Covid-19 still claims around 1,700 lives a week globally, the WHO reported on July 11, urging at-risk populations to stay vaccinated. Meanwhile, a recent study on Covid-19 involved infecting 36 healthy adult volunteers who had never been vaccinated or previously infected. The study found that some individuals’ genetic makeup naturally protected them from SARS-CoV-2 infection.
According to French media, Le Parisien, Camille, a 37-year-old Parisian, has never been contracted Covid. Over four and a half years, she was tested eight times after close contact with infected individuals, with all results negative. She experienced one suspicious symptom, but it was caused by influenza, not SARS-CoV-2. “I was protected by nature,” she says, attributing her immunity to her genes. Researchers have long hypothesized that some people are naturally protected, and a new study in Nature supports this theory as a new wave of the pandemic peaks.
How many people have never been infected with Covid-19? According to last year’s U.K. data, about 5 to 10 percent of the population. Public Health England measured this by testing for the absence of post-infection antibodies in the blood. These individuals are likely to remain uninfected for years to come.
In this new study, researchers infected 36 healthy adult volunteers who had neither been vaccinated nor previously infected. The small sample size is due to the ethical issues of deliberately infecting humans with pathogens. “The ethical problems posed by this type of research make its implementation in France very difficult, if not impossible,” noted Mircea T. Sofonea, a lecturer in epidemiology and infectious diseases at the Université de Montpellier.
Of the 36 subjects, researchers closely monitored 16. Six tested positive and developed symptoms lasting more than 48 hours; three tested positive but were asymptomatic; and seven tested negative, despite being inoculated with the original SARS-CoV-2 strain. The virus failed to take hold in their bodies, preventing true infection.
Scientists screened over 600,000 blood and nasal cells from each group, discovering that a localized immune response in the nasal mucosa seemed to protect some participants. The study also found that high activity of a gene called HLA-DQA2 before exposure to SARS-CoV-2 helped limit the risk of long-term infection.
“Everyone has this gene, but its expression varies from person to person and may even vary by life stage,” explains Sofonea. This means some people are less susceptible to the virus, and the likelihood of infection can change over time. Hormone cycles might also impact the immune system.
On June 5, U.S. astronauts Sunita “Suni” Williams and Barry “Butch” Wilmore entered space aboard Boeing’s CST-100 Starliner. Originally scheduled to return to Earth on the 14th, the Starliner has been stranded in space for over a month due to a series of technical failures, and Boeing has been unable to provide a clear timetable for its return.
The development and service process of the Starliner has been troubled from the start. Initially set to fly in 2017, it finally launched on December 20, 2019, using the Kosmos-5 launch vehicle, but failed to enter the intended orbit.
An investigation revealed that an incorrectly set onboard clock caused the spacecraft to miss its ignition time. In 2022, the Starliner conducted two unmanned missions to test its docking capability with the international space station (ISS). The first mission was canceled due to thruster failure, and the second experienced a thruster ignition failure during flight, requiring the activation of a backup system to reach the ISS.
The Starliner was then scheduled to carry astronauts to the ISS in early 2023. However, the manned mission was delayed to late 2023, and then to May and June 2024. When it finally launched with two NASA astronauts, it encountered a helium leak and propulsion failure while docking with the ISS. The astronauts had to complete the docking manually. Persistent malfunctions led NASA and Boeing to postpone the return flight several times to investigate and resolve the issues.
Despite frequent accidents during unmanned flights, Boeing attempted manned flight missions without adequately improving the design and optimizing the flight system. Even before the current manned launch, the Starliner suffered a helium leak, which Boeing downplayed as “not a big problem” and forced the launch.
In contrast, China launched its first manned spacecraft, Shenzhou V, only after four successful unmanned test flights. Similarly, SpaceX’s Dragon2 conducted its first official manned mission in November 2020, following three unmanned test flights and one manned test flight, all of which met the predetermined targets.
Boeing is responsible for solving the issues according to its contract with NASA, which provided $4.2 billion for the development of the Starliner to carry NASA astronauts to and from the ISS. The contract stipulates that the Starliner must complete at least one manned flight test and between two to six official manned missions.
Allowing a third party to complete the mission would expose Boeing’s shortcomings and damage its credibility. NASA would likely refrain from awarding similar contracts to Boeing in the future and might even discuss liquidated damages or contract termination. The Starliner can remain docked to the ISS for up to 210 days, according to design specifications.
If a last resort is necessary, Boeing’s least likely option would be to use SpaceX’s Dragon2, as this would admit the superiority of SpaceX’s product and cede market share. This leaves Boeing with two theoretical options: China’s Shenzhou and Russia’s Soyuz.
Technically, the Soyuz docking system is compatible with the Russian segment of the ISS, and Soyuz has a long history of successful missions. The two American astronauts could transfer to the Russian segment and return to Earth on a Soyuz spacecraft with a Russian astronaut. In contrast, Shenzhou’s docking system is not compatible with the ISS, and the flight altitudes and orbital inclinations differ significantly.
Institutionally, the Soyuz remains a better option despite strained U.S.-Russia relations due to the ongoing war in Ukraine. U.S.-Russian cooperation around the ISS continues, though it is reduced compared to when U.S. astronauts leased Russian spacecraft.
The U.S. has banned official space cooperation with China under the Wolfe Amendment, and other regulations complicate space cooperation with China. Boeing requesting China’s help would violate the Wolfe Amendment, and NASA would not approve it. However, there have been instances where the Wolfe Amendment was flexibly interpreted, such as NASA’s inquiry about obtaining moon soil from China’s Chang’e 6.
Ultimately, the key issue is not China’s feasibility to rescue but whether China has a legal obligation to do so. If Boeing asks for help, does China have the right to ignore it?
With the development of human space exploration, safeguarding the lives of astronauts has become a crucial issue. International organizations, primarily under the United Nations, have formulated and adopted a series of norms to regulate space activities and prevent risks, forming the system of international space law. Key documents include the Outer Space Treaty and the Rescue Agreement, which both impose legal obligations. China signed these documents in 1983 and 1988, respectively.
As the first written law in the international space law system, the Outer Space Treaty establishes guiding principles for space activities, including the rescue of astronauts. Article V states:
“States Parties to the Treaty shall regard astronauts as envoys of mankind in outer space and shall render to them all possible assistance in the event of accident, distress, or emergency landing on the territory of another State Party or on the high seas. When astronauts make such a landing, they shall be safely and promptly returned to the State of registry of their space vehicle.”
The Rescue Agreement provides more detailed regulations by Article I: “Notify the launching authority or, if it cannot identify and immediately communicate with the launching authority, immediately make a public announcement by all appropriate means of communication at its disposal; Notify the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who should disseminate the information without delay by all appropriate means of communication at his disposal.”
Article II states:
“If, owing to accident, distress, emergency or unintended landing, the personnel of a spacecraft land in territory under the jurisdiction of a contracting party, it shall immediately take all possible steps to rescue them and render them all necessary assistance. It shall inform the launching authority and also the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the steps it is taking and of their progress.”
Article III extends this to situations where astronauts land on the high seas or any place not under any state’s jurisdiction, requiring States Parties in a position to assist to support search and rescue operations and notify the launching authority and the UN Secretary-General of the progress.
