Ein nettes Treffen mit einem echten chinesischen Gourmet.
Herr Yang kam 2000 aus seiner Heimat Zhejiang nach Belgien. Er wollte in der Gastronomie arbeiten, um andere an seiner Liebe zur chinesischen Küche teilhaben zu lassen. In erster Linie ist er selbst ein großer Feinschmecker. Da er in China so hervorragend für seine Verwandten gekocht hatte, war ihm geraten worden, in diesem Bereich eine Ausbildung zu machen. In China bestand er die Prüfung für das staatliche Kochzertifikat der zweiten Stufe. Jetzt gehören ihm drei Keyaki-Restaurants in Belgien!
Als Spitzenkoch und Besitzer vieler Restaurants gewann Yang Gaijing in Europa internationale Auszeichnungen für seine Kenntnisse der chinesischen Küche. Heute ist er Jurymitglied bei dieser Art von internationalen Veranstaltungen.
Er ist ein Vertreter der neuen Auslandschinesen und wurde schnell zu einem führenden Vertreter der chinesischen Küche in Belgien. Da er jetzt Vorsitzender des belgischen internationalen Verbands des chinesischen Gaststättengewerbes ist, leitet er die Reform der chinesischen Restaurants in Belgien und erkundet einen geeigneten Weg für die Entwicklung der chinesischen Küche als Treffen, das dem Austausch und der Zusammenarbeit im Gaststättengewerbe zwischen China und Belgien gewidmet ist.
Da Herr Yang seit über zehn Jahren im chinesischen Gaststättengewerbe in Belgien tätig ist, wurde ihm von der Lütticher Provinzregierung in Belgien der Titel „Botschafter der Provinz Lüttich“ verliehen.
LHCH: Herr Yang, mit Ihren Restaurants bei Lüttich, Gent und Antwerpen kennen Sie den belgischen Markt sehr gut, aber auch den europäischen Markt. Welche Unterschiede gibt es zwischen diesen Ländern hinsichtlich der Wertschätzung der asiatischen Küche?
Yang Gaijing: Italiener mögen Pasta, Tomaten und gegrilltes Fleisch. Das eignet sich sehr gut für die chinesische Küche. Die Niederländer bevorzugen große, herzhafte, weniger raffinierte Gerichte. Franzosen und Belgier bevorzugen eher subtilere Gerichte.
LHCH: Die Allgemeinheit ist leider der Ansicht, dass es sich um chinesische Küche handelt, dabei ist sie den europäischen Gewohnheiten angepasst. Bedauern Sie das nicht?
Yang Gaijing: Die Restaurantbesitzer müssen sich dem Markt anpassen. Unsere Speisekarte ändert sich oft entsprechend dem Geschmack des sich verändernden Marktes. Aber wir wollen in der asiatischen Küche einen hohen Standard beibehalten. Deshalb habe ich den belgischen internationalen Verband des chinesischen Restaurantgewerbes gegründet. Anstatt miteinander in Wettbewerb zu treten, zum Beispiel durch Senkung der Preise und damit der Qualität der Produkte, einigen wir uns auf Standards, die von allen einzuhalten sind. Wir haben hundert Mitglieder und es herrscht Einigkeit. Wir müssen den Markt regulieren, um nicht zu Situationen wie in Spanien zu kommen, wo die Preise mit immer attraktiveren Formeln gefallen sind, aber für uns am Ende sehr enttäuschend waren. Wenn Werbeaktionen erforderlich sind, tun wir alles, um die Preise entsprechend den Städten usw. zu harmonisieren.
LHCH: Wie hat Ihr Abenteuer als Unternehmer in Belgien begonnen?
Yang Gaijing: Um ein Restaurant zu eröffnen, bin ich mehrmals zu Inspektionen in die Niederlande gefahren, wo die chinesische Küche gut entwickelt ist. Als ich 2004 dort war, stellte ich fest, dass in den Niederlanden gerade ein Catering-Modell namens „Wok“ populär wurde, das eigentlich aus einem Buffet umgewandelt wurde. Aufgrund der Kombination einfacher Gerichte aus der italienischen, japanischen und thailändischen Küche wurde diese neue Art von chinesischen Restaurants in Europa schnell populär, aber in Belgien war das noch ganz neu. Also habe ich das Konzept mit meiner eigenen Philosophie lanciert.
LHCH: Werden chinesische Restaurants zur Anpassung an den europäischen Markt auf Bio umstellen?
Yang Gaijing: Ja, es ist die Zukunft! Für die vielen vegetarischen Gerichte, die wir bereits haben, aber auch für die Fleischgerichte. Wir haben auch vor, die Philosophie des „YAO SHAN“ anzuwenden, dieses traditionelle Essens, das seit 1000 Jahren mit Heilkräutern zubereitet wird! Diese spezielle Küche wird beispielsweise jungen Müttern in China während des Monats der Ruhe nach der Geburt angeboten. Deshalb bleiben die jungen chinesischen Mütter so hübsch und gesund! Ihre Schönheitsgeheimnisse! Wir haben Restaurantprojekte, bei denen der Küchenchef mit einem chinesischen Arzt zusammenarbeitet. High-End-Yaoshan.
LHCH: Wie sieht Ihrer Meinung nach die Zukunft des chinesischen Essens in Europa aus?
Yang Gaijing: Die chinesische Esskultur soll über den „Gürtel und die Straße“ hinausgehen; chinesisches Essen soll in der ganzen Welt auf den Tisch kommen. Wir müssen die chinesische Geschichte hinter jeder chinesischen Küche erzählen und auch jeden Tag gutes, gesundes chinesisches Essen zubereiten.
Not a lot of people know how the art market is, almost everyone knows it’s a thriving business. Art market attracts millions of dollars every year, global sales of art reached over 64.1 billion in 2019, although it has a 5% fall in sales compared with 2018, but for a long term, from 2009 to 2019, art market maintains a positive sales growth at 62% and volume growth at 34% as table 1 shows.
Year
Value ($ millions)
Volume (millions)
2009
39,511
31.0
2010
57,025
35.1
2011
64,550
36.8
2012
56,698
35.5
2013
63,287
36.5
2014
68,237
38.8
2015
63,751
38.1
2016
56,948
36.1
2017
63,683
39.0
2018
67,653
39.8
2019
64,123
40.5
Growth 2018 – 2019
-5%
2%
Growth 2009 – 2019
62%
34%
Table 1 Value and Volume of Transactions in the Global Art Market Data Source: Arts Economics, 2020
Europe is one of the most important art markets all over the world, with advanced art education, constant art events, active art creations, long art history and numerous art purchasers.
Country
US
UK
China
France
Switzerland
Germany
Spain
Others
Share
44%
20%
18%
7%
2%
2%
1%
7%
Table 2 Value Market Share of Country in Global Art Market in 2019 Data Source: Arts Economics, 2020
There are many art styles works in the art market, but as “art for present-day”, contemporary artworks continuously being produced, gradually becomes the dominant art style, even facing criticism and sarcasm that massive amount of people do not understand the artistic value and monetary value of contemporary artworks well since it is too vanguardia and abstract, but institutions and rich people are exchanging those artworks passionately which discretely breaks the records of biding prices.
Do they understand contemporary art deeper than others? How does the value evaluation process?
Contemporary art allows various materials, methods and techniques used in artistic creation, enriching the artistic forms but bringing difficulties in value evaluation as artistic value are subjective depending on different aesthetic preferences of people, but monetary value is objective as the indifferent price set to everyone in the market.
Researchers try to use mathematical models to evaluate the value of artworks, they wish to build a model with selected or defined indicators to represent potential pricing factors, these indicators often are grouped as a profile of artist (name, age, sex, graduate school, place of residence, nationality, etc.), details of artwork (size, material, technique, year, recognition of institution, sold price records, etc.) and information of representative institution (location, institutional affiliation, etc.). Chosen characteristics discussed in the model should appear independently, but the reality is not simple like so.
Many factors in artworks are connected, social backgrounds and social events affecting artist’s opinions that may inspire their works, during the creation process, materials, techniques even forms the artist chooses mirror not only the personal background but also the real world. Without being realized the basic conditions to apply pricing model is so easy to be broken, and when realizing this issue, it is impossible to do the price analysis, but if ignoring this and continuing the model application, the results will be inconvincible. Furthermore, researchers discover that market participants don’t all rely on models that much to define price, the market has its way.
For artists they choose proper geographic markets to optimize the exposure and appreciation of the artwork; find features of their works to identify the specialties; compare with the counterparts to adjust original expectations.
For agents, models are widely used when considering internal factors of artwork, but many external factors needed to be considered when negotiating final prices, for example, Zorloni (2005) discusses the pricing process of artworks nowadays, which more depends on the preferences of the elite such as dealers, collectors and critics, unlike the old time that is influenced more by the academic researchers. Singer (2016) argues that art market has grown deformed, it creates a bubble that seems artists are expressing their thoughts about many unbalanced relationships in this world, which rises attention and prices of their artworks, but it is more like they please capitals to create luxury but useless works, which do not help the world develops better, neither shows the true value of artworks and brings huge ethical issue.
