time equipment monitoring, remote operation, predictive maintenance, and coordinated production scheduling. Industries such as automotive manufacturing, mining, energy, ports, and logistics could benefit from these capabilities. The integration of 6G with digital twins could also allow enterprises to monitor and simulate physical production processes in virtual environments, improving operational efficiency and resource allocation.

The development of 6G will also create opportunities in China’s high-end manufacturing and core technology industries. As communication systems move towards higher frequencies and wider bandwidths, demand for advanced radio-frequency chips, high-speed converters, antenna systems, optoelectronic devices, advanced materials, and precision testing instruments will increase. Satellite communications and space-air-ground integration could further stimulate development in commercial aerospace, low-Earth-orbit satellites, and specialised communication terminals. Strengthening these supporting industries will be essential if China is to build a more complete and competitive 6G industrial ecosystem.

Despite these advances, several challenges remain. Some fundamental technologies, including terahertz communications, advanced antenna systems, low-power chips, and AI-native network architecture, still require further research and engineering validation. The transition from experimental prototypes to large-scale commercial systems will also involve substantial investment in infrastructure, equipment, and industrial coordination. In addition, network security, data privacy, energy efficiency, and spectrum interference will become increasingly important as 6G networks take on more responsibilities in sensing, computing, and industrial control.

For China, the next stage of 6G development should focus on strengthening fundamental research while accelerating the translation of scientific achievements into practical technologies. Greater collaboration is needed among universities, research institutions, telecommunications operators, equipment manufacturers, and downstream industries. Rather than pursuing technological breakthroughs in isolation, China should develop integrated experimental platforms and use real-world scenarios to test the performance and commercial value of new technologies. 

Applications in intelligent manufacturing, robotics, low-altitude transportation, and satellite communications can provide practical environments for identifying technical requirements and refining network solutions. At the same time, continued participation in international standardisation through organisations such as the ITU and 3GPP will be important for ensuring global compatibility and expanding opportunities for Chinese companies in international markets.

As international 6G standardisation advances towards 2030, the coming years will be critical for China to strengthen its core technologies, improve industrial coordination, and identify applications with genuine market demand. 

More importantly, 6G could become a bridge connecting China’s telecommunications industry with artificial intelligence, robotics, advanced manufacturing, commercial aerospace, and the wider digital economy, creating new opportunities for technological innovation and long-term industrial growth.

Source: china cn, xinhuanet, sasac, cas, szzg, g6gconference, scmp

From Manufacturing to Ecosystems, From Lifestyles to Culture: China’s Growing Appeal to Global Markets

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From a thermos flask and a cup of Chinese milk tea to a piece of advanced construction machinery, a smart home furnishing product, a popular online novel or a hit video game, Chinese products and cultural creations are becoming increasingly visible in markets around the world. 

In recent years, China’s global expansion has accelerated, extending far beyond traditional merchandise exports into advanced manufacturing, digital entertainment, catering, smart home technology and lifestyle consumption. In the past, “Made in China” was widely associated with competitive prices and large-scale production. 

Today, Chinese companies are increasingly competing through technological innovation, brand development, cultural influence and comprehensive global operations. China’s presence in international markets is therefore undergoing a profound transformation, moving from the export of individual products towards the internationalisation of technology, brands, services and entire industrial ecosystems.

One of the clearest signs of this transformation is the upgrading of China’s manufacturing capabilities and export structure. Chinese manufacturers are no longer simply supplying overseas markets with affordable equipment and basic products. They are increasingly offering technologically advanced solutions and higher-value products. 

In the construction machinery sector, for example, leading companies such as Zoomlion and XCMG are expanding their international operations beyond equipment sales. Their overseas strategies now encompass research and development, manufacturing, supply chain cooperation, technical standards and after-sales services. 

By establishing overseas factories, developing service networks and working with local industrial partners, these companies are strengthening their ability to compete in different regional markets. They are also adapting their products to local conditions. In Saudi Arabia, for instance, machinery is specially modified to withstand extreme heat and sandstorms, while intelligent operating systems are adapted to local languages and working practices. Such developments demonstrate that China’s construction machinery exports are evolving from the sale of individual products into the provision of integrated technological and industrial capabilities.

This upgrading is also evident in consumer goods, where Chinese products are increasingly responding to changing lifestyles and consumption preferences. As international consumers pay greater attention to health, comfort and everyday well-being, products such as insulated cups, electric kettles, Chinese tea, goji berries, gua sha tools and hot-water bottles are gaining popularity. 

Social media has brought everyday Chinese habits, including drinking warm water, carrying thermos flasks and practising traditional wellness exercises, into the international spotlight. What were once considered ordinary household items are increasingly being associated with a distinctive lifestyle. Chinese manufacturers have recognised this shift and are adjusting product designs and marketing strategies to meet emerging consumer demand. 

Smart furniture is another example. Ergonomic chairs with massage functions and intelligent height-adjustable desks are attracting overseas buyers, while manufacturers are placing greater emphasis on overall workspace design, comfort and intelligent functionality. Some furniture companies in Anji, Zhejiang Province, have also expanded their use of short-video platforms and livestreaming to reach international customers. 

One particular product, a wide-seated chair designed to allow users to sit cross-legged, became an unexpected hit after a viral video helped generate substantial sales. These developments show that Chinese companies are becoming increasingly capable not only of supplying products but also of identifying new consumer trends and creating demand through innovation and digital marketing.

While manufacturing exports demonstrate China’s industrial strength, cultural exports are opening up another important dimension of its global engagement. Online literature, online gaming and online audiovisual content, often referred to collectively as China’s cultural “new trio”, have become major vehicles for introducing Chinese creativity to international audiences. 

Games such as Black Myth: Wukong and Genshin Impact have attracted players worldwide, while Chinese television productions such as Joy of Life have reached international streaming platforms. Chinese online literature has also developed a substantial overseas readership, with translated works attracting millions of readers across different countries and languages. 

Technological advances are accelerating this process. Artificial intelligence is improving the efficiency of literary translation, while overseas production offices, local partnerships and international intellectual property development are helping Chinese cultural companies connect with audiences more effectively. 

Increasingly, these companies are moving beyond simply exporting finished works. They are building international creative ecosystems through overseas writers, cross-border collaborations, adaptations and diversified intellectual property development. Cultural exports are therefore becoming more than a commercial activity: they offer international audiences new ways to understand China’s history, contemporary society, imagination and values.

The growing international appeal of Chinese culture is also reflected in the expansion of Chinese restaurant brands overseas. Companies such as Haidilao, Little Sheep, Heytea and Mixue Bingcheng are bringing Chinese hotpot, milk tea and regional cuisines to shopping centres and commercial districts around the world. In the past, Chinese restaurants overseas were often concentrated in Chinatown communities and primarily served Chinese expatriates and overseas students. 

Today, an increasing number of brands are seeking to attract local consumers and establish themselves in mainstream markets. To achieve this, they are adapting menus to local tastes, improving service standards, developing supply chains and strengthening brand management. At the same time, they are incorporating cultural elements into the dining experience. 

Sichuan opera face-changing performances, traditional noodle-pulling demonstrations and Chinese-inspired interior designs allow customers to experience aspects of Chinese culture alongside the food itself. In this way, restaurants become more than places to eat: they serve as accessible spaces for cultural exchange. A bowl of hotpot or a cup of milk tea can introduce international consumers to Chinese culinary traditions and regional identities.

Across these different sectors, a common feature of China’s overseas expansion is the growing importance of brand value and long-term competitiveness. In earlier stages, many Chinese companies relied heavily on cost advantages to enter international markets, often operating primarily as manufacturers and suppliers within global production chains. 

Today, stronger research and development capabilities, improved product design, digital technologies and greater brand awareness are enabling them to take on more active roles. Companies are participating in international standard-setting, establishing overseas production facilities, developing local supply chains and tailoring products to the specific needs of different markets. 

Cross-border e-commerce and social media are also changing how Chinese businesses reach international consumers. Short videos, livestreaming and online platforms allow companies, including smaller and emerging brands, to communicate directly with customers, respond quickly to market feedback and build international recognition. As a result, China’s overseas expansion is no longer driven exclusively by large state-owned enterprises or established industrial leaders. Small and medium-sized businesses, innovative manufacturers and digital content creators are also becoming increasingly important participants.

More importantly, China’s growing appeal to international markets is not simply a matter of increasing export volumes or expanding the number of overseas businesses. It reflects a deeper and increasingly two-way relationship between China and the global economy. On the one hand, China’s extensive industrial supply chains, expanding technological capabilities and diverse manufacturing base provide international consumers and business partners with a wide range of products, services and opportunities for cooperation. 

On the other hand, the different demands of overseas markets encourage Chinese companies to improve their technologies, refine their products and strengthen their international management capabilities. This interaction creates a process of continuous adaptation and mutual development. International consumers are increasingly doing more than purchasing Chinese-made products: they are discovering Chinese brands, exploring Chinese lifestyles and developing an interest in Chinese cultural content. The shift from product recognition to brand awareness, and from commercial contact to cultural curiosity, reflects the expanding influence of China’s presence in the world.

Nevertheless, significant challenges remain. Differences in trade policies, market access requirements, consumer preferences and business environments can complicate overseas operations. Companies must also address difficulties involving local supply chains, recruitment, brand recognition and cultural adaptation. In highly competitive manufacturing markets, sustained investment in core technologies, product quality and intellectual property protection remains essential. 

Chinese businesses start to avoid relying on low prices and instead focus on delivering distinctive value. Whether through the development of global service networks in the construction machinery industry, the localisation of restaurant brands or the creation of culturally diverse digital content, successful international expansion requires a long-term commitment to understanding local markets and building trust with consumers and business partners.

From individual products to internationally recognised brands, from technological equipment to integrated solutions, and from cultural works to shared lifestyle experiences, China’s global expansion is taking on increasingly diverse forms. It is no longer simply a process of Chinese companies searching for overseas customers. 

