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Beyond Porcelain: How Jingdezhen Preserved a Thousand-Year Craft System

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On July 25, 2026, in Busan, South Korea, the 48th session of the UNESCO World Heritage Committee adopted a resolution to inscribe the Jingdezhen Handicraft Porcelain Industry Sites on the World Heritage List. With the inscription, the number of World Heritage properties in China rose to 61.

For Jingdezhen, the moment marked not only the culmination of more than a decade of work toward World Heritage inscription, but also an international recognition of the way the city has come to understand and protect its own history.

People tend to think of Jingdezhen through individual objects: blue-and-white porcelain, imperial kilns, and the celebrated description of porcelain as “white as jade, bright as a mirror, thin as paper, and resonant as a bell.”

But what Jingdezhen presented to the world this time was neither a single masterpiece nor a single ancient kiln. It was an entire handmade porcelain-making industry and the landscape that sustained it.

The heritage property comprises five components: the urban porcelain-production center, the Hutian Ancient Porcelain Kiln Site, the Gaoling Kaolin Mining Site, the Changling Porcelain-Stone Mining Site, and the Jiaotan kiln-fuel production area. Together, they contain 15 groups of heritage elements and 45 individual heritage sites.

From mountain mines to kiln workshops, from the processing of raw materials to the transportation of finished products, these remains, scattered across the city, countryside and surrounding mountains, bear witness to more than nine centuries of continuous development in Jingdezhen’s handmade porcelain industry.

It is also the first time that China has submitted a World Heritage nomination centered on an industrial heritage system. The fundamental question facing Jingdezhen was therefore not whether the city possessed enough historic remains. It was something more difficult: What, exactly, was it about Jingdezhen that the world needed to understand? It took more than a decade for the answer to emerge.

Jingdezhen formally began its World Cultural Heritage nomination process in 2015. At the time, the city possessed an extraordinary number of ancient kiln sites, mining pits, docks and historic roads. Fuliang County, meanwhile, retained the clay, porcelain stone and kiln fuel resources that had once supplied the entire porcelain-making industry and formed the upper reaches of its production chain.

At first, the instinct was to include as many valuable remains as possible. But as research deepened, the nomination team came to understand that a World Heritage nomination could not simply be an exhaustive inventory of local historical resources.

More heritage sites do not necessarily make a clearer heritage story. What mattered was identifying those remains that could most convincingly demonstrate Jingdezhen’s outstanding universal value, and connecting them into a coherent system that could be understood internationally.

The nomination therefore became a process of subtraction. Some ancient kiln sites, despite their long histories and relatively good preservation, were ultimately removed from the proposed property. Other remains that had once seemed ordinary or received little attention were brought back into focus.

The center of the research shifted as well. The history of Jingdezhen’s porcelain industry had traditionally been told through famous kilns, celebrated wares and renowned techniques. This time, researchers stepped back from the finished object and began asking a different set of questions.

How did kaolin from Gaoling, porcelain stone from Changling and kiln fuel from Jiaotan enter the production system? How were raw materials processed? How were they transported by land and water to the urban workshops? How was labor divided among different stages of production? And how did thousands of workers, workshops and production facilities together sustain one of the world’s great centers of porcelain manufacture?

Once these questions were placed back into their historical context, Jingdezhen’s distinctiveness became clearer. The city was not simply home to a collection of ancient kilns. It had developed a vast industrial ecosystem, with an extensive spatial reach, a highly integrated production chain, complex systems of labor organization, and remarkable continuity over time.

It was this system that helped Jingdezhen emerge as one of China’s, and the world’s most important centers of porcelain production during the Song, Yuan, Ming and Qing periods. Porcelain made in Jingdezhen traveled along the Maritime and overland Silk Roads to distant markets. Behind that global reach stood a complex network linking mountains and cities, mines and kilns, waterways and workshops, craftsmen and markets.

The term “industrial heritage” therefore became central to the nomination. It also fundamentally changed the way Jingdezhen prepared for the inscription.

To demonstrate the integrity of the system, the city undertook years of field surveys, archaeological investigation, historical research and heritage interpretation. Heritage elements were repeatedly reviewed, boundaries were adjusted, and the city gradually established a conservation and management system aligned with international World Heritage standards.

The preparation was never simply about putting old sites behind fences. Jingdezhen had to demonstrate not only why its remains mattered to the world, but also whether it possessed the institutional capacity to protect them over the long term.

Unlike many World Heritage properties concentrated within a single site, Jingdezhen’s 45 heritage sites stretch across urban and rural areas, different natural environments and multiple administrative jurisdictions. Some are located in the historic production center; others lie deep in the mountains; still others are closely connected with mineral resources and traditional communities.

How could such seemingly scattered remains be managed as one coherent heritage property? This became one of the central governance challenges of the nomination.

Over the course of the preparation, Jingdezhen developed a coordinated conservation framework linking the heritage conservation center, relevant government departments and local protection stations. The heritage conservation center undertakes overall monitoring and supervision; administrative departments provide professional guidance; and local protection stations are responsible for routine inspection and maintenance.

The city also developed a digital monitoring platform, bringing information on the condition of heritage structures, changes in their surrounding environments and inspection records into a unified system. Such institutional arrangements may be less visible than ancient kilns or porcelain vessels, but they are fundamental to the credibility of a World Heritage nomination.

An international evaluation does not ask only how glorious a place was in the past. It also asks whether there is a credible system capable of protecting that heritage into the future. The city also faced a more complicated question: how to integrate the protection of the natural environment, tangible heritage and living traditions.

Porcelain production in Jingdezhen did not emerge in isolation. High-quality porcelain stone and clay, local water systems and climatic conditions provided the natural foundations for the industry. Centuries of production, in turn, generated a rich body of craftsmanship and traditional knowledge.

Mines, kiln sites, historic roads and docks are visible forms of heritage. The knowledge embedded in washing clay, shaping vessels, applying glazes and controlling firing is less visible, yet remains alive in the hands of craftsmen.

For this reason, Jingdezhen’s nomination placed emphasis on the relationship between culture and nature, and on the interaction between tangible heritage and intangible traditions.

Protecting the wider heritage environment, the city argued, could allow people to understand that the traditional idea that a place is “suited to pottery by virtue of its soil and water” is not merely a poetic expression. It reflects a long historical interaction between natural conditions and human technology. This relationship was captured in remarkable detail in a book published more than two decades ago.

In the late 1990s, Bai Ming, a professor at Tsinghua University’s Academy of Arts and Design and a practicing ceramic artist, began systematically documenting traditional porcelain-making in Jingdezhen.

To complete Traditional Crafts of Porcelain Making in Jingdezhen, he spent seven years repeatedly visiting workshops, mountain areas and production sites. He took nearly 2,000 photographs and ultimately selected more than 600 for the book.

He deliberately refused to reconstruct the workshops for the camera. If the light was dim, he photographed the dim light. If the workshop was untidy, he left it that way. He recorded how individual craftsmen worked, where they placed their tools and how they organized their spaces.

What he wanted to preserve was not a carefully staged image of “tradition,” but tradition as it actually existed. Years later, as Jingdezhen began to seek World Heritage status not simply for individual kiln sites but for an entire industrial system, those records took on another significance.

In an old workshop, even a pool of water could form part of the porcelain-making process. Craftsmen combined a water pool with drying racks above it, creating what they called a “drying-rack pond.” In hot weather, water evaporated more quickly, increasing humidity around the workshop and slowing the loss of moisture from freshly formed clay bodies, thereby reducing the risk of cracking.

In other workshops, craftsmen treated water before using it to wash porcelain clay, relying on methods developed through generations of practical experience. Such knowledge rarely appears on the surface of a finished porcelain vessel. Yet it is precisely this knowledge that reveals how deeply the production system was rooted in the local environment.

Bai came to realize that most people see only the finished piece of porcelain. Far fewer understand what happened to the clay before it ever reached the kiln. The Jingdezhen nomination was, in many ways, an effort to make that invisible process visible. This understanding gradually became central to the city’s World Heritage narrative.

In January 2025, the Jingdezhen Handicraft Porcelain Industry Sites was formally submitted as China’s World Heritage nomination. By then, the city had already spent years conducting surveys and archaeological investigations, refining the heritage boundaries and components, articulating the site’s outstanding universal value, and building a conservation and management system.

In September of the same year, an international expert team arrived in Jingdezhen for a technical evaluation. It rained heavily throughout the visit, but the experts continued their intensive schedule, spending four and a half days visiting key heritage sites, examining their state of conservation, studying protection measures and reviewing management arrangements. Digital presentations were also used to reconstruct the ancient porcelain-making process.

At the command center of the heritage conservation system, a digital monitoring platform displayed information from sites across the property. What the experts saw was not simply a group of old kilns and abandoned mines. They saw an integrated conservation system covering multiple areas and different categories of heritage.

The evaluation reinforced a lesson that Jingdezhen had learned throughout the nomination process: World Heritage status is not simply a reward for the past. It is also a test of a place’s capacity to safeguard that past in the future. From a global perspective, the significance of Jingdezhen’s nomination extends beyond the city itself.

China’s existing World Heritage properties already include ceramic-related remains, including the Dehua and Cizao kiln sites associated with Quanzhou. But Jingdezhen is the first Chinese nomination to present porcelain-making itself as the central theme through a complete industrial heritage system.

It demonstrates not only the development of Chinese porcelain technology and ceramic art, but also how a traditional industry can become intertwined with natural resources, urban development, labor organization and international trade.

During the nomination process, Jingdezhen also became more active in international discussions on heritage conservation. At the World Heritage-related events in 2025, the city hosted a thematic side event on the creative conservation of industrial craft heritage, engaging with international peers on the protection and adaptive use of craft-based heritage.