For investors, they have more desires in appreciation and liquidity which bring more financial features in art purchasing. The tax advantage is an important motivation for art purchasers, and many European countries have related policies:
Country
Net Wealth Tax
Belgium
No
France
Art assets are excluded
Italy
Art assets are excluded
UK
No
Table 3 Potential Net Wealth Tax for Art Works Data Source: Deloitte (2019)
Country
Corporate Tax
Belgium
33.99%, reach certain conditions can reduce graduated tax rates (≤ EUR 322,500)
France
33.33%, taxable deduction of art works from living artists over 5 years
Italy
27.5% (national), 3.9% (regional)
UK
20% – 21%
Table 4 Potential Corporate Tax of Companies for Art Works Data Source: Deloitte (2019)
Country
Income Tax
Belgium
25% – 50% (≥ EUR 34,330), may add communal surtaxe
France
≤ 45%; 2 additional contributions:15.5% (additional social security contribution, CSG and CRDS), high income contribution
Italy
Income resulting from commercial activities: 19% – 43% (national), 3.9% (regional) Income is not from commercial activities: No
UK
20% – 45% (≥ GBP 150,000)
Table 5 Potential Income Tax for Art Works Data Source: Deloitte (2019)
Country
Gift and Estate Tax
Belgium
Gift: 3% (direct descendants), 7% (beyond the individual’s immediate family) Estate: Complex rate scales vary from regions, 3% – 30% (spouses, direct descendants), 30% – 80% (others excluding charities) Inheritance: Can be reduced via manual donations of cultural property
France
Same but based on family relationship. 5% – 45% (≥ EUR 1,805,677) with a deduction of EUR 100,000, 60% (beyond the 4th degree of family relationships)
Italy
Considering the non-taxable threshold amounts and relationships between the transferor and recipient, 0% – 8% (gift, inheritance) ≤ 10% of the entire portfolio transferred (inheritance)
UK
No gift tax, but can be as capital gains tax and inheritance tax during lifetime and on death; 20% (gift to a trust during lifetime), 40% (transfers on death)
Table 6 Potential Gift and Estate Tax for Art Works Data Source: Deloitte (2019)
Country
Capital Gains Tax
Belgium
Not taxed on the disposal of cultural property if in the management of private assets
France
5% (individual sales ≥ EUR 5,000)
Italy
Excluded from the disposal of art assets (national), 3.9% (regional)
UK
18% or 28% (≥ GBP 31,865), annual exemption GBP 11,000
Table 7 Potential Capital Gains Tax for Art Works Data Source: Deloitte (2019)
The booming contemporary art market has two possibilities, from one side agents may use their advantage knowledge, information and position to promote sales of contemporary art, which encourages artists to create more contemporary artworks, as long as the business goes well, then the artistic value of the contemporary art matters less, to this point the passionate investment in contemporary art is value speculation in fact; from another side artists leading the art development, even people cannot understand contemporary art for now, but as long as artists create more to educate the public, then the recognition of contemporary art will get progress. Agents can see the value of it and would like to sell more, investors will buy more as they have a positive expectation in appreciation of it for a long term, so to this point, passionate investment in contemporary art is a real investment. Two possibilities both exist in the market, no matter market participants chase value speculation or value investment, their considerations and actions all affect the process of value evaluation.
Paris now has a contemporary art exhibition of a famous artist couple: Christo and Jeanne-Claude in Centre Pompidou, which gave us further thinking of investment and pricing issues of contemporary artworks, especially related to its features.
They were typical and representative contemporary art artists, they used new materials following the time, such as polypropylene. Their famous series of work was about packaging, using new materials and threads to package anything they had interests. One of their works was to package Pont Neuf in Paris in the 1960s as figure 1 shows.
Figure 1 Packaged Pont Neuf in the 1960s Source: Centre Pompidou
Huge work like so surely cost massively in every aspect, they spent decades of years to finalize the details of this project, they used crow funding towards the public to raise enough money to achieve this project, thousands of workers joined the construction as figure 16 shows, and this work attracted over three million visitors as figure 2 shows.
Figure 2 Massive Amounts of Visitors for Packaged Pont Neuf
Following pricing models and considerations of market participants, this work should be evaluated high price as it had countless investments and efforts, massive size and influence, and made by famous artists. But the fact is that it’s non-tradable as temporarily existed and related to a historical site. Separating the packing materials from the Pont Neuf causes meaninglessness and valuableness of the artwork. The model can give a value but doesn’t work in the market as no one can afford it, the considerations of market participants can affect the art work but no one can own it as the materials were recycled after the exhibition.
The market can lose its control when facing contemporary art, the challenges of pricing contemporary art are more than this work addresses. If the art style has evolution, models should also be improved to fit contemporary art better, or the price will be manipulated by people, but how far the research process can reach there is uncertain.
(Source: Lanze LIU / Deloitte / McAndrew Clare / Singer Peter / Zorloni Alessia / Sarah Cascone)
Reinhard Bütikofer findet derzeit kein einziges gutes Haar an China. Der ehemalige Chef von Bündnis90/Grüne und derzeitige Europaabgeordnete gibt sich große Mühe, China ständig in aller Schärfe zu kritisieren. Dabei war er mal sehr begeistert von China! Aber das ist lange her, fast 50 Jahre. Das war noch ein anderes China, es war auch ein anderer Bütikofer, der damals mit Eifer das Programm des Kommunistischen Bundes Westdeutschland – auch KBW genannt – unterstützte. Während Büti, wie er sich gerne nennen lässt, jüngst in einer großen deutschen Tageszeitung China „Großmachtarroganz und Hegemonialambitionen“ vorwirft, stritt der grüne Ex-Kommunist damals für die „Kulturrevolution des chinesischen Proletariats“, wie es im KBW-Programm hieß.
Bütikofer wurde über die Kommunistische Hochschulgruppe in Heidelberg aktiv. Dort befand sich eine der Keimzellen des späteren Kommunistischen Bundes Westdeutschlands, die Gruppe Neues Rotes Forum, NRF. Vermutlich fühlte er sich von der theoretischen Programmatik des NRF sehr angezogen. Jene betrachtete die Sowjetunion als Verräter am wahren Kommunismus. Stattdessen hieß es in der NRF-Erklärung folgendermaßen: „Die Erfahrung mit der Großen Proletarischen Kulturrevolution hat endlich den Alpdruck beseitigt, der durch die Entwicklung der SU [Sowjetunion, d. Verf.] auf der internationalen Arbeiterbewegung lastet. Insofern ist die chinesische Kulturrevolution die wichtigste revolutionäre Erfahrung der letzten Jahre nicht nur für die chinesischen Massen, sondern für die ganze internationale kommunistische Bewegung.“
Jene Heidelberger Hochschulkommunisten waren damals offenbar bereit, die bourgeoise Bürgergesellschaft Deutschlands zu zerschlagen. Eine proletarische Kulturrevolution sollte an dessen Stelle treten. Die NRF-Maoisten traten dafür dermaßen aggressiv auf, dass die Demonstrationen im Sommer 1975 in Heidelberg als die gewalttätigsten in der Geschichte Heidelbergs beschrieben wurden. Selbst schwere Werkzeuge wurden am 25. Juni 1975 eingesetzt, dutzende Polizisten und Studenten verletzt.
Heute schwadroniert Bütikofer nur noch von Demokratie, Freiheit und Rechtstaatlichkeit. Was ist mit Büti passiert? Nun, während die Volksrepublik China nach dem Tod Mao Zedongs die Diktatur der Viererbande stürzte, die Kulturrevolution beendete und umfassende Reformen unter Deng Xiaoping einleitete, traten die Kulturrevolutionäre des KBW den sogenannten Langen Marsch durch die Institutionen an. Sie gründeten die Grünen und mauserten sich zu Ministerpräsidenten, wie Winfried Kretschmann. Sie wurden zu Chefs einflussreicher Stiftungen, wie Ralf Fücks, 20 Jahre Chef der Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung. Oder sie zogen eben in das Europaparlament, wie Büti. Der ist dort offiziell für die China-Beziehungen zuständig.
Der Sekretär des Zentralkomitees des KBW, Hans-Gerhart Schmierer, der noch 1978 den grausamen Terror-Diktator Pol Pot in Kambodscha besuchte, war unter dem grünen Außenminister Joschka Fischer im Planungsstab des Außenministeriums. Es gibt zahlreiche weitere Beispiele. Und was ist die Politik unserer deutschen Kulturrevolutionäre? Sie zerstören systematisch unsere Industrie, Technologie und Kultur. Deutschlands Umbau zu einer Art grünem Lumpenproletariat ist in weiten Teilen gelungen.