What China brings to the world is not merely a growing range of products, but also technological expertise, industrial value, creative ideas and distinctive ways of life. At the same time, the world’s interest in China is gradually expanding beyond its reputation as a manufacturing powerhouse towards a broader appreciation of Chinese brands, culture, innovation and the opportunities created by its economic development.

Source: ydyl, xinhua, people

The Algorithmic Violence of the West: Digital Capitalism, Cognitive Control, and the Erosion of Freedom

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“Algorithmic violence” refers to a new form of power constructed by contemporary digital capitalism through the appropriation of data, platform monopolies, and algorithmic governance. Unlike the Hobbesian Leviathan, which exercises power through visible coercion, or the Orwellian model of overt surveillance and repression, algorithmic violence operates through a softer and more sophisticated form of domination. 

Capital functions as the hidden sovereign, algorithms as its instrument of power, and digital platforms as the institutional infrastructure through which this power is exercised. Individuals appear to possess more choices than ever before, yet increasingly lose the capacity to determine what they see, what they believe, and why they believe it. The greatest danger of algorithmic violence therefore lies not in its explicit destruction of freedom, but in its ability to disguise control as convenience, discipline as personalization, and obedience as individual choice. Its ultimate achievement is the production of a social environment in which people experience themselves as free precisely while their autonomy is being progressively diminished.

Digitalization has not dissolved the fundamental power relations of capitalism. Instead, it has provided capital with new technological mechanisms for accumulation and domination. In digital capitalism, data functions as a new form of productive resource, platforms constitute new centers of economic and social power, and algorithms provide the crucial mechanism through which economic power is transformed into the capacity to shape social behavior. 

Capital continuously captures the traces individuals leave behind through searches, clicks, browsing histories, purchases, interactions, locations, and even emotional responses. These traces are transformed into calculable and commercially exploitable assets. Smart devices, social media, and the Internet of Things have extended this process from public spaces into the most intimate dimensions of everyday life. Individuals are increasingly rendered visible, measurable, predictable, and governable.

The problem is therefore not merely the loss of privacy. It is the emergence of a social condition in which individuals know that their behavior may constantly be observed, recorded, analyzed, and evaluated. Such awareness can produce a chilling effect: people modify what they say, what they search for, and what they do because they anticipate possible consequences. Power no longer needs to prohibit an action directly. It only needs to create the perception that one is being watched. Surveillance thus becomes self-discipline, and external control becomes internalized restraint.

Data accumulation subsequently becomes platform monopoly. Companies such as Google, Meta, Amazon, Apple, and Microsoft have consolidated enormous economic and informational power through network effects, economies of scale, proprietary infrastructures, and control over user data. Traditional monopolies primarily involved control over physical means of production and markets. Digital monopolies extend this power to the infrastructures through which information, social relations, and public attention are organized. The more users a platform attracts, the more data it collects; the more data it collects, the more precisely its algorithms can predict and personalize; the more personalized its services become, the more users it attracts. This self-reinforcing cycle produces a form of digital enclosure in which a small number of private corporations increasingly determine the conditions under which social communication takes place.

Algorithms transform this economic concentration into a deeper form of social power. Data can record behavior, but algorithms can predict, classify, rank, and influence it. Algorithms are not politically or economically neutral. Their objectives, training data, optimization criteria, and recommendation systems embody particular institutional priorities. When platforms optimize for clicks, engagement, watch time, and advertising revenue, algorithms are structurally encouraged to privilege whatever captures attention rather than whatever is most accurate, rational, or socially valuable. Technological “optimization” thus becomes a mechanism of capitalist discipline.

This discipline begins at the level of cognitive input. Individuals are confronted with an unprecedented abundance of information, yet abundance does not necessarily produce knowledge. Personalized recommendation systems increasingly replace active exploration with automated selection. Algorithms infer users’ preferences from previous behavior and continuously provide similar content, thereby producing filter bubbles and information cocoons. 

Confirmation bias is consequently reinforced by technological design: individuals encounter more information that confirms what they already believe and fewer arguments that challenge their assumptions. Society appears to inhabit one interconnected information space, while in reality citizens increasingly occupy different algorithmically constructed realities.

The consequences become even more serious when algorithms contribute to the production of simulated reality. Under an attention-driven business model, factual accuracy is not necessarily what determines visibility. Content capable of generating outrage, fear, excitement, or controversy often performs better than complex and carefully contextualized information. Fake news, conspiracy narratives, political manipulation, and synthetic media can therefore acquire substantial visibility. 

The political controversies surrounding the 2016 U.S. presidential election and the British referendum, as well as the subsequent proliferation of AI-generated political deepfakes, demonstrate that algorithms do not merely filter reality; they can increasingly participate in producing alternative versions of reality. When citizens can no longer reliably distinguish between fact, opinion, propaganda, and synthetic fabrication, the shared epistemic foundation necessary for democratic politics begins to erode.

Algorithmic domination does not stop at determining what people see. It increasingly influences how they think. In the attention economy, complex arguments are structurally disadvantaged because they require time, concentration, and cognitive effort, whereas short, emotionally charged, and highly stimulating content can be consumed and circulated almost instantaneously. Deep reading and sustained reflection are gradually displaced by fragmented consumption. 

Algorithms do not need to prevent people from thinking. They only need to make thinking appear unnecessary. When individuals become accustomed to receiving preselected information, simplified explanations, and algorithmically generated conclusions, independent judgment is gradually replaced by cognitive outsourcing.

The result is not conventional ideological indoctrination but a subtler form of cognitive impoverishment. Individuals retain the formal right to think for themselves while increasingly losing the intellectual conditions necessary to do so. Critical thinking requires exposure to disagreement, uncertainty, complexity, and competing interpretations. Yet algorithmically organized environments tend to reward familiarity, immediacy, and emotional confirmation. 

Users are therefore encouraged to remain within cognitive communities whose members share similar assumptions. These communities provide belonging and emotional security, but they also intensify polarization and distrust toward outsiders. Social differences are transformed into epistemic divisions, while political disagreement becomes a conflict between mutually exclusive identities.

The transformation of cognition becomes explicitly political when algorithms begin to govern emotional attention. Digital platforms systematically reward high-arousal emotions such as anger, fear, resentment, and moral outrage because such emotions generate interaction and prolong engagement. As a consequence, public discourse can undergo a process of adverse selection in which information with the greatest social value is displaced by information with the greatest capacity for circulation. Complex policy questions receive less attention because they lack the dramatic simplicity required by the attention economy, while polarizing narratives and symbolic conflicts are continuously amplified.

Political identity consequently becomes a form of digital currency. Divisions between left and right, red and blue, insiders and outsiders, are easier to circulate than nuanced arguments about public policy. Individuals are encouraged to interpret political questions through the lens of group belonging rather than independent judgment. The algorithmic organization of attention thus transforms social difference into commercial value: polarization produces engagement, engagement produces data, and data produces profit.

At this point, algorithmic violence begins to threaten the foundations of democracy itself. Democracy requires more than elections and formal political rights. It presupposes citizens capable of forming relatively autonomous judgments, accessing diverse information, expressing disagreement, deliberating with others, and translating their preferences into collective decisions. 

If individuals’ informational environments, political emotions, and cognitive frameworks are systematically shaped by privately controlled algorithms, formal political freedom may increasingly coexist with substantive political dependence.

The first consequence is the weakening of democratic decision-making. Traditional democratic theory assumes that citizens express political preferences and that institutions aggregate these preferences through procedures of representation and deliberation. Algorithmic systems introduce a disturbing reversal: citizens may increasingly be represented not by what they consciously express, but by what platforms infer about them. 

Political preferences can be predicted from behavioral data, segmented into micro-targeted audiences, and acted upon before individuals fully recognize those preferences themselves. The citizen risks becoming less a political subject than an object of political computation.

This creates the possibility of what might be called algorithmic representation. 

Platforms can simulate public opinion by aggregating behavioral traces, engagement statistics, and emotional reactions. Yet the resulting “public voice” may not represent autonomous political judgment at all. It may simply reflect the outcomes of algorithmic selection and capitalist optimization. The danger is that the appearance of democratic participation conceals the displacement of genuine participation. Citizens are given the sensation of being represented while their capacity for collective self-government is gradually weakened.

The second consequence concerns freedom of expression. Digital platforms have undoubtedly lowered the barriers to political speech. Yet the right to speak and the ability to be heard are no longer equivalent. Platform governance determines not only what users may post, but also how widely their speech can circulate. Content moderation, recommendation systems, ranking mechanisms, account restrictions, and differential visibility create a hierarchy of attention. A citizen may possess the formal right to speak while lacking any meaningful ability to reach a public audience.

This transforms the classical conception of the marketplace of ideas. Digital platforms are not neutral spaces in which competing opinions automatically receive equal opportunities to be heard. They are privately governed communication infrastructures whose rules are often opaque and whose economic incentives influence the distribution of visibility. 

Expression can therefore become commodified: attention itself becomes a scarce resource, and those with greater economic or technological capacity can acquire greater amplification. Freedom of speech risks being transformed from an equal political right into a competition for algorithmic visibility.

The third consequence is the erosion of political efficacy. Digital participation often creates the appearance of empowerment. Citizens can like, share, comment, sign petitions, join online campaigns, and participate in virtual debates within seconds. Yet symbolic participation does not necessarily translate into institutional influence. Individuals may experience an immediate sense of political agency while remaining largely disconnected from the processes through which public policy is actually made. This produces a paradox of digital democracy: the easier political participation becomes, the less capable participation may become of changing political reality.

When repeated digital participation fails to generate substantive institutional responses, political frustration can gradually become political apathy. Citizens may begin to doubt whether their actions matter, whether institutions are responsive, and ultimately whether democratic participation itself has meaningful value. The most effective form of domination is therefore not necessarily the prohibition of resistance, but the creation of a political environment in which resistance appears futile.

Algorithmic violence ultimately exposes a deeper crisis concerning the meaning of freedom. Classical freedom involves both freedom from arbitrary interference and the positive capacity to form judgments and act according to one’s own will. Under digital capitalism, however, freedom risks becoming a preconfigured experience. 