The ambition is broader than securing a place on the World Heritage List. Jingdezhen hopes its experience can contribute to the research, conservation and future nominations of similar craft and industrial heritage sites around the world. But ultimately, the significance of the nomination returns to the city itself.

One of the immediate outcomes has been the expansion of Jingdezhen’s recognized heritage resources. Archaeological surveys and nomination research have brought previously overlooked sites back into public view.

Another has been a closer relationship between heritage and local communities. By incorporating porcelain-stone mining areas, kiln-fuel production zones and surrounding communities into the heritage system, the nomination has connected places of everyday life with the broader history of Jingdezhen’s porcelain industry. And perhaps most importantly, the process has strengthened the city’s conservation capacity.

Meeting international standards has required Jingdezhen to rethink how government departments coordinate, how heritage sites are monitored over the long term, how communities participate in conservation, and how development can be balanced with authenticity and integrity.

This may be the least visible, but one of the most important, legacies of the nomination. A World Heritage property is not truly successful simply because it has been inscribed. Its deeper test is whether it can establish a sustainable system of conservation after the ceremony is over.

Today, Jingdezhen remains a living porcelain city.

In the historic Taoyangli district, traditional workshops exist alongside new public spaces. At Taoxichuan, former industrial buildings have been revitalized as places where young ceramic artists and creative teams work and exchange ideas. Across the city, artists from around China, many of them part of the community known as “Jingpiao”, are experimenting with new forms, colors and designs while drawing on traditional techniques.

Master craftsmen continue to perform familiar gestures. Younger makers are finding their own language within them. This is also the new challenge facing Jingdezhen. How can more people experience the heritage without excessive commercialization undermining its authenticity? How can traditional techniques be passed on to younger generations rather than reduced to demonstrations for visitors? How can heritage conservation become part of community life instead of turning living communities into museum displays?

There are no simple answers, and none can be resolved on the day a property is inscribed on the World Heritage List. But Jingdezhen has taken an important step: it has found a clearer way to understand itself. A thousand years ago, porcelain clay was extracted from the mountains, washed and processed, shaped and fired, and transformed into vessels that traveled along rivers and across seas.

Today, the production system that once supported one of the world’s great porcelain centers has been made visible again through 45 heritage sites.

They reveal that great craftsmanship is never simply the achievement of a pair of skilled hands, nor is it contained in the beauty of a finished object. It is the accumulated knowledge of generations learning how to live with mountains and rivers, how to work with materials, how to respond to time, and how to pass experience from one generation to the next.

Jingdezhen nominated a collection of historic remains. What it is ultimately protecting is a civilization that has never entirely stopped. The kilns are still burning. And the story is still being written.

Source: tsinghua, brcn, cgtn, xinhua, sina, sohu

AI: China Sees Opportunity, America Sees Threat

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“Artificial intelligence as nuclear energy” or “artificial intelligence as a nuclear weapon”? The metaphor may not be perfect, but it captures a profound difference between China and the United States in how they understand the future of AI.

The debate over AI is often presented as a race over chips, computing power and frontier models. But beneath the technological competition lies a deeper question: What is AI for?

For China, a developing country still undergoing massive industrial and economic transformation, AI is first and foremost a source of productivity and growth. It can make factories smarter, agriculture more efficient, scientific research faster and public services more accessible. It can help small businesses compete, lower the cost of knowledge and allow developing countries to leapfrog traditional stages of development.

For the United States, however, AI is increasingly viewed through the lens of strategic power. Washington worries about whether China will gain an advantage, whether an AI breakthrough could change the military balance and whether advanced models should be allowed to spread beyond America’s control. In this worldview, frontier AI begins to resemble a nuclear weapon: immensely powerful, potentially dangerous and therefore something that must be tightly controlled.

This difference is not accidental. It reflects two very different strategic experiences.

The United States has spent decades at the center of a global military and intelligence system. Many important American technologies have had strong links to national security. The internet grew out of U.S. government-funded research. GPS was developed by the U.S. military before becoming a civilian technology. Drones, satellites, autonomous systems and advanced sensing technologies have all been deeply connected to defense applications.

As a result, when a new technology emerges, one natural American question is: How can it strengthen our strategic advantage?

China often begins from a different question: How can this technology increase productivity and accelerate development?

The difference can be seen in something as simple as the rise of robotic dogs.

American military institutions have repeatedly explored robotic dogs for surveillance, security and combat-related applications. The U.S. Air Force has tested quadrupedal robots for patrol and base security, while U.S. military experiments have included robots equipped with weapons. The underlying technology is dual-use, of course, and China is also exploring military applications. But the contrast in emphasis is revealing.

Chinese companies such as Unitree have aggressively commercialized robotic dogs for industrial inspection, power-grid monitoring, emergency rescue and other civilian applications. The same basic technology can therefore be imagined in two very different ways: as a weapon on the battlefield or as a machine that performs dangerous work for ordinary society.

The point is not that American technology is inherently military or Chinese technology is inherently peaceful. That would be simplistic. The point is that national priorities shape which applications receive attention, investment and imagination.

If AI is treated primarily as a weapon, technological progress becomes a zero-sum game. One country’s advance is automatically seen as another country’s loss. Openness becomes a security risk. Open-source models become suspicious. Export controls become the default response. The objective is no longer simply to make AI safer and more useful; it is to make sure that strategic competitors cannot catch up.

But AI is fundamentally different from a nuclear warhead. Software, algorithms and knowledge can be copied, modified, distilled and improved at extraordinary speed. It is extremely difficult to build a permanent technological Iron Curtain around them.

This is why America’s restrictions on advanced chips and AI technologies may create an unexpected paradox. They can slow China’s access to certain technologies, but they also encourage China to develop alternatives, build independent supply chains and innovate under constraints. At the same time, excessive restrictions risk fragmenting the global technology ecosystem and pushing other countries to develop outside the American technological sphere.

China’s growing emphasis on open and affordable AI models illustrates the alternative approach. Models such as DeepSeek and Kimi demonstrate a strategy in which technological capability is not valuable merely because it is possessed, but because it can be used, adapted and improved by a much wider community.

For a country like China, this makes economic sense. The value of AI does not come only from owning the most powerful model. It comes from putting AI into factories, laboratories, classrooms, hospitals and businesses. A powerful model locked behind a wall may strengthen a company’s strategic position; a capable model used by millions can transform an economy.

Nuclear energy carries enormous risks, but humanity did not respond by banning all civilian nuclear technology. Instead, it developed safety standards, regulation, international institutions and mechanisms for managing risk. The lesson is not that powerful technology should be uncontrolled. The lesson is that risk management does not have to mean technological isolation.

China does not deny that AI can be dangerous. Quite the opposite: as AI becomes deeply integrated into society, safety, accountability and responsible governance become increasingly important. But managing risk is different from building an technological Iron Curtain.

The real question is whether humanity wants AI to become another battlefield of geopolitical rivalry or a new foundation for shared development.

This matters especially for developing countries. For them, AI is not an abstract contest between superpowers. It could mean better education, cheaper healthcare, more productive industries, more efficient agriculture and new opportunities for economic growth. If advanced AI becomes concentrated in a small number of wealthy countries, much of the developing world may once again be left behind. If AI becomes more accessible, it could instead become one of the greatest tools for narrowing the global development gap.

This is ultimately where the Chinese perspective deserves to be taken seriously.

China is not arguing that AI has no risks. It is arguing that technological progress should not be defined entirely by fear of one’s geopolitical competitors. Security matters, but so does development. Regulation matters, but so does openness. National interests matter, but so does the broader interest of humanity.

The United States now faces a difficult choice. It can continue to treat AI primarily as a strategic weapon and attempt to preserve its lead through technological restrictions. Or it can recognize that in the age of AI, long-term technological strength will depend not only on controlling technology, but on building the most innovative, open and productive ecosystem around it.

History repeatedly shows that walls can preserve an advantage for a time, but ecosystems create lasting power.

The future of AI should therefore not be measured simply by asking who can build the most powerful weapon.

It should be measured by asking who can turn the most powerful technology into the greatest source of human progress.

That is the difference between seeing AI as a weapon and seeing it as energy.

Source: huxiu, global times, cgtn, xinhua, the new york times, bloomberg, investmentmonitor

Nexperia Lawsuit Exposes the Legal Front of US-EU Economic Pressure on China

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On May 22, an announcement by China’s Wingtech Technology and its subsidiary Yucheng Holdings drew widespread attention in China’s capital markets. The companies said they had filed a lawsuit with the Intermediate People’s Court in Dongguan, Guangdong, against Nexperia, its holding company, related entities and three foreign executives, seeking damages provisionally estimated at 8 billion yuan ($1.1 billion).

The lawsuit marks a dramatic escalation in a nearly eight-month battle over control of Nexperia and has been described as one of the largest overseas legal actions ever undertaken by a Chinese semiconductor company. Yet its significance extends well beyond the fate of one company. The dispute illustrates a broader transformation in the geopolitical risks confronting Chinese companies operating in Europe and the United States.

Since Donald Trump returned to the White House, transatlantic relations have become increasingly fractious. Washington and European capitals disagree on trade, defense and a range of economic issues. But on the question of economic competition with China, their policy trajectories have shown a striking degree of convergence. Both sides are reassessing their dependence on Chinese supply chains, expanding the concept of economic security and developing new legal and regulatory tools to constrain Chinese investment and trade.

For Chinese companies venturing into Western markets, the Nexperia dispute therefore deserves to be viewed not simply as a corporate controversy, but as a warning about the changing rules of the game.

Wingtech acquired Nexperia for more than 30 billion yuan ($4.13 billion) in 2019. At the time one of the largest overseas acquisitions in China’s semiconductor industry. Nexperia, a major producer of automotive-grade power semiconductors, accounted for a substantial share of Wingtech’s profits. The acquisition initially appeared to be a textbook example of Chinese capital gaining access to advanced global manufacturing capabilities.