Vermutlich gefällt Büti ein China nicht, das in wenigen Jahren ein 35.000 km langes Streckennetz für Hochgeschwindigkeitszüge mit 350 km/h Reisegeschwindigkeit erbaut hat. Ein China, das auf Verbesserungen des Lebensstandards aller Chinesen dringt, durch technologischen Fortschritt in Kernenergie, Kernfusion, Raumfahrt, Infrastruktur, Kommunikationstechnologie. Vielleicht gefällt es ihm nicht, dass der chinesische Staatspräsident im Dialog mit den Spitzenuniversitäten seines Landes die ästhetische Erziehung der Jugend voranbringen will, und der seine Staatsgäste mit Zitaten von Konfuzius und Menzius geistig verköstigt.
Büti will China lieber vor den Internationalen Gerichtshof zerren und droht mit Sanktionen. Er bietet den gewalttätigen Hongkonger Demonstranten Asyl an. Rechnet er damit, dass jene neue Generation von Kulturrevolutionären die Regierung in Beijing tatsächlich stürzen wird? Für dieses Ziel ist ihm jedenfalls keine schmutzige Allianz zu schade. Ob mit dem rechten Rand der US-Republikaner wie Senator Marco Rubio, oder dem Überbleibseln des British Empire, wie Lord Patten, dem letzten Kolonialgouverneur Hongkongs. Manch einer mag hoffen, das alles wäre nur ein absurdes Theaterstück!
Mit Büti und Co. macht sich Deutschland und das EU-Parlament vor den Augen der Welt jedenfalls völlig lächerlich. Es ist an der Zeit, einzusehen, dass dieser Weg für Deutschland ebenfalls ein historischer Irrtum gewesen ist.
The coronavirus crisis accelerates the conflict intention of the USA against China, especially in the field of technological power, a key domain to decide the dominant position of a country in the new world order. Though undoubtedly as one of the leading economies of the modern digital age on a global scale, without the ability to manufacture the most advanced and common used chips, China can only slightly win national dignity through tough but pale foreign speeches in the cost of constant retreats of Chinese information and technology companies in semiconductor markets controlled by the USA.
What is a semiconductor? Why is it so important?
A semiconductor is a substance with resistivity (102 to 0.5 ohm-m) between an insulator and a conductor. The electrical resistivity of semiconductor generally decreases strongly with increasing temperature, whereas the resistivity of metal generally increases weakly with increasing temperature. When a suitable metallic impurity such as arsenic is added to a semiconductor, it changes the current-conducting properties of the semiconductor appreciably. Therefore, semiconductor devices play an irreplaceable role in electronics, many types of semiconductor devices are well known and widely used in various systems for quality control and automation today, such as LED (Light Emitting Diode), bipolar transistor, etc.
Compared to electronic valves, semiconductor devices offer the following advantages:
Low weight and small size
No power for the filament
Long service life
Mechanical ruggedness
Low power losses
Low supply voltages
Based on the above definition and properties, almost any device that you can see around you use semiconductors, such as air conditioner, rice cooker, smartphone, digital camera, television, computer, washing machine, refrigerator, bank ATM, train, etc. The usage of semiconductor is deeper and wider than the public acknowledgment of it. Semiconductor to technology is like sunshine to nature, and technology to an economy is like nutrition to flesh and blood. Without the ability to manufacture semiconductor will bury today’s technology in the darkness ahead of its birth, and without advanced technology will starve an economy around other wealthy competitors. Commissioner Thierry Breton pointed out that “without an autonomous European capacity on microelectronics, there will be no European digital sovereignty”, the potential consequence is much more severe than that, an economy weakening in the semiconductor industry will be eventually turned around the stronger one’s finger by all means as it lacks main competitiveness in the information era, and this stronger one has remained to be the USA over half a century, beating every imaginary enemy completely, the first loser was Japan.
After the World War II., the USA supported Japan to rebuild its economy to prevent the expansion of red power. In 1949, Japan formed the Ministry of International Trade and Industry which created a synergy between the Japanese government and the private sectors to improve industrial productivity and adjusted technology imports and after all kinds of imports thus leading to significant economic gains year after year.
With “Investment Inducing Investment” process, Japan gradually was led by metals and chemicals industry, more research and development and production of technology made every Japanese family can afford appliances and electronics. Japanese economy experienced a golden period in the 1960’s, then got stuck but could still smoothly grow in the 1970’s by turning into the technology-intensive industry, decreasing taxes to increase exports, etc. Meanwhile, the USA survived from twice oil crises, a should-be-lackey one at that time had better economic conditions than the-predestined-master, and even took benefit from the latter via budget and trade deficits, the USA declared trade war to Japan in its 6 advantageous industries: textile, steel, television, car, telecommunication and semiconductor. As discussed previously, the semiconductor is a key element in the modern production process and technological products, so most of these industries are centered around the semiconductor.
The USA investigated and sued Japanese companies in the name of dumping, monopolization, governmental leadership and national security; limited the exporting amounts of Japanese products; charged anti-dumping duty on them; stetted suggested but practically must sale price of them; adjusted industrial standards to be favorable to domestic producers and unfavorable to Japanese producers; forced Japanese companies to manufacture products in the USA and to open channels, stores and factories to promote American products; required Japan to increase the market shares of similar products from other competitive countries. These actions were designed for the trade war, following it there also came the economical war and financial war. The miracle of Japanese economy could last longer if it held its semiconductor advantage. Since Japan failed that war, it has been under the shadow of the USA till now. In 2018, over 80% of semiconductors in the USA were produced by its companies, and in every regional market the USA firms have absolute power in semiconductor manufacturing, all firms from all other countries share the remaining market shares.
The market share of firms manufacturing in the global market
Source: World Semiconductor Trade Statistics, SIA Estimates
History easily repeats itself, one after another economy came into prominence credited to rising digital power, then unwillingly loses advantage and forcibly agrees to weaken relevant research, development and production. The last lesson was from Japan, a shining star in the semiconductor industry in the early information era, then fell rapidly during the trade war with the USA. The ongoing trade war between China and the USA even is different from the one between Japan and the USA, but they do have a lot of common features:
Both involve the largest and the second-largest economies at the time
Both are triggered by the largest trade surplus with the USA from Japan and China
Both the powers of discourse belong to the USA as Japan and China highly rely on the American market
Since Japan lost the fight to keep its dominant semiconductor position with the USA, the digital evolution in Japan also gets stuck. “Lack of digital investment by the government has hampered productivity and efficiency at the private sector,” said Takuya Hoshino, senior economist at Dai-ichi Life Research Institute. The last OECD Digital Economy Outlook put Japan at the lowest rank among 31 countries in online procedures, Seiji Kihara, a former Ministry of Finance official commented on the Japanese digitalization process compared with 20 years ago, “They are doing pretty much the same now”.
There are not many economies besides the EU owning the discourse of power in technology, economy and politics against the USA, Japan was one, China is on show, others are less noticeable than the EU. In the face of growing tensions between the USA and China, the EU will be more like the next target than a safe bystander, joining the battlefield immediately is to balance the power of the USA, and to save time to develop European industries to underpin European future with full sovereignty.
An economy, without independent technology, will always serve the one who has it, and cannot own real sovereignty, the EU must “seize the opportunity of data, microelectronics and connectivity”. Europe has all the skills and talents to invest and develop an effective European cyber shield starting from the small but mattering semiconductor.
Remember what happened to Japan, look at what China is suffering and imagine what the EU will face, all can be traced back to semiconductor, small item, large picture and predictable future.
Nach dem Ausbruch von COVID-19 in WUHAN im Dezember 2019 hatte China einen Monat später die Stadt komplett abgeriegelt, um das Virus einzudämmen. Im März 2020 folgten die EU-Staaten diesen effektiven Maßnahmen. Bevor Impfstoffe verfügbar sind, müssen sich infizierte Personen in Quarantäne begeben.
Zwar hatten die USA als erste ihre Diplomaten aus WUHAN zurückgezogen, aber die US-Regierung verlor doch mindestens 5 Monate, in denen sie einiges hätte tun können, um die Situation in ihrem Land unter Kontrolle zu bringen. Es gab zu viele Meinungen zum Thema Virenbekämpfung: Quarantäne, Entwicklung eines Impfstoffs, Schwedens Sonderweg usw. Zu langsam getroffene Entscheidungen, zu viel Einfluss des religiösen Glaubens, falsches Selbstvertrauen, keine hinreichende Hinzuziehung von Wissenschaftlern, das alles führte zu den Katastrophen in den USA. Natürlich bietet sich China seitdem am besten als Sündenbock an, dem man die Schuld zuweisen kann.
Forscher haben offenbar den Ursprung des Coronavirus herausgefunden: „Sars-CoV-2“, das seit Jahrzehnten völlig unbemerkt existiert und mit Fledermäusen quer durch die Welt reist. Maciej Boni, Professor für Biologie an der „Pennsylvania State University“ erklärte, Coronaviren hatten genetisches Material, das stark rekombinant sei, so dass die genauen Ursprünge von Sars-Cov-2 sehr schwierig zu rekonstruieren seien.