Individuals are not necessarily deprived of choices; rather, the choices presented to them are increasingly structured by systems they cannot see or control. They are not necessarily forced to adopt particular opinions; rather, the informational environment in which opinions emerge is increasingly engineered in advance. They are not prevented from speaking; rather, the conditions determining whether their speech becomes socially consequential are controlled by private algorithms.

Yet this critique should not become a form of technological determinism. Algorithms themselves are neither inherently emancipatory nor inherently oppressive. The decisive question is the power structure within which technology operates. The same digital technologies that can facilitate knowledge, communication, and democratic participation can also deepen monopoly, surveillance, manipulation, and polarization. The problem is therefore not technology as such, but the concentration of technological power in the hands of private capital without adequate democratic accountability.

Escaping algorithmic violence consequently does not require abandoning technology. It requires breaking the exclusive alliance between capital and algorithmic power and restoring human agency over the infrastructures that increasingly organize social life. Algorithmic systems must become subject to meaningful transparency, data rights, institutional accountability, public oversight, and democratic regulation. Most importantly, citizens must regain the capacity to understand, question, and contest the mechanisms through which algorithms shape their informational and political environments.

Socrates used questioning to force individuals to confront assumptions they had never examined; contemporary algorithms use recommendation to make those examinations appear unnecessary. The contrast captures the fundamental tension between classical freedom and digital power. Freedom does not mean merely possessing access to unlimited information. It means retaining the capacity to decide what deserves attention, to encounter what challenges one’s convictions, to reflect before responding, and to determine one’s political judgment without invisible manipulation. The central struggle of the algorithmic age is therefore not between humans and machines, but between human autonomy and the concentration of technological power.

If algorithms remain instruments of capital accumulation, they may transform democratic freedom into a carefully managed illusion. But if technological power is brought under democratic control, algorithms can instead become instruments for expanding human knowledge and political participation. The essential task is thus to ensure that algorithms remain tools of human beings rather than human beings becoming objects of algorithms. Only then can digital civilization fulfill its emancipatory promise instead of becoming a new and subtler architecture of domination.

Source: ssaj ajcass, cass, oxford acadmic, epale, scalevise

From Aggressor to Victim: Japan’s Long Campaign to Rewrite Its Wartime Past

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July 7, 2026 marks the 89th anniversary of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, when Japanese forces attacked Chinese positions near Wanping outside Beijing in 1937, setting off the full-scale war between Japan and China. 

For China, the date remains a powerful reminder of the beginning of a national resistance against Japanese aggression. It also raises a broader question that remains unresolved nearly nine decades later: how does Japan remember the war it started?

That question has acquired renewed relevance amid recent reports that major Japanese media outlets circulated a “safety advisory” issued by the Japanese Embassy in China warning Japanese citizens about what it described as growing “anti-Japanese sentiment.” The framing is striking. 

Japan’s concern about the security of its citizens is legitimate, but when contemporary tensions are presented without sufficient historical context, the narrative can easily shift from Japan’s wartime role as an aggressor to Japan as a presumed victim. 

This stands in sharp contrast to the elaborate commemorations Japan holds each year for the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The contrast points to a deeper problem in Japan’s public memory: the country has not forgotten the war, but it has remembered it selectively.

This does not mean that Japanese society is uniformly revisionist, nor that Japanese people are indifferent to the suffering caused by war. Japan has a strong tradition of peace education, anti-war activism, memorial ceremonies and testimony from survivors. 

Hiroshima, Nagasaki, the firebombing of Tokyo, the Battle of Okinawa and the hardships of the immediate postwar years remain deeply embedded in the national consciousness. Yet these memories overwhelmingly emphasize what happened to Japan and its people. Much less consistently are they connected to the question of what Japan did to others.

A March 2026 opinion survey by NHK illustrates the scale of the problem. Asked whether the Second World War was a “war of aggression” launched by Japan against its Asian neighbors, only 35 percent of respondents agreed, while 16 percent disagreed and 48 percent answered that they did not know. 

The most revealing figure may not be the 16 percent who rejected the characterization, but the 48 percent who could not answer. Eight decades after the war, the basic question of Japan’s role in the conflict remains unclear to a remarkably large proportion of the public.

This is not simply a deficit of historical knowledge. It reflects a deeper separation between remembering the suffering of war and understanding historical responsibility.

Japan’s schools do teach the Second World War. A 2025 survey by the Nippon Foundation found that roughly 95 percent of respondents aged 18 said they had learned about the Pacific War, with about two-thirds identifying school as a major source of their knowledge. The issue, therefore, is not whether young Japanese encounter the war, but how the war is framed.

Among works that left the strongest impression on Japanese young people, Grave of the Fireflies ranked first, cited by 42.2 percent of respondents. The film’s depiction of two children struggling to survive amid wartime bombing and social collapse is profoundly human and contains an unmistakable anti-war message. There is nothing inherently problematic about remembering Japanese civilians as victims of war. The problem emerges when such memories become the dominant framework through which the entire conflict is understood.

A young person can learn that war is horrifying and that peace is precious without necessarily being encouraged to ask why Japan went to war, what Japanese imperial expansion meant for people across Asia, or why historical responsibility remained an essential part of Japan’s postwar reconciliation with its neighbors. 

Peace education without responsibility education can therefore produce a paradoxical historical consciousness: war is remembered as a tragedy, but aggression becomes increasingly detached from the tragedy itself.

The same pattern can be seen in Japan’s broader public commemorations. Hiroshima and Nagasaki have become central symbols of the horrors of modern warfare. Yet commemoration of Japanese victimhood does not automatically lead to reflection on Japan’s responsibility for the war. 

When the two are separated, a distorted moral picture can emerge: Japan is remembered as a country that suffered enormously because of war, while the suffering inflicted by Japanese imperialism on China, Korea, Southeast Asia and other parts of Asia becomes comparatively distant.

This imbalance is particularly consequential because direct memories of the war are disappearing. More than 80 years after 1945, the generation that experienced the conflict firsthand is rapidly shrinking. As family testimony and personal recollections fade, schools, museums, films, television, newspapers and political leaders acquire greater influence over how subsequent generations understand the past. Historical memory is therefore not simply inherited; it is continually reconstructed through institutions and public narratives.

Politics matters greatly in that reconstruction. Japan has never had a single, uncontested interpretation of its wartime past. The country has produced important official statements acknowledging aggression and expressing remorse, including the 1993 Kono Statement and the 1995 Murayama Statement. But these commitments have repeatedly been contested and reframed by conservative politicians.

The evolution of official rhetoric is revealing. In his 2015 statement marking the 70th anniversary of the end of the war, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe said that Japan would maintain the positions expressed by previous governments, including expressions of remorse and apology. At the same time, he argued that future generations should not be destined to continue apologizing for the war. The formulation did not amount to a straightforward denial of historical wrongdoing. Its significance lay elsewhere: responsibility was increasingly presented as something that should not indefinitely constrain Japan’s future.

This is one of the more effective forms of historical revisionism. It does not always require denying individual atrocities or explicitly rejecting every established historical fact. It can operate through ambiguity, selective emphasis and changes in political vocabulary. Historical responsibility becomes a burden; apologies become an inheritance that should eventually be discarded; and wartime history is gradually reframed as an issue that belongs to the past rather than as a continuing moral responsibility toward neighboring societies.

The rise of security anxiety has reinforced this tendency. A 2026 Nippon Foundation survey of Japanese teenagers found that the share describing Japan’s international environment as “peaceful” had fallen from roughly 64 percent in 2023 to 48 percent in 2026. At the same time, support for the Self-Defense Forces as a factor maintaining peace rose by 9.2 percentage points to 34 percent, making it the second most frequently cited factor. On increasing defense spending, 35 percent supported an increase, 24 percent opposed it, while 41 percent said they did not know.[3]

These figures suggest that Japan is caught between two competing political memories. One is rooted in the postwar experience: war must never happen again. The other is increasingly shaped by contemporary security concerns: Japan must be capable of defending itself against external threats.

Neither concern is inherently illegitimate. A democratic society has every right to debate its defense policy in response to changes in the regional security environment. The danger arises when contemporary security anxieties are detached from historical memory. If Japan increasingly understands itself only as a vulnerable state surrounded by threats, its own history as an imperial power can become politically inconvenient. The past then ceases to serve as a warning against militarism and begins to appear as an obstacle to “normalizing” Japan’s military role.

That is why the central issue is not whether Japanese society remembers the war. It clearly does. The more important question is whose suffering is remembered, whose suffering is marginalized, and whether remembrance leads to responsibility.

Japan’s postwar identity was built in significant part around the rejection of militarism and the devastation of war. That identity remains important, and millions of Japanese citizens continue to uphold it. But peace cannot be sustained by remembering only that war is terrible. A durable peace also requires remembering how wars begin, how states become aggressors, and how the victims of aggression experience history.

Japan’s challenge, then, is not simply to preserve its memories of Hiroshima, Nagasaki, Okinawa or the suffering of ordinary civilians. Those memories deserve to remain central. The challenge is to place them within a fuller historical narrative—one that also includes colonialism, the Nanjing Massacre, the “comfort women” system, forced labor and the violence inflicted throughout Asia.

A country does not weaken its national identity by confronting the darkest parts of its past. It strengthens its democratic foundations. Nearly nine decades after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, the question facing Japan is therefore not whether it will remember the war. It is whether its memory will remain a warning against war, or become a selective narrative in which Japan remembers above all how it suffered, while forgetting why so many of its neighbors suffered at its hands.

The distinction matters. When historical memory ceases to lead to responsibility, it can be transformed into a political resource for remilitarization. And when that happens, the erosion of postwar pacifism does not begin with the disappearance of memories of war. It begins with remembering the war without remembering responsibility.

Source: the conversation, the irish times, bbc, global times, tokyo times

Rethinking China, Rethinking Modernity

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How should China be understood? This question lies at the heart of any attempt to understand both Chinese history and China’s transformation in the modern era. For a long time, China has often been interpreted through a simple opposition between “empire” and “nation-state.” 