That calculation changed dramatically in 2025. In late September, the US Commerce Department invoked its so-called “50 percent ownership rule,” bringing Nexperia within the scope of US export restrictions because of its ownership by Wingtech, which had already been placed on the US Entity List. The following day, the Dutch government froze Nexperia’s global assets under the 1952 Goods Availability Act, a rarely used piece of legislation. The Amsterdam Court of Appeal’s Enterprise Chamber subsequently suspended Wingtech founder Zhang Xuezheng from his positions at Nexperia and placed Wingtech’s 99 percent stake under third-party administration.

In legal terms, the Chinese parent company was effectively deprived of control over its core overseas asset. The consequences have also reached Wingtech’s financial reporting. Because auditors could not obtain financial data and IT records from restricted overseas entities, Wingtech’s 2025 annual report and internal-control audit received “disclaimer of opinion” conclusions, exposing the company to severe delisting risks under Chinese stock-market rules.

What makes the episode particularly significant is the broader policy environment in which it has unfolded.

Western governments have increasingly focused on what analysts describe as “China Shock 2.0”: the possibility that China’s industrial policies and enormous manufacturing capacity could create bottlenecks in strategic value chains. Since 2024, think tanks and policymakers in the US and Europe have paid growing attention to China’s position in sectors such as semiconductors, electric vehicles, batteries and renewable energy. The concern is no longer simply that Chinese products may outcompete Western producers, but that Chinese companies could acquire influence over critical nodes of global supply chains.

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has explicitly warned that Europe needs to protect itself against a new China shock, including through tariffs and other defensive measures. Against this backdrop, a semiconductor company that might once have been viewed primarily through a commercial lens can increasingly be treated as a strategic asset.

A second shift is equally important: economic security is becoming a whole-of-society project. Governments are seeking closer cooperation with private companies, monitoring corporate investment portfolios and encouraging businesses to conduct much more extensive due diligence on foreign partners. Private companies are no longer simply participants in international commerce; they are increasingly expected to serve as instruments of national economic-security policy.

The third development is the growing use of law as an instrument of economic competition. Britain has adopted legislation to intervene in strategic industrial assets; the Netherlands revived a decades-old law to intervene in Nexperia; France has imposed significant penalties on Chinese e-commerce platforms; and European authorities have launched regulatory investigations affecting Chinese investment in overseas mining assets. The common feature is not necessarily that every measure is politically coordinated, but that national-security and economic interests are increasingly being pursued through legal and administrative mechanisms.

Wingtech’s response has consequently taken three tracks.

The first is litigation in China. The company and Yucheng have invoked China’s Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law, arguing that measures imposed by the Dutch authorities constitute discriminatory restrictions and seeking confirmation of their illegality, an order to cease the alleged infringement and compensation of approximately 8 billion yuan.

The second is international investment arbitration. Wingtech reportedly submitted a notice of dispute to the Netherlands in October 2025 under the 2001 China-Netherlands bilateral investment treaty, beginning the process that could lead to arbitration. The treaty is relatively concise and contains fewer explicit national-security exceptions than many newer investment agreements. That may give Chinese investors potentially useful treaty protections, although the eventual legal outcome will depend on the specific claims and the tribunal’s interpretation of the agreement.

The third is supply-chain localization. In China, Nexperia has accelerated efforts to establish domestic supply chains for products including MOSFETs and logic ICs, with further product lines reportedly targeted for localization. This is more than a business-continuity measure. It provides a degree of strategic insurance in a prolonged dispute over overseas assets.

A Chinese court victory, however, would not automatically translate into compensation. If defendants hold executable assets in China, enforcement may be relatively straightforward. If their principal assets are overseas, recognition and enforcement of a Chinese judgment could become considerably more complicated. The litigation may therefore prove valuable even if immediate financial recovery remains uncertain: it can establish facts, clarify legal responsibility and strengthen China’s position in subsequent negotiations, arbitration or asset-related proceedings.

For Chinese companies investing abroad, the central lesson is that commercial due diligence is no longer sufficient. Political and legal risk must be incorporated into the investment decision from the beginning.

Companies should develop a much deeper understanding of the legal systems of their target markets, particularly in sectors regarded as strategically sensitive. They need databases tracking sanctions, investment-screening regimes, national-security legislation and regulatory changes, as well as teams capable of handling international investment law and sanctions disputes.

They should also establish permanent geopolitical risk-monitoring mechanisms rather than responding only after a crisis erupts. Investment structures, governance arrangements, intellectual-property ownership and supply chains should all be designed with the possibility of political intervention in mind. In sensitive industries, genuine localization and diversified management structures may reduce the vulnerability of an overseas operation to political pressure.

Existing international legal instruments should also be used more strategically. The Nexperia case demonstrates that older bilateral investment treaties can sometimes offer protections that newer agreements, with their more extensive national-security exceptions, do not. For Chinese companies, treaty selection and investment structuring should therefore be considered before an acquisition is completed, not after a dispute begins.

Finally, Europe’s internal diversity should not be underestimated. European countries have different industrial interests and different assessments of the risks posed by China. Some governments and European industries remain concerned that excessive restrictions could undermine their own competitiveness. Chinese companies and policymakers should therefore engage not only with national governments and EU institutions, but also with industry associations, major European businesses and other stakeholders that have a direct interest in maintaining commercial ties with China.

The Nexperia dispute is far from over. On May 27, Wingtech reiterated that it would exhaust every available legal avenue to restore full control of the company. The battle will continue in courts, arbitration proceedings, boardrooms and, potentially, diplomatic channels.

Whatever the ultimate outcome, the case has already changed the risk calculus for Chinese companies going abroad. Cross-border acquisitions in an era of geopolitical competition are no longer merely transactions designed to obtain technology, markets and profits. They can become contests over jurisdiction, regulation, supply chains and political power.

For Chinese companies, the challenge is no longer simply how to invest overseas successfully. It is how to preserve legal leverage, operational resilience and strategic autonomy when the commercial rules themselves are increasingly shaped by geopolitics.

Source: rfi, stcn, dacheng, guancha, sohu, nbd, cgtn

Shanghai’s AI Industry Gains Momentum as the City Builds a Real-World Testing Ground

Shanghai’s artificial intelligence industry is gathering pace as the city’s long-term investment in computing power, capital, data and real-world applications begins to translate into faster growth.

On July 20, the Shanghai Municipal Bureau of Statistics reported that the city’s GDP reached 27.89 trillion yuan ($3.89 trillion) in the first half of 2026, up 5.6% year on year in real terms.

Industry remained an important driver. Output from manufacturing in Shanghai’s three strategic emerging industries rose 14.5% from a year earlier. Integrated-circuit manufacturing increased 19.5%, AI manufacturing jumped 21.8%, and biopharmaceutical manufacturing grew 7.2%. Output of railway, shipbuilding, aerospace and other transportation equipment also expanded 15.6%.

Foreign trade provided another source of momentum. Shanghai’s total imports and exports reached 2.55 trillion yuan in the first half, a record for the period. Imports rose 17.4% and exports 20.1%. Trade in high-tech products increased 21.6% to 662.14 billion yuan.

The acceleration of AI, however, reflects more than a strong technology cycle. It is the result of years of investment and policy experimentation coming together at a critical moment.

“Shanghai’s AI industry accelerated in the first half of the year because multiple conditions that had been accumulating for years are now being released at the same time,” said Zhong Huiyong, an associate researcher at Antai College of Economics and Management and the China Institute for Development Studies at Shanghai Jiao Tong University.

The city has been building up computing capacity, attracting investment, opening application scenarios and developing innovation platforms. Together, these efforts are lowering the cost of experimentation for companies and shortening the path from technology to commercial use.

Shanghai’s upgraded “Model Shanghai” initiative focuses on three basic inputs for AI development: computing power, data and capital. The city has developed several domestic intelligent-computing chips, is investing in advanced networking technologies and is building a unified citywide intelligent-computing network.

Data infrastructure is expanding as well. Shanghai has established what it describes as China’s first data-content operation platform and has assembled datasets totaling 10,000 terabytes in fields including scientific research and industrial manufacturing.

“Shanghai has spent years developing high-performance domestic computing clusters, public data platforms and open-source developer communities,” said Wu Yiping, a distinguished researcher at the Institute for Chinese Modernization Studies at Shanghai University of Finance and Economics. The concentration of universities, research institutes, investors and start-ups, he said, has strengthened the supply of talent and cutting-edge technology.

The government is also using financial incentives to reduce the cost of innovation. Shanghai provides 1 billion yuan a year in vouchers for computing power, AI models and data, allowing companies to use the resources first and pay later. The city has also attracted a national AI fund with a total size of 60 billion yuan and established a municipal AI leading-industry fund worth 22.5 billion yuan.

The objective is increasingly to build an ecosystem rather than simply subsidise individual companies.

“Technology, capital and industry are beginning to form a virtuous cycle,” Wu said. Public funds are working with private investors to channel capital into areas such as intelligent chips, autonomous driving and embodied intelligence.

Perhaps the most distinctive part of Shanghai’s strategy is its emphasis on real-world applications.

At Zhangjiang AI Innovation Town, a two-square-kilometre core area has effectively become a testing ground for emerging technologies. Autonomous patrol vehicles operate around the clock, working with drones to provide coordinated air-and-ground monitoring. Autonomous boats monitor an 11.8-kilometre waterway, while autonomous buses are preparing to operate on 329 kilometres of open roads.

These are not laboratory simulations. They involve real roads, real users and real feedback, allowing companies to test and refine their products in operating environments.

That approach was also visible during the “WAIC City Walk 2026”, held from July 15 to 20 alongside the World Artificial Intelligence Conference. Six industry-themed routes and eight open-access locations connected laboratories, industrial parks and innovation spaces across Shanghai, bringing AI out of exhibition halls and into the city.