In den letzten Wochen tauchten in den sozialen Medien Beweise dafür auf, dass es Amerikanerinnen gab, die sich bereits vor dem Dezember 2019 mit dem Coronavirus infiziert hatten, bei denen aber leider nur eine Lungenentzündung diagnostiziert worden war. So stand in einem Artikel auf USMESSAGEBOARD.COM, eine 66-jährige Frau, Mary Ellen Ralph aus Crystal River in Florida, sei im Juli 2019 erkrankt und ihre Lungenaufnahmen hätten die gleichen Symptome wie bei Covid-19-Infizierten aufgewiesen. Glücklicherweise konnte sie trotz der falschen Diagnose überleben. Zusätzlich gab es in Ocala, Florida, noch drei weitere unglückliche Fälle: Enna Maulseed, Dean N Harris, Judy Marie McIntosh.
Der Austritt aus der WHO bedeutet, dass die USA dann nicht mehr verpflichtet sind, Erklärungen zu ihren militärischen Virenlabors oder zu vielen verdächtigen Fällen abzugeben, während China im Februar und auch im Juli 2020 das Forschungsteam der WHO nach China eingeladen hat. Jetzt stellt sich die Frage, ob das Coronavirus bereits Mitte 2019 in den USA aktiv war.
Worldwide political concerns rise along with trending discussion of the balance between developing 5G and ensuring national security, as China is the first country to release 5G technology to domestic consumers, and China aims to promote it globally, which brings controversies centered around the relationship between Chinese information and communications technology (ICT) company and the Chinese government.
Obviously, China wishes to lead the 5G evolution due to previous disadvantage development of 2G, 3G, and 4G which certainly is a drag to its society advancement. Reviewing the developing path of generations of wireless networks reminds us of the life changes: 1G (1979) brought phone call to the world; 2G (1991) let people to text each other, 2.5G and 2.75G came with GPRS and EDGE; 3G (1998) achieved a better but limited internet usage experience, 3.5G arrived with mobile applications; 4G (2008) allowed voice and data, 4G long term evolution (LTE) doubled data speeds. In fact, if there is a chance to be advanced in the revolution of wireless networks, any country would like to be the one to gaze it. If cannot be the first one, even following the trend rather than standing alone to lose the right moments. Missing an opportunity in technology revolution equals being behind an era in economic advancement.
Global system for mobile communications (GSMA), an industry organization representing the interests of mobile network operators worldwide, points out that information and communication technology (ICT) has become a fundamental element of modern society to grow economic sustainably.
5G technology has to meet 8 specific requirements:
Up to 10 Gbps data rate, representing 10 to 100x improvement over 4G and 4.5G networks
1-millisecond latency
1000x bandwidth per unit area
Massive amount of connected devices per unit area, around 100x improvement over 4G network
99.999% availability
100% coverage
90% energy reduction of network usage
Up to 10 years of battery life for low power LoT devices
What we can expect for 5G is a highly connected society operating efficiently and interacting actively with every participant, either device and any application.
Source: European Commission
The importance that 5G plays in an economy goes without saying, the secure issues are obvious as 5G connects everything so tightly to a new level that any potentially uncontrollable risk may cause a national security crisis, and political risk is included.
On 24th March, around which time China just got rid of the first epidemic of coronavirus and started to recover its economic and technical development, meanwhile Europe and the USA were trapped in the first epidemic of coronavirus and experienced a huge economic loss, the ministry of industry and information technology (MIIT) of Chinese government published a Notice Concerning Promoting the Accelerated Development of 5G (MIIT Communications No.(2020)49), which is the latest national 5G supportive policy requiring to be implemented strictly. The notice divides into 5 parts directing construction, application, research, security protection, and policy implementation, which aims to accelerate 5G network construction by supporting telecommunications enterprises, strengthening industrial corporation, and encouraging local governments to entre location resources required for 5G network construction; enriching the vista for various 5G technology applications of healthcare, transportation, education, entertainment to build a 5G ecological system; enhancing the 5G technology research and development; building 5G security protection for infrastructure, data, and cybersecurity; all directions are required to be coordinated and corporated cross departments with information exchanges.
The worries are reasonable to a certain extent for many countries since the Chinese government indeed offers supportive policies to information and communications technology (ICT) companies and significantly rules major mobile operators. Even though some leading information and communication technology (ICT) companies, such as Huawei, tried serval times to clarify its independent market position with shreds of evidence but failed to win trusts back as the world exclusive China refers Chinese rising technology and related market to Chinese governmental leadership.
There are 3 ways to face China and its 5G technology, accept it without animosity, use it wisely and selectively, and reject it for all possibilities. The USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, UK, and Japan decided on Huawei 5G ban as they are fully confident of national security issues brought by Chinese 5G shortly. The Philippines and South Korea accepted Chinese 5G as no evidence to accuse it. Poland, Germany, and France won’t ban Chinese 5G totally but do apply stricter security requirements on all wireless networks. The chosen attitudes are grouped by interests, European union should stand for safe, stable, and sustainable development, it led previous generation telecommunications, but gets a little behind the 5G times. China may not be a trustworthy partner, but the USA definitely won’t be a better choice. In 2019, U.S Department of State stated “Germany is one of the United States’ closest and strongest allies in Europe…Our political, economic, and security relationships, critical to shared prosperity and continued stability…”, but Germany should never trust the USA that much again after 2013, when SPIEGEL revealed that united states intelligence agencies targeted Chancellor Angela Merkel’s cellphone and used the American Embassy in Berlin as a listening station to monitor important political communications.
The USA triggers the 5G war in the name of data protection and national security, diverting people’s attention away from itself deliberately, which is only a deceptive trick. Even stated Germany as a close allie, but another statement desires to be remarked that “The United States provides no development assistance to Germany.” Considering historical corporations, choosing China can be negotiated relatively easier, at least Chinese policies aim to achieve win-win development.
In 2018, the Chinese government announced a policy based on the China-EU Science and Technology Cooperation Joint Steering Committee, which mentioned the concerns brought by Chinese 5G and the potential future built by the two sides.
“China and the EU need to support each other and carry out exchanges and cooperation in developing ‘Digital China’ and the EU Digital Single Market. Make good use of such mechanisms as the China-EU dialogue on information technology, telecommunications and informatization, and the China-EU digital economy and cybersecurity expert working group, deepen cooperation on 5G, promote technological exchanges and standardization cooperation on the digital economy, internet of things, internet of vehicles, industrial internet, artificial intelligence and smart cities…”
“Noting the higher requirements made by the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) on privacy protection, data security, and trade and investment for corporations with digital businesses in Europe…China will continue to carry out exchanges, mutual learning and cooperation with the EU on data protection to better protect personal information and the legitimate rights and interests of citizens.”
On 29th November 2019, EU-China Symposium on Data Security and Personal Information Protection was held in Bruxelles. Officers, researchers, lawers, and representatives of information and communication technology (ICT) companies from China and the EU discussed the system design and application of data protection and personal information based on technical innovation. The forum aims to be helpful to build a mutual trust system soon.
Building an EU-China mutual trust system of data protection and security is an ideal solution to enforce Chinese 5G development and application in the EU. A system that adapts competitive advantages both in technology and prices from China 5G, and meets the integrated regulation of data protection from the EU. Such a system supervised by European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) with active Chinese information and communication technology is no doubt a sufficient and efficient condition to let Chinese 5G enter the EU market and to allow the EU accept Chinese 5G with a guaranty.
With the rollout of export controls on emerging technologies starting in 2020, the United States has opened a new front in its confrontation with China. This marks a shift from defensive measures to more offensive tools.
Over the past year, the US has engaged in an aggressive campaign to convince European partners to ban Chinese suppliers from their 5G networks. Its push to curb the transfer of sensitive technologies to China risks becoming a new source of transatlantic tension in the years ahead.
In a world of deeply integrated, global supply chains, European governments view export controls as a blunt instrument for tackling the risks tied to new technologies. They are skeptical about the US administration’s aims, seeing controls as part of a broader push to contain China.
Despite this scepticism, European countries can neither ignore the US push nor refuse to engage with Washington as it presses ahead with its plans. On the contrary, Europe must formulate its own, considered approach to the transfer of sensitive technologies. Affected member states must coordinate their work more effectively and consider giving the European Commission a broader mandate, as they have done on investment screening and 5G.
The EU faces unique structural hurdles in responding to the US push to restrict emerging technology transfers. Despite a years-old legislative push to reform the EU’s dual-use regulations, the bloc still has a weak mandate on export controls and limited scope to ramp up its scrutiny of emerging technologies.
The EU and its member states are not well positioned to address highly complex policy questions at the nexus of technology and security. While officials in some member states have begun to wrestle with these questions, there is a lack of high-level political attention, hindering progress, and leaving the bloc vulnerable.
The United States has been reaching out to allies on a bilateral basis and in various ad-hoc and established forums, including multilateral regimes like the Wassenaar Arrangement, to get their buy-in. But there is a risk that Washington loses patience with Europe and other allies if they move too slowly and goes down a unilateral path. This could expose European companies to secondary sanctions.