International law requires States Parties to make every effort to search and rescue astronauts who have landed on the surface, especially within their own territories, and to keep the international community informed. However, it does not require States Parties, even those with human spaceflight capabilities, to use personnel and equipment to carry out space rescues. The law lacks a clear definition of “accident” and “distress,” leaving discretionary power to States Parties to assess the situation according to their own judgment.
Under current international law, China is not obligated to launch a spacecraft to rescue the two U.S. astronauts unless they crash-land in or near China or in the open sea. NASA’s commercial manned program manager emphasized that the two astronauts are “very safe” and “not trapped,” so China has even more reason to believe there is no “accident” or “distress.” Therefore, even if Boeing seeks help from China, they may be refused.
In short, regarding the Boeing spacecraft astronauts, China has no responsibility, mission feasibility, or legal obligation to participate. What is notable is the significant gap in product development and operation levels between Boeing and SpaceX, despite their similar development models. The factors and lessons behind this disparity are worth in-depth consideration.
Source: Space, SpaceNews, ZLSA Design, New Space Economy
Ecological civilization is characterized by the need to repair the contradictory relationship between human and nature, and human and the environment. The phenomenon of the concentration of fertility from one place to the city, turning it into garbage, is the material basis of the contemporary urban-rural conflict.
Over the past two hundred years, in response to this problem, everyone from Liebig to Borlaug has advocated the cultivation of artificial fertilizers to supplement soil fertility. In the 19th century, before the advent of the organic chemical industry, the so-called fertilizers were bird droppings.
In order to dig up guano, many Chinese laborers were shipped to the region as workers, and the basis of the agricultural revolution in Europe and America at that time was these cheap Chinese laborers. After entering the 20th century, compound fertilizer was widely used in agricultural production through different ratios of various elements such as nitrogen, phosphorus, and potassium. However, this did not solve the problem at its root, but made agriculture more and more dependent on fossil fuels and compound fertilizers.
The various ways of fertilizing the soil are often a central part of the so-called “Green Revolution,” but this is not the greening of “green ecology.” Instead, it is mainly to distinguish it from the “Red Revolution.” Before liberation, the Rockefeller Foundation had conducted scientific experiments in Mexico and social experiments in China. The imperialists tried to explore new ways of governing the underdeveloped societies of the East but ultimately failed. The Chinese revolution drove the Rockefellers and their experiments out of China, and the Ford Foundation and other such organizations looked to India to take over the techno-social experiments of the past and create a new philosophy, the so-called “Green Revolution.” The Green Revolution was epitomized by Borlaug, who was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, but not for science, which is self-explanatory.
Paul Hoffman, president of the Ford Foundation in the early days of the Cold War, was also a Marshall Plan executive. He once mentioned that If the U.S. had done the Green Revolution in China in 1945, it would have cost no more than $200 million a year. India was China in 1945 for him.
China’s ecological civilization construction in the past two to three decades has made brilliant and remarkable achievements. However, looking towards the future, this work has a long way to go, and how to do a better job of ecological civilization construction is a problem that China must solve at present and in the future.
The “Green Revolution” was not a simple technology but a political project with clear Cold War political connotations.
In terms of per capita cereal production in India, wheat yields rose rapidly after 1965, while yields of other important crops, such as rice and sorghum, increased slowly. The rate of growth of per capita cereal production in India did not show much change after this period. The so-called Green Revolution involved seeds, fertilizers, water projects, and other technological tools that did not truly improve and enhance the ability of Indians to feed themselves.
Worldwide, per capita cereal production was on an upward trend from the 1960s to the early 1980s, but it has stagnated since then. In the 2010s, per capita cereal production had not even surpassed the levels of the early 1980s. Thus, the potential of the Green Revolution has been exhausted, even in terms of overall world productivity.
North Korea invested heavily in the Green Revolution. As early as the Kim Il Sung period, North Korea proposed the electrification of agriculture, and its agricultural development achieved very good results, surpassing South Korea’s. However, this success was entirely dependent on the use of fertilizers and inputs.
From 1961 to 1991, fertilizer and cereal output in North Korea showed an upward trend. In the early 1990s, geopolitical changes led to a 90% reduction in North Korea’s fertilizer inputs, which caused a significant decline in grain output and triggered a period of food hardship known as the “March of Misery.” At that time, North Korea’s heavy industry was one of the best in Northeast Asia, but it paid a high price for its complete dependence on industrialized agriculture and has not yet emerged from this predicament completely.
How do South Korea and Japan perform compared to North Korea? Looking at the grain yields of several East Asian countries in 2020, the DPRK, with a fertilizer intensity of about 14 kg per hectare, produced 3,496 kg of grain, which is quite a good performance. Japan and South Korea’s fertilizer intensity exceeds North Korea’s by more than ten times, but their grain yields are only twice that of North Korea. In fact, Japan and South Korea rely heavily on chemical inputs combined with large grain imports to maintain their current situation. In contrast, North Korea’s ability to achieve its present level under difficult conditions is remarkable, reflecting its efforts to move away from chemical and industrialized agriculture within the constraints of industrial civilization.
The highly developed market economies in Europe and the United States rely on a high density of long-distance trade, embedded in local labor and the fertility of the land. African coffee and Latin American fruits are shipped to New York and Europe to become consumer goods, where their nutritional value is eventually transformed into local garbage.
In cities with developed market economies, these products often end up as waste. However, in traditional agricultural societies, substances such as human feces and urine are not considered garbage; they are invaluable resources. Without long-distance trade and frequent movement of materials across regions, these nutrients flow back to where they came from and continue to circulate. In this sense, a circular economy and ecology is a closed-loop system.
In the more than two years since the Afghan Interim Administration was established, Afghanistan’s political landscape has largely stabilized, yet a deep humanitarian crisis persists alongside sporadic terrorist attacks.
According to the United Nations, Afghanistan still hosts approximately 20 active terrorist organizations, primarily linked to the Afghan Taliban. The Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) stands out as the primary adversary to the Afghan Interim Administration.
Sirajuddin Haqqani, leader of the Haqqani Network, now serves as the deputy leader of the Afghan Interim Authority and Acting Minister of the Interior. This integration has made the Haqqani Network an essential component of the Interim Authority’s intelligence apparatus.
Construction of the Afghan Interim Government’s Intelligence System
The Afghan intelligence system, which is based on the liquidation of the intelligence system of the previous government and is a continuation and development of the intelligence system of Atta’s first administration (1996-2001), consists of four main institutions: the General Intelligence Directorate, the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Defense, and the Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice.
The former Afghan government’s intelligence apparatus primarily comprised the Afghan National Directorate of Security (NDS), established in 2002 with assistance from the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), alongside the National Security Forces (NSF) and local police.
The Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) encompassed the Afghan National Army (ANA), Afghan Air Force (AAF), and Afghan National Police (ANP). The ANA, established in 2002, provided various military and support functions. The AAF, formed in 2007, focused on airborne intelligence gathering and firefighting. The ANP, including the Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP), the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), and the Afghan Border Police (ABP), maintained law and order across different regions and borders.