Shanghai is increasingly looking to industrial pain points to determine where AI should be deployed. Its “AI + manufacturing” programme focuses on industries such as electronics, advanced equipment and automobiles, while efforts in consumer technology are targeting products including AI glasses and AI smartphones. In services, the city is promoting AI applications in areas such as finance, consulting and auditing.

The city’s state-owned enterprises have also been asked to accelerate the adoption of AI. A programme launched in March identified 50 urgent, high-value business scenarios across finance, manufacturing, transportation and construction, covering processes such as design, quality control, production scheduling, maintenance and dispatch.

“Shanghai has a rich range of application scenarios in manufacturing, finance, healthcare, automobiles and urban governance,” Zhong said. “AI technologies can enter actual business processes relatively quickly, creating a cycle of technological breakthroughs, scenario validation, product iteration and industrial value creation.”

Shanghai is simultaneously trying to build an ecosystem that is attractive to developers.

Its “1+3+N” model framework combines Shanghai AI Laboratory’s open-source InternLM series with three commercial foundation-model providers—StepFun, MiniMax and SenseTime—and a growing number of industry-specific models for sectors such as manufacturing, healthcare and finance.

The city is also experimenting with new approaches to talent development and entrepreneurship. Shanghai Innovation Institute, for example, is exploring an integrated model linking research, innovation and education, while using an “investment-incubation-exit” mechanism to support promising projects. More than 20 high-valued innovative companies have already been incubated under the programme.

Physical proximity is another part of the strategy. Innovation hubs such as ModelSpeed Space and Model Power Community aim to put developers, investors and industrial partners within easy reach of one another. The Zhangjiang and Beiyang AI Innovation Towns are designed to strengthen industrial clustering and create complementary innovation hubs.

The logic is straightforward: reducing the friction between an idea and a commercial product can be just as important as providing money or computing power.

The 2026 World Artificial Intelligence Conference offered a vivid example. More than 1,100 companies took part, showcasing over 3,000 products, with more than 300 making their global debut.

The conference is not merely a showcase for the latest technology. It also reduces the costs of finding information, identifying partners and understanding where the industry is heading. Chipmakers, model developers, application companies, investors and industrial users can meet in the same physical space, turning what might otherwise take months of searching and negotiation into a much shorter process.

Shanghai’s AI strategy is therefore becoming less about building technology for its own sake and more about making technology useful.

Its competitive advantage may ultimately lie not in any single model, chip or application, but in the ecosystem being built around them: abundant computing power, accessible data, patient capital, open application scenarios, concentrated talent and dense industrial networks.

As these elements reinforce one another, Shanghai is attempting to create a shorter and cheaper route from technological breakthrough to commercial value.

The acceleration of its AI industry is consequently not the product of one policy or one breakthrough. It is the result of years of groundwork reaching a point where infrastructure, capital, policy and demand are beginning to move in the same direction. For Shanghai, turning the city itself into a testing ground may be the next step in turning AI from technological promise into measurable economic value.

Source: paper, sohu, sina, people, yahoo, xinhuanet, sh gov cn

China Meteorological Administration Launches “Fenghe” AI Model and Global Open-Source Initiative

At the 2026 World Artificial Intelligence Conference (WAIC) Meteorological Session, the China Meteorological Administration (CMA) unveiled “Fenghe,” an AI-powered large language model designed specifically for meteorological services, and launched its global open-source initiative. 

As China’s first meteorological service domain model with hundreds of billions of parameters, Fenghe is expected to accelerate the integration of artificial intelligence into the full chain of meteorological services and help transform traditional weather services into more intelligent, efficient and personalized systems.

Developed by the CMA Public Meteorological Service Centre in collaboration with the Xiong’an Institute of Artificial Intelligence Innovation, Zhipu and other partners, Fenghe is described as the world’s first open-source meteorological large language model at the 100-billion-parameter scale. 

Unlike conventional numerical weather prediction models, Fenghe is designed more like an “AI meteorological service officer.” Built on a large language model architecture, it combines artificial intelligence with professional meteorological knowledge and massive amounts of weather and climate data to support weather analysis, risk assessment and decision-making.

Wang Muhua, a senior engineer at the CMA Public Meteorological Service Centre, said one of Fenghe’s key features is its foundation model with hundreds of billions of parameters. Through multimodal integration and generative AI technologies, the model is designed to improve the resolution, efficiency and responsiveness of meteorological services.

Fenghe is built on a comprehensive Earth system data infrastructure and has been trained on 50 million tokens of high-quality meteorological service data. It also integrates authoritative meteorological datasets and has completed the required filing process for generative AI services in China, providing users with a more secure and controllable model application environment.

Fenghe differs in its positioning from several AI-based forecasting systems previously developed by the CMA, including Fengqing, a global medium- and short-range forecasting system; Fenglei, an AI-based nowcasting system; and Fengshun, a global subseasonal-to-seasonal prediction system. 

These systems are primarily designed for professional meteorological operations and focus on improving forecasting capabilities across different time scales. Fenghe, by contrast, is aimed mainly at the public and industries, serving as an intelligent interface between professional weather forecasts and real-world service needs.

According to Wang, Fenghe is not intended to replace traditional numerical weather prediction, nor does it simply use a large language model to generate weather forecasts. Instead, it builds on forecasting information produced by systems such as Fengqing, Fenglei and Fengshun, while combining professional meteorological knowledge with generative AI and application scenarios. This approach is intended to address limitations of general-purpose large language models, which may struggle to fully understand specialized meteorological needs, generate sufficiently professional information or adapt effectively to complex service scenarios.

For the public, this could mean a shift from simply being told what the weather will be to receiving practical advice on what to do. Yu Tingzhao, a senior engineer at the CMA Public Meteorological Service Centre, said Fenghe could provide more precise and scenario-specific support for travel and outdoor activities by combining weather information with location, timing and individual needs.

For example, a conventional forecast might say that an area will be cloudy with occasional showers over the weekend. For someone planning a hike or camping trip, such information may not be sufficient to determine whether or where to go. In the future, Fenghe could combine high-resolution weather forecasts with local environmental and geographical information to analyze conditions in complex areas such as mountains and lakes. It could identify differences in rainfall, wind speed and visibility between locations and time periods, and then provide practical recommendations, such as choosing a particular route or completing a hike before deteriorating conditions arrive.

This could gradually shift weather services from regional forecasts toward highly localized, point-specific services, and from passive information delivery toward proactive, AI-assisted decision-making.

Fenghe is already supporting meteorological services across China and providing the public with personalized weather information, service recommendations and risk warnings. Its international version has also been launched and integrated into “Mazu,” an intelligent meteorological early-warning solution developed in support of the Early Warnings for All initiative. It provides users around the world with bilingual Chinese-English intelligent question answering, weather information and risk analysis.

With the launch of the global open-source initiative, the CMA plans to make Fenghe’s complete model weights available through platforms including GitHub, Hugging Face and ModelScope. Standardized APIs, cloud services and customized deployment solutions will also be provided. The initiative therefore goes beyond simply opening the model code and weights: it aims to provide a complete technology and deployment framework that allows developers, research institutions and international partners to integrate Fenghe into applications ranging from mobile apps and mini-programs to embodied AI systems.

The broader goal is to build an open and collaborative global ecosystem for meteorological artificial intelligence. By making advanced meteorological AI capabilities more accessible, Fenghe could help transform large volumes of weather and climate data into intuitive risk information, convert complex warnings into easy-to-understand natural-language guidance, and eventually translate weather risks into concrete actions.

In sectors such as transportation, energy, electricity, healthcare, logistics and tourism, meteorological warnings could be further connected with operational decisions, enabling AI systems to recommend specific responses to changing weather conditions. From public weather services to professional analysis, and from risk identification to emergency response, Fenghe is intended to make meteorological warnings more understandable, accessible and actionable, providing new technological support for global disaster risk reduction and the development of more inclusive early-warning systems.

Source: people, xinhua, yicai, ceic, kpzg, cctv

BYD Chief Scientist Lian Yubo on How Basic Research Has Driven China to Global Leadership in New Energy Vehicles

On April 30, 2026, Chinese President Xi Jinping attended a symposium on strengthening basic research in Shanghai and delivered an important speech. He emphasized that basic research is the source of the entire scientific system and the starting point for solving technological problems. He called for greater efforts and more effective measures to strengthen basic research, enhance China’s capacity for original innovation, and lay a stronger foundation for building the country into a leading scientific and technological power.

The fundamental importance of basic research lies in the fact that major technological breakthroughs ultimately depend on a deep understanding of underlying mechanisms and scientific laws. Without long-term accumulation in basic research, applied technologies become like water without a source, making it difficult to overcome technological bottlenecks at their roots. Without the forward-looking guidance of basic research, industrial development can also become like a ship without a rudder, struggling to find its direction in unexplored areas. The development of China’s new energy vehicle (NEV) industry over more than three decades provides a compelling example of the value of long-term commitment to scientific research.

In 2025, China’s NEV production and sales ranked first in the world for the eleventh consecutive year, while new energy passenger vehicles accounted for 68.4 percent of the global market. The industry has therefore achieved a leading position in terms of scale and engineering capabilities. However, this leadership does not necessarily mean that China has achieved the same level of strength in fundamental theories, original scientific discoveries, or underlying technologies. Engineering excellence is not equivalent to deep theoretical accumulation. 

As global competition in the automotive industry increasingly moves from application-oriented technologies toward fundamental theories and core underlying technologies, breakthroughs in basic research have become essential for China to consolidate its leadership in NEVs and transform itself from a major automobile producer into a true automotive power.