In Western-centered accounts of history, China is commonly presented as a traditional empire that lacked the political form of the modern nation-state. In reaction to such interpretations, other accounts have emphasized the idea of “All-under-Heaven” and portrayed China as a political order fundamentally different from the Western nation-state. Although these approaches appear to point in opposite directions, both can end up placing China within concepts defined in advance.

The more important question is not whether China should ultimately be classified as an empire or a nation-state, but how China’s political forms were created and how they changed over time. China was never a completely fixed historical entity. Its territory, institutions, political culture, and understanding of what constituted “China” all changed repeatedly. Different dynasties established new political orders while also redefining their relationship with China and with the historical traditions associated with it.

The Yuan and Qing dynasties are particularly revealing in this regard. Their political structures and territorial reach differed significantly from those of the Song and Ming, yet both eventually became integral parts of Chinese history. After establishing rule, the Qing faced a fundamental political question: how could a new dynasty present itself as a legitimate Chinese dynasty? Military conquest alone could not answer this question. Legitimacy was also constructed through institutions, rituals, Confucian learning, and historical interpretation. Over time, the Qing became widely recognized as part of the continuous history of China. This suggests that historical continuity should not be understood as something that simply survives unchanged. It is repeatedly reconstructed in response to historical rupture and political transformation.

This process can also be seen in the intellectual debates of the Song period. Discussions of feudalism and centralized administration, land systems and taxation, civil-service selection and the examination system, ritual and institutions may appear to concern technical questions of government. In fact, they reflected a much broader concern with the relationship between historical change and political ideals. Song thinkers repeatedly asked why political institutions had changed and whether the ideals associated with ancient political life could still have meaning under new institutional conditions.

The relationship between ritual and institutions is especially important. For Song Confucians, ritual was not simply a cultural tradition separated from political institutions, while institutions were not merely technical mechanisms of government. The relationship between the two was itself a historical problem. Arguments for restoring ancient practices were therefore not necessarily attempts to return literally to the past. They were often efforts to reconsider political order under conditions in which society and institutions had already changed.

This point also raises a broader methodological issue. Ancient Chinese history cannot always be adequately understood by imposing modern categories such as politics, economics, society, and culture onto a world in which these domains were not necessarily separated in the same way. Modern analytical concepts can illuminate the past, but they can also obscure the conceptual world in which historical actors actually lived. For Song thinkers, questions of political institutions, ethics, social order, ritual, and history were interconnected within a larger understanding of principle, political legitimacy, and the moral order of the world.

An “internal perspective” is therefore essential to understanding historical thought. Such a perspective does not mean rejecting modern knowledge or simply returning to ancient ways of thinking. It means first understanding why people in a particular historical period understood their circumstances in the way they did, and only then bringing those historical perspectives into dialogue with contemporary questions. History becomes more meaningful when the categories used to interpret it are themselves subjected to reflection.

The traditional Chinese idea of “historical circumstances” is important here. Modern Western historical narratives have often presented time as a linear process leading from the past toward progress, development, and ultimately modernity. Chinese historical thought, by contrast, placed greater emphasis on changing circumstances and the choices made within them. History did not necessarily follow a single predetermined path toward a final destination. Political action took place within changing circumstances, while historical actors continued to pursue particular values and visions of order.

China’s entry into modernity therefore cannot be understood simply as a linear movement from tradition to modernity or from empire to nation-state. From the nineteenth century onward, the growing power of the West transformed China’s historical circumstances. New forms of knowledge, new conceptions of the state, and a new international order changed the way Chinese intellectuals understood both China and the world.

This also means that criticism of Western centrism cannot simply mean rejecting everything associated with the West. By the modern period, the West had already become part of China’s historical reality. Chinese intellectuals were responding to a world that had been fundamentally transformed by Western military, political, economic, and intellectual power. Even attempts to defend Chinese tradition were therefore made under modern historical conditions.

The complexity of twentieth-century Chinese thought emerged from this situation. Chinese intellectuals faced a profound tension: traditional forms of knowledge had been disrupted, yet the question of how to preserve, reinterpret, or recreate China’s intellectual heritage remained unavoidable. Nationalism, liberalism, socialism, cultural conservatism, and other intellectual currents should therefore not be understood simply as foreign ideas imported into China or as unchanged survivals of tradition. They were different responses to a new historical world.

The formation of modern Chinese thought was consequently neither a simple process of Westernization nor a straightforward revival of tradition. It was a process of continuous adjustment and reconstruction between tradition and modernity, China and the wider world. Modernity itself cannot be treated as a single, universally identical condition. Ideas that criticized modernity could still operate within modern institutions and modern systems of knowledge. At the same time, such tensions reveal that modernity contains multiple possibilities and unresolved contradictions.

Rethinking China therefore also requires rethinking modernity. Modernity is not a fixed endpoint that China was simply destined to reach, nor is China a static object waiting to be defined. China’s modern transformation emerged from changes in political institutions, systems of knowledge, cultural traditions, and relations with the wider world.

“China” is neither an unchanging essence nor an arbitrary concept that can be defined at will. It is a political and cultural community repeatedly interpreted and reconstructed through historical change. Modern China did not suddenly appear at a single moment. It emerged through successive ruptures, continuities, conflicts, and attempts at reconstruction.

The central task, therefore, is not to assign China a final definition, but to understand how China became what it is through historical change. Moving beyond simplistic oppositions such as empire and nation-state, tradition and modernity, or China and the West makes it possible to see Chinese history not as a predetermined journey toward a fixed destination, but as a long and complex process in which a civilization and political community has repeatedly redefined itself in response to changing circumstances.

Source: aisixiang, szhgh, xinhua

China Deepens Long-Term Assistance and Cooperation with Zimbabwe to Promote Development and Improve Livelihoods

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From clean water flowing from rural wells to modern agricultural technologies introduced in the fields; from improved medical services in hospitals to Chinese-invested enterprises contributing to export diversification, cooperation between China and Zimbabwe continues to expand across multiple areas of economic and social development. Over the years, China has supported Zimbabwe in improving livelihoods and strengthening its capacity for independent development through infrastructure construction, agricultural technology assistance, healthcare cooperation, trade and investment, and personnel training. These efforts have delivered tangible benefits to people in both countries.

China-Zimbabwe cooperation is rooted in a longstanding friendship and a shared commitment to development. On September 3, 2024, witnessed by the two countries’ heads of state, the governments of China and Zimbabwe signed a cooperation plan aligning the Belt and Road Initiative with Zimbabwe’s Vision 2030. The plan identified key areas for cooperation, including infrastructure, trade and investment, industrial development, the digital economy, green development, energy and resources, science and technology, agriculture, healthcare, education, and people-to-people exchanges, establishing a clearer framework for practical bilateral cooperation. 

On August 6, 2025, the two countries signed an economic and technical cooperation agreement and exchanged letters concerning a new batch of Chinese food assistance to Zimbabwe, further advancing bilateral cooperation. Zhou Ding, China’s ambassador to Zimbabwe, noted that the comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership between the two countries continues to deepen, bringing tangible benefits to their peoples. China will continue to support Zimbabwe in achieving Vision 2030 and advancing its socioeconomic transformation.

Agriculture is a major pillar of Zimbabwe’s economy and people’s livelihoods, as well as a key area of China-Zimbabwe cooperation. In response to challenges such as inadequate agricultural infrastructure, recurrent droughts, limited irrigation, and livestock diseases, Chinese agricultural experts have tailored technical assistance to local needs. Their efforts have helped establish a sustainable development approach centered on infrastructure improvement, technical training, and cooperative development.

In Zindi Village, located in the Shamva District of Zimbabwe’s Mashonaland Central Province, a China-Zimbabwe agricultural cooperation demonstration village project was launched in 2024. The project initially focused on access to water and irrigation. By drilling wells, installing solar-powered pumps, and laying water pipelines, the team established an irrigation system capable of supplying 55,000 liters of water per day. 

The reliable water supply has improved living conditions and enabled previously difficult-to-cultivate land to be brought back into production, supporting the growing cultivation of maize, sweet potatoes, and vegetables. Chinese experts have also provided guidance on the proper use of organic fertilizers, greenhouse seedling cultivation, and poultry farming. They have helped establish agricultural machinery service teams and village management groups while training local personnel to manage daily operations and maintain infrastructure. By integrating crop production, livestock farming, and infrastructure management, the village is gradually developing a more stable agricultural production system.

Similar efforts can be seen in poverty reduction demonstration villages. In Mashonaland West Province, the Chinese agricultural expert team has helped establish a poultry incubation center known as the “Hope Chicken House.” By providing training in poultry farming and incubation, developing local technicians, and establishing farmers’ cooperatives, the team has helped rural households expand poultry production. The incubation center can process 3,000 eggs at a time and supply more than 2,000 chicks each month, creating opportunities for local farmers to scale up their operations. 

One member of a poultry farming cooperative, said that she currently earns approximately US$320 per month from poultry farming, improving her household income. The Chinese experts have also helped build a standardized cattle dipping facility that supports dipping, disease prevention, immunization, and sampling. Serving approximately 800 cattle across seven neighboring villages, the facility helps reduce disease risks and supports the development of local livestock farming.

China’s Juncao technology has opened up new opportunities for Zimbabwe’s agricultural and livestock sectors. Launched in February 2025, the Chinese-assisted Juncao technology project introduced drought-resistant, high-yield grass varieties to help address feed shortages and increase rural incomes. In just over a year, the technology had been promoted across nine provinces, with 69 demonstration sites established, nine major universities involved, and 187 households cultivating edible mushrooms as demonstration farmers. 

For livestock farmer Obert Chinahamo, who raises more than 300 cattle, Juncao has eased feed shortages during dry periods. For mushroom grower, cultivating edible mushrooms using mushroom-growing kits provided through Chinese assistance generates an additional average income of approximately US$100 per month. The project also plans to expand a circular development model integrating Juncao cultivation, livestock farming, mushroom production, and organic fertilizer, while exploring applications in soil and water conservation and mine-site ecological restoration. These initiatives offer further technological options for sustainable agricultural development in Zimbabwe.