Those EU states that are most affected should consider creating new structures to address risks at the intersection of trade, technology and security. They should formalise coordination and information exchange with other EU governments and ensure this exchange is grounded in a European process involving the Commission, which needs a more robust mandate to tackle the growing emerging technology challenge.
States should accelerate efforts to bring outside experts from business and academia into the policy discussion. And they need to establish a more regular, structured dialogue on emerging security challenges with partners outside of Europe, particularly in Asia.
1. Export controls open new front in US-China tech war
“The EU has the option of becoming a player, a true geo-strategic actor, or being mostly the playground.” —— Josep Borrell, High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy1
On January 3, 2020, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) at the US Department of Commerce unveiled the first in a series of proposed rules to limit the export of emerging technologies2. The announcement did not garner much in the way of public attention. After all, it was highly technical in nature (the technology in question was software to automate the analysis of geospatial imagery). But symbolically, the move was significant: it was the first shot from a new front in the Trump administration’s accelerating technology war with China.
Over the past two years, the United States has unveiled a dizzying array of new legislation aimed at China. The Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA) of 2018 and the Executive Order on Information and Communications Technology and Services (ICTS) of 2019 can be seen as defensive measures designed to shield US companies, technology and critical infrastructure from Chinese investors and suppliers. But the Export Control Reform Act (ECRA) – together with the administration’s liberal use of the Entity List, an export blacklist targeting end-users rather than products – has set the stage for a more offensive approach: a campaign to prevent China from obtaining vital technologies that the United States suspects could be used for military purposes3.
While emerging technologies have always been part of the discussion on export controls, ECRA, signed into law by President Donald Trump in August 2018, signals a new, more intense focus on this area as part of the administration’s aggressive “whole of government” response to China’s rise as an economic, military and, increasingly, geopolitical power. ECRA grew out of a Department of Defense report in early 2018, which described intense Chinese government efforts in Silicon Valley to acquire advanced technologies4.
In explaining the new focus on restricting exports of these technologies, US government officials have highlighted China’s “Military-Civil Fusion” (MCF) strategy under President Xi Jinping. “Simply put, in the context of MCF, it is impossible to rely upon any Chinese promise of purely peaceful or civilian end use if the technology in question has value to China’s security services or its military,” Christopher Ford, Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Non-proliferation said in September 20195. Because China has blurred the lines between the civil and military spheres as part of an overarching strategy, the administration’s argument goes, a broader interpretation of what constitutes dual-use technologies is warranted.
There are divisions within the US government about the extent to which export controls can and should be used to limit the transfer of new technologies to China6. Memories are still fresh of efforts in the 1990s to restrict the export of satellite technology, a campaign that backfired spectacularly when US manufacturers simply moved their operations abroad7. But the broad push enjoys bipartisan support in the US Congress and is likely to remain a pillar of US policy, regardless of who is sitting in the White House.
Three months after ECRA was signed into law, the BIS unveiled a list of 14 broad technology categories (see exhibit 1) that it said would be evaluated for possible national security risks.
Exhibit 1
It spent a year analyzing these technologies and seeking feedback from industry, experts and allies. After issuing its first rule proposal on January 3, the US campaign is poised to accelerate in 2020 as the United States rolls out additional export controls and ramps up pressure on allies, including those in Europe, to follow its lead. It has signaled that its initial focus will be on artificial intelligence, quantum computing and 3D-printing. Later it is expected to turn to so-called foundational technologies like semiconductor manufacturing equipment and design tools.
The case of Dutch company ASML (see case study/box 1) shows that the United States has already begun heaping pressure on allies to restrict exports of certain goods to China8. Recent signals that Washington is considering reducing the 25 percent US content threshold above which it can require a US export license from foreign companies suggests a much more aggressive approach going forward9. Indeed, after an intense, aggressive US lobbying campaign in 2019 to convince European allies to exclude Chinese suppliers from their 5G networks, the debate over restricting transfers of sensitive technologies has the potential to become an even bigger and more enduring source of transatlantic tension in the years ahead.
2. Europe views US export restrictions with skepticism
“Historically, export controls have been an instrument of economic warfare. They have depended on a clear-cut idea of an enemy. Europe doesn’t perceive China as the enemy. But it still has to think about this. The US is moving fast. It forces Europe to take a position.” —— Mario Daniels, Georgetown University10
The US push to restrict exports of sensitive technologies to China has significant implications for European states and industry and will confront the EU with a series of difficult choices beginning in 2020. The EU shares many of Washington’s concerns about China, from its aggressive pursuit of western technology and vast surveillance state, to its growing military ambitions and human rights record. Yet while a rough European consensus has emerged in recent years on the use of defensive measures to shield companies and critical infrastructure from acquisitive Chinese rivals, there is a healthy skepticism in European capitals about Washington’s use of offensive economic tools, such as export controls, to counter China.
First, export controls are seen by many in Europe as a blunt, antiquated instrument for curbing technology transfers in a world where supply chains are deeply integrated and global. The fear is that they will inhibit innovation and disrupt value chains, doing self-inflicted damage to home-grown companies and industries.
Second, there are concerns that the US effort is being driven not by a fear that western technology could be used by the Chinese for military purposes, but rather by a desire to contain China’s technological rise more generally. This is not a goal that European countries support. Unlike officials in the Trump administration, they do not see themselves in a zero-sum competition with China and are reluctant to take steps that amount to a form of economic warfare. Third, there is a fear, particularly in European industry, that the US push is part of an “America First” industrial policy meant to shore up US companies and industries at the expense of foreign rivals.
Despite these misgivings, Europe cannot afford to ignore the US campaign nor refuse to engage with Washington and other allies on what in some cases may be legitimate concerns relating to the spread of sensitive technologies to an authoritarian China. On the contrary, whether European countries ultimately decide to go along with the United States in restricting the export of certain technologies or to push back against these new controls, Europe needs to formulate its own approach to this issue – as it has tried to do on foreign direct investment from China and security risks related to the rollout of 5G mobile networks. If it fails to do so, the risk is an “every country for itself” approach which opens up new divisions between European states and undermines the leverage of the EU as an actor on trade matters.
Although emerging technology questions may not have been at the front of new European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s mind when she promised to make the EU executive a geopolitical force, it is likely that they will end up being at the very heart of this challenge11. As in 2019, when the Trump administration pulled out of the Iran nuclear deal, European companies face a risk of extra-territorial sanctions from Washington if they continue to export technologies that are subject to US controls. Without its own considered strategy and without the tools to implement it, Europe risks being thrust onto the defensive.
3. Europe faces internal challenges in responding to US tech push
“We have taken more than three years to discuss just one of the 14 technology categories on the US list and we can’t even agree on that.” —— Paul Diegel, senior policy adviser, European Parliament12
European states and the European Union face a number of internal challenges, both short and longer term, in responding to US export controls on emerging technologies. They need to move beyond a years-long impasse over the reform of their own export control rules, raise technology considerations to the top of the political agenda and think creatively about moving beyond old, siloed structures to tackle the growing nexus between technology and security.
3.1 Moving beyong the legislative impasse
The Trump administration’s new focus on restricting exports of sensitive technologies has come at an awkward time for the EU, which has been bogged down for years in a legislative effort to reform its own dual-use export control regime. This process was fueled not by concerns about China, but rather reports that cybersurveillance technology – one of the 14 categories on the BIS list of emerging technologies – originating from Europe had been used by authoritarian regimes to suppress democratic uprisings during the Arab Spring.
The failure to clinch a deal on this narrow technology grouping after nearly 3.5 years of negotiations has raised doubts about whether Europe will ever be united or nimble enough to tackle the array of more complex questions that loom in the escalating US tech war with China. Therefore, moving beyond this legislative impasse in the first half of 2020 – a task which could be complicated by travel restrictions linked to the coronavirus epidemic – should be a top priority for the EU and its member states.
While the EU has a mandate from its members to negotiate trade deals on their behalf, its powers in the realm of export controls remain limited. Until now, the bloc has been a rule-taker rather than a rule-maker. The EU adopts one-for-one controls that are agreed in multilateral regimes like the Wassenaar Arrangement, but it does not have the power to add controls itself13. Nor does it have a formal mandate to explore dual-use risks tied to emerging technologies.
Exhibit 2
Addressing these deficiencies is essential if the EU is to engage with allies and defend the interests of its member states in the intensifying debate over technology transfers. In a worst-case scenario for Europe, the US could come out with a full-fledged list of US export controls in 2020 and Europe would be powerless to deliver a collective response. Then US secondary sanctions could come into play. Against this backdrop, the least bad option for the EU may be to break its multi-year deadlock and conclude a limited deal under the Croatian presidency of the EU in the first half of 2020, even if it stops short of giving the Commission the greater autonomy it is seeking. The bloc could then pivot quickly during Germany’s presidency in the second half of the year to a focused appraisal of emerging technology risks.