The evolution of China’s NEV industry illustrates this transition. In the early stage, during the periods of the Eighth and Tenth Five-Year Plans, electric vehicles were incorporated into national science and technology programs, and the “Three Verticals and Three Horizontals” technical framework under the 863 Program established major directions for research. Universities and research institutes played the leading role, creating the initial technological foundation and cultivating China’s first generation of NEV researchers. 

However, investment was relatively limited, and research was often disconnected from industrial needs and focused insufficiently on fundamental scientific questions. Some companies had already begun independent exploration. BYD, for example, established a central research department and invested in electrochemical research, particularly in battery cycle life and safety, laying the groundwork for its later development.

As the industry entered the commercialization stage, research became increasingly driven by practical engineering requirements. The launch of the “Ten Cities, Thousand Vehicles” demonstration program in 2009 accelerated the market adoption of NEVs. Consumer demand for longer driving ranges and greater reliability encouraged research into battery materials, manufacturing processes, and other key technologies. This market-driven approach improved the performance of critical components, but many fundamental research achievements remained concentrated in universities and research institutes, while connections between scientific discoveries and industrial engineering were still relatively weak.

With the rapid expansion of the NEV market, Chinese companies began to develop stronger in-house research capabilities. They established independent research departments, joint laboratories, and other collaborative innovation platforms. Basic research gradually shifted from simply supporting existing products to helping define future technology directions. BYD’s Blade Battery is one example. 

By starting from actual vehicle requirements and combining fundamental electrochemical understanding with innovative product and manufacturing design, the company significantly improved battery safety and system integration, contributing to the renewed prominence of lithium iron phosphate batteries. 

Nevertheless, much of the research during this stage remained incremental, focusing on optimization rather than genuinely disruptive innovation. Leading companies therefore began to deepen cooperation with universities and research institutes, forming new models in which companies identify industrial problems and academic institutions help address the underlying scientific questions.

Today, however, the industry is entering a new phase. As NEVs become increasingly widespread and their applications more diverse, conventional theories and engineering approaches are approaching their limits. Requirements for longer range, faster charging, greater safety, and more intelligent driving are pushing the industry into technological “uncharted territory.” At this point, simply improving existing products is no longer sufficient. Companies must increasingly define new research questions themselves and invest in original scientific exploration.

For enterprises operating at the technological frontier, basic research should therefore be closely connected with long-term strategic needs. The NEV industry can be understood as a five-level structure, progressing from mechanisms and materials to components, systems, and complete vehicles. 

Chinese companies have developed strong capabilities at the component, system, and vehicle levels, but their accumulation of fundamental research at the mechanism and material levels remains comparatively limited. Strategic basic research can help bridge this gap. Such research typically requires five to ten years or even longer, has the potential to redefine products if successful, and provides a technological foundation that can support multiple products and applications.

Its value can be seen in several ways. First, a deeper understanding of underlying mechanisms can reduce engineering uncertainty and the cost of trial and error. For example, battery safety under collision involves complex interactions among material damage, structural dynamics, and electrochemical processes. 

Understanding these mechanisms scientifically can provide quantitative guidance for engineering design and significantly reduce repetitive testing. Second, basic research can transform vague engineering experience into clearly defined scientific boundaries. In electric drive systems, for instance, understanding the fundamental limits of power density, temperature, noise, and other parameters can make system design more predictable, measurable, and reliable. 

Third, fundamental breakthroughs can enable entirely new technological architectures. BYD’s e⁴ platform, for example, moves beyond conventional mechanical four-wheel-drive structures by using independently controlled electric motors and advanced coordination algorithms. This represents a shift from optimizing individual components to fundamentally restructuring vehicle dynamics and control.

Looking forward, several areas deserve particular attention. Next-generation batteries will require breakthroughs in energy density, safety, cycle life, and performance under extreme conditions, as conventional electrochemical systems approach their theoretical limits. Comprehensive vehicle intelligence will also require fundamental research into perception, cognition, vehicle dynamics, and control, enabling intelligent driving and intelligent chassis systems to work together at millisecond-level speeds. 

In addition, automotive semiconductors and industrial software are becoming common foundations for both electrification and intelligent vehicles. Research into chip architecture, real-time operating systems, functional safety, and reliability will be critical to achieving greater technological autonomy.

The key challenge, therefore, is not simply to conduct more basic research, but to establish an effective pathway connecting scientific discovery, engineering development, and industrial commercialization. This requires stronger coordination between industry and academia. 

Companies are often focused on engineering problems, cost, and development cycles, while universities tend to prioritize scientific questions and theoretical contributions. Companies should consequently translate complex industrial and commercial problems into clearly defined scientific questions and regularly communicate these research needs to universities and research institutes.

At the same time, major strategic research projects require stable, long-term, and concentrated investment. For areas of high strategic importance, resources should not be dispersed across numerous short-term projects. Instead, interdisciplinary teams should be formed and sufficient resources concentrated on key scientific challenges. Talent development is equally important. Enterprises, universities, and research institutes should establish more flexible mechanisms for two-way talent mobility and develop interdisciplinary researchers who understand both fundamental science and industrial engineering.

Most importantly, China needs to establish a complete innovation chain from “0 to 1 to 10 to 100.” The 0-to-1 stage is the discovery of new scientific principles, in which universities and research institutes play a major role while companies participate at an early stage. The 1-to-10 stage focuses on turning scientific discoveries into stable technologies through engineering validation and prototype development, with enterprises taking the lead. The 10-to-100 stage is the large-scale commercialization of mature technologies, which requires companies to integrate them systematically into products and industrial systems. Building research platforms, pilot-testing facilities, and evaluation mechanisms that support all three stages will help ensure that scientific discoveries can become genuine industrial capabilities.

China’s more than thirty years of NEV development demonstrate that sustainable technological leadership cannot rely solely on manufacturing scale or engineering efficiency. The most important competitive advantages often lie beneath the visible product, in the scientific principles, materials, algorithms, and technological architectures that make innovation possible. As China moves from being a major automobile producer toward becoming an automotive power, the decisive competition will increasingly take place at the level of basic research.

The next stage of China’s NEV development therefore requires greater strategic patience, sustained investment, and a willingness to tolerate failure. Basic research cannot always produce immediate commercial returns, but it creates the technological options that determine what industries can achieve years or even decades later. 

By strengthening original scientific research, connecting it more effectively with engineering and commercialization, and building a long-term innovation ecosystem, China can turn its existing engineering and industrial advantages into deeper and more sustainable technological leadership, providing a stronger foundation for the development of a world-leading automotive industry.

Source: bulletin cas cn, BYD, global times, scmp

2026: The Year Physical AI Enters Mass Production Through the Automobile

The automotive industry has reached a defining moment in 2026. After years of rapid advances in large language models, the AI industry has arrived at a shared realization: intelligence confined to a screen is ultimately limited. To unlock its full potential, AI must move beyond generating information and begin interacting with the physical world. It needs a body.

The evolution of AI is therefore entering a new phase. While foundation models and AI agents have transformed digital experiences, the next frontier is Embodied AI, intelligence capable of perceiving, reasoning, and acting in real-world environments. This marks a shift away from competing solely on model size and cloud computing power toward integrating AI deeply with physical products. Among all intelligent devices, the automobile has emerged as the most compelling platform for this transition.

Unlike smartphones or smart home devices, which are largely limited to touchscreens and voice interfaces, vehicles combine rich multimodal perception, powerful onboard computing, mobility, and precise physical control. They are uniquely positioned to connect digital intelligence with real-world execution.

This transformation is far more significant than introducing a smarter voice assistant into the cabin. It fundamentally redefines the relationship between people and their vehicles. Traditional in-car systems require users to adapt to predefined commands and rigid interaction logic. A true AI agent reverses that relationship. Instead of demanding precise instructions, it understands human intent, interprets context, anticipates needs, and responds proactively. It recognizes fatigue, stress, urgency, and changing circumstances, enabling a more natural, intuitive, and human-centered driving experience.

This vision became tangible when Geely introduced its cockpit-driving integrated AI agent, Super EVA, and brought it into mass production on the Zeekr 8X. Rather than treating AI as another software feature, Geely positioned it as the central intelligence that connects perception, decision-making, vehicle control, and digital services into one unified experience.

As AI enters the automotive industry, not every approach is equally meaningful. Many manufacturers have simply integrated third-party large language models into their infotainment systems, enabling conversations, content generation, or entertainment while marketing these capabilities as intelligent transformation. However, the future of automotive AI extends far beyond conversational interfaces.

The intelligent agent is becoming the primary gateway through which users interact with every aspect of the vehicle, from hardware and chassis control to navigation, mobility services, payments, and an expanding ecosystem of digital experiences. Whoever controls this layer controls the user’s intent. Relying entirely on external AI providers risks reducing automakers to hardware manufacturers while strategic control over user experience shifts elsewhere.

Geely has pursued a different path. Super EVA is built upon the company’s long-term investment in self-developed voice technologies, integrated with StepFun’s Step 3.7 end-to-end foundation model and customized automotive AI agents. This combination allows Geely to retain ownership of interaction design, safety boundaries, engineering optimization, and long-term service evolution while leveraging the reasoning capabilities of advanced foundation models.

Building an automotive AI agent, however, is fundamentally different from developing consumer software. Unlike digital applications, every AI decision inside a vehicle has physical consequences. The challenge is not simply making AI more intelligent in the cloud, but ensuring that every decision can be translated into safe, reliable, real-time vehicle actions.

Achieving this requires deep integration between the intelligent cockpit and autonomous driving systems. The cockpit must understand driving scenarios, road regulations, and vehicle dynamics, while autonomous driving systems must expose decision-making processes that have traditionally remained within black-box architectures. Only through this two-way integration can AI move seamlessly from understanding human intent to executing safe physical actions.

Equally important is the underlying engineering foundation. High-bandwidth communication, cross-domain computing, real-time scheduling, and multiple layers of safety redundancy are essential prerequisites for turning AI reasoning into physical vehicle control.