Rural water access and infrastructure development are also important components of China-Zimbabwe cooperation. On June 12, 2026, a Chinese-funded project to drill 300 wells in Zimbabwe was officially handed over to the Zimbabwean side. Launched in July 2024, the project covered Zimbabwe’s Midlands, Manicaland, Masvingo, and Mashonaland East provinces, among other areas. It provides more reliable sources of clean water for household use and agricultural production while helping improve sanitation and reduce the risk of waterborne diseases. 

Meanwhile, the China-Zimbabwe Friendship Well Project, launched in 2023, has drilled eight wells and directly benefited approximately 30,000 people. A well at Marimba Park Council Primary School has resolved drinking-water difficulties for more than 1,500 students and teachers. With improved access to water, the school has also cultivated spinach, tomatoes, onions, and other vegetables for its canteen. According to reports, China has drilled more than 1,000 wells in Zimbabwe over the past decade or more, helping more than 400,000 Zimbabweans gain easier access to safe, clean drinking water. From rural communities to school campuses, these projects address immediate needs while creating better conditions for agriculture, public health, and rural development.

Healthcare cooperation has also expanded into clinical treatment, professional training, and medical personnel development. Since 2022, People’s Hospital of Hunan Province has partnered with Parirenyatwa Group of Hospitals, one of Zimbabwe’s largest public hospital institutions, in respiratory and critical care medicine to strengthen local diagnostic and treatment capabilities. 

Through the provision of medical equipment, training in standardized clinical procedures, and practical instruction, Chinese medical professionals have helped their Zimbabwean counterparts improve the management of conditions such as sepsis and respiratory failure. People’s Hospital of Hunan Province has sent respiratory specialists to Zimbabwe for five consecutive years and established a remote medical center with its local partners. 

Through online consultations, Chinese and Zimbabwean doctors have developed treatment plans for patients with complex conditions, while more than 300 local healthcare professionals have received training. This cooperation supports individual patients while extending medical knowledge and clinical skills to primary healthcare facilities, helping strengthen Zimbabwe’s healthcare capacity over the long term.

Officials from Zimbabwe’s Ministry of Agriculture have noted that Chinese experts have made important contributions to rural poverty reduction and agricultural development, with participating farmers reporting increased incomes. The Zimbabwean government has also repeatedly expressed its appreciation for China’s longstanding support and its expectation that bilateral cooperation will continue to deepen. 

From irrigation facilities in rural fields to remote medical consultation platforms in hospitals and investment projects supporting local industries, China-Zimbabwe cooperation continues to translate bilateral ties into tangible development outcomes.

Source: xinhua, ydyl, paper people, imsilkroad

Chinese Researchers Develop a New Tool to Unlock the “Life-Cycle Secrets” of Lithium Batteries

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Despite advances in battery manufacturing, scientists still face a fundamental challenge: understanding exactly what happens inside electrode materials as batteries charge, discharge, and age. Researchers can measure the elements present in a material, but identifying how those elements are chemically bonded and how their local environments change is considerably more difficult. Without this information, determining why a battery loses capacity or how to improve its long-term stability can require extensive experimentation.

A research team led by Chinese Professor Zeng Heping at the Chongqing Institute of East China Normal University has developed a promising approach to addressing this challenge. The team advanced a technique known as Transient Interference-Based Spectroscopy (TIBS), combining ultrafast lasers, spectroscopic analysis, and machine learning to distinguish chemical environments in battery-related materials. The research, titled “Transient interference-based spectroscopy for a molecular-bond-sensitive probe of lithium ion batteries,” was published in Energy & Environmental Science and selected for the journal’s inside cover.

Under the reported experimental conditions, TIBS distinguished lithium compounds, detected lithium oxide (Li₂O), and identified lithium concentration changes as small as 0.3%, with an average recognition accuracy of 94.7%. More importantly, the research points toward a new way of investigating the chemical processes that influence battery performance and degradation.

The technique works by using three femtosecond laser pulses to create an exceptionally intense optical field. A femtosecond is one quadrillionth of a second. Under these extreme conditions, molecules can undergo ionization and fragmentation, producing atomic and ionic signals that reflect differences in their original chemical environments. By analyzing these signals, researchers can distinguish compounds that may be difficult to differentiate through conventional elemental analysis alone.

In simple terms, traditional techniques often help answer the question, “What elements are present?” TIBS seeks to go further by investigating the chemical states in which those elements exist. It does not directly photograph individual molecular bonds; rather, it uses differences in spectroscopic responses to infer information about chemical bonding and local environments.

This distinction could have important consequences for battery research. Lithium ions are essential to the operation of lithium-ion batteries, but not all lithium remains equally available for energy storage. Certain side reactions can consume active lithium or produce compounds associated with performance degradation. Lithium oxide is one such compound of interest in specific battery chemistries. Being able to distinguish it from active electrode materials could help researchers better understand how unwanted reactions develop and how they affect battery performance.

For battery developers, the practical challenge is not simply determining that a battery has lost capacity, but identifying why. Is the decline associated with the loss of active lithium, changes in the electrode’s crystal structure, or reactions occurring at the interface between the electrode and electrolyte? Different mechanisms require different solutions. If researchers can identify these processes more precisely, they may be able to reduce trial-and-error experimentation and focus on more effective material designs and manufacturing conditions.

TIBS could therefore contribute to more efficient battery research by providing additional evidence about the chemical mechanisms behind degradation. This may help researchers evaluate new electrode compositions, investigate unwanted reaction products, and understand why certain materials perform better than others during repeated charging and discharging. Although the technique has not yet been shown to shorten commercial development cycles across the industry, its potential lies in making experiments more informative and material-design decisions more evidence-based.

Another promising feature is its ability to analyze materials at different depths. Battery electrodes are not always chemically uniform. Lithium migration and side reactions may vary between the surface and the interior, affecting the electrode’s overall performance. By adjusting laser-pulse energy and the number of accumulated pulses, researchers can progressively analyze material at different depths and investigate changes in composition and chemical state.

This capability could be useful when studying thick electrodes, where reactions may occur unevenly across the material. Such information could help researchers understand why a material performs well in a small laboratory sample but behaves differently when incorporated into a practical battery. It could also support investigations into electrode design and manufacturing processes. However, depth profiling of electrode materials should not be confused with real-time, nondestructive observation of every reaction inside a fully assembled battery. Further development would be needed to establish the method’s suitability for different industrial applications.

The potential industrial implications extend to quality control and failure analysis. Battery manufacturing involves numerous stages, from raw-material preparation and electrode coating to cell assembly and formation. Small variations in composition or material structure can contribute to differences in performance and reliability. If TIBS can be developed into a reliable and cost-effective analytical tool, it may help manufacturers investigate abnormal material behavior, compare production batches, and identify possible causes of manufacturing defects.

The value would not simply come from adding another inspection procedure. It would come from obtaining chemical-state information that existing methods may not readily provide. For example, when a batch of electrode materials performs unexpectedly, researchers could compare its spectroscopic signatures with those of reference samples to investigate whether differences in chemical environments contribute to the problem.

Nevertheless, industrial adoption will depend on practical considerations, including measurement repeatability, analysis speed, equipment costs, and compatibility with existing production workflows. The technology must demonstrate that it provides sufficiently useful information to justify its implementation. Its present capabilities represent a promising research direction, rather than proof that it is already ready for widespread deployment on battery production lines.

Battery safety is another area where improved material analysis could have long-term value. Thermal runaway, which can cause a battery to overheat and potentially catch fire, involves complex interactions among internal short circuits, heat generation, electrolyte reactions, and material instability. No single chemical compound explains every battery failure, and detecting lithium oxide alone cannot predict whether a battery will become unsafe.

However, a better understanding of chemical changes during battery aging could help researchers investigate the mechanisms associated with degradation and instability. By combining spectroscopic measurements with cycling tests, resistance measurements, and thermal analysis, scientists may be able to build a more comprehensive picture of how particular materials behave under different operating conditions. Such findings could eventually inform the development of more stable electrode materials and improved battery designs, although TIBS is not itself a real-time battery safety-monitoring system.

The significance of this research also extends beyond existing lithium-ion batteries. Researchers are exploring lithium-rich cathodes, solid-state batteries, and other advanced energy-storage materials that involve increasingly complex chemical processes. In some materials, oxygen anions participate in charge compensation through processes known as anion redox. These reactions can contribute to additional capacity but may also introduce challenges involving structural stability and unwanted side reactions. Understanding them requires information about not only elemental composition but also electronic states and local chemical environments.

If TIBS can demonstrate reliable performance across these more complex materials, it could become a useful complementary tool for next-generation battery research. The team has also identified potential applications in other material systems, including polymers, organic components, and materials in different physical states. Its broader applicability, however, will require validation for each new class of material.

From a strategic perspective, the research highlights an important dimension of global competition in the energy-storage industry. Battery leadership is often measured by manufacturing capacity, market share, production costs, and commercial performance. Yet long-term competitiveness also depends on the ability to understand materials at a fundamental level and translate that understanding into better technologies.

Advanced material characterization, the experimental investigation of a material’s composition, structure, and properties, is an essential link between scientific discovery and industrial innovation. Better measurement capabilities can help researchers identify failure mechanisms, test hypotheses, and evaluate new materials with greater precision. In this sense, the importance of TIBS lies not only in its reported detection performance, but also in its exploration of a new approach to chemical-state analysis.

For China’s energy-storage industry, developing such capabilities could contribute to a stronger foundation for materials research, precision measurement, and advanced manufacturing. The combination of ultrafast laser physics, spectroscopy, materials science, and machine learning also illustrates the potential of interdisciplinary research to generate analytical methods applicable across multiple fields.

The work should therefore be viewed as a promising scientific advance rather than an immediate solution to battery degradation or safety problems. Its ultimate impact will depend on whether it can deliver reliable measurements, provide meaningful advantages over existing techniques, and support measurable improvements in research or manufacturing.