The Afghan Local Police (ALP), supported by the U.S. and UK, assisted the National Security Forces against insurgency. However, under Atta’s leadership, former government intelligence officers were purged, resulting in executions and forced disappearances. Many fled the country, while others went into hiding. Despite amnesties, reprisals continued, leading to a significant reduction in the former government’s intelligence capabilities.
Building the Intelligence System of this Government
The Afghan intelligence system encompasses four main agencies: the General Directorate of Intelligence (GDI), the Ministry of the Interior (MOI), the Ministry of Defense (MOD), and the Ministry for the Propagation of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice (MPPV).
The General Directorate of Intelligence (GDI), under the leadership of Abdul Haq Wasiq, operates under the supreme leadership of Hibatullah Akhundzada. It focuses on defending the regime and safeguarding cultural, religious, and property rights through human and open-source intelligence gathering methods.
The Ministry of the Interior (MOI), headed by Sirajuddin Haqqani, oversees law enforcement and public order, predominantly utilizing the intelligence network of the Haqqani Network. It maintains ties with Pakistani intelligence agencies and various terrorist organizations, facilitating intelligence sharing.
The Ministry of Defense (MOD), led by Mohammad Yaqoob, prioritizes border security and national sovereignty. Its intelligence capabilities are rooted in Atta’s traditional network, employing regional commanders and village community groups for information dissemination.
The Ministry for the Propagation of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice (MPPV), led by Sheikh Muhammad Khalid Hanafi, upholds Islamic ideology by monitoring and enforcing adherence to Islamic norms in various aspects of society. Its efforts extend to military establishments and civilian life, ensuring compliance with Islamic decrees and values.
Effectiveness of the intelligence system of the Afghan Interim Authority
The Afghan intelligence system focuses on safeguarding the Islamic regime, controlling hostile forces, aiding reconstruction, and defending Islamic ideology. It has upheld a positive image of the regime by monitoring and guiding the media and enforcing strict societal regulations.
This includes banning music, controlling protests, and imposing dress codes. Additionally, it purges and integrates former government armed forces while combating terrorists both domestically and internationally. Efforts have also been made to persuade fugitive talents to return and maintain international cooperation, particularly with Pakistan’s ISI and the US CIA.
The system has effectively maintained a positive portrayal of the Islamic regime by closely monitoring and influencing media content, enforcing stringent societal regulations such as dress codes and music bans, and suppressing dissenting voices.
It has also played a significant role in purging and integrating former government armed forces, combating terrorist groups like ISIS, and encouraging the return of skilled professionals to contribute to the nation’s development.
Furthermore, the intelligence system has actively engaged in international cooperation, notably with Pakistan’s ISI and the US CIA, to address mutual security concerns and foster diplomatic relations.
Challenges to the intelligence system of the Afghan Interim Authority
The Afghan intelligence system has made significant strides in safeguarding the Islamic regime, combating hostile forces, and aiding in post-war reconstruction over the past two years. However, it faces challenges from domestic, regional, and major powers.
Domestically, resistance from pro-democracy factions persists, with concerns over inclusivity and women’s rights. Terrorist organizations, including Al-Qaeda and ISIS-K, continue to operate with some autonomy under the regime’s umbrella, posing internal threats.
Regionally, neighboring countries like Pakistan and Iran maintain infiltration through their intelligence services. Tajikistan, in particular, expresses hostility towards the Afghan government.
Internationally, the U.S. continues to monitor and act against potential threats, while Russia and India exert pressure on the regime to combat terrorism and ensure inclusivity.
Source: Middle East Institute, Long War Journal, Intelligence Briefs
Faced with the restructuring of the global value chain, insufficient foreign demand, and numerous uncertain factors, my country confronts significant challenges in foreign investment and trade. This year China’s government work report once again stresses the importance of expanding high-level opening up the linkage effect between domestic and international markets.
Amidst the backdrop of global economic slowdown, rising protectionism, and anti-globalization sentiments, China’s foreign trade dynamics have undergone notable structural shifts. In 2022, China’s top five trading partners included ASEAN, the European Union, the United States, Japan, and South Korea. While the share of traditional partners like Japan and the United States has declined, there has been a rapid increase in trade with countries along the Belt and Road initiative, Russia, and ASEAN nations.
The transformation in China’s trade and export structure is evident, reflected in the expanding trade surplus. Unlike a decade ago when China primarily exported light industrial products such as shoes, socks, and toys, there has been a significant upgrade in export products and added value, contributing to the growth in export volume.
China’s foreign trade exports have been restructuring notably, especially in recent years amidst the pandemic. Notably, exports to non-Western countries have been on the rise, surpassing exports to the United States, Europe, and Japan in 2023. This shift is attributed to several factors.
Firstly, China has been diversifying its export destinations to mitigate risks associated with overreliance on developed markets like the United States, Europe, and Japan. This strategic diversification began around 2010, accelerated by geopolitical tensions.
Secondly, the advancement of the One Belt, One Road initiative has significantly boosted exports to non-traditional markets, buoyed by increased foreign investments. China’s extensive infrastructure projects in Belt and Road countries have not only facilitated trade but also boosted exports of high-value electromechanical machinery and equipment.
Thirdly, Western countries increasingly perceive China as a formidable competitor, prompting trade disputes under the guise of national security concerns. Despite such challenges, China’s robust performance in overseas markets has cemented its position as the largest trading partner for numerous countries, prompting trade tensions with the West.
Observing the evolution of China’s export trade reveals a broader shift, including the relocation of production to Southeast Asia and South Asia. Consequently, China’s industrial and supply chains have also undergone significant restructuring, with raw materials and semi-finished products processed in Southeast Asian countries before reaching US and European markets.
This phenomenon has resulted in a significant shift: ASEAN countries have emerged as China’s primary trading partners, yet a considerable portion of China’s exports to ASEAN consists of intermediate products rather than final goods. These intermediates are assembled in ASEAN nations and then exported to the United States. Global trade data indicates a rising trend in China’s exports to ASEAN alongside an increase in ASEAN countries’ exports to the United States.
For instance, approximately 70% of products exported from Vietnam to the United States originate from China, leading to an apparent surge in “Made in Vietnam” trade volume, primarily driven by increased exports from China.
A similar scenario unfolds in Mexico, where many Chinese manufacturers have shifted production, leveraging Mexico’s membership in the North American Free Trade Agreement to benefit from low tariffs on exports to the US. Consequently, China’s trade surplus with Mexico and Mexico’s trade surplus with the United States have both expanded, ultimately accumulating trade deficits for the United States across various countries.
As China’s primary trading partner in ASEAN for four consecutive years, China’s exports to ASEAN predominantly include electromechanical and audio-visual equipment (constituting 37.5% of the total), base metals, textile raw materials, chemical products, and more. Both market and non-market factors influence these dynamics. Market factors primarily revolve around shifts in comparative advantages, such as lower land and labor costs in ASEAN compared to China.
Non-market factors, particularly geopolitics, also play a significant role. Pressure from the United States to relocate suppliers, impose tariffs on Chinese goods, or prohibit direct imports from China has compelled some Chinese companies to adapt. For instance, restrictions related to Xinjiang cotton over alleged human rights violations have disrupted supply chains, affecting industries like artillery manufacturing. Some Chinese firms, entrenched in US and European markets, reluctantly redirect part of their production to South and Southeast Asian countries in response to geopolitical conflicts, driven not only by economic considerations but also political pressures.