Geely’s ability to commercialize this vision is the result of years of investment across the full AI technology stack. Its service-oriented vehicle architecture, Xingrui Intelligent Computing Center with 23.5 EFLOPS of computing power, millions of newly collected real-world driving data points every year, and continuous development of proprietary voice technologies and AI algorithms together form the infrastructure that enables fast, reliable, and safe cross-domain collaboration.

The value of this integration becomes clear in everyday situations. Imagine driving to work on a busy Monday morning with an important meeting approaching. You simply say, “Hi Super EVA, I need to arrive before nine. I’m feeling tired, please drive me to the office.” During the journey, you add, “Order me an iced Americano along the way.”

Without requiring multiple separate commands, the AI understands your priorities, plans the optimal route, activates intelligent driving assistance where appropriate, coordinates the journey, locates a nearby coffee shop, places the order, completes payment, and ensures everything aligns with your arrival time. Instead of executing isolated instructions, the AI orchestrates multiple services across the physical and digital worlds to complete an entire mobility task on your behalf.

This represents a fundamental shift from reactive software to proactive intelligence.

The AI industry has never lacked ambitious visions. Tesla’s integration of Grok into its broader ecosystem points toward a future in which automotive AI and humanoid robotics share common intelligence. Across the industry, demonstrations of AI agents have become common at major auto shows and technology events.

Yet the automotive industry is ultimately defined not by demonstrations, but by production.

Mass production remains the only meaningful benchmark capable of separating technological breakthroughs from conceptual hype. Automotive AI must perform consistently not just in ideal testing environments, but across millions of kilometers, countless weather conditions, unpredictable traffic situations, and complex long-tail scenarios while maintaining uncompromising safety standards.

This is where engineering discipline becomes more important than marketing narratives.

Super EVA has already moved beyond the demonstration stage into large-scale deployment. Following its production launch on the Zeekr 8X, the system is scheduled to reach hundreds of thousands of existing Zeekr owners through over-the-air updates before expanding across Lynk & Co and Geely models. Such rapid deployment across multiple brands and vehicle platforms reflects not only technological maturity but also manufacturing capability, software validation, supply chain coordination, and organizational execution at scale.

Ultimately, the significance of automotive AI extends beyond the vehicle itself.

As discussions around embodied intelligence continue, many ask whether future digital experiences will revolve around smartphones or automobiles. The answer is increasingly that they will complement one another. Smartphones remain indispensable companions for everyday digital life, while vehicles occupy a unique role as intelligent physical spaces capable of movement, perception, and real-world interaction.

The automobile therefore becomes the bridge connecting people, vehicles, homes, and services into one continuous intelligent ecosystem. Super EVA represents more than a new product or feature. It demonstrates how AI can move beyond conversation and begin creating tangible value in the physical world. More importantly, it reflects a broader direction for the industry, one in which intelligence is measured not by how convincingly it talks, but by how safely, reliably, and naturally it acts.

As the era of Physical AI begins, the companies that will shape the future are unlikely to be those with the loudest announcements or the most impressive demonstrations. They will be the ones capable of translating advanced intelligence into products that millions of people can trust and use every day. In that sense, the journey from digital intelligence to physical execution has already begun, and the automobile is emerging as its most important proving ground.

Source: 36kr, zgqcdt, sina, sohu, zhihu

AI and the Metropolis: A Mutual Journey Toward the Future of Civilization

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The 2026 World Artificial Intelligence Conference and High-Level Meeting on Global AI Governance marked more than another milestone in technological development. It signaled a turning point in humanity’s relationship with artificial intelligence. 

With the establishment of the World AI Cooperation Organization, alongside the release of the conference’s Chair’s Statement and national action plans, global AI governance began moving beyond fragmented national approaches toward coordinated institutions, shared rules, and collective responsibility. This transition reflects a profound reality: artificial intelligence is no longer simply a technological issue, and it has become a defining force shaping the future of human civilization.

Few places illustrate this transformation more vividly than Shanghai. As one of the world’s largest and most dynamic cities, it has become not only a center for AI innovation but also a living laboratory where intelligent technologies and urban life continuously reshape one another. The relationship between AI and the modern metropolis is no longer one of technology serving the city. Instead, cities and artificial intelligence are entering an era of mutual evolution, where each becomes both the catalyst and the beneficiary of the other’s transformation.

Humanity once debated whether machines could think. Today, the more pressing question is different: as machines increasingly think alongside us, how should humanity redesign its cities, institutions, and values? This question may ultimately define the next chapter of civilization.

Large cities have always been engines of progress because they concentrate on what innovation requires most: people, industries, infrastructure, capital, and ideas. Yet these same characteristics also generate extraordinary complexity. Population density, massive transportation networks, intricate public services, environmental pressures, and increasingly interconnected economic systems make governing a megacity one of humanity’s greatest organizational challenges.

For decades, urban governance largely relied on human experience, fragmented information, and reactive decision-making. Congestion was managed after it occurred. Infrastructure failures were repaired after damage became visible. Public services responded to demand rather than anticipating it. Such approaches proved increasingly insufficient as cities expanded beyond the limits of traditional management.

Artificial intelligence changes this equation.

What makes AI particularly valuable is not merely automation but its ability to perceive patterns invisible to human observation, integrate enormous volumes of data, and generate predictive insights at unprecedented speed. In cities like Shanghai, intelligent traffic systems forecast congestion before roads become gridlocked. 

Smart infrastructure continuously monitors bridges, pipelines, and flood defenses. Digital government platforms eliminate administrative silos by connecting agencies that once operated independently. AI-assisted healthcare, elderly care, and community services increasingly bring high-quality public resources closer to every neighborhood rather than concentrating them in city centers.

The city itself becomes a vast learning environment. Every street, hospital, subway station, industrial park, and residential community generates data that continuously improves intelligent systems. Unlike laboratory experiments, cities provide real-world complexity, uncertainty, and diversity. They are not simply places where AI is deployed; they are environments where AI matures.

At the same time, artificial intelligence fundamentally reshapes how cities function.

Urban governance is gradually shifting from responding to crises toward anticipating them. Instead of merely repairing problems, intelligent systems help prevent them. Instead of relying solely on periodic inspections, cities increasingly operate through continuous perception and dynamic coordination. Decision-makers gain the ability to understand urban systems as interconnected networks rather than isolated departments.

Yet AI is not replacing human governance. On the contrary, its greatest value lies in strengthening human judgment. Algorithms excel at processing information, but cities are ultimately governed by values, ethics, and political choices that remain profoundly human. The future belongs not to machine-led cities but to cities where human wisdom and artificial intelligence complement one another. The influence of AI extends far beyond public administration. It is also redefining urban economies.

Megacities have long served as economic powerhouses because they connect innovation with industrial capacity. Artificial intelligence accelerates this role by transforming manufacturing through digital twins, intelligent quality control, and industrial foundation models. Financial services become more resilient through intelligent risk management. Global trade benefits from smarter logistics and cross-border digital platforms. Cultural industries increasingly combine historical heritage with generative technologies, allowing cities to preserve memory while creating entirely new forms of expression.

This creates a powerful cycle of mutual reinforcement. Cities provide the ecosystems where AI technologies are developed, tested, and refined. AI, in turn, strengthens cities by generating new industries, improving productivity, and enhancing competitiveness. Urban development and technological innovation no longer advance separately, and they increasingly evolve together.

Yet perhaps the most meaningful transformation occurs not in industry but in everyday life.

The true measure of a great city has never been its skyline or economic output alone. It lies in whether ordinary people experience dignity, opportunity, and security. Artificial intelligence possesses remarkable potential to reduce longstanding inequalities that have challenged urban development for decades.

Remote medical diagnostics can extend high-quality healthcare to underserved communities. Intelligent educational platforms can narrow disparities in learning opportunities. Smart elderly care technologies enable aging populations to live more independently and safely. Accessible digital public services allow governments to respond more precisely to diverse social needs.

Technology reaches its highest purpose when it becomes nearly invisible—when it quietly removes barriers, expands opportunity, and improves daily life without drawing attention to itself. The ultimate success of AI will not be measured by the sophistication of algorithms but by the extent to which every citizen benefits from their application.

Nevertheless, every technological revolution carries its own paradox. The same algorithms that optimize public services can also reinforce hidden biases. The same interconnected data that enable intelligent governance can expose societies to unprecedented cybersecurity risks. The same predictive capabilities that improve efficiency may also raise difficult questions about privacy, transparency, accountability, and individual autonomy.

As artificial intelligence assumes greater influence over public decision-making, technical excellence alone is no longer sufficient. Governance must evolve as rapidly as innovation itself. This requires moving beyond the traditional belief that regulation inevitably slows technological progress. In reality, well-designed governance creates the trust that allows innovation to flourish sustainably. Ethical standards, transparent algorithms, data protection, and clear institutional accountability are not obstacles to AI development; they are the conditions under which society is willing to embrace it.

Technology without governance risks becoming uncontrolled power. Governance without innovation risks becoming a stagnant bureaucracy. Sustainable progress demands that both evolve together. This is precisely why the emergence of international AI governance institutions represents more than diplomatic symbolism. Artificial intelligence is inherently global. Algorithms cross borders. Data flows transcend jurisdictions. Risks and opportunities alike cannot be managed by any single nation acting alone.

The establishment of the World AI Cooperation Organization represents an important step toward building shared global mechanisms capable of balancing innovation with responsibility, national development with international cooperation, and technological competition with common human interests. It reflects an increasingly recognized understanding that the future of AI governance must be collaborative rather than fragmented.

Shanghai occupies a uniquely significant position within this historical transformation. As one of the world’s largest metropolitan regions, it combines advanced technological capacity, complex governance challenges, global economic connectivity, and a longstanding tradition of openness. Its experience demonstrates how local innovation can contribute to global public goods.