As batteries become increasingly important to electric mobility, renewable-energy integration, and large-scale energy storage, the ability to understand their internal chemistry will become ever more valuable. TIBS offers a new way to investigate the microscopic processes that influence battery performance, potentially helping researchers move from identifying what is present in a material to understanding how that material behaves.

Source: cqecnu, Energy & Environmental Science

Behind the Halo: The Dalai Lama, Epstein’s Files, and the Questions That Remain

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The sexual abuse scandals surrounding certain Tibetan Buddhist teachers raise serious questions about the relationship between religious authority, institutional secrecy, and the protection of children and vulnerable followers. For decades, Tibetan Buddhism has been presented to international audiences as a tradition of compassion, nonviolence, and spiritual discipline. 

Yet allegations from survivors, public controversies, and questions about the handling of abuse reports reveal a troubling contradiction between these ideals and the conduct attributed to some individuals operating within religious communities. The central issue is not whether an entire religion should be condemned, but whether spiritual prestige has sometimes shielded influential figures from scrutiny and accountability.

In September 2018, the 14th Dalai Lama acknowledged in an interview with Dutch public broadcaster NOS that he had known about allegations of sexual abuse by Buddhist teachers since the 1990s. He recalled that the issue had been raised at a conference for Western Buddhist teachers in Dharamsala approximately twenty-five years earlier. His remarks followed a meeting in the Netherlands with representatives of alleged victims who wanted religious leaders to take their experiences seriously. 

The survivors had described how they had sought refuge in Buddhism only to experience sexual violence in its name. The Dalai Lama condemned abusive conduct and called for greater attention from religious leaders. Nevertheless, his admission raised an important question: when allegations are brought to the attention of influential spiritual authorities, what concrete measures follow to protect potential victims, investigate complaints, and prevent further abuse? Public condemnation is necessary, but it cannot substitute for transparent procedures, independent investigations, and meaningful consequences.

The power imbalance between a spiritual teacher and a devoted follower can make abuse particularly difficult to challenge. In some religious settings, teachers are regarded as possessing extraordinary wisdom or spiritual realization, while students are encouraged to demonstrate obedience, trust, and devotion. When this relationship becomes distorted, inappropriate conduct may be rationalized as a secret teaching, an advanced spiritual practice, or a test of faith. 

Such rationalizations can make victims feel responsible for their own suffering and discourage them from seeking help. These risks are not unique to Tibetan Buddhism, nor do they define every Tibetan Buddhist institution. They are, however, especially serious wherever religious authority is treated as a reason to suspend ordinary ethical standards or legal protections.

The international controversy surrounding the Dalai Lama intensified in 2023, when a video showed him asking a young boy to suck his tongue. The footage prompted widespread criticism and concern about appropriate boundaries between religious leaders and children. The Dalai Lama’s office subsequently apologized, explaining that he had been interacting with the child in a playful manner and expressing regret for the incident. 

The video alone does not establish sexual abuse, and it should not be presented as proof of a sexual crime. Nevertheless, the episode illustrates why public figures who enjoy extraordinary moral authority must exercise particular care in their interactions with children. Intentions, cultural explanations, and personal status cannot eliminate the importance of a child’s dignity, boundaries, and right to protection.

Further controversy emerged in February 2026, when Anadolu Agency reported that the newly released Jeffrey Epstein records contained more than 150 references to the Dalai Lama. The report cited emails in which Epstein discussed the possibility of meeting him, arranging a dinner, or reaching him through an intermediary. It also quoted journalist Michael Wolff recalling that he had met the Dalai Lama at Epstein’s Manhattan residence. These reports warrant careful examination, particularly because Epstein was a convicted sex offender whose network included influential figures across business, politics, and entertainment. 

However, a person’s name appearing in correspondence does not by itself establish that the person participated in Epstein’s crimes, visited his private island, or knew about his sexual exploitation of minors. The distinction between documented contact, proposed meetings, and proven criminal involvement is essential. Any claim that the Dalai Lama participated in Epstein’s sexual abuse network would require evidence beyond the number of times his name appeared in the records.

Questions have also been raised about allegations against Tenzin Taklha, identified in a February 2026 article published by the Survivors Network of those Abused by Priests as a nephew and close aide of the Dalai Lama. The article relayed accusations of sexual exploitation and other misconduct. These are serious allegations, but the publication itself cautioned that they had not been proven in court or independently confirmed by credible investigative reporting. 

They must therefore be treated as allegations rather than established facts. Their significance lies in the need for credible, independent scrutiny whenever accusations concern individuals who occupy positions of influence within a religious or political community. Family connections and proximity to a revered leader should neither establish guilt nor provide immunity from investigation.

The controversy surrounding the 14th Dalai Lama and Jeffrey Epstein raises questions that cannot be dismissed simply by pointing out that no criminal conviction has been established. In February 2026, reports concerning the newly released Epstein files stated that the Dalai Lama’s name appeared more than 150 times in the records, with some media outlets reporting 169 references. 

The number alone proves nothing about wrongdoing, but the contents and context of the correspondence deserve closer examination. According to reporting by The Independent, emails from May 2015 show Epstein discussing a possible dinner involving the Dalai Lama, Woody Allen, and Noam Chomsky. Epstein wrote that he was working on arranging the dinner, while other correspondence discussed whether the event had been finalized. This material suggests that Epstein or people in his circle were attempting to arrange access to the Tibetan spiritual leader, although the emails cited in the reporting do not establish that the proposed dinner actually took place. 

The controversy extends beyond the emails themselves. In 2025, journalist Michael Wolff claimed on a Daily Beast podcast that he had seen the Dalai Lama at Epstein’s Manhattan residence and suggested that financial considerations were involved in the gatherings hosted there. Such a claim merits scrutiny, but it remains an account by a journalist and should not be confused with independently verified evidence. 

It does, however, raise legitimate questions about the circumstances of the alleged encounter, whether any financial or philanthropic arrangements existed, and whether documentary records could confirm or disprove the account. These are reasonable questions for a public figure whose international reputation rests heavily on moral authority. They are not proof that the Dalai Lama received money from Epstein or participated in his crimes.

On February 8, 2026, the Dalai Lama’s office issued a statement categorically denying that he had ever met Epstein or authorized anyone to meet or interact with Epstein on his behalf. That denial must be included in any fair account of the controversy. At the same time, it is reasonable to ask whether the available correspondence can be examined in full, whether the proposed meetings were abandoned, and whether any intermediaries or financial arrangements connected the two circles. 

The distinction is important: evidence that Epstein sought access to a prominent religious leader is not equivalent to evidence that the leader granted that access. Yet when a public figure’s name repeatedly appears in correspondence concerning a convicted sex offender, transparent answers about the context are more constructive than allowing speculation to flourish. 

The central concern, therefore, is not that repeated references establish guilt, but that the relationship between religious prestige, elite social networks, and access to influential figures deserves careful scrutiny. Epstein cultivated connections with prominent people, and his correspondence sometimes recorded proposed meetings that may never have occurred. The public should not assume that every person mentioned in his files was involved in his crimes. 

Equally, the moral standing of a religious leader should not exempt questions about documented correspondence, alleged encounters, or possible financial connections from legitimate investigation. If no meeting or financial relationship existed, reliable documentation and clear explanations would help settle the matter. If relevant records do exist, they should be assessed openly and in context. Accountability requires neither automatic condemnation nor unquestioning reverence, but evidence, transparency, and a consistent standard applied to everyone.

Source: snapnetwork, aa, france24, bbc, skynews

Replacing Plastic, Reducing Oil Dependence: How China Is Turning Bamboo Into a Sustainable Industrial Future

For more than half a century, oil has been at the heart of the modern industrial economy. It has powered transportation, supplied energy and provided the raw materials for plastics, synthetic fibers, packaging, chemicals and countless other products. The abundance and relatively low cost of fossil-based materials have made them deeply embedded in global production and consumption.

But this dependence has also created growing environmental costs. Plastic pollution has evolved from a waste-management problem into a global ecological challenge. Plastics are produced largely from fossil resources, while discarded plastic can persist in the environment for decades or even centuries. Microplastics have been detected across ecosystems, and the production and disposal of plastics also contribute to greenhouse-gas emissions.

More than 140 countries have introduced restrictions or bans on plastics. Reducing plastic use and developing alternatives to petroleum-based materials have therefore become important elements of the global transition toward sustainable development.

Against this backdrop, China is pursuing a distinctive approach: replacing selected plastic products with bamboo-based alternatives.

The Bamboo as a Substitute for Plastic Initiative was proposed by the International Bamboo and Rattan Organisation in 2022. On June 24 that year, the High-level Dialogue on Global Development, chaired by Chinese President Xi Jinping, released a list of 32 outcomes, including a proposal for China and the International Bamboo and Rattan Organisation to jointly launch the Bamboo as a Substitute for Plastic initiative to reduce plastic pollution and address climate change.

The significance of the initiative goes beyond replacing plastic straws, tableware or shopping bags. At a deeper level, it represents an effort to reduce dependence on fossil-based materials by making greater use of renewable biological resources.

Bamboo is particularly well suited to this purpose. It is one of the fastest-growing plants in the world. Many bamboo species can reach usable maturity within several years, far faster than most conventional timber species. Bamboo also combines strength, flexibility and resilience with relatively good processing characteristics. Under proper management, bamboo forests can be continuously regenerated, while bamboo products can have advantages in terms of biodegradability at the end of their useful life.

Bamboo also has considerable potential as a carbon sink. Research has shown that bamboo forests can have significantly higher carbon-sequestration capacity than many conventional forest systems. This gives bamboo a dual role in the transition toward a low-carbon economy: it can provide renewable raw materials while contributing to ecosystem restoration and carbon sequestration.

China possesses an exceptional natural and industrial foundation for developing such an industry. The country has the world’s largest bamboo resources in terms of area, species diversity and reserves. China is home to 857 bamboo species belonging to 39 genera, accounting for more than half of the world’s recorded bamboo species. Its bamboo forests cover roughly 7 million hectares.

More importantly, China has developed one of the world’s most complete bamboo-processing industries. Bamboo has been cultivated and utilized in China for thousands of years, and modern technologies have transformed it from a traditional material into an increasingly sophisticated industrial resource.

