Since the conclusion of the 14th National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam, Hanoi’s diplomatic tempo has accelerated noticeably. Shortly after wrapping up his visit to China, General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam and State President Tô Lâm embarked on a trip to India, with Sri Lanka as a second stop.
Newly appointed Prime Minister Lê Minh Hưng chose the Philippines for his diplomatic debut, attending the ASEAN Summit, while Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi selected Vietnam as the second destination of her first overseas tour after forming her new cabinet, underscoring the continued expansion of Japan–Vietnam cooperation in both economic and security affairs.
Viewed individually, these are routine diplomatic engagements. Taken together, however, they reveal a broader strategic pattern: Vietnam is steadily constructing a diplomatic framework that spans the wider Indo-Pacific.
Tô Lâm’s visit to India coincided with the tenth anniversary of the Vietnam–India Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, giving the trip particular symbolic and strategic significance. For years, Vietnam–India ties were often interpreted either as a continuation of traditional friendship or through India’s own “Act East” strategy, in which Vietnam occupied an important position. Today, however, the relationship has evolved far beyond those earlier perceptions.
Cooperation now extends across virtually every major sector, including political dialogue, defense and security, trade and investment, connectivity, high technology, and people-to-people exchanges. From Hanoi’s perspective, India has become the centerpiece of its westward diplomatic strategy and its gateway to the Indian Ocean.
India’s strategic location, growing defense capabilities, expanding consumer market, and technological potential complement Vietnam’s own priorities of strengthening maritime security, diversifying export markets, upgrading industrial capacity, and reducing dependence on any single external partner amid the ongoing restructuring of global supply chains.
During the visit, the two countries elevated their relationship to an Enhanced Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. Both sides pledged to deepen political trust through more frequent high-level exchanges and to make fuller use of existing bilateral cooperation mechanisms.
Defense and security remain one of the pillars of the relationship, with commitments to expand cooperation in defense industry, maritime security, cybersecurity, intelligence sharing, and counterterrorism.
They also exchanged views on regional and international issues of mutual concern, reaffirming the importance of maintaining peace and stability in the South China Sea and resolving disputes peacefully in accordance with international law, without the threat or use of force. Economically, the two governments reaffirmed their ambition of reaching US$25 billion in bilateral trade by 2030, reducing trade barriers, encouraging higher-quality two-way investment, and making science, technology, innovation, and digital transformation key drivers of future cooperation.
Taken together, these outcomes demonstrate that Vietnam’s India policy is no longer primarily diplomatic symbolism. Instead, Hanoi increasingly views its partnership with New Delhi as a practical means of enhancing national security, improving supply-chain resilience, and expanding strategic autonomy.
Sri Lanka, the less publicized stop on Tô Lâm’s itinerary, is equally significant. This marked the highest-level Vietnamese visit to the island nation in more than half a century of diplomatic relations. Although relatively small in size, Sri Lanka occupies a strategic position along one of the world’s busiest maritime routes in the Indian Ocean.
For Vietnam, whose economy depends heavily on maritime trade, stronger ties with Colombo contribute to securing sea lines of communication, protecting energy transport routes, and expanding access to markets beyond Southeast Asia. During the visit, the two countries upgraded their relationship to a Comprehensive Partnership and agreed to deepen cooperation in politics, defense, trade, connectivity, agriculture, and tourism, further strengthening Vietnam’s strategic footprint in the Indian Ocean.
Seen in a broader context, Tô Lâm’s diplomacy reflects an increasingly coherent strategic vision. As great-power competition intensifies and global supply chains continue to evolve, Vietnam’s overriding objective is neither to choose sides nor simply to cultivate as many partners as possible. Rather, Hanoi seeks to maximize its strategic room for maneuver by maintaining diversified relationships with all major powers while avoiding excessive dependence on any single country. Preserving strategic autonomy remains the central organizing principle of Vietnam’s foreign policy.
This logic is evident in the sequencing of Vietnam’s recent diplomatic initiatives. Tô Lâm chose China for his first overseas visit after assuming office and has repeatedly described relations with Beijing as Vietnam’s foremost foreign policy priority, signaling Hanoi’s intention to preserve stable ties with its largest neighbor.
At the same time, Vietnam has continued to strengthen industrial and security cooperation with Japan, expand strategic engagement with India, and reinforce ASEAN-centered multilateral diplomacy. Together, these moves suggest an evolution of Vietnam’s well-known “bamboo diplomacy.”
Whereas the concept once emphasized flexibility and balance amid great-power rivalry, it has increasingly become a more proactive strategy. Hanoi now seeks to stabilize relations with China, deepen cooperation with Japan and other partners, strengthen ASEAN centrality, and expand its engagement westward toward India, all while avoiding formal alignment with any competing bloc and maximizing its own national interests.
From China’s perspective, Vietnam’s expanding diplomatic network should not be interpreted as a weakening of bilateral relations. Rather, it reflects Hanoi’s long-standing commitment to an independent and diversified foreign policy. Beijing therefore has every reason to respond with strategic confidence rather than zero-sum thinking.
China should continue to respect Vietnam’s independent foreign policy while maintaining long-term strategic patience. High-level political guidance should remain the foundation of bilateral ties, with sustained implementation of the important consensus reached by the leaders of the two countries and continued progress in building the China–Vietnam community with a shared future. Existing mechanisms, including the “3+3” strategic dialogue, should be further utilized to consolidate political trust, maintain border stability, and deepen practical cooperation.
Economic integration should remain another priority. As China’s largest trading partner within ASEAN and China’s biggest trading partner in Southeast Asia, Vietnam occupies a unique position in bilateral economic relations. Expanding cooperation in cross-border infrastructure, manufacturing supply chains, the digital economy, and green development would further strengthen mutual interests and enhance the resilience of the bilateral relationship.
Meanwhile, maritime differences in the South China Sea should continue to be managed prudently through dialogue and existing bilateral mechanisms, preventing disputes from undermining the broader relationship. Practical cooperation in fisheries management, maritime law enforcement, and confidence-building measures can help preserve regional stability while reducing the risk of miscalculation.
Finally, China should continue to make full use of ASEAN-led regional platforms, accelerate negotiations on the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea, and promote deeper China–ASEAN economic integration. By strengthening regional institutions and expanding shared economic interests, both China and Southeast Asian countries, including Vietnam, can reinforce a stable regional order that is less vulnerable to external geopolitical rivalry and better positioned to support long-term peace, development, and prosperity.
Source: nyyjtx, guancha, politicaltheory hcma vn, reuters