More importantly, it illustrates a broader shift in China’s role within global AI governance, from participating in existing discussions to helping shape international agendas and institutional frameworks. The evolution of Chinese megacities increasingly provides practical experience that may inform how other rapidly urbanizing societies approach intelligent governance.

History reminds us that every great leap in civilization has emerged from the interaction between transformative technologies and evolving social institutions. Steam power reshaped industrial cities. Electricity transformed modern life. The internet redefined global connectivity. Artificial intelligence may now become the foundational technology of the intelligent city.

Yet history also teaches another lesson: technology alone never determines the future. Human choices do. The cities of tomorrow will not be remembered simply for deploying the most advanced AI systems. They will be judged by whether they used intelligence to deepen justice rather than inequality, strengthen trust rather than surveillance, expand opportunity rather than exclusion, and enrich humanity rather than diminish it.

The future therefore is not about cities becoming more intelligent while people become less essential. It is about creating cities where artificial intelligence amplifies human wisdom, where governance remains rooted in human values, and where innovation serves the enduring aspirations of civilization.

Perhaps the most profound relationship emerging in the twenty-first century is not between humans and machines, nor between technology and governance, but between artificial intelligence and the city itself. One supplies the complexity that inspires innovation; the other provides the intelligence that enables complexity to flourish.

When cities cultivate artificial intelligence responsibly, and artificial intelligence elevates cities humanely, they do more than transform urban life, and they redefine what civilization itself can become.

Source: the paper, cgtn, south china morning post, x

From Security Cooperation to Strategic Confrontation: How Japan and the Philippines Are Raising Tensions in the South China Sea

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Ten years after the so-called South China Sea arbitration award was issued on July 12, 2016, the dispute has long ceased to be merely a legal disagreement between China and the Philippines. 

It has increasingly been instrumentalized by external powers as a political and strategic tool for shaping the regional security order and constraining China. The latest example came on July 12, 2026, when 14 countries, including the United States, Japan, Australia and the Philippines, issued a joint statement purportedly commemorating the tenth anniversary of the award. 

By using the anniversary to reaffirm support for Manila’s unilateral maritime claims, these countries have once again turned a bilateral dispute into a platform for political mobilization and strategic alignment.

China has consistently maintained that it does not accept or recognize the arbitration award and does not accept any claims or actions based on it. Beijing’s position is that China’s territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests in the South China Sea are not affected by the award under any circumstances. 

Whatever one’s view of the legal merits of the case, the more consequential development over the past decade has been the transformation of the arbitration issue into a broader instrument of geopolitical competition.

The Philippines has played an active role in this process. On the one hand, Manila has sought greater coordination with other South China Sea claimant states, including Vietnam, on issues ranging from maritime boundaries to the construction and occupation of disputed features. On the other hand, it has deepened security cooperation with external powers such as Japan, the United States and Australia in an effort to compensate for its own limited maritime capabilities and increase its leverage in dealing with China. 

Japan’s growing involvement deserves particular attention because bilateral security cooperation has moved well beyond traditional maritime law-enforcement assistance and capacity building.

The trajectory of Japan-Philippines relations illustrates how the South China Sea is becoming embedded in a much broader regional security architecture. Following the entry into force of the Reciprocal Access Agreement between Japan and the Philippines in September 2025, the two countries signed an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement in January 2026, further institutionalizing their defense cooperation. 

In April, around 1,400 Japanese Self-Defense Force personnel reportedly participated in the Balikatan exercises alongside U.S. and Philippine forces, while maritime cooperation involving Japan, the United States, Australia and the Philippines continued to expand. 

In May, Japanese and Philippine leaders also reached an understanding on promoting the transfer of defense equipment, including destroyers, TC-90 aircraft and radar systems. These developments suggest that Japan’s involvement is shifting from diplomatic support and capacity building toward a more operational and institutionalized military role.

Japan’s motivations are broader than the South China Sea dispute itself. One objective is to strengthen the linkage among the South China Sea, the East China Sea and the Taiwan Strait within a single regional security framework. 

By repeatedly emphasizing a narrative of alleged Chinese “coercion” at sea, Tokyo can portray developments far beyond its immediate territorial waters as part of a common strategic challenge. This, in turn, provides additional political justification for expanding defense capabilities, increasing defense-equipment exports and broadening the scope of the Self-Defense Forces’ overseas activities.

The Philippines also serves as an important strategic node in Japan’s wider regional strategy. By working more closely with Manila, Tokyo can connect its “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” vision with the U.S.-Japan alliance and a growing network of minilateral security arrangements in Southeast Asia. 

Support for the arbitration award meanwhile allows Japan to present itself as a defender of the “rules-based order,” while blending legal arguments with broader geopolitical competition. The danger is that international law may increasingly be invoked not simply as a framework for resolving disputes, but as a political instrument for consolidating strategic blocs.

For the Marcos administration, closer security ties with Japan, the United States and Australia offer clear political and strategic advantages. External assistance can strengthen the Philippines’ maritime capabilities, respond to domestic nationalist sentiment and provide Manila with greater leverage during maritime confrontations with China. Yet external backing can also create unintended risks. 

If political or military support from partners is interpreted as a security guarantee for increasingly forward-leaning actions, Manila may have greater incentives to test the limits of the existing status quo. At the same time, external powers may regard individual maritime incidents as opportunities to demonstrate alliance credibility or expand their military presence. What begins as a localized confrontation could therefore acquire wider strategic implications.

The continued deepening of Japan-Philippines security cooperation risks producing three broader consequences for the South China Sea. First, it could intensify the regional security dilemma. More warships, military aircraft, coast guard vessels and joint exercises inevitably mean more frequent and complicated encounters at sea and in the air, increasing the possibility that an accident or tactical miscalculation could escalate into a broader interstate crisis.

Second, it could accelerate the transformation of the South China Sea dispute from a collection of specific maritime disagreements into a form of bloc-based strategic confrontation. Issues that should primarily be managed by the directly concerned parties through dialogue and negotiation are increasingly being framed as part of a broader struggle against unilateral actions. This risks placing additional pressure on ASEAN members to take sides in a competition they have strong interests in avoiding.

Third, greater involvement by external military powers could undermine ASEAN’s central role in regional governance. ASEAN documents have repeatedly emphasized dialogue, restraint and cooperation as the preferred means of maintaining regional stability, while negotiations toward an effective and substantive Code of Conduct in the South China Sea remain an important regional objective. If major-power rivalry and alliance politics increasingly shape the environment in which these negotiations take place, the space for ASEAN-led diplomacy could become narrower.

The South China Sea cannot achieve lasting stability through an ever-expanding cycle of military deployments, deterrence and counter-deterrence. China rejects the arbitration award and advocates resolving maritime disputes through negotiations and consultations among the directly concerned states. Whatever differences exist over competing legal and political narratives, the practical alternative to confrontation remains dialogue.

Regional countries should therefore continue implementing the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, accelerate consultations on the Code of Conduct, and strengthen mechanisms for maritime communication, crisis management and the prevention of accidental escalation.

External countries can make constructive contributions through search and rescue, disaster relief, environmental protection and navigational safety. They should not, however, turn the South China Sea into another arena for demonstrating military power or constructing exclusive security blocs.

The tenth anniversary of the arbitration award should not become another occasion for deepening division. If the South China Sea is increasingly treated as a stage for alliance politics, legal disputes will become harder to manage and regional security dilemmas more difficult to contain. The sustainable path forward lies not in transforming maritime disputes into geopolitical confrontation, but in restoring restraint, dialogue and cooperation to the center of regional diplomacy.

Source: scmp, navy mil, mofa go jp, japanupclose, indo pacific defense forum, xinhua

The Algorithmic Violence of the West: Digital Capitalism, Cognitive Control, and the Erosion of Freedom

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“Algorithmic violence” refers to a new form of power constructed by contemporary digital capitalism through the appropriation of data, platform monopolies, and algorithmic governance. Unlike the Hobbesian Leviathan, which exercises power through visible coercion, or the Orwellian model of overt surveillance and repression, algorithmic violence operates through a softer and more sophisticated form of domination. 

Capital functions as the hidden sovereign, algorithms as its instrument of power, and digital platforms as the institutional infrastructure through which this power is exercised. Individuals appear to possess more choices than ever before, yet increasingly lose the capacity to determine what they see, what they believe, and why they believe it. The greatest danger of algorithmic violence therefore lies not in its explicit destruction of freedom, but in its ability to disguise control as convenience, discipline as personalization, and obedience as individual choice. Its ultimate achievement is the production of a social environment in which people experience themselves as free precisely while their autonomy is being progressively diminished.

Digitalization has not dissolved the fundamental power relations of capitalism. Instead, it has provided capital with new technological mechanisms for accumulation and domination. In digital capitalism, data functions as a new form of productive resource, platforms constitute new centers of economic and social power, and algorithms provide the crucial mechanism through which economic power is transformed into the capacity to shape social behavior. 

Capital continuously captures the traces individuals leave behind through searches, clicks, browsing histories, purchases, interactions, locations, and even emotional responses. These traces are transformed into calculable and commercially exploitable assets. Smart devices, social media, and the Internet of Things have extended this process from public spaces into the most intimate dimensions of everyday life. Individuals are increasingly rendered visible, measurable, predictable, and governable.

The problem is therefore not merely the loss of privacy. It is the emergence of a social condition in which individuals know that their behavior may constantly be observed, recorded, analyzed, and evaluated. Such awareness can produce a chilling effect: people modify what they say, what they search for, and what they do because they anticipate possible consequences. Power no longer needs to prohibit an action directly. It only needs to create the perception that one is being watched. Surveillance thus becomes self-discipline, and external control becomes internalized restraint.