The Commission, building on a series of informal workshops it has organized, could be given a coordinating mandate, like the one it received for investment screening and 5G. Still, if the Commission does not get the greater autonomy on export controls that it has sought, the EU will remain reliant on the multilateral regime process and struggle to respond to the US push in a joined-up manner.
3.2 Pushing technology transfers up the political priority list
“On content, the emerging technology issue is very similar to 5G and investment screening. But as far as the political attention goes there is a big difference. This simply isn’t a top priority.” —— Senior official from a large EU member state14
Although officials in some European member states have begun to wrestle with the question of restrictions on emerging technologies, progress has been hindered by a lack of political attention at the highest levels. This was not the case for investment screening. In early 2017, the German, French and Italian governments, unsettled by a flurry of Chinese acquisitions on the Continent, asked the European Commission to take a closer look at Europe’s foreign investment rules. The Commission produced a proposal half a year later, and by the end of 2018 an agreement had been clinched between the Commission, Parliament and Council to centralize scrutiny of foreign investments.
The comparatively slow progress on reform of the EU’s dual-use export control regime shows that giving the European Commission more powers in this domain is not at the top of the political priority list. The irony, as several European officials pointed out, is that technology leakage via exports is greater than with FDI. While the United States sees export controls and FDI screening as closely linked, complementary tools, European politicians are only slowly waking up to potential risks tied to technology exports. In Europe, the discussion has focused mainly on human rights violations in relation to cyber-surveillance and, more recently, trade with entities in China’s western Xinjiang region.
Complicating the discussion at the EU level is the fact that only a handful of advanced technology-producing states (Germany, France, the Netherlands, Sweden and Finland among them) will be directly affected by US controls.
Therefore, the issue is not a priority for the majority of member states. This will make it difficult to develop an EU consensus on emerging technologies and puts the burden on bigger member states, like Germany and France, to use their clout to push the issue higher up the EU agenda. In order to avert a situation where Europe must scramble to react to US actions, these states will need to drive the discussion forward in 2020.
3.3 Tackling the technology-security nexus
“You need to create the structures to deal with the nexus of trade and security. It is difficult enough to do this at the national level. Just imagine how tough it will be in the EU.” —— Senior official from a Benelux country
In a world where questions about technology, trade and security are ever more closely intertwined, member states and EU institutions must ensure they have the structures in place to address this nexus. Europe’s fraught debate over 5G has shown that countries like Germany still have a ways to go in this regard.
In Berlin, ministries with conflicting interests that are run by members of rival parties, have struggled to conduct a balanced, fact-based discussion that addresses complex questions about technology, economic competitiveness and national security in a holistic way. In Brussels, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen must ensure that her team of commissioners – notably those focused on trade, industrial policy and digital challenges – are working seamlessly with the European External Action Service to address these questions.
Inter-ministerial working groups have been set up in countries like Germany and the Netherlands to address emerging technology questions. And since late 2019, the European Commission has been arranging voluntary workshops for member states to help them get a better understanding of the security questions related to new technologies like artificial intelligence, quantum computing and additive manufacturing.
But for now, this is soft coordination without a clear political mandate or direct flow into policymaking channels. Old, siloed structures that treat economic and security issues separately are ill-suited for tackling a new nexus that is likely to grow in importance in the years ahead, spurred on by the US focus on restricting the export of sensitive technologies to China.
Against this backdrop, the idea of setting up national security council-type structures in member states like Germany and at the EU level warrants a closer look15. Allies on the front line of the US-China technology war can offer valuable lessons. Japan, for example, is creating an economic statecraft function within its own National Security Secretariat, which will include officials seconded from key ministries as well as outside experts. Japanese ministries are setting up units to address emerging security challenges that would feed into this new body16.
4. US reaches out to allies but could shift to unilateral course
“The Americans are very impatient. And the multilateral regimes are slow. I’m not sure the system will be able to swallow the level of ambition that we are seeing in Washington.” —— Senior EU official
The choice of whether to follow the US lead in restricting exports of emerging technologies to China will be thrust upon European countries in 2020 – whether they are ready or not. Some, like the Netherlands, are feeling the heat even before new controls are in place (see case study below). What remains unclear is whether Washington will have the patience to build what US officials have called “coalitions of caution” in relation to China, or go down a more unilateral path, pressing ahead independently with controls and using the threat of secondary sanctions to coerce allies to follow suit as the administration did after pulling out of the Iran nuclear deal.
Case Study: ASML
Perhaps no case highlights the risks for European countries of the accelerating US technology war with China better than that of ASML, a Dutch company that makes the machines required to manufacture the world’s fastest semiconductors. ASML is alone among its competitors in producing the most advanced machines that use a chip-making process called extreme ultraviolet lithography. These allow circuits to be etched onto silicon wafers in much smaller sizes, yielding faster, more powerful microprocessors.
ASML sells its EUV lithography machines, which weigh 180 tons and cost about USD 150 million, , to the world’s biggest chipmakers – Intel, Samsung and Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC). The technology is considered “dual-use” under the Wassenaar Arrangement, and thus requires a license for export.
In 2018, ASML received an order for its EUV lithography machine from a Chinese customer, Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corp (SMIC). The Dutch government subsequently came under intense pressure from Washington to block the sale17. It has refused to grant ASML an export license and the company has been unable to deliver the machine to SMIC. In January, the Chinese ambassador to the Netherlands expressed concern that the Dutch were “politicizing our trade relationship under American pressure” and said the move would harm bilateral ties.
ASML’s machine is in many ways unique in the world of sensitive technologies – a large, expensive tool that is vital to China’s ambitions of becoming a high-tech manufacturing power. Very few emerging technologies will share all of these characteristics. Still, the ASML case is a flashing-red alarm for European countries, warning them of the pressures they could come under across a range of technologies in the years ahead.
The early signs are that US officials in the State Department and Commerce Department are keen to establish a dialogue with allies and, where possible, move in unison. In September 2019, the State Department hosted a three-day Multilateral Action on Sensitive Technologies (MAST) conference at which 15 advanced industrial nations, many of them European, compared notes on technology transfer threats. In early December, US officials met with a similar grouping of “like-minded” countries on the margins of the annual Wassenaar Arrangement plenary meeting in Vienna. At that meeting, US officials talked with allies about focusing, in three-month intervals, on “sprint groups” of priority technologies.
But despite these signals, European officials are skeptical that Washington will have the patience to forge a consensus in Wassenaar, a painstaking process that can take several years. A more likely scenario, supported by the recent proliferation of meetings, is that Washington will try to secure the backing of a targeted group of allies, in Europe, Japan and elsewhere, for its emerging technology controls and press them to act outside of the multilateral regime. Individual European countries that decide to go along with the United States could introduce new controls at the national level. Or they might push back if they believe the US proposals go too far. Either way, the process could turn into a nightmare for the European Union, with member states pursuing their own paths and the EU itself unable to act, because under its current legislation, it cannot add controls that haven’t been approved by a multilateral regime.
Longer term, European officials are concerned about the future of the Wassenaar Arrangement. They worry that its approval process may be too slow to keep pace with the rapid pace of technological change. And they see a risk that the United States will lose interest in the arduous process of consensus building within the regime if it can convince advanced technology producing countries to move outside of Wassenaar, either through persuasion or the threat of secondary sanctions.
The concerns mirror those surrounding US efforts to undermine the functioning of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). A breakdown of the multilateral approach to export controls would raise new questions for the European Union, whose own controls are wholly reliant on decisions taken in the regimes. To avoid this, Europe should seek a more regular, structured dialogue on technology & security issues with partners outside of Europe, particularly those on the front-line of the US-China tech war, like Japan, South Korea and Taiwan.
5. Conclusions: Europe must ramp up emerging technology focus
“Either you make your rules or you take them. It is neither in the interests of the EU nor the US to have rule takers only on this side of the pond. We should not sit on the fence.” —— Sandra Gallina, Deputy Director General, DG Trade, European Commission18
The rollout of new US rules to restrict the export of sensitive technologies to China risks becoming a new source of tension in the transatlantic relationship in 2020 and will confront Europe with a series of complex policy challenges. Despite Europe’s concerns that Washington’s push is driven in part by a desire to contain or slow China’s technological rise, a goal it does not share, EU member states and the European Commission will need to develop their own considered approach to emerging technologies.
If Europe fails to do so, the US campaign could deepen divisions between EU states, undermine the Commission’s role as an actor on trade and threaten the multilateral approach to export controls that has been the basis of EU action for decades.
While the United States has been reaching out to allies in ad-hoc and established forums like the Wassenaar Arrangement, there is a risk that it loses patience with allies and shifts to a more unilateral approach, threatening them with extra-territorial sanctions if they refuse to comply with new US controls aimed at China. For the EU, this goes to the heart of the challenge to become a geopolitical force in a world of heightened competition between the United States and China.
The EU must take action soon if it wants to assert itself as a sovereign actor in this new arena.
First, member states should consider giving the European Commission a formal mandate to explore risks tied to emerging technologies, as they have done in recent years in the areas of investment screening and 5G. In doing so, it will be important not to let stubborn divisions over a multi-year push to reform the EU’s dual-use export control regime get in the way.