The government work report underscores the importance of promoting stable growth and optimizing the structure of foreign trade, emphasizing the export of electric vehicles, lithium batteries, and photovoltaic products. These sectors have seen significant growth, representing strategic industries with high added value and alignment with green and low-carbon trends.
Despite the success, concerns have been raised about over-investment and overcapacity in these fields, a common occurrence in emerging industries. Similar challenges were faced during the rise of the internet industry in the United States, where market competition led to consolidations and mergers among companies.
China’s electric vehicle sector is poised for similar transformations, with government subsidies and corporate investments driving initial growth. As competition intensifies and the market matures, some companies may face elimination or consolidation, ultimately leading to a balanced supply-demand equilibrium and sustainable profitability.
The emergence of “new productivity” signals a trend towards combining digital technologies like artificial intelligence with new machinery and equipment to develop innovative products and services. While promising, such ventures entail risks, including uncertainties in marketization and investment failures that governments must navigate.
To support innovation, China should focus on nurturing imaginative small businesses capable of technological advancements. These companies often become acquisition targets for larger manufacturers, leading to wider applications and improved profits.
The external market landscape is further complicated by geopolitical tensions and trade protectionism, as evidenced by recent restrictions imposed by the European Commission on electric vehicle imports from China. Negotiations between governments and international organizations like the WTO will play a crucial role in safeguarding trade interests amid evolving geopolitical dynamics.
China’s decreasing foreign trade dependence reflects a shift towards a more balanced development model, reducing reliance on external markets. However, sustaining economic growth requires mobilizing both domestic and foreign markets, emphasizing product quality and developing consumer markets in developing countries.
As China progresses from being an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) to setting global standards, concerns from Western nations about China’s technological advancements may lead to restrictions. Nevertheless, China’s commitment to innovation and adherence to its technological trajectory will ultimately establish Chinese standards and brands as dominant forces in global markets.
In contrast to Russia, China’s robust capabilities enable swift adaptation to market gaps left by foreign companies, ensuring the stability of its industrial and supply chains. Encouraging Chinese private enterprises to fill these vacancies and protecting their manufacturing capabilities are critical for sustaining growth.
While both China and Russia face challenges from foreign capital withdrawals, China’s ample foreign exchange reserves provide a buffer against such risks, ensuring stability amidst changing market conditions.
In 2023, Hong Kong SAR, China, solidified its position as Asia’s top hedge fund and wealth management hub, aiming to surpass Switzerland globally. Regulatory reforms and positive interactions between the government and industries drive its success. New policies allowing private equity funds to register under Limited Partnership Fund (LPFs) have boosted Hong Kong’s appeal, matching Singapore’s LPF registrations within three years. LPFs are expected to further influence investment strategies and financial ecosystems in Hong Kong in 2024.
Progressive Logic of Reform
As a Special Administrative Region (SAR) of China, Hong Kong maintains a close economic and trade relationship with the Mainland market. The surge in affluence within mainland China has fueled significant growth in cross-border wealth management activities in Hong Kong. Data from the Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission (SFC) reveals a staggering 143% increase in assets under management for Hong Kong’s asset and wealth management sector over the past decade.
However, industry observers note a shift in dynamics. Previously, before 2018, Hong Kong was the unequivocal offshore destination of choice for mainland wealth management. Yet, recent geopolitical developments and other unfavorable factors have begun to erode Hong Kong SAR’s traditional role as a primary intermediary. In contrast, Singapore has experienced fewer adverse effects and maintains a robust competitive edge and reputation in various aspects.
While Hong Kong boasts strong offshore financial characteristics, a significant portion of its assets under management originates from outside Hong Kong, with many funds not registered locally. This is particularly evident in private funds, where historically, the majority were registered non-locally. Such practices not only impede operational efficiency and increase costs but also complicate compliance efforts.
These challenges are linked to shortcomings in Hong Kong’s company and related systems. The Limited Partnership Ordinance, enacted in 1912, governs business partnerships. However, over time, this outdated system has failed to adapt to the needs of modern investment funds.
Previously, most local funds in Hong Kong operated on a trust-based structure, such as Unit Trusts. Corporate funds from overseas markets launched in Hong Kong typically took the form of public or private offerings. This was due to local restrictions on reducing contributions and allocating funds, often necessitating the establishment of funds as unit trusts. Additionally, until April 1, 2019, there was no tax exemption regime safeguarding investment profits for private equity funds registered in Hong Kong, potentially subjecting them to profits tax.
An official from the Financial Services and the Treasury Bureau of Hong Kong pointed out that the existing legislation lacks flexibility for capital investment and profit distribution, fails to provide contractual flexibility, and lacks a straightforward dissolution mechanism.
In contrast, offshore jurisdictions like the Cayman Islands were favored for incorporating private equity funds due to easy registration, operational flexibility, and fewer restrictions. Exempted Limited Partnerships (ELP) and Segregated Portfolio Companies (SPC) were particularly popular choices for fund managers and investors.
The industry has long advocated for institutional-level reforms, including registration procedures. Amid various pressures, 2020 marked a significant turning point for Hong Kong, China, with the initiation of several institutional reforms.
The introduction of new fund structures allows external funds in Hong Kong to benefit from similar registration forms, thus enticing capital flow into the region.
A pivotal phase in the series of changes can be traced back to 2018. In July of that year, the Open-ended Fund Company (OFC) regime was introduced in Hong Kong, marking a significant shift in fund structure. Investment funds incorporated in Hong Kong gained the option to adopt a corporate fund structure alongside the traditional unit trust structure. They could be established as public or private funds, or as sub-funds, with the flexibility to invest in diverse sectors such as technology, environmental protection, healthcare, and artificial intelligence.
As market recognition grows, funds naturally follow suit. By the end of October 2023, a total of 194 OFCs and 372 sub-funds had been incorporated or relocated to Hong Kong in accordance with relevant policies.
The formal launch of the Limited Partnership Funds Ordinance (Cap. 637) in August 2020 brought significant attention to the LPF system. This operational and management model in the fund industry comprises a general partner and a limited partner, serving as infrastructure widely acknowledged for providing new facilities for the establishment and operation of private equity funds in Hong Kong, as well as offering tax relief.
The range of policy measures implemented by the HKSAR is widely regarded as very competitive due to their flexibility and applicability to various private equity structures. Drawing on past experience and major private equity legal frameworks, these measures have gained significant momentum since their inception.
According to the Hong Kong LPF Association (HKLPFA), the number of local limited partnership fund registrations as of July 2023 had already equaled that of Singapore (680), surpassing it officially in August 2023. By the end of November 2023, this figure had further risen to 740 registrations.
In contrast to Hong Kong SAR of China, Singapore initiated its regime reform much earlier, starting in May 2009. However, despite this early start, Singapore’s number of registrations has not yet reached 700 in 14 years.
Future Challenges and Opportunities
The increasing number of LPFs registered in the HKSAR is catalyzing the development of the asset and wealth management industry in Hong Kong, acting as a new conduit for capital inflow.