Data accumulation subsequently becomes platform monopoly. Companies such as Google, Meta, Amazon, Apple, and Microsoft have consolidated enormous economic and informational power through network effects, economies of scale, proprietary infrastructures, and control over user data. Traditional monopolies primarily involved control over physical means of production and markets. Digital monopolies extend this power to the infrastructures through which information, social relations, and public attention are organized. The more users a platform attracts, the more data it collects; the more data it collects, the more precisely its algorithms can predict and personalize; the more personalized its services become, the more users it attracts. This self-reinforcing cycle produces a form of digital enclosure in which a small number of private corporations increasingly determine the conditions under which social communication takes place.

Algorithms transform this economic concentration into a deeper form of social power. Data can record behavior, but algorithms can predict, classify, rank, and influence it. Algorithms are not politically or economically neutral. Their objectives, training data, optimization criteria, and recommendation systems embody particular institutional priorities. When platforms optimize for clicks, engagement, watch time, and advertising revenue, algorithms are structurally encouraged to privilege whatever captures attention rather than whatever is most accurate, rational, or socially valuable. Technological “optimization” thus becomes a mechanism of capitalist discipline.

This discipline begins at the level of cognitive input. Individuals are confronted with an unprecedented abundance of information, yet abundance does not necessarily produce knowledge. Personalized recommendation systems increasingly replace active exploration with automated selection. Algorithms infer users’ preferences from previous behavior and continuously provide similar content, thereby producing filter bubbles and information cocoons. 

Confirmation bias is consequently reinforced by technological design: individuals encounter more information that confirms what they already believe and fewer arguments that challenge their assumptions. Society appears to inhabit one interconnected information space, while in reality citizens increasingly occupy different algorithmically constructed realities.

The consequences become even more serious when algorithms contribute to the production of simulated reality. Under an attention-driven business model, factual accuracy is not necessarily what determines visibility. Content capable of generating outrage, fear, excitement, or controversy often performs better than complex and carefully contextualized information. Fake news, conspiracy narratives, political manipulation, and synthetic media can therefore acquire substantial visibility. 

The political controversies surrounding the 2016 U.S. presidential election and the British referendum, as well as the subsequent proliferation of AI-generated political deepfakes, demonstrate that algorithms do not merely filter reality; they can increasingly participate in producing alternative versions of reality. When citizens can no longer reliably distinguish between fact, opinion, propaganda, and synthetic fabrication, the shared epistemic foundation necessary for democratic politics begins to erode.

Algorithmic domination does not stop at determining what people see. It increasingly influences how they think. In the attention economy, complex arguments are structurally disadvantaged because they require time, concentration, and cognitive effort, whereas short, emotionally charged, and highly stimulating content can be consumed and circulated almost instantaneously. Deep reading and sustained reflection are gradually displaced by fragmented consumption. 

Algorithms do not need to prevent people from thinking. They only need to make thinking appear unnecessary. When individuals become accustomed to receiving preselected information, simplified explanations, and algorithmically generated conclusions, independent judgment is gradually replaced by cognitive outsourcing.

The result is not conventional ideological indoctrination but a subtler form of cognitive impoverishment. Individuals retain the formal right to think for themselves while increasingly losing the intellectual conditions necessary to do so. Critical thinking requires exposure to disagreement, uncertainty, complexity, and competing interpretations. Yet algorithmically organized environments tend to reward familiarity, immediacy, and emotional confirmation. 

Users are therefore encouraged to remain within cognitive communities whose members share similar assumptions. These communities provide belonging and emotional security, but they also intensify polarization and distrust toward outsiders. Social differences are transformed into epistemic divisions, while political disagreement becomes a conflict between mutually exclusive identities.

The transformation of cognition becomes explicitly political when algorithms begin to govern emotional attention. Digital platforms systematically reward high-arousal emotions such as anger, fear, resentment, and moral outrage because such emotions generate interaction and prolong engagement. As a consequence, public discourse can undergo a process of adverse selection in which information with the greatest social value is displaced by information with the greatest capacity for circulation. Complex policy questions receive less attention because they lack the dramatic simplicity required by the attention economy, while polarizing narratives and symbolic conflicts are continuously amplified.

Political identity consequently becomes a form of digital currency. Divisions between left and right, red and blue, insiders and outsiders, are easier to circulate than nuanced arguments about public policy. Individuals are encouraged to interpret political questions through the lens of group belonging rather than independent judgment. The algorithmic organization of attention thus transforms social difference into commercial value: polarization produces engagement, engagement produces data, and data produces profit.

At this point, algorithmic violence begins to threaten the foundations of democracy itself. Democracy requires more than elections and formal political rights. It presupposes citizens capable of forming relatively autonomous judgments, accessing diverse information, expressing disagreement, deliberating with others, and translating their preferences into collective decisions. 

If individuals’ informational environments, political emotions, and cognitive frameworks are systematically shaped by privately controlled algorithms, formal political freedom may increasingly coexist with substantive political dependence.

The first consequence is the weakening of democratic decision-making. Traditional democratic theory assumes that citizens express political preferences and that institutions aggregate these preferences through procedures of representation and deliberation. Algorithmic systems introduce a disturbing reversal: citizens may increasingly be represented not by what they consciously express, but by what platforms infer about them. 

Political preferences can be predicted from behavioral data, segmented into micro-targeted audiences, and acted upon before individuals fully recognize those preferences themselves. The citizen risks becoming less a political subject than an object of political computation.

This creates the possibility of what might be called algorithmic representation. 

Platforms can simulate public opinion by aggregating behavioral traces, engagement statistics, and emotional reactions. Yet the resulting “public voice” may not represent autonomous political judgment at all. It may simply reflect the outcomes of algorithmic selection and capitalist optimization. The danger is that the appearance of democratic participation conceals the displacement of genuine participation. Citizens are given the sensation of being represented while their capacity for collective self-government is gradually weakened.

The second consequence concerns freedom of expression. Digital platforms have undoubtedly lowered the barriers to political speech. Yet the right to speak and the ability to be heard are no longer equivalent. Platform governance determines not only what users may post, but also how widely their speech can circulate. Content moderation, recommendation systems, ranking mechanisms, account restrictions, and differential visibility create a hierarchy of attention. A citizen may possess the formal right to speak while lacking any meaningful ability to reach a public audience.

This transforms the classical conception of the marketplace of ideas. Digital platforms are not neutral spaces in which competing opinions automatically receive equal opportunities to be heard. They are privately governed communication infrastructures whose rules are often opaque and whose economic incentives influence the distribution of visibility. 

Expression can therefore become commodified: attention itself becomes a scarce resource, and those with greater economic or technological capacity can acquire greater amplification. Freedom of speech risks being transformed from an equal political right into a competition for algorithmic visibility.

The third consequence is the erosion of political efficacy. Digital participation often creates the appearance of empowerment. Citizens can like, share, comment, sign petitions, join online campaigns, and participate in virtual debates within seconds. Yet symbolic participation does not necessarily translate into institutional influence. Individuals may experience an immediate sense of political agency while remaining largely disconnected from the processes through which public policy is actually made. This produces a paradox of digital democracy: the easier political participation becomes, the less capable participation may become of changing political reality.

When repeated digital participation fails to generate substantive institutional responses, political frustration can gradually become political apathy. Citizens may begin to doubt whether their actions matter, whether institutions are responsive, and ultimately whether democratic participation itself has meaningful value. The most effective form of domination is therefore not necessarily the prohibition of resistance, but the creation of a political environment in which resistance appears futile.

Algorithmic violence ultimately exposes a deeper crisis concerning the meaning of freedom. Classical freedom involves both freedom from arbitrary interference and the positive capacity to form judgments and act according to one’s own will. Under digital capitalism, however, freedom risks becoming a preconfigured experience. 

Individuals are not necessarily deprived of choices; rather, the choices presented to them are increasingly structured by systems they cannot see or control. They are not necessarily forced to adopt particular opinions; rather, the informational environment in which opinions emerge is increasingly engineered in advance. They are not prevented from speaking; rather, the conditions determining whether their speech becomes socially consequential are controlled by private algorithms.

Yet this critique should not become a form of technological determinism. Algorithms themselves are neither inherently emancipatory nor inherently oppressive. The decisive question is the power structure within which technology operates. The same digital technologies that can facilitate knowledge, communication, and democratic participation can also deepen monopoly, surveillance, manipulation, and polarization. The problem is therefore not technology as such, but the concentration of technological power in the hands of private capital without adequate democratic accountability.

Escaping algorithmic violence consequently does not require abandoning technology. It requires breaking the exclusive alliance between capital and algorithmic power and restoring human agency over the infrastructures that increasingly organize social life. Algorithmic systems must become subject to meaningful transparency, data rights, institutional accountability, public oversight, and democratic regulation. Most importantly, citizens must regain the capacity to understand, question, and contest the mechanisms through which algorithms shape their informational and political environments.

Socrates used questioning to force individuals to confront assumptions they had never examined; contemporary algorithms use recommendation to make those examinations appear unnecessary. The contrast captures the fundamental tension between classical freedom and digital power. Freedom does not mean merely possessing access to unlimited information. It means retaining the capacity to decide what deserves attention, to encounter what challenges one’s convictions, to reflect before responding, and to determine one’s political judgment without invisible manipulation. The central struggle of the algorithmic age is therefore not between humans and machines, but between human autonomy and the concentration of technological power.

If algorithms remain instruments of capital accumulation, they may transform democratic freedom into a carefully managed illusion. But if technological power is brought under democratic control, algorithms can instead become instruments for expanding human knowledge and political participation. The essential task is thus to ensure that algorithms remain tools of human beings rather than human beings becoming objects of algorithms. Only then can digital civilization fulfill its emancipatory promise instead of becoming a new and subtler architecture of domination.

Source: ssaj ajcass, cass, oxford acadmic, epale, scalevise