Second, leaders from Europe’s biggest states will need to make the issue of emerging technology risks a political priority, ensuring that soft coordination taking place at the national and European level is formalized and is feeding into policymaking channels.
Third, member states and the EU will need to explore creating new structures to help them cope with policy challenges at the nexus of technology, trade and security. Increasingly, this will involve bringing in expertise from outside of government and even rethinking what kind of people they recruit into government. Allies like Japan, which is setting up new functions in its ministries and national security apparatus to tackle emerging security challenges, can offer valuable lessons in this regard.
Rapid advances in technology that require quick policy responses will continue to be a challenge for the European Union, a grouping of 27 member states that operates by consensus and can therefore be slower in responding to new developments. Indeed, the blurring of lines between technology and security call into question a core premise on which the EU is based, namely that centralized rules can govern economic considerations – for example for trade, competition and monetary policy – while foreign and defence issues should be left primarily to member states. In a world of intensifying US-China competition, the EU will find it difficult to paper over these internal contradictions. Instead it must tackle them head-on.
– Robert McNally, President, Rapidan Energy Group. Quelle: FT, 24. Juli 2020
Washington has been vigorously trying for years to prevent the completion of the Nord Stream 2 project, which is supposed to transport up to 57 billion cubic meters of Russian natural gas annually from Western Siberia across the Baltic Sea floor directly to consumers in Germany and Europe.
According to official positions, the US is allegedly concerned that Nord Stream 2 would increase Europe’s energy dependency on a “strategic rival”. However, economic estimations and other facts clearly show that the cowboy behaviour of our American partners is rather motivated by mundane financial interests.
Europe is not as energy dependent on Moscow as it seems. According to Eurostat, Russia supplied over 38 percent of all extra-EU natural gas imports from in 2019. According to the German Handelsblatt newspaper, however, that accounted for only 6 percent of the EU’s total energy consumption.
Due to the European energy transition (“EU Green Deal”), the decision of the German government to shut down coal and nuclear power plants by 2022, and also because of the decision by Ukraine to buy gas from Europe and not directly from Gazprom, the European demand for natural gas is unlikely to decline, but will remain relatively stable until 2050. This assumption is supported by official evaluations of the European Commission.
Natural gas is likely to play an important role as a bridging agent in the EU’s energy transition, as it is the least carbon-intensive of the fossil fuels. When it is combusted, around 40 percent less CO2 is emitted than with coal and around 25 percent less than with crude oil.
At the same time, the demand for gas imports will increase by an average of 11 percent every five years during this period due to the decline in domestic production. The total demand of the EU, Switzerland and western Ukraine for natural gas in 2025 should therefore amount to around 500 billion cubic meters, of which around 400 billion cubic meters will have to be imported. This is a consensus forecast from German, British, Dutch, Swedish, Ukrainian and EU researchers.
However, since production will also decline in two of the EU’s most important external gas suppliers – Algeria and Norway – an import gap will arise (e.g. of approx. 76 billion cubic meters in 2025), which only the global market for liquefied natural gas (LNG) and Russia will be able to close.
As a result, Europeans will be forced to buy this necessary volume of gas mainly either via pipelines (including Nord Stream 2) from Russia or on the international LNG market, mostly from Qatar, Australia and … the US.
If the Germans and other Europeans decide to buy this gas from the Americans rather than from the Russians, they will have to pay more, and domestic gas prices will rise. These are the research results of several independent research institutes and economists.
According to detailed forecasts by the Oxford Institute for Energy Research, the average price for liquefied natural gas supplied from the USA to Northwest Europe will be around EUR 6.65 per mmBThU in 2025, while that for pipeline gas supplied from Russia to Central Europe will only be around USD 6.25 per mmBThU. On average, Russian gas will be around 40 euro cents cheaper per mmBThU than American tanker gas. (Exchange rate: USD 1 = EUR 0.85, as of August 10, 2020).
As mentioned in the beginning, the planned throughput capacity of Nord Stream 2 should be up to 57 billion cubic meters per annum. The conversion rate for 1 cubic meter of natural gas is 35,310,734.46 mmBThU. If the United States succeeded in preventing the completion of Nord Stream 2 so that Germany and other EU member states would not buy the same volume of gas from Russia, but instead, hypothetically, exclusively from the USA, then the EU would have to annually pay a total of EUR 805 million more. Applying Eurostat’s rough distribution quota for Russian natural gas imports into the EU, the additional costs for Germany and Italy would each amount to EUR 161 million per year (Tab. 1). By 2030, the additional costs due to the lack of Nord Stream 2 could add up to almost EUR 8 billion for the EU, and EUR 1.6 billion for Germany alone.
On the other hand, preventing the Nord Stream 2 project could bring the United States an annual income of EUR 13.4 billion. By 2030 that would amount to a total of EUR 133 billion.
Tab 1. Additional costs for the EU member states, without Nord Stream 2 and buying the same amount of US-American LNG instead (EUR million)
Annual
Total 2020-2030
AUT
12,1
121
FIN
80,5
805
FRA
80,5
805
DEU
161
1610
ITA
161
1610
NDL
80,5
805
POL
80,5
805
Rest of EU
8,1 (per country or less)
81 (per country or less)
EU Total
805,1
8051
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from OIER (2019) and Eurostat (2020).
This conclusion is also supported by other empirical studies. According to a research report by Dr. Maik Günther, energy industry expert, Stadtwerke München, visiting researcher, TUM, in a scenario without Nord Stream 2, the average wholesale prices for gas in Italy will be 55 euro cents per MWh higher, 70 euro cents in France and 80 euro cents higher in Germany – compared to a scenario in which Nord Stream 2 would be in operation (Tab. 2).
Tab. 2. Average price difference compared to a scenario without Nord Stream 2 (in wholesale prices for gas, in EUR 2017 per MWh, 2020 to 2040)
GBR
FRA
NDL
DEU
CZE
POL
ITA
BGR
ROM
0,66
0,70
0,79
0,80
0,89
0,70
0,55
0,39
0,15
Source: Günther and Nissen 2019.
In a comprehensive four-scenario simulation of the average wholesale price for natural gas in the EU, the Institute of Energy Economics at the University of Cologne (EWI) comes to even more acute findings. According to their results, EU wholesale gas prices in a low global LNG demand scenario will be almost 11 percent higher in 2025 (EUR 2.6 more per MWh) if Nord Stream 2 is not available, compared to a scenario with Nord Stream 2 in operation. Consumers in the EU countries would thus suffer a total welfare loss of EUR 12.9 billion. In a scenario with high global LNG demand, European consumers would incur total welfare costs of EUR 34.8 billion in 2025 compared to a situation in which Nord Stream 2 is in operation. The average EU wholesale price for gas in 2025 would be 27 percent higher (EUR 6.9 more per MWh) than in a scenario where Nord Stream 2 is available.
Despite the fact that the quantitative results of the above-mentioned studies vary, they all agree that failure to deploy Nord Stream 2 will result in a significant increase in EU wholesale gas prices and in a significant welfare loss for the European economies. In particular, two of the main consumers of Russian gas – Germany and Italy – should consider whether they are ready for this. After all, according to the BMWi and the IW Cologne, they both already some of have the highest industrial electricity prices and unit wage costs among the EU countries.
The policy of meddling in internal European affairs and of external pressure to advance national economic interests is a common practice in Washington. The latest example: According to estimations by the IfW Kiel, the White House will force China to buy US-American LNG worth more than USD 2 billion in 2021 as part of the highly asymmetric Phase-One-Deal.
The economic pragmatism and the duplicity of American policy are also evident in the fact that the United States forbid Europeans from buying Russian gas, but are actively buying Russian oil themselves. From the beginning of the Ukrainian crisis in 2014 up until 2020, imports of crude oil and petroleum products from Russia to the USA rose by 56.2 percent to almost 190 billion barrels per year. This is the official data from the US government.
Ultimately, the American liquid gas alternative would also be much less climate friendly. According to a study by the Chicago-based risk management and consulting firm Sphera, importing natural gas to Central Europe via the Nord Stream 2 pipeline would emit four times less CO2 on average than importing the same amount of liquefied natural gas by tanker ships from the United States.
Finally, Nord Stream 2 could also become a cornerstone of the EU’s ambitious hydrogen strategy. According to Gazprom and the Eurogas Association, it is technically possible to load the pipeline flow with up to 70-80 percent hydrogen.
Dem Großprojekt Nord Stream 2, das russisches Erdgas über die Ostsee nach Deutschland bzw. weiter an den anderen EU-Staaten, bringen soll, fehlen nur noch wenige Kilometer bis zur Fertigstellung. Dies ruft die Vereinigten Staaten auf den Plan, die nun schwere Geschütze auffahren, um die Fertigstellung des Projektes zu verhindern. Das Projekt ruht seit Dezember letzten Jahres, nachdem die USA mit massiven Sanktionen gegen Unternehmen vorzugehen drohten, die mit ihren Verlegeschiffen den Bau von Nord Stream 2 vorantreiben. Zwei russische Spezialschiffe liegen nun vor Ort, um die Arbeiten fortzusetzen, sobald dies nach Ende der Laich-Saison wieder möglich ist.