From a longer-term perspective, this phenomenon is linked to the classification of the asset and wealth management industry in HKSAR, which encompasses four main areas: private investment, private banking, trust management, and fund consultancy.
According to HKSFC, in 2022, Hong Kong’s assets under management totaled HK$30.5 trillion (US$3.9 trillion), with a net capital inflow of HK$88 billion (US$11 billion). Since the second half of 2022, the funds under management of funds domiciled in Hong Kong have experienced accelerated growth, with assets rebounding by 15% from the third quarter of 2022 to reach HK$1.3 trillion (US$171 billion) by the end of June 2023.
The expansion of scale presents opportunities as the large capital market system and diversified product structure gradually interact with the new models introduced by LPFs. A closer look at the investment categories of LPFs reveals a shift: the proportion of LPFs choosing to invest in a wide range of sectors has decreased from 58% in 2021 to 49% in 2023, while those focusing on investing in specific sectors have increased year by year.
At a micro level, the growing number of LPFs is enhancing the local treasury ecosystem, offering more opportunities for talent growth. Moreover, as acceptance grows, LPFs are emerging as alternative structures for fund managers. Since 2022, private equity fund managers have been leveraging Hong Kong’s LPF structure to invest in diverse industries globally, such as retirement and art collections. Additionally, the number of funds investing in North America and Europe is on the rise.
From the perspective of long-term investors and local financial service practitioners, the proximity to mainland China’s vast market and the continued enhancement of Hong Kong’s IPO listing system are conducive to financing and investment management in Hong Kong. This symbiotic relationship between LPFs and the IPO market holds promise for the region’s fund industry development. For example, mainland investors can leverage the synergistic effects of LPFs and IPO markets when undertaking relevant projects.
From a relevance perspective, a series of HKSAR government policy drives are seen as closely linked to the growth in LPF registrations. In February 2023, in a bid to attract more family offices to Hong Kong, the government allocated HK$100 million in funding to Invest Hong Kong over the next three years. Additionally, in May, the local tax relief ordinance for Family Investment Control Vehicles (FICVs) came into effect, followed by the official launch of the Family Office Service Network (FOSNET) in June. These initiatives, aimed at enhancing the family office ecosystem, are expected to drive LPF development, given their significance in family office asset allocation.
Furthermore, the long-awaited New Capital Investment Entrant Scheme Office (“New CIES Office”), expected to be implemented by the end of 2023, is anticipated to provide further momentum to LPFs.
Looking ahead to 2024, the development of Hong Kong’s offshore RMB business is anticipated to witness further breakthroughs, with LPFs expected to facilitate the flow of funds between Hong Kong and other cities in the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area, serving as a vital tool for financial interoperability in the region.
According to analysis from People’s Daily, compared to other pilot regions, Hong Kong investors participating in relevant pilots enjoy lower access requirements, a wider investment scope, more convenient cross-border investment processes, simplified consultation processes, and other characteristic advantages.
The Ukrainian crisis has entered its third year, with the conflict reaching a stalemate. Despite initial victories, the Ukrainian side’s performance faltered in the second year, failing to meet President Zelensky’s expectations for a turnaround.
Fatigue among U.S. and European leaders in addressing the Ukrainian crisis, which emerged in 2023, continues to spread. Additionally, since October 2023, a new round of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict has had a cascading effect in the West, contributing to a decline in public opinion regarding the Ukrainian crisis.
America’s Weariness of Ukraine’s Struggles
During Zelensky’s second visit to the U.S. in September 2023, he encountered a notably different atmosphere in Congress compared to his previous visit at the end of 2022. With the House of Representatives now under Republican control, support for Ukraine waned. His third visit in December further underscored the chilly political climate in Washington.
Amid Republican demands linking border security, immigration policy, and aid programs to Ukraine, the Biden administration’s $60 billion aid proposal to Ukraine on February 13 stalled in Congress, ultimately blocked by Republican extremists in the House of Representatives.
By July 2023, a CNN-commissioned poll revealed deep divisions among Americans regarding aid to Ukraine. While 55% of respondents felt Congress shouldn’t authorize additional funding, 51% believed current aid efforts were adequate, and 48% thought more should be done.
Partisan divides were stark: 71% of Republicans opposed new funding, contrasting with 62% of Democrats who favored increased support. By November 2023, a poll by AP-NORC Center for Public Affairs Research found growing sentiment (45%) that the U.S. was overspending on aid to Ukraine, up from 52% in October.
Meanwhile, the U.S. presidential election saw former President Donald Trump securing the Republican nomination early, pledging not to protect NATO members underspending on defense and emboldening Russia. Trump’s rhetoric of potentially ending the war within 24 hours of his presidency alarmed European nations reliant on U.S. security guarantees. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s meeting with Trump further solidified the message: “no more aid for Ukraine” under a potential Trump administration.
Europe’s Anxiety Amidst Growing Exhaustion
Since the eruption of the Ukrainian crisis in February 2022, the EU initially showed strong support for Ukraine, imposing multiple rounds of sanctions on Russia and granting Ukraine EU candidate status promptly. However, at the December 2023 EU summit, Hungary’s opposition led to the postponement of the EU’s plan to provide €50 billion in financial aid to Ukraine. Hungary’s concerns were assuaged only in February 2024, with the proposal of a control mechanism for aid funds. In Slovakia, the Fico government halted military aid to Ukraine, citing concerns about Ukraine’s sovereignty and its alignment with the United States.
European solidarity with Ukraine has dwindled over time. Central and Eastern European countries, dissatisfied with the impact of cheap Ukrainian imports on domestic agriculture, threatened to reduce aid to Ukraine and implemented temporary bans on Ukrainian food imports. Protests erupted against the EU’s decision to grant Ukrainian trucks unrestricted access, leading to border blockades and demonstrations by Polish and Slovakian truckers.
The influx of Ukrainian refugees into Europe, totaling 5.9 million according to UNHCR data, has strained resources and exacerbated economic challenges. As Europe grapples with high inflation and weak economic growth, solidarity with Ukrainian refugees wanes. Several EU member states are contemplating reducing financial support for Ukrainian refugees in 2024.
Public support for Ukraine in Europe has also diminished. While earlier polls showed overwhelming support for humanitarian, financial, and military aid to Ukraine, recent surveys indicate a decline in support. German citizens, for instance, increasingly view financial support to Ukraine as excessive, and skepticism grows regarding Europe’s ability to compensate for reduced U.S. aid. Polish sentiment has shifted as well, with a significant portion opposing additional aid to Ukraine.
Furthermore, European popular support for providing arms to Ukraine has declined, with Italians particularly opposed to EU arms supply to Ukraine. These trends underscore a shifting landscape in European attitudes toward the Ukrainian crisis.
The exchange of fire between Russia and Ukraine persists with no indication of easing. A breakthrough at the proposed “peace conference on Ukraine” slated for Switzerland in summer 2024 appears improbable, given the starkly differing stances of the two sides. As the crisis lingers, Europeans grow increasingly anxious about the repercussions of their support for Ukraine on their own well-being. A January 2024 poll conducted by the European Council on Foreign Relations across 12 European countries revealed widespread pessimism regarding the war’s outcome, with only 10% of respondents believing in Ukraine’s victory.