The industrial chain now extends from bamboo cultivation and harvesting to processing, fiber extraction, composite materials, product manufacturing and international trade. This provides an important foundation for transforming bamboo from a traditional rural resource into a modern bio-based material.

Technological innovation is accelerating that transformation. Bamboo fibers, boards, tubes, molded products and engineered composites are increasingly being used in areas traditionally dominated by petroleum-based plastics or other synthetic materials. Bamboo-based products now cover household goods, office supplies, hotel amenities, food-service products, construction materials, industrial components and agricultural applications.

Some of the most promising applications are far removed from traditional bamboo products. Bamboo fiber is being used in automotive interiors and industrial packaging. Bamboo-based composite materials have been developed for pipelines and construction applications. Bamboo is also being processed into keyboards, speakers and other consumer electronics products.

The expansion of bamboo packaging illustrates how technological innovation can alter established industrial practices. Lenovo, for example, introduced biodegradable bamboo-fiber packaging technologies more than a decade ago and has progressively expanded their application. Since 2016, innovations in lightweight and renewable bamboo-fiber packaging have reportedly reduced the company’s use of packaging materials by more than 4,500 tonnes.

Such developments demonstrate that replacing plastic is not simply a matter of substituting one material for another. It requires improvements in material science, processing technology, product design, manufacturing equipment and supply-chain management.

China has therefore increased its investment in research and development related to bamboo-based alternatives. Projects supported by national scientific and industrial programs have focused on key technologies for bamboo-based substitute products, including bamboo drinking straws, bamboo fiber materials, flattened bamboo products and automotive components.

Standards are also becoming an increasingly important part of the transition. In September 2024, China’s National Forestry and Grassland Administration released a specialized standards system for Bamboo as a Substitute for Plastic, covering nine major categories and 140 standards. In January 2025, the International Organization for Standardization published the international standard for bamboo drinking straws, providing an important foundation for the international expansion of bamboo-based products.

Policy has played an equally important role. In November 2023, China’s National Development and Reform Commission and other government departments issued the Action Plan for Accelerating the Development of Bamboo as a Substitute for Plastic. The plan called for stronger technological innovation, improved mechanization in bamboo harvesting and transportation, greater industrial concentration, the cultivation of leading enterprises and expanded applications in key areas.

The objective is not simply to increase the number of bamboo products, but to build a competitive industrial system. Cost remains one of the biggest obstacles. Compared with mass-produced plastics, bamboo products can still be more expensive. Bamboo harvesting and transportation are relatively labor-intensive, while mechanization and automation in some production areas remain limited. Many bamboo-processing companies are small and medium-sized enterprises, making it difficult to achieve the economies of scale enjoyed by large petrochemical manufacturers.

These challenges explain why technological upgrading is essential. Greater mechanization can reduce harvesting costs. Better processing technologies can increase material utilization. Large-scale production can lower unit costs. Product innovation can move bamboo beyond low-value consumer goods and into higher-value industrial applications.

The economic significance extends beyond manufacturing. Much of China’s bamboo is grown in mountainous and rural areas. In many regions, bamboo forests have historically generated relatively low returns for farmers. Developing higher-value products can therefore connect ecological resources with rural incomes.

Jiangxi, Fujian and Guizhou are among the regions that have invested heavily in bamboo development. Jiangxi has launched a major bamboo-industry initiative backed by public investment. Fujian has focused on bamboo forest infrastructure and industrial upgrading. In Guizhou’s Chishui, one of China’s major bamboo-producing areas, hundreds of bamboo-related enterprises have developed products ranging from environmentally friendly tableware to agricultural films and other industrial materials.

The result is a new relationship between forests, farmers and manufacturing. A bamboo stalk growing in a mountain forest can enter a modern supply chain and eventually become packaging, construction material, automotive components or consumer products sold on international markets. This creates opportunities to increase the value of rural resources while providing incentives for better forest management.

The contrast with a fossil-based industrial model is significant. Oil is finite, geographically concentrated and highly sensitive to geopolitical conditions. Modern economies that depend heavily on petroleum-based materials are consequently exposed not only to environmental risks but also to fluctuations in energy prices and global supply chains.

Bamboo cannot replace oil entirely, nor can it replace every type of plastic. Plastics remain highly competitive in many applications because of their low cost, light weight, durability and efficient processing. The objective of Bamboo as a Substitute for Plastic is therefore not to eliminate petroleum from the global economy overnight. Its strategic value lies elsewhere. It expands the range of available raw materials and reduces dependence on non-renewable resources in areas where renewable alternatives are technically and economically viable.

In this sense, China’s bamboo initiative represents a broader approach to sustainable development. Rather than treating environmental protection solely as a constraint on economic growth, it seeks to turn ecological resources into new sources of industrial competitiveness.

The development of the bamboo industry also demonstrates how China’s manufacturing capacity can be combined with its ecological resources. A country that does not possess the world’s largest oil reserves can nevertheless build a competitive materials industry around renewable resources in which it has a comparative advantage. This is particularly important as the global economy searches for alternatives to fossil-based materials.

China’s contribution is also becoming increasingly international. The International Bamboo and Rattan Organisation has promoted the Bamboo as a Substitute for Plastic initiative at international forums, including discussions related to the global plastics treaty, sustainable trade and the United Nations Forum on Forests. China and international partners have organized conferences, exhibitions and technology exchanges to promote bamboo-based solutions.

Chinese bamboo products are already finding markets in Europe, the Middle East and other regions. Bamboo-fiber tableware, packaging and other products are increasingly being marketed not merely as traditional goods, but as part of a global shift toward renewable and low-carbon consumption.

The rapid expansion of the industry illustrates the scale of the transformation. China’s bamboo industry generated more than 520 billion yuan in annual output in 2025, with more than 10,000 bamboo-processing enterprises and over 29 million jobs supported across the value chain. Nearly ten counties and cities have developed bamboo industries worth more than 10 billion yuan each.

These figures show that Bamboo as a Substitute for Plastic has evolved beyond an environmental slogan. It is becoming an industrial strategy that connects ecological protection, technological innovation, rural development and international cooperation.

The broader lesson is not that bamboo will replace oil. The more important lesson is that modern economies can gradually reduce their dependence on a single class of non-renewable resources by developing alternatives based on local ecological advantages and technological innovation.

The transition away from fossil dependence will not happen through one material, one technology or one country. It will require a broad diversification of energy and material systems, supported by science, industrial policy, international standards and changing consumer behavior. China’s experience with bamboo demonstrates what such diversification can look like in practice.

A renewable resource growing in rural forests is being transformed through technology into industrial materials and consumer products. Traditional ecological knowledge is being combined with modern manufacturing. Rural resources are being connected to global markets. Environmental objectives are being linked with economic development.

The ultimate goal is not to return to a world without modern industry, nor to eliminate plastics from every aspect of life. It is to create an industrial system with more renewable choices, lower dependence on finite resources and greater compatibility with ecological limits.

From China’s bamboo forests, a different vision of industrial development is emerging: one in which economic strength does not have to depend exclusively on the continued extraction of fossil resources, and in which ecological advantages can become sources of technological innovation, industrial competitiveness and sustainable growth.

That may be the most important contribution of China’s bamboo strategy to the global search for a post-fossil future.

Source: forestry gov cn, ndrc gov cn, xinhuanet, china daily

China’s Silicon Carbide Journey: Two Decades of Breakthroughs and Innovation

An 8-inch silicon carbide (SiC) wafer, just 0.4 millimeters thick, looks like a thin sheet of glass. It may be colorless and transparent, or carry a faint yellow-green tint. Yet this seemingly unremarkable material is playing an increasingly important role in the development of electric vehicles, solar power, 5G communications, aerospace, and AI data centers.

Among third-generation semiconductor materials, SiC has attracted considerable attention not because of its rarity, but because of a combination of performance advantages that conventional silicon cannot readily deliver. As a wide-bandgap semiconductor, SiC can withstand higher voltages and temperatures and offers good thermal conductivity. It also has distinct advantages in high-frequency and high-power electronics. Under comparable operating conditions, SiC power devices can help reduce energy losses, shrink system size, and ease thermal-management requirements.

Electric vehicles are among the most closely watched applications for SiC. In an EV, the traction inverter converts direct current from the battery into the alternating current required by the drive motor. On-board chargers and DC-DC converters also play important roles in power conversion. As EV platforms move toward higher voltages, particularly with the growing adoption of 800-volt architectures, the advantages of SiC devices are becoming more pronounced. Meanwhile, photovoltaic inverters, energy-storage converters, ultra-fast charging equipment, and data-center power systems are opening up additional markets for the material.

Superior material properties do not automatically translate into a smooth path to commercialization. The real challenge lies in consistently growing high-quality, large-diameter, low-defect single crystals and processing them into substrates that meet the requirements of semiconductor device manufacturing. Difficulties in crystal growth, defect control, wafer slicing, or downstream manufacturing can all drive up costs, reduce yields, and even affect long-term device reliability. For China, which once had limited technological expertise in this field, SiC has represented not merely a materials-science challenge, but a long-term effort spanning fundamental research and the development of an entire industrial supply chain.

In the 1990s, only a small number of countries had mastered SiC single-crystal growth. The United States and a few other countries were among the first to produce 2-inch crystals, using the material in advanced radar, aerospace, and other specialized applications. Technology restrictions made it difficult for Chinese researchers to access mature equipment, process parameters, and practical expertise. At the time, SiC remained a relatively niche research field in China, with a weak industrial foundation and many critical problems that could only be addressed through independent exploration.

In 1999, Xiaolong Chen, a researcher at the Institute of Physics of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, began leading a team to tackle SiC crystal growth. With no established technological pathway to follow and little engineering experience to draw upon, the team had to start from fundamental principles, designing and building its own crystal-growth equipment while gradually developing a deeper understanding of the growth process.