Allerdings scheint dies weiter in Frage zu stehen, denn das amerikanische Außenministerium hat die Bestimmungen des Countering Americas Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, eines Sanktionsgesetzes aus dem Jahre 2017, weiter verschärft. Alle Unternehmen, die den Bau finanzieren oder unterstützen, könnten dann Sanktionen durch die US-Regierung drohen. Dies betrifft 120 Unternehmen aus zwölf europäischen Ländern. Vor allem die Finanzierung des Projektes ist nun extrem gefährdet.
Mit ihren Sanktionen möchten die USA, natürlich wieder mit einer guten Ausrede, wie bei vielen anderen, eine zu große Abhängigkeit Europas von russischem Gas unterbinden, aber eine untrennbare Abhängigkeit Europas von den USA, die mit viel zu hohen Preisen (möglicherweise um ca. 30%) verbunden sind, scheint der amerikanischen Regierung willkommen zu sein.
Die USA versuchen dagegen weiter, Deutschland in eine Allianz gegen Russland und China zu drängen. Der Handelskrieg gegen China hatte sich zuletzt durch das angekündigte CLEAN-NETWORK-PROGRAMM weiter verstärkt. Die USA weiteten ihre massiven Wettbewerbseinschränkungen gegen China, die zuletzt den IT-Konzern Huawei und die Videoplattform TikTok betrafen, auf die gesamte chinesische Wettbewerbsbranche aus, mit der Begründung, den chinesischen Behörden auf diese Weise den Zugriff zu amerikanischen Daten unmöglich zu machen, wobei es bis heute aber keinerlei Beweise dafür gibt.
Aus amerikanischen App-Stores sollen chinesische Apps entfernt werden. An die Seite dieser Maßnahmen treten weitere Sanktionen gegen chinesische Unternehmen. Ein allmächtiges Land dieser Erde hat jetzt doch Angst vor den privaten Unternehmen und daher ignoriert es dreist seine eigenen Freiwirtschaftsregeln. Sollte die WTO die Marktwirtschaft der USA weiter anerkennen?
Wie viele Menschen eigentlich würden sich für den Tod von Floyd interessieren, wenn es keine CORONA-Krise in den USA gäbe?
Die Ermordung von George Floyd in Minneapolis löste einen landesweiten Aufschrei gegen Rassendiskriminierung aus. Dennoch ist es fast unmöglich, die so genannte Minnesota-Bewegung aufgrund dieses einzigartigen Ereignisses zu verstehen. Es ist schwierig, das Ausmaß des Rassismus in den Vereinigten Staaten zu messen, ohne tief in die Geschichte des Landes einzutauchen. Farbige Menschen haben Jahrhunderte verdeckter und offener Unterwerfung durchlebt. Von der Sklaverei bis zu den Ausbeutungsgesetzen, die Geschichte ist voll von den Leiden der schwarzen Bevölkerung in den USA.
Die Muster der Diskriminierung haben sich jedoch seit der Bürgerrechtsbewegung verändert, offener Rassismus hat subtilen Vorurteilen Platz gemacht. Dieser Wandel manifestiert sich im wirtschaftlichen Bereich in niedrigen Einkommen, zunehmender Armut und hohen Arbeitslosenquoten unter Afroamerikanern im Vergleich zu nicht hispanischen weißen Amerikanern. Auch im sozialen Bereich deuten die niedrige Lebenserwartung, die hohe Analphabetenrate und die Häufigkeit von Krankheiten in der farbigen Bevölkerung auf postmoderne Strömungen der Diskriminierung hin. Darüber hinaus sind Afroamerikaner trotz der gesetzlichen Absicherung von Rechten und Freiheiten nach wie vor mit staatlicher Diskriminierung in Form einer eingeschränkten Teilnahme an den Netzen der sozialen Sicherheit, hohen Raten falscher Verurteilungen und einer unzureichenden Leistung der staatlichen Antidiskriminierungsbehörden konfrontiert.
Die Diskriminierung der schwarzen Bevölkerung blickt auf eine lange Tradition zurück. Es waren die Portugiesen, die die Sklaverei auf dem amerikanischen Kontinent zum ersten Mal im Zeitalter der Entdeckungen einführten. Sie hatten afrikanische Sklaven in ihre südamerikanische Kolonie Brasilien gebracht, um die Produktion von Zuckerrohr zu steigern. Nicht lange danach exportierten die Briten 1619 afrikanische Sklaven in ihre Kolonie Jamestown, Virginia, um die Geschichte der Sklaverei in den heutigen Vereinigten Staaten zu beginnen. Nach den revolutionären Tagen der Unabhängigkeit tauchte die Frage der Sklaverei für die neue Republik erstmals 1787 während des Verfassungsgebungsprozesses auf. Delegierte aus den ursprünglichen 13 Staaten, mit Ausnahme von Rhode Islands, berieten darüber, wie Sklaven für die Zwecke der Vertretung im Kongress gezählt werden sollten. Es wurde der so genannte Dreifünftel-Kompromiss erreicht, bei dem alle fünf schwarzen Sklaven für die Zwecke der gesetzgeberischen Vertretung und der Besteuerung als drei gezählt wurden. Dieser Schritt kam den Südstaaten zugute, für deren Landwirtschaft die Sklaverei nahezu notwendig geworden war. Der Kompromiss zwischen den Industriestaaten des Nordens und den agrarischen Südstaaten hatte jedoch nicht lange Bestand. Die Ausdehnung nach Westen und die Aufnahme neuer Staaten verschärfte das Problem der Sklaverei in den Vereinigten Staaten in der ersten Hälfte des 19. Mit dem Aufstieg Abraham Lincolns zum Präsidenten (1860) gipfelte die Auseinandersetzung zwischen dem Süden und dem Norden jedoch schließlich im Bürgerkrieg. Der Bürgerkrieg endete mit dem Sieg der Unionstruppen gegen die konföderierte Armee. Später wurden der 14. und 15. Zusatzartikel verabschiedet, mit denen die Sklaverei in den Vereinigten Staaten technisch abgeschafft wurde. Dennoch gab es in den Vereinigten Staaten immer noch Rassendiskriminierung in verschiedenen Formen und Ausprägungen. Die Doktrin “Getrennt, aber gleich” war das Arbeitsprinzip in den Vereinigten Staaten nach dem Bürgerkrieg, wo farbige Menschen mit den schlimmsten Formen der Rassendiskriminierung konfrontiert waren. Nach dieser Doktrin aßen Schwarze in verschiedenen Restaurants, benutzten verschiedene Waschräume, tranken aus unterschiedlichen Wasserhähnen, besuchten verschiedene Schulen und hatten einen unterschiedlichen wirtschaftlichen Wert auf dem Arbeitsmarkt. Der Zustand fortwährender Diskriminierung führte schließlich Anfang der 1960er Jahre zur Bürgerrechtsbewegung. Sowohl gewalttätige als auch gewaltfreie Proteste brachen überall in den Vereinigten Staaten aus und zwangen den Kongress zur Verabschiedung des Bürgerrechtsgesetzes (1964), mit dem die rassische, religiöse, sexuelle und nationale Diskriminierung für illegal erklärt wurde. Während die Bürgerrechtsbewegung bei der Schaffung der rechtlichen Grundlagen gegen Diskriminierung monumental war, gelang es ihr weit weniger, die tief verwurzelte rassistische Haltung der Weißen gegenüber den Afroamerikanern zu ändern.
Der Mord an Floyd ist der traurige Ausdruck der systematischen Diskriminierung der Schwarzen in Minnesota und beispielhaft für die Zustände in den USA. Die Polizei wendet im Durchschnitt 7-mal mehr Gewalt gegen Afroamerikaner an als gegen weiße Amerikaner. In diesem fortwährenden Umfeld von Unterdrückung und Polizeigewalt hatte sich der Todesfall von George Floyd ereignet. Die massiven Proteste, die bald darauf ausbrachen, sind keine Reaktion auf die Tötung eines einzigen Afroamerikaners. Sie sind vielmehr eine Reaktion auf eine tief verwurzelte Diskriminierung von Afroamerikanern. Der historische Kontext ist auch nützlich, um die gewalttätige Wende zu erklären, die viele Proteste genommen haben. Wie Martin Luther King sagen würde: “Aufruhr ist die Sprache des Unerhörten”, die Jahrhunderte von Vorurteilen, Diskriminierung und Vernachlässigung haben zu der Wut und Frustration geführt, die man von Minneapolis bis New York beobachten kann. Obwohl das “Black Lives Matter Movement” andauert und die Regierung mit dem Einsatz der Nationalgarde reagiert, bleibt abzuwarten, wie die neue Bewegung die Sache der Afroamerikaner unterstützen wird.