Yet, mainstream European discourse maintains that “Ukraine must win” and “Europe must spare no effort to support Ukraine until the end.” European nations have redoubled their support for Ukraine, stepping up as primary providers of foreign aid amid U.S. congressional obstacles to Ukraine’s budget. Several countries, including Germany, France, Britain, Italy, Canada, Denmark, and the Netherlands, have inked ten-year security agreements with Ukraine. French President Emmanuel Macron has hinted at the possibility of deploying troops to aid Ukraine, a sentiment echoed to some extent by Poland’s leadership. Europe has embraced the Czech initiative to procure 800,000 rounds of artillery for Ukraine, and on March 13, the EU committed an additional 5 billion euros to the European Peace Fund for weapons procurement on Ukraine’s behalf, both within Europe and beyond.
Despite the resolve exhibited by top government officials, there is a growing contrast with the weariness felt by the population, which could ultimately dampen political resolve at the highest levels. The Ukrainian crisis is poised to be a pivotal issue in the upcoming European Parliament elections in June 2024 and the U.S. elections in November. The impact of war-weary voters on both elections remains to be seen.
Source: wap1934, X, the Moscow Times, Global Times
The Ganges is a major river in South Asia, flowing through northern India and Bangladesh. With a total length of 2,525 kilometers and a basin area of 910,000 square kilometers, covering one-third of India’s land area. The Ganges ranks among the world’s top 20 rivers in terms of water flow, and the Ganges basin is the most densely populated river basin globally, housing over 400 million people and boasting a population density exceeding 390 people per square kilometer.
Despite its significance, large ships are rarely seen on the Ganges, India’s largest river. In contrast, China’s largest river, the Yangtze River, features over 71,000 kilometers of navigable waterways, annually serving 184 million passengers and transporting 4.714 billion tons of cargo.
Nestled in the densely populated and urbanized plains of northeastern India, the question arises: why is navigation virtually nonexistent on the Ganges River, despite its ample width and resources?
Situated at the rear of the Asian continent, the entire Indian Peninsula extends southward into the Indian Ocean, rendering India profoundly influenced by the interplay of land and sea and shaping its tropical monsoon climate.
During summer, the barometric pressure belt shifts, driving the wind belt northward and pushing the equatorial low pressure to the northern hemisphere. The southeast trade winds then sweep northward toward the Indian Peninsula, where they morph into southwesterly winds, laden with moisture from the Indian Ocean. These winds blanket the entire peninsula, triggering substantial precipitation, particularly along the south slopes of the Himalayas where precipitation is amplified due to blocking effects.
Conversely, winter witnesses the reversal of these atmospheric dynamics. The pressure belts and wind patterns shift southward, with the equatorial low pressure belt migrating to the southern hemisphere. The Asian continent experiences the dominance of cold high pressure systems, causing winds to blow from Mongolia and Siberia towards India, deflecting into northeast winds. These winds, originating from the northern inland regions, carry significantly less moisture, resulting in markedly reduced winter precipitation compared to summer.
Influenced by the tropical monsoon climate, the Ganges River Basin experiences two distinct precipitation seasons: the rainy season, concentrated from July to October, marks the flood season of the Ganges River, with its water volume comprising 82% of the annual total. In contrast, the remaining eight months constitute the dry season, during which the Ganges River’s water volume dwindles to a mere 18% of the total annual volume. The stability of river water is crucial for the development of navigation within a river system. The Rhine River serves as a prime example of a “golden waterway” enabled by consistent precipitation throughout the year within a temperate maritime climate.
However, the Ganges River presents a different scenario, characterized by drying up in times of drought and flooding in times of excessive rainfall. This erratic behavior results in high navigational value during periods of ample water flow, while the value diminishes significantly during low-water periods, which can persist for up to eight months.
Is there a viable man-made solution to this dilemma? Indeed, constructing reservoirs offers a potential remedy for regulating river water volume. The Yangtze River, situated in a similar monsoon climate zone, provides a compelling example. China has erected 284 large reservoirs and 1529 medium-sized reservoirs along the Yangtze River’s tributaries. These reservoirs serve not only for power generation but also for flood mitigation and water release during dry periods. By strategically controlling water levels—closing gates during flood seasons and opening them during dry periods—the Yangtze River effectively counters the challenges posed by the monsoon climate, ensuring consistent water levels year-round and facilitating uninterrupted ship passage.
However, a direct application of this solution to the Ganges River basin proves unfeasible when considering the differing climate and topography of India.
The Ganges River faces additional challenges due to high sedimentation and its relatively flat terrain. Flowing from northwest to southeast, the Ganges Plain provides a flat and open backdrop to the river.
Considering the period of continental drift, the collision between the Indian Ocean plate and the Eurasian continental plate resulted in the formation of the towering Himalayas. Simultaneously, structural subsidence in the southern foothills of the Himalayas created numerous troughs gradually filled by the alluvial action of the Indus and Ganges Rivers, ultimately forming the present-day Indus-Ganges Plain. Geologically categorized as a pre abyssal or foreland basin, the Indus-Ganges Plain is flatter than the average plain.
Unlike the Yangtze River, where reservoirs are mostly constructed in upstream areas with steep terrain to regulate water levels downstream, the situation along the Ganges River poses unique challenges. The mainstream traverses the Great Plains, characterized by minimal elevation changes and densely populated areas.
The construction of reservoirs in such regions would inundate vast areas, posing significant resettlement costs beyond governmental capacities. The northern tributaries, flowing through the southern slopes of the Himalayas, feature steep slopes and narrow canyons, rendering large reservoir construction impractical. Similarly, the southern tributaries, mainly traversing the Deccan plateau, despite gentler slopes compared to the southern Himalayan slopes, receive average precipitation levels, diminishing the effectiveness of reservoir construction in regulating the main stream’s water levels. Moreover, these areas are densely populated, further complicating large-scale reservoir projects.
Consequently, only Nepal has attempted to construct small reservoirs along the Ganges River tributaries. However, their combined capacity of 28 billion cubic meters pales in comparison to the Ganges River’s annual runoff, exceeding 550 billion cubic meters. Additionally, the immense sediment load poses a significant hindrance to reservoir construction. The Ganges River annually loses 1.451 billion tons of sand, surpassing that of the Yangtze River threefold and even exceeding the renowned sediment-rich Yellow River by sevenfold. The likelihood of sedimentation rapidly filling any constructed reservoir is thus considerable.
Furthermore, the Ganges River’s excessively flat topography results in a significantly slower average flow rate of 12,000 cubic meters per second in the middle and lower reaches, far lower than the Yangtze River’s average of 28,800 cubic meters per second. The river’s wide and shallow channels further exacerbate navigation challenges, as deeper-draft vessels are prone to grounding.
Moreover, the absence of an estuary and the Ganges River’s location far from international shipping lanes in the Bay of Bengal discourage maritime traffic. In contrast, China’s Yangshan Port and Zhoushan Port lie along major international shipping routes, facilitating convenient access for ships from various countries.