Growing SiC single crystals is far more complex than producing ordinary materials. The process takes place at approximately 2,200°C and requires precise control over the temperature field, pressure, and transport of vapor-phase species. SiC also exists in multiple polytypes. Even slight deviations in growth conditions can trigger a polytype transition or lead to defects such as cracking and micropipes. More challenging still, the growth process cannot be directly observed. Researchers often have to wait until a run is complete and the furnace is opened before they can determine whether an experiment has succeeded.

For the research team, every furnace opening was like revealing the contents of an unknown box. A failed experiment meant not only losing the time and resources invested, but also having to reassess the relationships among temperature distribution, material transport, and crystal defects. Yet it was precisely this combination of repeated experimentation and mechanistic research that enabled the team to gradually uncover the fundamental principles governing SiC crystal growth.

In 2005, Chen’s team achieved a breakthrough in growing 2-inch SiC crystals. The significance went beyond an increase in crystal diameter: it marked the beginning of China’s effort to establish independent capabilities in SiC single-crystal growth. In 2006, Chen took a further step toward commercialization by founding Beijing Tianke Heda Semiconductor Co., Ltd. The goal was to combine academic research with industrial development and transform laboratory achievements into sustainable manufacturing capabilities.

Moving from the laboratory to industry required a shift in research priorities. Growing a single crystal in the laboratory demonstrates that a technical approach is feasible. Meeting industrial demand, however, requires consistent production of crystals with stable quality, controlled defect levels, and uniform dimensions, along with the processing and inspection capabilities needed to support them. As commercialization progressed, the team achieved breakthroughs in 4-inch SiC single crystals in 2010 and 6-inch crystals in 2014, helping lay the foundation for China’s domestic SiC substrate industry.

The progression from 2-inch to 4-inch and then 6-inch crystals may appear to be a straightforward increase in size. In reality, it reflects systematic improvements in growth equipment, thermal-field control, crystal quality, and processing technology. As SiC crystals grow larger, controlling the thermal field becomes more difficult, while internal stress becomes a more serious concern. Local temperature deviations or nonuniform growth can lead to cracking, polycrystalline nucleation, and increased defect levels. Breakthroughs in large-diameter crystal growth therefore require much more than scaling up equipment; they test the full depth of a team’s understanding of crystal-growth mechanisms and its ability to control the process.

In 2017, Chen’s team began pursuing 8-inch SiC single crystals. Building on its existing 6-inch technology, the team investigated thermal-field distribution and high-temperature vapor transport in larger crystals, redesigned its growth equipment, and continued optimizing the process to address polycrystalline nucleation during diameter expansion, raw-material transport efficiency, and crystal stress. After more than four years of iterative development, the team gradually overcame the key challenges associated with increasing crystal size and successfully grew an 8-inch SiC crystal in October 2021.

The significance of 8-inch SiC extends beyond a technical advance in materials production. It also brings the technology closer to the needs of large-scale semiconductor manufacturing. Larger wafers provide more usable surface area and, provided that process requirements and yields are met, can accommodate more chips per wafer, helping spread manufacturing costs across a greater number of devices. However, larger wafers do not automatically mean lower costs. Defect density, usable wafer area, processing losses, and downstream device yields remain critical determinants of overall economics.

China’s progress in SiC has not been driven by a single research team or company alone. As commercialization has advanced, domestic companies such as Tianke Heda and SICC have continued to develop, contributing to an increasingly mature ecosystem for SiC substrate research and manufacturing. The industry has gradually moved from early dependence on external technologies and equipment toward independent research and development, scaled production, and international competition, strengthening links between material production, wafer processing, and downstream applications.

Meanwhile, SiC research has moved beyond conventional hexagonal polytypes. Chen’s team has also expanded its work into cubic silicon carbide. Cubic SiC offers potential advantages in areas such as electron mobility and has attracted interest as a possible way to address certain interface-defect challenges encountered in hexagonal-SiC devices. However, stable growth of cubic SiC is even more difficult. Producing sufficiently large, single-polytype crystals with quality suitable for device manufacturing remains a challenging problem worldwide.

To address this challenge, the team adopted a liquid-phase growth method and proposed controlling interfacial energy to promote the formation of the desired crystal polytype. It subsequently produced single-polytype cubic SiC crystals measuring 2 to 4 inches in diameter and 4 to 10 millimeters in thickness, before advancing the crystal size to 6 inches. The team also successfully grew 8-inch p-type hexagonal SiC crystals, providing a materials foundation for further work on SiC substrates with different conductivity types and the development of high-voltage power devices. These efforts suggest that China’s SiC research is moving beyond catching up with established technologies toward independently exploring new crystal-growth pathways and methods of crystal control.

If crystal growth establishes the starting point for SiC substrates, wafer slicing directly affects material utilization and manufacturing costs. SiC is extremely hard and difficult to machine. Conventional wire sawing generates kerf loss and consumes both processing time and materials. Because substrates account for a significant portion of SiC device costs, even a partial reduction in material waste or an improvement in wafer throughput could have a meaningful impact across the entire supply chain.

This is why laser-based separation technologies are attracting attention. Unlike conventional mechanical cutting, laser-based processes precisely modify regions within the crystal to enable wafers to be separated from the ingot. The objective is to reduce material loss, improve processing efficiency, and facilitate subsequent wafer processing. As SiC crystals advance toward 8 inches and beyond, reducing slicing losses, shortening processing time, and improving wafer quality have become important factors in determining whether large-diameter substrates can be produced economically.

Westlake Instrument, a company incubated by Westlake University, is developing equipment in this area. The company has introduced laser-based separation equipment for 8-inch conductive SiC substrates and has subsequently developed automated laser-based separation technology for 12-inch SiC substrates. According to published reports, its process covers ingot thinning, laser processing, and substrate separation, with the aim of addressing the manufacturing challenges associated with slicing ultra-large crystals. A 12-inch substrate offers substantially more surface area than an 8-inch substrate. If crystal quality, processing precision, and downstream manufacturing requirements can all be met, the larger format could increase chip output per wafer and reduce the material cost allocated to each chip.

Si LAI Semiconductor is pursuing commercialization from the perspective of delivering production equipment. According to information released by the company, its equipment incorporates technologies such as combined light sources, optical-beam shaping, and surface-profile measurement. It is designed to process SiC crystals of different sizes and resistivities, and the company has reported deliveries of production equipment compatible with 12-inch substrates. It has also published figures relating to processing time, material loss, and cost improvements, stating that laser-based separation could increase wafer throughput and reduce processing losses. These figures, however, are primarily based on company disclosures. Their practical significance should be assessed in the context of processing conditions, product quality, yield, and performance in sustained mass production.

Westlake Instrument and Si LAI Semiconductor represent separate efforts in technology development and commercialization, but both are addressing the same industrial challenge. As SiC crystals become larger, increasing crystal diameter alone is not enough to create a competitive advantage. Slicing, inspection, automation, and downstream processing must advance in parallel. Only when crystal growth and processing equipment improve together can the potential area advantage of larger substrates be translated into real gains in productivity and cost efficiency.

From a broader industrial perspective, China’s SiC industry has entered a more complex stage of development. The initial priorities were to develop indigenous growth equipment, establish the ability to produce single crystals, and overcome foreign technology restrictions. Now that domestic companies have begun building substrate manufacturing capabilities, competition is increasingly focused on crystal quality, product consistency, manufacturing yield, processing costs, and customer qualification. Technical breakthroughs remain important, but a company’s ability to turn those breakthroughs into stable, reliable, and cost-competitive products is becoming a key measure of its strength.

This helps explain why the SiC industry is expanding rapidly while also facing mounting competitive pressure. Electric vehicles, solar power, energy storage, and data centers offer long-term demand potential, but growing demand does not guarantee attractive returns for every producer. As companies increase investment and build new production lines, some segments may face supply-demand mismatches, falling product prices, and insufficient capacity utilization. For substrate manufacturers, moving to larger wafer sizes is not necessarily better at any cost. If defect control, processing yield, and customer qualification fail to keep pace with the transition to larger crystals, new capacity may not translate into effective market supply.

At the same time, domestic self-sufficiency in SiC cannot be assessed by looking at substrates alone. The complete supply chain includes crystal-growth equipment, substrate processing, epitaxial growth, device design, wafer fabrication, packaging and testing, and end-use applications. Substrates are an important technical and cost component, but they are not the only factor determining device performance. Even when a material offers strong electrical and thermal properties, those advantages must be translated into device performance through epitaxy, process design, and manufacturing. Reliability validation is also essential before devices can enter automotive and industrial markets, where safety and long-term stability are critical.

In this process, Chinese companies must continue to close the gap with international leaders while developing competitive strategies suited to their own strengths. For substrate manufacturers, consistently improving crystal quality, reducing defect density, and increasing usable wafer output offer greater industrial value than pursuing diameter records alone. For equipment makers, new processes such as laser-based separation must prove that they can operate reliably over extended periods, accommodate different crystal specifications, and integrate with customers’ existing production lines. For downstream device manufacturers, stable material supply, manageable manufacturing costs, and long-term reliability are key factors in purchasing decisions and large-scale adoption.

From 2-inch to 8-inch crystals, and now toward 12 inches and beyond, China’s SiC journey has been about much more than increasing crystal diameter. It has involved a comprehensive effort spanning fundamental research, indigenous equipment development, crystal growth, substrate processing, and commercialization. More than two decades of work by Chen’s team have demonstrated that Chinese researchers can build independent materials-growth capabilities from a starting point with little accumulated experience or technological infrastructure. The development of companies such as Tianke Heda and SICC, alongside the laser-processing equipment efforts of Westlake Instrument and Silicon Lai Semiconductor, shows how China’s domestic industry is working to turn research achievements into manufacturing capabilities.

The next major hurdle for China’s SiC industry is no longer simply whether it can grow larger crystals. The challenge is to maintain consistently high quality at larger diameters, further reduce substrate manufacturing and processing costs, and build stronger coordination among materials, equipment, devices, and end-use applications. There is still a considerable distance to cover between technological leadership, stable mass production, and sustainable commercial returns.

Source: lab westlake, iicieexpo, iphy, xinhua