Lastly, the widespread adoption of rail transportation, dating back to the British colonial era, has supplanted river transport along the Ganges. The extensive railway network spanning over 50,000 kilometers efficiently connects various regions, rendering river transport obsolete. Additionally, historical bridge construction over the Ganges, characterized by low bridge heights relative to the river level, further deters large-scale shipping development. Even today, makeshift pontoon bridges are erected near permanent bridges to alleviate traffic congestion, further underscoring the limited navigational capacity of the Ganges.
Despite these challenges, the Indian government has taken proactive steps to enhance the Ganges’ shipping capacity. Initiatives such as the Jal Marg Vikas Project, launched in 2014 with support from the World Bank, aim to upgrade the Ganges as National Waterway No. 1. This ambitious plan involves constructing inland multimodal terminals to accommodate vessels weighing 1,500-2,000 tons. The successful inauguration of India’s first inland navigation terminal, Varanasi Port, in December 2018 marks a significant milestone, reintroducing inland container transportation after 70 years of independence.
Henry Chang-Yu Lee, an internationally renowned criminal forensics expert, was born in Jiangsu Province, China, and is of Chinese American descent. In July 1998, he became the chief emeritus for the Connecticut State Police, marking the first time a Chinese American had held such a position at the state level in the United States.
Lee has conducted forensic examinations in several high-profile cases, including the Assassination of John F. Kennedy, the Watergate scandal of Richard Nixon, and the Impeachment of Bill Clinton.
At 86 years old, Henry Chang-Yu Lee remains active and vigorous, speaking with clarity and displaying a keen sense of humor. Recently, he has been extensively involved in activities across China: from attending the opening ceremony of the second phase of the Henry Chang-Yu Lee Criminal Investigation Science Museum in Jiangsu Province, to lecturing at Xinhua College in Guangzhou, Guangdong Province, and participating in the charity gala in Shanghai.
With over 60 years of experience in law enforcement, Lee continues to contribute to the exchange and advancement of forensic science between Eastern and Western countries. During his lectures, he captivates young students by sharing intriguing case studies.
Despite his global renown as a criminal forensics expert, Lee humbly stated in a recent interview with China News Agency that he considers himself simply an ordinary scientist. He also encouraged young people to pursue forensic science education.
How has your Chinese background shaped and influenced your career trajectory?
This is a significant and challenging question to address. In the West, due to widespread misinformation perpetuated by the media and society, many Westerners hold the belief that the only contributions Chinese people made to the United States were in building railroads, operating laundries, and restaurants in the 18th century.
Particularly in recent years, Chinese individuals have faced suppressions influenced by social media. However, contrary to these misconceptions, there are numerous outstanding Chinese individuals in the U.S. across various fields who have made substantial contributions not only to the U.S. but also to the world.
Historically, forensic science practitioners in the U.S. were predominantly white men. When I initially applied for membership in the American Academy of Forensic Sciences (AAFS), I faced rejection on the basis of being a person of color, although this information was not accurately assessed. While many Chinese individuals might have tolerated such situations, I took a proactive stance by writing a letter to the AAFS seeking clarification.
The response from the AAFS cited the reason for my rejection as having completed a portion of my educational experience outside the United States. At that juncture, I suggested revising their bylaws to only permit participation from white individuals. Eventually, they granted me provisional membership and awarded me their highest honor after three years.
In 2022, I was invited to speak at the AAFS Annual Conference. During my speech, I emphasized the Academy’s progress over the decades in promoting equality for all members. My hope for the future is one of global peace and integration, envisioning a world where boundaries dissolve, emphasizing our shared humanity, and advocating for equal treatment for everyone.
Which of the over 8,000 cases you’ve handled throughout your career stands out as particularly memorable or impactful to you?
First and foremost, it’s important to dispel any misconceptions: no case can be solved by a single individual alone; it truly takes a team effort. Solving a case involves numerous factors beyond just forensic science; it requires collaboration with criminal police, engagement from the community, and often utilizes large databases and artificial intelligence technology.
It’s crucial to acknowledge that the media’s portrayal can sometimes exaggerate the role of individuals. I don’t consider myself a sleuth akin to Sherlock Holmes or Bao Zheng, a Chinese politician who defended peasants and commoners against corruption or injustice in China’s Song Dynasty; I’m simply an ordinary scientist working alongside others.
When discussing notable cases like the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, the murder trial of American football star Simpson, or the Clinton impeachment case, it’s important to recognize that while these cases garnered immense attention due to their high-profile nature, there are countless other cases that are equally significant. One case that has particularly resonated with me is that of the murder of an elderly woman who lived alone. Despite lacking the spotlight, it was a classic case that deeply affected me.
The murder occurred on Thanksgiving, when a concerned neighbor delivered food to the elderly woman, only to discover her lifeless body. She had been brutally stabbed 17 times, and although there should have been ample blood at the scene, the initial responding officers overlooked it.
Through scientific methods, we were able to detect blood on the floor and identify shoe prints. Despite the absence of advanced technology like big data at the time, over 200 officers diligently combed through trash cans near the crime scene that night, eventually leading to a breakthrough. Near the trash cans, we found a suspect who had used a card to purchase the shoes found at the scene — the victim’s nephew, driven to murder due to drug addiction and financial desperation.
There are no rewards or celebrations for solving crimes. However, on that day, we found closure for the victim, prioritized justice, and demonstrated the importance of putting people’s lives first while remaining grounded in reality.
What lessons can Eastern and Western cultures exchange with each other in the realm of forensic science?
Differences between Eastern and Western societies stem from variations in culture and systems, yet the fundamental principles of civilization remain universal. For instance, Chinese learning traditionally emphasizes memorization and recitation, while Western education emphasizes critical thinking. Many Chinese students face challenges when adapting to American culture due to these differences, but fostering open communication can help bridge the gap.
Chinese traditional culture, characterized by the concept of “sincerity,” has deeply influenced my life, emphasizing genuine interactions and actions towards others. Conversely, Western culture, with its emphasis on innovation and breaking rules, has also inspired me significantly.
These cultural disparities often prove beneficial in solving cases. For instance, in a case involving fried chicken found at the crime scene, the manner in which different parts of the chicken were consumed helped determine the perpetrator. I even made a light-hearted remark about Chinese preferences for chicken legs, noting that the untouched fried chicken legs implicated a non-Chinese individual in the crime.
The eclectic nature of Chinese culture influences my approach to interacting with others during investigations. When collaborating with Western counterparts at crime scenes, I employ a peaceful and tactful manner to guide them in recognizing areas for improvement in their forensic skills, fostering a cooperative and productive environment.
Are you familiar with traditional Chinese methods of criminal investigation, and do you believe they remain pertinent in modern forensic practices?
Indeed, the utilization of scientific methods in crime-solving dates back centuries, even to figures like Bao Zheng and Song Ci, a renowned forensic scientist of the Southern Song Dynasty.
Song Ci’s seminal work, “Collected Cases of Injustice Rectified,” is considered the world’s earliest forensic science book. Despite previous beliefs abroad that forensic science originated in England or Austria, Song Ci’s contributions underscore China’s historical prominence in this field.
In contemporary times, China has made significant advancements in criminal investigation, evidenced by the establishment of identification centers within public security systems. Through my experiences teaching and consulting in China over the past few years, I’ve observed firsthand the remarkable progress in forensic science.
China’s forensic science practices now align closely with international standards, with certain aspects even surpassing global benchmarks. This progress highlights China’s commitment to excellence in forensic science and its contribution to the broader international community.
From 1963 to 2023, China dispatched 24,000 members of its foreign aid medical teams to Africa, with 45 medical teams currently operating across 100 work sites in 44 African countries. These teams have established counterpart cooperation with African hospitals, supported the establishment of specialty centers, trained local medical personnel, and improved the health and well-being of people in recipient countries.
Through various activities such as clinical teaching, surgical demonstrations, academic exchanges, health lectures, epidemic prevention education, remote guidance, and medical tours, they have also contributed to upgrading the medical technology level in these countries.
However, in several East African countries, present-day regulations often require doctors to obtain professional qualifications issued by national medical associations in order to practice medicine. This requirement poses challenges for many members of the current medical teams, particularly due to language barriers and difficulties in obtaining qualification certificates.
Consequently, some members hold only volunteer certificates and are limited to auxiliary roles. This contrasts with the experiences of earlier medical teams, particularly during the Nyerere period in Tanzania, where the absence of strict licensing requirements allowed them to engage more freely in medical practice. This difference in treatment is not attributed to variations in skill level between former and current team members or changes in government attitudes towards China, but rather to the evolving medical ecology in Africa.
The development of African healthcare ecology has undergone four main stages since the entry of Western colonizers.
The first stage was characterized by missionary medicine, viewing healthcare as a means of religious salvation and colonization. The second stage, colonial or imperial medicine, operated in conquered territories to serve colonial interests. Post-colonial medicine, the third stage, saw the continuation of colonial influences alongside efforts towards national health system development. The current stage, democratic political medicine, reflects a balance between pragmatism, human rights, and neoliberalism.
However, the predominance of neoliberal values in healthcare systems has created challenges for non Western medical teams, as African countries have adopted Western medical standards requiring extensive training and licensing for medical practice.
The Prevalence of Neoliberalism and the Embarrassing Situation of Medical Teams in Africa
The licensing of physicians mentioned previously is just one aspect of the neoliberal medical ecology. Neoliberalism advocates for the medical field to operate under market logic, believing that monopolies without market competition lead to inefficiency. Consequently, healthcare in Africa has witnessed significant privatization in recent decades.
Due to limited pharmaceutical production capacity and market competition, modern medicine in Africa heavily relies on expensive imports. Some African countries permit doctors in public hospitals to practice multiple professions, allowing them to open pharmacies, clinics, and even hospitals to address the scarcity of national health resources.
However, under neoliberal influences, some medical practitioners exploit this by diverting hospital drugs to their own pharmacies for substantial profits through false prescriptions. Moreover, egoism among doctors within public hospitals, coupled with the pursuit of welfare benefits not aligned with social development, has resulted in frequent medical strikes and a mass exodus of medical and public health personnel to higher-paying sectors.
Neoliberalism also emphasizes the pursuit of advanced technology and talent. Despite Africa’s overall medical standard lagging behind, its professional standards for physicians and pharmaceutical quality are comparable to those of the World Health Organization, Europe, and the United States.
However, the insistence on adhering to Western standards has hindered the provision of basic medical care to the African population. With the absence of local pharmaceutical companies and lower drug standards compared to the West, Africa relies on expensive imported medicines, leading to significant resource waste and hindrance to meeting basic medical needs.
As African countries’ economy develops, their medical and healthcare systems progress as well. Consequently, the expectations placed on foreign aid medical teams in Africa have evolved. Some African countries now request high-precision equipment, technology, and specialized center construction, rather than solely relying on experts.
For instance, the Ebola epidemic prompted demands for disease control laboratories. While China previously provided personnel assistance, it now offers sophisticated technology, such as mobile P3 laboratories, within a short timeframe. However, establishing these laboratories requires careful consideration of personnel training, biosafety, and regulatory frameworks, posing challenges for African Union countries.
Neoliberal values also emphasize the population’s right to choose healthcare, leading to the proliferation of private medical institutions and medical tourism in Africa. While private hospitals offer top-notch services, they often cater to the wealthy elite and are predominantly controlled by foreign capital. As a result, health inequality persists, with the general population relying on underfunded public hospitals. The preference for overseas medical treatment among African elites further exacerbates the neglect of domestic healthcare infrastructure.
This neoliberal-led healthcare system presents a dilemma for China’s medical teams in Africa. While they aim to assist African healthcare systems, they are confronted with the realities of neoliberal dominance, where profit-driven practices and healthcare inequality prevail. This disconnect between perception and reality has prompted a crisis of values among China’s medical aid workers, as they navigate the complex landscape of African healthcare.
The Awakening of Medical Autonomy in Africa and Opportunities for Medical Teams in Africa
Healthcare autonomy has always been a crucial aspect of Africa’s pursuit of independent development. In the early years of independence, amid the Cold War, most African countries explored paths suitable for their own medical and health development, despite economic constraints. For instance, Tanzania implemented a free medical policy and primary health care measures during the socialist villagization movement of Ujamaa, while Kenya introduced external capital to push forward healthcare privatization reforms.
Additionally, many African countries, including South Africa, Ethiopia, Tanzania, and Uganda, revitalized traditional medicine as part of their healthcare strategies. With the recent economic development of Africa, characterized by rich natural resources, abundant labor force, and a large market potential, the continent has made significant strides in healthcare.
This progress includes building hospitals, establishing pharmaceutical companies, training local medical personnel, preventing and controlling infectious diseases, improving child nutrition, maternal and child health, and developing a certain degree of medical and healthcare resources and service capacity.
Consequently, Africa’s sense of autonomy in healthcare has strengthened, particularly in the search for development strategies, disease control, multilateral cooperation, and the promotion of traditional medicine. However, the lack of clear health development strategies and realistic goals can hinder self-development and pose challenges to aid efforts in Africa.
European and American aid, in particular, often focuses on medicines, vaccines, disease treatment, and epidemiological control, neglecting health system development. This has perpetuated Africa’s dependency on external medical resources and hindered the establishment of a self-sufficient health system.
Nonetheless, Africa’s increasing sense of autonomy in healthcare presents opportunities for Chinese medical teams. These teams aim to assist in the formulation of practical health development strategies and disease prevention measures that benefit the general population.
Through initiatives like disease control centers and public health interventions, China’s involvement in Africa’s healthcare has been pivotal. Notably, China’s assistance during the Ebola epidemic and its contribution to establishing the Africa CDC exemplify the potential for multilateral cooperation in public health governance.
Moreover, Africa’s autonomy in healthcare extends to traditional medicine, deeply rooted in African culture and consciousness. Traditional medicine, emphasizing comprehensive treatment and accessibility, has played a significant role in dealing with various diseases and has become a crucial option for African people seeking independent medical treatment.
China’s recognition of traditional medicine has led to cooperation with African countries in this field, with agreements signed to collaborate on laws and regulations, healthcare, education, training, research and development, and industrial cooperation. As China’s medical aid to Africa evolves, there is potential for transformation from bilateral to multilateral cooperation, involving international organizations, local NGOs, and medical organizations from other donor countries. This reflects Africa’s increasing autonomy and the diversified approach to healthcare cooperation on the continent.
